Platypus es un proyecto para la autocrítica, autoeducación y, en última instancia, reconstitución
práctica de una Izquierda Marxista. En la actualidad, la Izquierda Marxista aparece como una
ruina histórica. La sabiduría recibida de hoy dicta que pasados intentos fallidos de emancipación
no se presentan como momentos llenos de potencial aún por redimir, sino como "lo que fue":
utopismo que estuvo destinado a terminar en tragedia. Como herederos críticos de una tradición
vencida, Platypus sostiene que —después del fracaso de la Nueva Izquierda de la década de 1960,
y el desmantelamiento del estado de bienestar y la destrucción de la Unión Soviética en las
décadas de 1980-90— la presente desorientación de la Izquierda significa que difícilmente
conozcamos las tareas y metas para la emancipación social mejor que los “utopistas” del pasado.
Nuestra tarea es la crítica y la educación hacia la reconstitución de una Izquierda Marxista.
Platypus sostiene que la ruina de la Izquierda Marxista tal como está hoy es de una tradición cuya
derrota fue por gran parte autoinfligida. Por lo tanto, en la actualidad, la Izquierda Marxista es
histórica y se encuentra en un estado de descomposición tan grave que se ha vuelto
extremadamente difícil de redactar demandas político-sociales coherentemente. Frente al pasado
y presente catastrófico, la primera tarea para la reconstitución de una Izquierda Marxista como
fuerza emancipadora es reconocer las razones del fracaso histórico del Marxismo y aclarar la
necesidad de una Izquierda Marxista para el presente y el futuro - ¡Si la Izquierda quiere cambiar
el mundo, primero debe transformarse a sí misma!
La improbable —pero no imposible— reconstitución de una Izquierda emancipatoria es una
tarea urgente; creemos que el futuro de la humanidad depende de ello. Mientras las fuerzas
devastadoras desatadas por la sociedad moderna - el capitalismo - permanezcan vigentes, la
promesa incumplida de la emancipación social todavía exige redención. Abdicar de esto u
oscurecer la gravedad de las derrotas y fracasos del pasado mirando a la “resistencia” desde
“fuera” de la dinámica de la sociedad moderna es afirmar su presente y garantizar su futura
realidad destructiva.
Platypus hace las preguntas: ¿Cómo es relevante el pensamiento de los teóricos críticos de la
sociedad moderna como Marx, Lukács, Benjamin y Adorno para la lucha por la emancipación
social en la actualidad? ¿Cómo podemos dar sentido a la larga historia de empobrecimiento
político de la izquierda que lleva al presente —después de la Izquierda Marxista internacional de
Lenin, Luxemburg y Trotsky, a la esterilidad de hoy— sin sentirnos aterrorizados o desalentados
por esta historia? — ¿Cómo podrían las respuestas a tales preguntas ayudar en la urgente tarea
de reconstituir la Izquierda en sus niveles más fundamentales de teoría y práctica? ¿Cómo
podemos ayudar a escapar del callejón sin salida en el que se ha convertido la Izquierda?
Esperamos revitalizar una conversación en la Izquierda que hace mucho que cayó en la senilidad
o en el silencio, para ayudar a fundar de nuevo una práctica política emancipatoria que en la
actualidad está ausente.
¿Qué ha sido la Izquierda y qué puede llegar a ser todavía? — Platypus existe porque la respuesta
a tal pregunta, incluso su básica formulación, ha dejado de ser evidente por sí misma hace mucho
tiempo.
