On David Harvey's The Condition of Postmodernity
Kathrin D. and Andreas Wintersperger
Platypus Review 187 | June 2026
On January 12, 2025, Platypus Affiliated Society members Kathrin D. and Andreas Wintersperger gave a teach-in on David Harvey’s book The Condition of Postmodernity (1989)[1] during the Platypus Weekend in Cologne, Germany.[2] An edited English translation follows.
“A statesman . . . must wait until he hears the steps of God sounding through events, then leap up and grasp the hem of His garment.”
— Otto von Bismarck[3]
“If we imagine that history is on our side, we threaten to rationalize a course of change already underway that we have yet to control. Our protest against it may already be our resignation to it, in the guise of calling us to task.”
— Chris Cutrone, “A cry of protest before accommodation?”[4]
Introduction
What is the task of the Left in history? What is the task of capital in history? What is history? Under conditions of bourgeois cooperation, any serious intellectual endeavor troubling itself — at least nominally — with changing society as a whole is necessarily directed towards its own historical orientation: how did what we want to change come about? What are its historical conditions? What is the concrete through which we recognize the universal? And what is the universal through which we can identify the concrete? Behind society’s deeply damaged attempts to become aware of its own direction, the current, more or less deformed, intellectual instinct already indicates that the world has changed. What is the reality of the past in the present?
A founding text of the Platypus Affiliated Society by Chris Cutrone states: “We in Platypus focus on the history of the Left because we think that the narrative one tells about this history is in fact one’s theory of the present. Implicitly or explicitly, in one’s conception of the history of the Left, is an account of how the present came to be. By focusing on the history of the Left, or, by adopting a Left-centric view of history, we hypothesize that the most important determinations of the present are the result of what the Left has done or failed to do historically.”[5]
What kind of history does David Harvey’s Condition of Postmodernity — 35 years after its publication — give to the present? What does Harvey’s concept of post-Fordism mean at the end of neoliberalism? What is historical change under, with, and of a dead Left?
How does Harvey approach the capitalist reconfiguration of post-Fordism?
In the 1970s and 80s, postmodernist theories increasingly dominated cultural debates, social criticism, and the activism of the new social movements. At the end of the 80s, this prompted Harvey to examine the theories of thinkers such as Baudrillard, Lyotard, Foucault, and Derrida in the context of their time. He endeavored to further develop Marxism by linking economic and political analyses with a changed perception of space and time, which he identified in postmodern culture. He was not interested in a vulgar materialist explanation, but in understanding a new total way of life and its institutional conditions. As an isolated academic without a clear addressee, Harvey speculated on what insights into capitalism could be derived from the “condition of postmodernity” for the future.
The concept of postmodernism emerged in the course of the 1970s in art and as a reaction to the exploding cultural sector, which Harvey focuses on. This presentation is therefore also based on aesthetics. Postmodern theory, art, design, and urban planning are united by resistance to modernism — the latter is accused of positivism, rationalism, ethnocentrism, universalism, and standardization. In contrast, postmodernism appears to be inspired by a reawakened sense of the limitless malleability of man. The post-war cityscape, characterized by uniform grids of skyscrapers, briefly gave way to a collage-like diversity that satisfied diversified consumer needs in major U.S. cities. Along these lines postmodernist philosophy, anthropology, and social criticism celebrated heterogeneity, contrast, fragmentation, and indeterminacy as liberating impulses. Foucault exemplarily condemned meta-language and meta-theories, which are supposed to connect all phenomena, as the seeds of “fascism in our heads.”[6]
What is modernism about?
High modernism, the target of postmodernism, designates the prevailing aesthetic of the cityscape during the Cold War (1950s–60s). Its functionalism — the specification of form by function — demanded materials such as concrete, glass, and steel. The function was the efficient creation of living space for the masses through state coordination — hence the grid structure of modernist cities. One of Harvey’s great intellectual achievements is to break down this high modernism as a state-integrated, rigidified modernism.