| Letter to Fraternal and Friendly Parties About the Situation in Iraq and the Position of the Iraqi Communist Party |
| Dear comrades and friends, Warm comradely greetings, The situation in Iraq has continued to be an international issue throughout the year 2005, even becoming a predominant national issue in several countries. It has also been the subject of debate among popular, progressive and democratic circles, especially because of the continued instability and extreme violence that has resulted in the death of scores of innocent civilians every day. All this is taking place with the presence of more than 140 thousand foreign soldiers. At the same time, a political process continues to advance in a climate of sharp sectarian and ethnic/national polarization and struggle around different political and societal visions and agendas. Now that nearly three years have elapsed since the war, the occupation, and the downfall of the dictatorial regime, and in view of the recent general elections for a full term parliament and permanent government institutions, we think it is important to inform fraternal and friendly parties and forces about the theoretical and political analyses that were the basis of policies and positions adopted by our party, both during the period preceding the war and following the occupation and the collapse of the Iraqi state. In order to focus attention on principal issues, we shall solely concentrate here on the main political and theoretical themes that are currently debated. Unprecedented situation The situation that has emerged in Iraq after the war and collapse of the dictatorial regime is characterised with by almost unprecedented features and complications. It is different from the familiar historical cases of occupation in past decades, connected to colonial wars and Nazi occupation of Europe. Here lies the source of disagreement in analysis and error emanating from drawing comparisons outside the historical context, that do not give due consideration to the concrete conditions characterizing the situation in Iraq. Analysing the situation in Iraq as being the case of an occupied country that necessitates supporting the national liberation struggle of its people with the aim of expelling the occupiers and achieving independence, entails a diminution and disregard of other important factors in the situation that need to be taken into consideration. Such analyses ignore not only the responsibility of the dictatorial regime in creating the conditions that facilitated foreign intervention, but also the attitude of the vast majority of the Iraqi people, who welcomed the collapse of the regime, but did not welcome the invaders with flowers. Above all, such an analysis does not fully grasp the implications of the complete collapse of the Iraqi state resulting in, on the one hand, the ensuing institutional and security vacuum, and, on the other, the active involvement of the Iraqi people, in all its social and political constituents, in the sphere of political action. Hence, it is no longer pos! sible to deal with the issue of ending the occupation and the restoration of full national sovereignty, which is a principal objective of the current stage, without due consideration to the stipulations of the internal situation and the ongoing struggle over the form and content of the process of rebuilding the Iraqi state and civil institutions. Our aim is to ensure that such a state will be national and democratic, both politically and socially. Role of foreign intervention in change and establishing democracy As to the controversy about foreign intervention and its ability to establish democracy, we would like to refer to our party's positions prior to, and especially on the eve of the war. We rejected then that war would be an instrument of change, considering it to be the worst option. We repeatedly stressed that war, military invasion and occupation were unacceptable as means for salvation from the dictatorial regime. We pointed out that the war option would not lead to genuine democracy, as it involves enormous dangers and unpredictable and hazardous repercussions. The experience of Iraq since the fall of dictatorship provides ample proof for this. Democracy as a historical process We are fully aware that