Its protagonist, the New Deal state, emerged at the end of the 1920s from the need for a new mode of state regulation in the face of novel Fordist production and widespread underconsumption. According to Harvey, it was almost unprecedented and could be compared in its authoritarianism and interventionism with the Bonapartist interventions of the Second French Empire. Harvey writes:
A regime of accumulation ‘describes the stabilization over a long period of the allocation of the net product between consumption and accumulation; it implies some correspondence between the transformation of both the conditions of production and the conditions of reproduction of wage earners.’ A particular system of accumulation can exist because ‘its schema of reproduction is coherent.’ The problem, however, is to bring the behaviours of all kinds of individuals — capitalists, workers, state employees, financiers, and all manner of other political-economic agents — into some kind of configuration that will keep the regime of accumulation functioning. There must exist, therefore, ‘a materialization of the regime of accumulation taking the form of norms, habits, laws, regulating networks and so on that ensure the unity of the process, i.e. the appropriate consistency of individual behaviours with the schema of reproduction. This body of interiorized rules and social processes is called the mode of regulation.’[7]
20 years earlier, the automotive pioneer Henry Ford failed to “create a new man” due to his isolation. He paid his assembly-line workers better for their dull manual work, and at the same time sent social workers to their families to ensure a functional married life and, for example, abstinence from alcohol. Through the New Deal, his dream was realized on a large scale in the Fordist accumulation regime by nationwide job-creation programs, Keynesian economic regulation, and mass propaganda. The influential journalist Walter Lippmann wrote about the New Deal state in 1933: “At the end of February, we were a congeries of disorderly, panic-stricken mobs and factions. In the hundred days from March to June [1933] we became again an organized nation confident of our power to provide for our own security and to control our own destiny.”[8]
Harvey describes the New Left as a harbinger of postmodernism due to its criticism of the resulting rigid bureaucracy of the New Deal state and its trade-union apparatus, its politics of counter-cultural iconoclasm in clothing, music, language, and lifestyle; and its anti-authoritarian revolt. According to their self-image, they countered the uniform rigidity of the world with an exhilarating dynamism and fleetingness — and hoped for the liberation of humanity from capitalist rule. It is this impulse that postmodern culture and theories inherited, and which appeared attractive to the new social movements from the end of the 1960s onwards (feminism, gays, ethnic and religious groups, regional autonomism, etc.). While the New Left failed politically to liberate humanity from capitalist domination, it celebrated a cultural and academic triumph.
Around 20 years after 1968, Harvey intervened with a clarification: ideas of dynamism and transience were not, or not always, alien to modernism either. It is rooted in the middle of the 19th century, when the crisis of the bourgeois social ideal became apparent in the course of industrialization. Baudelaire’s essay “The Painter of Modern Life” (1863) articulates the artist’s self-image in this crisis: “Modernity is the transient, the fleeting, the contingent; it is the one half of art, the other being the eternal and the immutable.”[9] The artist should capture and mediate both. With Baudelaire, the whole of modern art and its epochs can be seen as a struggle for the interplay of the two halves.
According to Harvey, the failure to overcome this crisis, the failed socialist world revolution, was culturally paralleled after the First World War (1930–60) by the gradual ossification of the modernist struggle for the relationship between impressionism and the eternal. Modernism once attempted repeatedly to capture a crisis-ridden relationship between the eternal and the impressionistic in the face of the crisis of society caused by industrialization, massification, and the resulting struggle of revolutionary movements against the powers of the status quo (1848, 1871, 1917). In the name of the “free world,” as the hallmark of a new American dream and promise of progress for the Third World, modernism was consolidated into a state-appropriated aesthetic in infrastructure, prestige projects, and propaganda posters for job-creation programs. This was a global phenomenon: even National Socialist Germany could not avoid commissioning the ex-Bauhaus architect Albert Speer to design its concentration camps. In the establishment of a “modernist form,” the negotiation of substance, which it once accounted for, became arbitrary. This naturalized form could pull the slum-dwelling masses of workers out of poverty, and send them not into world revolution, but the Second World War in “class community” with the capitalists, culminating in the reconstruction of war-torn nations as high modernism. This all-encompassing aesthetic and rhythm of life fundamentally changed the perception of space and time — what Harvey calls spatio-temporal fixations that stabilize the accumulation regime.
The New Left rebelled against this diffusing integration of modernism. According to Harvey, however, it was not aware of the genesis of the Fordist accumulation regime, based on the failure of world revolution. The New Left was unable to critically capture the lost complexity with which modern revolutionary movements and art dealt with the liberation of humanity, and instead identified the modernism of its time, high modernism, with its entire history. Thus, it completely rejected the modernist project. Paradoxically, the New Left behaved affirmatively towards the state, rightly criticized as authoritarian, by conceding to it the control of the modernist narrative — and with it, history. Harvey describes how the one-sided criticism of modernism (as eternal and rigid) has led to an overemphasis on its other facet (dynamism) as a supposed antidote. His historical retracing of the history of modernism intends to be a belated intervention in this unconscious, veiled concession of the Left to the reality of the state against which it superficially rebelled. The Left’s unconscious assistance in the emergence of the post-Fordist accumulation regime was thus sealed.