democracy is a historical process of multisided dimensions: political, social, economic and cultural. No doubt, all the institutional prerequisites for democracy have not matured or fully developed within Iraqi society. However, instituting democracy, in all its aspects, is a long term and complex process. We consider that this process has already started in Iraq, and we have no illusions as to its completeness and shortcomings. But we are fighting to create the broadest alignment of forces possible in favour of pursuing this process, and fulfilling and consolidating the conditions for its success. Such a process may start under occupation, indeed it has, but cannot achieve all its requisites without regaining national sovereignty whose sole source is the free will of the people. Therefore, it is not right to invalidate all that has been achieved under this process, owing to the presence of foreign troops in the country. On the contrary, the struggle ! for consolidating democracy with all its constituent components is not only closely intertwined with that of ending occupation, but is considered as a supporting lever for the latter. Position after occupation The war took place in the context of a global strategy of the US pursuing its own interests and aiming at establishing hegemony in the region and worldwide. This doctrine of “pre-emptive war” is the concrete embodiment of this strategy. The war sought to reshape the political map of the region, and was related to the Plan for the Greater Middle East. Our Party is well aware of all these aspects and has a clear view in this respect. That is why it opposed the war. However, in the aftermath of the war and following the collapse of the regime and the Iraqi state, new elements emerged in the internal situation that the party had to deal and interact with, aiming to influence them in favour of its national democratic project. With this in mind, we exerted the greatest effort throughout the early months following the collapse of the regime in order to mobilize the Iraq patriotic forces to fill the ensuing political vacuum and build up the best possible national balance of forces vis-à-vis the occupation powers in order to impose the national will of the people. However, for various reasons, this objective was not achieved. When we were approached to take part in the Governing Council and the political process as a whole, we decided, after carefully studying the situation and consulting a wide circle of party cadres and members, to join the Council, emphasizing at the same time the need to combine the struggle within emerging institution! s with the that outside these institutions, in the various fields of the mass action. Our evaluation then, which still holds now, is that in the prevailing circumstances and balance of forces in Iraq, there is no alternative process, other than the existing one, that offers a political prospect of restoring security and order in the country and puts it on the path of reconstruction and development. Resorting to armed action may succeed in obstructing some aspects of the political process, causing hardships, and providing bargaining cards to secure additional stakes and positions for those who adopt this course of action. But it holds no political prospect for solving the problems of the country, whether ending occupation or rebuilding the state, let alone establishing democracy. This lack of a political prospect of armed action has been confirmed by the progress of the political process and the holding of general elections in January 2005. Contradictions in the political process The political process is faced with two types of contradictions or conflicts. The first is between its components as a whole and the forces opposed to it, mainly followers of the defunct regime and extremist Islamists. A second set of contradictions exists among its constituent political forces and currents, which have different, perhaps conflicting visions and societal projects and agendas. Owing to the grave legacy of the previous regime, the way that change took place, and the changes in the world, the political and social forces committed to the national democratic agenda are not in their best state; they are in a weaker position than the forces based on politicising religious, sectarian or ethnic identities. The latter were not as adversely affected by the tyranny and repression as civil organisations and democratic forces. They benefited from the fact that because places of worship provided sanctuary they could be used as avenues for indoctrination and politi! cal mobilization. This situation, however, is not static. The US and their allies are a major player in Iraqi affairs. However, it is wrong to overlook the role of the internal factors and the Iraqi actors. Events and developments in Iraq show that the latter can effectively influence the direction, content and pace of the development of the political process. This influence grows stronger the more the Iraqi forces succeed in unifying their ranks and act together on agreed upon national objectives. Therefore, we consider developments and their course as the outcome of a struggle, rather than being merely an implementation of a preset plan laid down by the occupation forces. There is no doubt that these forces have their own agenda and plans, but these can be foiled or changed by the Iraqi forces. We conceive the political process as an arena of struggle, with a view to orientate it closer to the national democratic agenda. Resistance is a legitimate right of the people Resistance against an invading force is a legitimate right that is universally acknowledged. However, we think it is wrong to reduce the resistance to armed struggle, which is but a form of struggle that is resorted to when the other forms are either exhausted or not feasible. Since the collapse of the regime in Iraq, there have been, and there will be in the foreseeable future, quite a variety of possible forms of political struggle. We, and the political forces in general, are no near to exhaust them entirely, especially in the spheres of mass struggle, trade union movement, civil society organisations, etc. On the other hand, contrary to all past examples that we know, the forces which claim armed resistance against the occupation, have not presented a political and social programme and have not put forward their own political representatives. In fact, their real project is a despotic and viciously anti-democratic one. Although we believe that resorting to arms is counter! productive in the current Iraqi context, we are ready to engage in dialogue with forces that really fight occupation but refrain from resorting to terror and targeting civilians and the infrastructure. While not denying the existence of such forces, they do not constitute the main element in the armed action which is generally dominated by extremist Islamists and supporters of the previous regime. Position on withdrawal of foreign troops We struggle for creating the conditions for the withdrawal of foreign troops at the earliest possible time. However, we believe that calling for their immediate withdrawal does not take into consideration the sharp current polarization in our country, the existence of paramilitary organizations, and the insufficient preparedness of the Iraqi security forces. Hence we call for a timetable for withdrawal together with doubling the efforts to provide the internal political, institutional and security conditions for this withdrawal. As was evident in the statement of the National Accord Conference held in Cairo last November, there is an Iraqi consensus regarding such a withdrawal timetable in order to avoid chaos and additional suffering. This is a realistic agenda and can be implemented in a relatively short period. We hope that the anti-war forces take into consideration the complexities of the situation in Iraq. At the same time, we respect the right of all parties and organizations in the countries that have sent troops in Iraq to call for their speedy withdrawal. It is their own internal affair, while we too reserve the right to formulate our own position in accordance with what we consider to be in the interests of our country. Such an approach can provide an effective and practical basis for joint action that would serve the noble cause of world peace and the struggle for freedom, democracy, human rights and social progress. We welcome an enhanced UN role in this transitional period, towards achieving full national sovereignty, ending the presence of all