The integration of postmodernist impulses into a post-Fordist accumulation regime
The Leftist structure of feeling revolted against modernism with localist impulses of “suppressed” voices like those of women or blacks — those excluded from the old, now-crumbling trade-union apparatus and mass consumerism. Everyone should be allowed to have their voice in the plastic metropolis. The Fordist state and its accumulation regime were pressured to adapt its strategy. New (communication) technologies, a new wave of commodification of cultural goods, and a revival of ethno-aesthetics satisfied diversified needs — at least for those with the power to pay. Extensive planning was replaced by exchanges between various districts and cities, which were to restructure themselves independently and in competition with each other. New urban-development strategies included the organization of cultural festivals, which quickly became commercialized. They attracted new human material, young professionals, to deindustrializing cities. The newly introduced capital changed the cityscape into a collage by expanding the event and entertainment industry. Their fast pace in turn required adequate restructuring in a growing financial sector. A new spatio-temporal fixation had emerged.
According to Harvey, the original celebration of ethnic diversity through cultural festivals was not least an appeasing reaction to the riotous demonstrations of the 1960s, during which modernist office districts burned in the aftermath of Martin Luther King Jr.’s assassination. Harvey draws on Marxism to teach the lesson of capitalism’s flexibility and capacity for integration — the historical constant. He also shows how the neoliberal state is not an overcoming of the New Deal state, but merely its continuation, made appropriate to the challenges of its time. The post-Fordist accumulation regime inherited the task of disciplining the labor force in a reconfiguration of production and consumption through the provision of infrastructure, and integrated the Leftist revolt — the new needs — for this purpose: The state becomes postmodern.
However, if in the 1970s and 80s the Left consciously and theoretically expressed the disposal of history through postmodernism as a current, as Harvey depicts, its current attitude to history appears completely obscure due to its naturalization in the post-Fordist accumulation regime. If we — thinking with Harvey — have not known for a long time what the Left is fighting for, what is the Left actually fighting against in our moment?
David Harvey and the Millennial Left
I. Imperialism
While the critical strength of Harvey’s Condition of Postmodernity was precisely to show the extent to which there is a contradiction between continuity and change, new and old in capitalist change, which the legacy of the New Left could only ever resolve on one side, Harvey’s perspective changed with the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq in 2001 and 2003 after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. In his book The New Imperialism (2003), Harvey, who was born in England in 1935, writes that for him, “it feels passing strange to come to consciousness of the world at the moment of one empire’s passing and to come to retirement age at a moment of such public proclamations of the official birth of another.”[10] By the official birth of another empire, Harvey, whose understanding of the world, as he says, “during the Second World War and its immediate aftermath,”[11] means the “overt recognition of empire and of imperialism [of the U.S.] by those on the right as well as those of a liberal persuasion.”[12] At the same time as the demand for an open and explicit “imperial” foreign policy on the part of the U.S. emerged, Michael Hardt’s and Antonio Negri’s Empire (2000) was published. Harvey writes:
the publication of Hardt and Negri’s Empire in 2000, and the controversy that surrounded it, challenged traditional debates and suggested that left opposition had to be rethought in relation to a decentred configuration of empire that had many new, postmodern, qualities. While critical of this line of argument, many others on the left began to recognize that the forces of globalization (however those might be construed) were creating a novel situation that required a new framework of analysis. . . . The effect has been to turn the questions of empire and of imperialism into open topics of debate across the political spectrum (it was noteworthy that Hardt and Negri's work gained attention in the mainstream media). But this then poses the further question: what, if anything, is new about all this?[13]
Three years after the publication of Harvey’s New Imperialism, the Platypus Affiliated Society was founded to organize and hold its first panel discussion: “Imperialism: What is it, why should we be against it?”[14]
II. A new New Deal
The New Imperialism can be seen as intervention in Left-wing debates on imperialism at the time by using the method he developed in the 1980s. If Harvey attempted in The Condition of Postmodernity to show theoretically how the perennially occurring crises of overproduction in capitalism make new spatio-temporal fixations necessary in order to enable the continued accumulation of capital, also changing our subjective experience of such fundamental categories as space and time, it now became necessary to understand the logic of imperialism against the background of these new and changing spatio-temporal fixations.