foreign troops as soon as possible, and providing support for the country's reconstruction. We also call for activating the role of the UN to enable Iraq and our people to complete the political processو build democratic constitutional institutions, and set up a fully legitimate elected government, as well as ensuring a free, fair and transparent election process. International Solidarity We have to note, with regret, that the Iraqi democratic forces have not received, in their difficult struggle, effective solidarity and support from international forces of the left. As a result, most of the latter have unfortunately been rendered observers of events, rather than exerting positive influence on the ongoing struggle over the future course of developments in Iraq, especially in supporting the struggle for a democratic prospect, at a time when the Iraqi patriotic and democratic forces are in urgent need for such concrete and multifarious support and solidarity. International Relations Committee Central Committee - Iraqi Communist Party Baghdad, 15 January 2006 |
Zeit: Mittwochs, 19-22 Uhr
Ort: via Zoom
(• vorausgesetzte Texte / + zusätzlich, empfohlene Texte)
Empfohlene Hintergrundlektüre:
+ Benjamin Constant: „Von der Freiheit des Altertums, verglichen mit der Freiheit der Gegenwart“ (1819)
+ J.P. Nettl: „The German Social Democratic Party 1890-1914 as a Political Model“ (1965)
Empfohlene Zusatzliteratur:
+ Chris Cutrone: „The end of the Gilded Age“ (2017) und „Gilded Age socialism – historical past?“ (2023)
+ Cutrone: „Lenin’s liberalism“ und „Lenin’s politics“ (2011)
+ Cutrone: „What is political party for Marxism?“ (2014)
+ Cutrone: „Back to Herbert Spencer! Industrial vs. militant society“ (2016) [audio]
+ Cutrone: „Horkheimer in 1943 on party and class“ (2016)
+ Max Horkheimer: „Zur Soziologie der Klassenverhältnisse“ (1943)
+ Cutrone: „Die Diktatur des Proletariats und der Tod der Linken“ (2021/22)
+ August Nimtz, Andrew Arato, Chris Cutrone: „Socialism, liberalism and Marxism“ (6. Januar 2021)
23.08.2023 – 1. Woche:
• August Nimtz: Marxism versus Liberalism (2019) – Einleitung sowie Kapitel 2 und 3 über Marx und Engels versus Tocqueville und John Stuart Mill
30.08.2023 – 2. Woche:
• August Nimtz: Marxism versus Liberalism (2019) – Kapitel 4 und 5 über Lenin versus Weber und Woodrow Wilson sowie Kapitel 6
06.09.2023 – 3. Woche:
• Robert Michels: Zur Soziologie des Parteiwesens in der modernen Demokratie (1911) – insbesondere Vorwort, Kapitel 1 und 2, Teil 1, Teil 3, Teil 4
13.09.2023 – 4. Woche:
• Max Weber: „Der Sozialismus“ (1918); „Politik als Beruf“ und „Wissenschaft als Beruf“ (1919)
+ Weber: „Structures of power“, „Class, status, party“, „Bureaucracy“
20.09.2023 – 5. Woche:
• Otto Kirchheimer: „Changes in the structure of political compromise“ (1941)
• Herbert Marcuse: „Der Kampf gegen den Liberalismus in der totalitären Staatsauffassung“ (1943)
+ Franz Neumann: „The change in the function of law in modern society“ (1937) [deutsche Version: „Der Funktionswandel des Gesetzes im Recht der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft“ (1937)]
• Sigmund Neumann: „The party of democratic integration“ (1956); und Kirchheimer: „The catch-all party“ (1966)
27.09.2023 – 6. Woche:
• Nicos Poulantzas und Ralph Miliband: Debatte über Kapitalismus und Staat (1972)
+ Michael Harrington: „Marxism and Democracy“ (1981)
• Mike Macnair: Revolutionary Strategy (2009)
04.10.2023 – 7. Woche:
• Benjamin Studebaker: The Chronic Crisis of American Democracy: The Way is Shut (2023)
+ Studebaker: „The Heart of Isonomia: Equality of Political Participation versus Equality of Political Capabilities: A Fundamental Dilemma at the Heart of Democratic Theory“ (2023)
Der Lesekreis soll einen Überblick über das vielbesprochene, aber selten wirklich gelesene Opus magnum von Marx, „das Kapital - Kritik der politischen Ökonomie“, bieten. Um ein Verständnis des Gesamtwerks zu gewinnen, werden Ausschnitte sowohl aus den Grundrissen, dem ersten, dem dritten und dem inoffiziellen vierten Band („Die Theorien über den Mehrwert“) diskutiert. Entgegen der Herangehensweise der sogenannten „Neuen Marx-Lektüre“ soll dabei das „Politische“ nicht vom „Ökonomischen“, das „Frühe“ nicht vom Späten“ und das „Logische“ nicht vom „Historischen“ getrennt werden. Ebenso wenig wollen wir Marx gegen seinen engsten Mitstreiter Friedrich Engels ausspielen. Welche Rolle also nimmt die Kritik der politischen Ökonomie in der Politik von Marx und dem Marxismus ein?