Harvey argues: “Even before the events of 9/11, it was clear that neo-liberal imperialism was weakening on the inside, that even the asset values on Wall Street could not be protected, and that the days of neo-liberalism and its specific forms of imperialism were numbered. The big issue was what kind of relation between the territorial and capitalistic logics of power would now emerge and what kind of imperialism it would produce.”[15]
Looking back on the history of the last 20 years since the publication of the book, i.e. the period of the Millennial Left, Harvey’s answer to the question of what imperialism will be produced by the newly emerging regime of accumulation needs to be foregrounded. He writes:
There are, of course, far more radical solutions lurking in the wings, but the construction of a new ‘New Deal’ led by the United States and Europe, both domestically and internationally, in the face of the overwhelming class forces and special interests ranged against it, is surely enough to fight for in the present conjuncture. And the thought that it might, by adequate pursuit of some long term spatio-temporal fix, actually assuage the problems of overaccumulation for at least a few years and diminish the need to accumulate by dispossession might encourage democratic, progressive, and humane forces to align behind it and turn it into some kind of practical reality. This does seem to propose a far less violent and far more benevolent imperial trajectory than the raw militaristic imperialism currently offered up by the neo-conservative movement in the United States.[16]
The picture is clear: Harvey’s preferred response to the worst excesses of the “neo-conservative” crude imperialism of neoliberalism is a kind of new New Deal led by the U.S. and Europe. This should “diminish the need to accumulate by dispossession” or at least put it on hold for a few years. Thus, following Harvey at the beginning of the Millennial Left, we find the political argument for a “far more benevolent imperial trajectory,” which — based on Kautsky’s theory of ultra-imperialism — “might encourage democratic, progressive, and humane forces to align behind it and turn it into some kind of practical reality.”
In the wake of the global economic crisis of 2008, the newly elected U.S. President Barack Obama passed the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act in early 2009, an economic stimulus program that the Obama administration itself would later refer to as the “New New Deal.”[17] This supposed new New Deal was met with fierce resistance. On the Republican side, it was a key reason for the founding of the Tea Party, which would later find its “echo” in the Occupy Wall Street movement.[18] Left-wing advocates of a New Deal, such as Nobel Prize winner Paul Krugman and David Harvey himself, were also bitterly disappointed.
In a 2009 contribution to the Platypus Review entitled “Why the U.S. stimulus package is bound to fail,” Harvey argues that the Keynesian economic policy he calls for should no longer be implemented under the leadership of the U.S. and Europe, but that of China. However, the task of “the West” in view of the “tectonic shifts” within the current spatio-temporal fixation of capitalist development is clear:
That is not a heartening thought but then thinking of such a prospect might just awaken much of the West to the urgency of the task before it and get political leaders to stop preaching banalities about restoring trust and confidence and get down to doing what has to be done to rescue capitalism from the capitalists and their false neoliberal ideology. And if that means socialism, nationalizations, strong state direction, binding international collaborations, and a new and far more inclusive (dare I say “democratic”) international financial architecture, then so be it.[19]
Platypus member Ian Morrison formulated the following critical perspective, also published in the Platypus Review, in his response to Harvey’s text:
The Left’s current resurrection of the New Deal imagination is an example of the all-too-common practice on the Left of calling defeat victory. Young Leftists should realize that the crucial objection Mills and others on the Left made in the aftermath of the failures of the 1930s was directed precisely against nationalization. For, in reality, the 30s witnessed the most horrific defeat for internationalism. How else could one describe the events leading up to World War II for the Left? And, after all, the New Deal was also only one form that political nationalization took during that decade. With the erosion of the international socialist revolution over the course of the 1920s, Roosevelt’s New Deal emerged in competition with other major political ideologies, especially Stalinist “socialism in one country” and German National Socialist variants, which also oversaw a period of intense industrialization, and should not be left out of consideration. Of course, while the political differences among these forms matter a great deal, it is necessary to point out how vague the call for national re-industrialization becomes when discussed in solely economic, and not political, terms. From today’s vantage point, the inability of the 1960s’ New Left to work through the nationalization of the Left has made the marginal character of the contemporary “Left” seem rather well deserved. However interconnected and globalized the world may now appear, politically it is nothing of the kind. The increasingly uneven and “flexible” geographical development, which Harvey so lucidly illustrates, demands a political solution. . . . And exactly which industries will become key sites of political struggle, whether it is mid-20th century-style durable-goods production or new, service-sector industries, or both, it all remains highly vague without testing the waters. But new organizational and tactical difficulties should not inhibit the Left ideologically from making bold claims and audacious demands. Moreover, these difficulties should not inhibit the intellectual from laying bare the reality of the past, no matter how daunting.[20]
Why is Harvey speaking to us today?
The Condition of Postmodernity attempts to take belated responsibility for the failure of the Left two decades before and bears witness to how the misrecognition of the problem of modernism — history — leads to an affirmative politics. Affirmative here means the provision of a structure of perception and feeling for a subsequent regime of accumulation, post-Fordism. What shines through in the work is that — measured by the New Left’s own standards — more would have been possible. But did the New Left — which Harvey calls the “anti-modern” Left — really fail because of a recognition problem? Was there really no one in the New Left who recognized not only the static but also the dynamic moment in modernism? If so, why was this analysis unable to assert itself or bear fruit politically and practically? Harvey ignores these questions and thus logically identifies the New Left with postmodernism — with the theories and the lifestyle that became “fixed” after its failure — despite his critical adherence to a broader horizon of possibilities.
In “Marginalia to Theory and Praxis” (1969), Adorno writes: “Praxis is a source of power for theory but cannot be prescribed by it. It appears in theory merely, and indeed necessarily, as a blind spot, as an obsession with what is being criticized.”[21] For Harvey, the practice of the New Left, which has failed to overcome capitalism, is the “source of power” for his “theory.” Only a pale reflection of a utopia-realizing practice can be glimpsed in his obsession with postmodernism. The assumption of a lost practical potential hurts more than a blind spot — as a torn-out eye — because it remains so vague: what could the New Left really have become had it been armed with Harvey’s critical insight that came 20 years later? What did the Millennial Left become when actually armed with his critique 20 years after him? Harvey — like his object of critique, postmodernism — can only trace change. In the terms “postmodernism” and “accumulation regime” — as illuminating as they are — no subject or object can be discerned. There is only a sequence of reconfigurations of capital relations. Thus he cannot seriously consider the New Left as a subject in history, as an actor. This makes Harvey’s view of history contemplative. Ultimately, his logical identification of the New Left and postmodernism appears to be a back-projected doubling of his own contemplative stance. Contrary to the notion of an unexploited practical horizon, this identification implies that the New Left could only have become postmodernism in social criticism, aesthetics, and the state. The evoked missed opportunity — Harvey’s apparent motivation — is undermined precisely in the attempt to explain the failure of the New Left in retrospect by attributing a lack of insight. Thus Harvey’s theory is also fundamentally damaged. The possibility of a mutually beneficial relationship between theory and practice leads to a strange, undead existence.
In this way, Harvey also writes the entire history of modernity according to Baudelaire’s scheme of the duality of fleetingness and eternity. According to Harvey, the thinkers of the 18th-century Enlightenment have already speculated on the eternal moments of modern man: freedom, equality, universal reason, and the belief in human intelligence, which are revealed and realized through dynamism — world trade, scientific and technological progress, and the fall of the ancien régime. Harvey places Marx in this continuity because of Marx’s description of the creative destruction of capital and its revolutionary potential in, for example, the Communist Manifesto (1848). In contrast to previous thinkers, allegedly, Marx was able to gain insight into the origin of the two poles of modernism by analyzing the all-dominant commodity form: by leveling particular characteristics of commodities and people through their comparability in value, expressed in money, a new form of domination had emerged, which Marx felt needed to be understood and overcome — while at the same time he recognized and wanted to continue the historical specificity of the free market as an emancipation from traditional societies. This is a widespread misconception to this day.
Even pre-Marxist, bourgeois philosophy went beyond the setting of reason by the Enlightenment: Hegel, Kant, and Smith — whom Harvey mentions — are already immanent critics of the Enlightenment. Smith, in The Wealth of Nations (1776), already points out the dangers of a one-sided realization of enlightenment in the sense of instrumental reason: for example, the atrophy of the mind and thus the hindering of individual development through monotonous work as a danger of the division of labor.[22] He therefore called for state intervention to ensure a basic minimum level of education for all citizens. Smith was also aware of the risk of impoverishment through the market. While the advantages of the free market and the division of labor had already been emphasized in the previous century, one might think that Smith’s originality lies in his call for a legal basis for labor organizations, whose struggle for higher wages would serve the greater good and prosperity of society as a whole. Smith did not posit an eternal automatism of an “invisible hand of the market,” but thought in specific historical terms about the way in which the ideals of the Enlightenment already materialize and undermine,in order to show which conscious transformation by which subject is necessary.