Die Texte werden im Voraus gelesen und dann zusammen diskutiert. Neueinsteiger sind herzlich willkommen und es werden keine Vorkenntnisse benötigt!
Zeit: Mittwochs, 19:00 - 22:00, 9. August - 27. September 2023
Ort: Hedwig Dohm Haus, Ziegelstr. 4, HU Berlin
Weitere Infos über Telegram und andere Kanäle
• vorausgesetzte Texte
+ zusätzlich, empfohlene Texte
Hintergrundlektüre:
+ Commodity form chart of terms
+ Capitalist contradiction chart of terms
+ Organic composition of capital chart of terms
+ Marx on surplus-value chart of terms
+ Karl Kautsky (1903): Karl Marx’ Ökonomische Lehren gemeinverständlich dargestellt und erläutert
+ Franz Mehring (1918): Karl Marx - Geschichte seines Lebens
+ David Riazanov (1927): Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: An Introduction to Their Lives and Work
Woche 1.: Einführung | 9. August
• Karl Marx (1849): Lohnarbeit und Kapital
• Karl Marx, Die kommende Schlacht (aus Das Elend der Philosophie, 1847)
• Karl Marx, Klassenkampf und Produktionsweise (aus dem Brief an Weydemeyer, 1852)
• Wladimir Lenin (1914): Karl Marx. In: Lenin Werke Band 21, S.30-80 (Für die Diskussion vorausgesetzt wird nur das Kapitel „Die Ökonomische Lehre von Marx“)
Woche 2.: Die Grundrisse | 16. August
• Karl Marx (1857): Einleitung zur Kritik der Politischen Ökonomie
• Karl Marx, Auszüge aus den Grundrisse (1857–61)
Woche 3: Das Kapital (Band 1) Teil 1 | 23. August
• Marx: Das Kapital Band 1. Zur Kritik der politischen Ökonomie: Vorwort zur ersten und Nachwort zur zweiten Auflage (1867/1873) von Das Kapital Bd. I (1867), Vor- und Nachwort zur französischen Ausgabe (1872), Erster Abschnitt Ware und Geld. Erstes Kapitel: Die Ware., Zweiter Abschnitt. Viertes Kapitel. Die Verwandlung von Geld in Kapital. Nur: Die allgemeine Formel des Kapitals
Woche 4: Das Kapital (Band 1) Teil 2 | 30. August
• Marx: Das Kapital Band 1. Zur Kritik der politischen Ökonomie: Viertes Kapitel: Der Kauf und Verkauf der Arbeitskraft, Sechstes Kapitel: Konstantes Kapital und variables Kapital, Siebtes Kapitel: Die Rate des Mehrwerts, Achtes Kapitel: Der Arbeitstag
Woche 5: Das Kapital (Band 1) Teil 3 | 6. September
• Marx: Das Kapital Band 1. Zur Kritik der politischen Ökonomie: Teil 4. Die Produktion des relativen Mehrwerts, Zehntes Kapitel: Begriff des relativen Mehrwerts, Elftes Kapitel: Kooperation, Zwölftes Kapitel: Teilung der Arbeit und Manufaktur (1-5), Dreizehntes Kapitel: Maschinerie und große Industrie (nur Teil 1 und Teil 3)
Woche 6: Das Kapital (Band 1) Teil 4 | 13. September
• Marx: Das Kapital Band 1. Zur Kritik der politischen Ökonomie: Dreizehntes Kapitel, Teil 4: Die Fabrik, Teil 5: Der Kampf zwischen Arbeiter und Maschine, Teil 9: Fabrikgesetzgebung, Teil 10: Große Industrie und Agrikultur, Vierzehntes Kapitel: Die Produktion des absoluten und relativen Mehrwerts, Dreiundzwanzigstes Kapitel. Das allgemeine Gesetz der kapitalistischen Akkumulation Nur Teil 1, 3 und 4, Vierundzwanzigstes Kapitel. Die sogenannte ursprüngliche Akkumulation: 1. Das Geheimnis der ursprünglichen Akkumulation, 2. Expropriation des Landvolks von Grund und Boden, 6. Genesis des industriellen Kapitalisten, 7. Geschichtliche Tendenz der kapitalistischen Akkumulation
Woche 7: Das Kapital (Band 3) Teil 1 | 20. September
• Marx: Das Kapital Band 1. Zur Kritik der politischen Ökonomie: Vierundzwanzigstes Kapitel. Die sogenannte ursprüngliche Akkumulation: 1. Das Geheimnis der ursprünglichen Akkumulation, 2. Expropriation des Landvolks von Grund und Boden, 6. Genesis des industriellen Kapitalisten, 7. Geschichtliche Tendenz der kapitalistischen Akkumulation
• Marx: Das Kapital Band 3. Zur Kritik der politischen Ökonomie: Dritter Abschnitt. Gesetz des tendenziellen Falls der Profitrate, Dreizehntes Kapitel, Vierzehntes Kapitel, Fünfzehntes Kapitel
Woche 8: Das Kapital (Band 3) Teil 2 | 27. September
• Marx: Das Kapital Band 3. Zur Kritik der politischen Ökonomie: Siebenter Abschnitt. Die Revenuen und ihre Quellen. Die trinitarische Formel, 48., 49., 50. und 51. Kapitel
• Marx: Die Theorien über den Mehrwert: Kapitel 17.: Abschnitt 8., 9., 10., 11. und 14