This reflection on the conditions of the possibilities for transformation of society as a whole is based on the idea of freedom. Since Rousseau and Marx, freedom has meant the development of the human species solely on the basis of all its previous developments, realized through the constitution of a social collective subject. In this sense, freedom is posited speculatively— not as a fact, but as a task, as a condition of human existence that is to be practically proven. History is the site of this universal project — of progress in the consciousness of freedom, to use Hegel’s language.[23] After the failed revolutions of 1848 and the emergence of the Bonapartist state, which hovers above and hinders this social process, a profound crisis of this project becomes apparent. This is what’s symptomatically expressed in the fast-paced, wrestling avant-gardes of modernist art, characterized by Baudelaire’s polarity of the eternally fleeting.
Did the Millennial Left and the present Left fail because they could not think of a transformation of the accumulation regime — according to Harvey, it’s a decentralized-imperialist one — as an opportunity, as something that inherently concerns it? And not only — in Harvey’s terms — to worship it in a postmodernist gesture as a necessary state-produced restructuring? And apropos postmodernism: the thrilling potential of capital’s dynamism, which is supposed to point to our limitless malleability and freedom — can the Left even see it in the face of current reconfigurations, or has even postmodernism already regressed too far through its naturalization? Was the moment of anti-neoliberal excitement of the anti-war movement our great — now long-missed — moment? To what extent has it changed our perception of space and time, our consciousness of history, our understanding of Marxism and the Left? How can we approach these questions without merely explanatorily naturalizing our failure after the fact — and damning ourselves to prove our theory of eternal capitalism in the future? |P
[1] David Harvey, The Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change (Oxford: Blackwell, 1989).
[2] Kathrin D. and Andreas Wintersperger, “Über David Harveys Condition of Postmodernity” (January 12, 2025), <https://youtu.be/6XoHcDnrvdQ>.
[3] See A. J. P. Taylor, Bismarck: The Man and the Statesman (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1955), 115.
[4] Chris Cutrone, “A cry of protest before accommodation? The dialectic of emancipation and domination,” Platypus Review 42 (December 2011), <https://platypus1917.org/2011/12/01/cry-of-protest-before-accommodation/>.
[5] Chris Cutrone, “Capital in history: The need for a Marxian philosophy of history of the Left,” Platypus Review 7 (October 2008), <https://platypus1917.org/2008/10/01/capital-in-history-the-need-for-a-marxian-philosophy-of-history-of-the-left/>.
[6] Harvey, Condition of Postmodernity, 45–46.
[7] Ibid., 121–22.
[8] Quoted in Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Age of Roosevelt, vol. 2, The Coming of the New Deal (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1958), 22.
[9] Quoted in Harvey, Condition of Postmodernity, 10.
[10] David Harvey, The New Imperialism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 3.
[11] Ibid., 1.
[12] Ibid., 7.
[13] Ibid.
[14] Kevin Anderson, Chris Cutrone, Nick Kreitman, Danny Postel, and Adam Turl, “Imperialism: What is it, and why should we be against it?,” Platypus Review 25 (July 2010), <https://platypus1917.org/2010/07/09/imperialism-what-is-it-why-should-we-be-against-it/>.
[15] Harvey, New Imperialism, 190.
[16] Ibid., 210–11.
[17] See Michael Grunwald, The New New Deal: The Hidden Story of Change in the Obama Era (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2012).
[18] See D. L. Jacobs, “What was the Millennial Left?,” Platypus Review 137 (June 2021), <https://platypus1917.org/2021/06/01/what-was-the-millennial-left/>.
[19] David Harvey, “Why the U.S. stimulus package is bound to fail,” Platypus Review 11 (March 2009), <https://platypus1917.org/2009/03/15/why-the-us-stimulus-package-is-bound-to-fail/>.
[20] Ian Morrison, “Resurrecting the ’30s: A response to David Harvey and James Heartfield,” Platypus Review 12 (May 2009), <https://platypus1917.org/2009/05/15/resurrecting-the-30s/>.
[21] Theodor W. Adorno, “Marginalia to Theory and Praxis,” in Critical Models Interventions and Catchwords, trans. Henry W. Pickford (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), 278.
[22] Adam Smith, “Of the Expence of the Institutions for the Education of Youth,” in An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, vol. 2, ed. Edwin Cannon (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976), 302–04.
[23] G. W. F. Hegel, Introduction to the Philosophy of History, trans. Leo Rausch (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1988), 22.
