In the fields with which we are concerned, knowledge comes only in lightning flashes. The text is the long roll of thunder that follows. [N1,1]

Comparison of other people’s attempts to the undertaking of a sea voyage in which the ships are drawn off course by the magnetic North Pole. Discover this North Pole. What for others are deviations are, for me, the data which determine my course.—On the differentials of time (which, for others, disturb the main lines of the inquiry), I base my reckoning. [N1,2]

Say something about the method of composition itself: how everything one is thinking at a specific moment in time must at all costs be incorporated into the project then at hand. Assume that the intensity of the project is thereby attested, or that one’s thoughts, from the very beginning, bear this project within them as their telos. So it is with the present portion of the work, which aims to characterize and to preserve the intervals of reflection, the distances lying between the most essential parts of this work, which are turned most intensively to the outside. [N1,3]

To cultivate fields where, until now, only madness has reigned. Forge ahead with the whetted axe of reason, looking neither right nor left so as not to succumb to the horror that beckons from deep in the primeval forest. Every ground must at some point have been made arable by reason, must have been cleared of the undergrowth of delusion and myth. This is to be accomplished here for the terrain of the nineteenth century. [N1,4]

These notes devoted to the Paris arcades were begun under an open sky of cloudless blue that arched above the foliage; and yet—owing to the millions of leaves that were visited by the fresh breeze of diligence, the stertorous breath of the researcher, the storm of youthful zeal, and the idle wind of curiosity—they’ve been covered with the dust of centuries. For the painted sky of summer that looks...
down from the arcades in the reading room of the Bibliothèque Nationale in Paris has spread out over them its dreamy, unlit ceiling. [N1,5]

The pathos of this work: there are no periods of decline. Attempt to see the nineteenth century just as positively as I tried to see the seventeenth, in the work on Traverspiel. No belief in periods of decline. By the same token, every city is beautiful to me (from outside its borders), just as all talk of particular languages' having greater or lesser value is to me unacceptable. [N1,6]

And, later, the glassed-in spot facing my seat at the Staatsbibliothek. Charmed circle inviolate, virgin terrain for the soles of figures I conjured. [N1,7]

Pedagogic side of this undertaking: "To educate the image-making medium within us, raising it to a stereoscopic and dimensional seeing into the depths of historical shadows." The words are Rudolf Borchardt's in Epitomea zu Dante, vol. 1 (Berlin, 1923), pp. 56-57. [N1,8]

Delimitation of the tendency of this project with respect to Aragon: whereas Aragon persists within the realm of dream, here the concern is to find the constellation of awakening. While in Aragon there remains an impressionistic element, namely the "mythology" (and this impressionism must be held responsible for the many vague philosophemes in his book), here it is a question of the dissolution of "mythology" into the space of history. That, of course, can happen only through the awakening of a not-yet-conscious knowledge of what has been. [N1,9]

This work has to develop to the highest degree the art of citing without quotation marks. Its theory is intimately related to that of montage. [N1,10]

"Apart from a certain haut-gout charm," says Giedion, "the artistic draperies and wall-hangings of the previous century have come to seem musty." <Sigfried> Giedion, Baua in Frankreich (Leipzig and Berlin <1928>, p. 3. We, however, believe that the charm they exercise on us is proof that these things, too, contain material of vital importance for us—not indeed for our building practice, as is the case with the constructive possibilities inherent in iron frameworks, but rather for our understanding, for the radioscopé, if you will, of the situation of the bourgeois class at the moment it evinces the first signs of decline. In any case, material of vital importance politically; this is demonstrated by the attachment of the Surrealists to these things, as much as by their exploitation in contemporary fashion. In other words: just as Giedion teaches us to read off the basic features of today's architecture in the buildings erected around 1850, we, in turn, would recognize today's life, today's forms, in the life and in the apparently secondary, lost forms of that epoch. [N1,11]

"In the windswept stairways of the Eiffel Tower, or, better still, in the steel supports of a Pont Transbordeur, one meets with the fundamental aesthetic experience of present-day architecture: through the thin net of iron that hangs suspended in the air, things stream—ships, ocean, houses, maus, landscape, harbor. They lose their distinctive shape, swirl into one another as we climb downward, merge simultaneously." Sigfried Giedion, Baua in Frankreich (Leipzig and Berlin), p. 7. In the same way, the historian today has only to erect a slender but sturdy scaffolding—a philosophic structure—in order to draw the most vital aspects of the past into his net. But just as the magnificent vistas of the city provided by the new construction in iron (again, see Giedion, illustrations on pp. 61-63) for a long time were reserved exclusively for the workers and engineers, so too the philosopher who wishes here to garner fresh perspectives must be someone immune to vertigo—an independent and, if need be, solitary worker. [N1,a,1]

The book on the Baroque exposed the seventeenth century to the light of the present day. Here, something analogous must be done for the nineteenth century, but with greater distinctness. [N1,a,2]

Modest methodological proposal for the cultural-historical dialectic. It is very easy to establish oppositions, according to determinate points of view, within the various "fields" of any epoch, such that on one side lies the "productive," "forward-looking," "lively," "positive" part of the epoch, and on the other side the abortive, retrograde, and obsolescent. The very contours of the positive element will appear distinctly only insofar as this element is set off against the negative. On the other hand, every negation has its value solely as background for the delineation of the lively, the positive. It is therefore of decisive importance that a new partition be applied to this initially excluded, negative component so that, by a displacement of the angle of vision (but not of the criteria!), a positive element emerges anew in it too—something different from that previously signified. And so on, ad infinitum, until the entire past is brought into the present in a historical apocatastasis. [N1,a,3]

The foregoing, put differently: the indestructibility of the highest life in all things. Against the prognosticators of decline. Consider, though: Isn't it an affront to Goethe to make a film of Faust, and isn't there a world of difference between the poem Faust and the film Faust? Yes, certainly. But, again, isn't there a whole world of difference between a bad film of Faust and a good one? What matter are never the "great" but only the dialectical contrasts, which often seem indistinguishable from nuances. It is nonetheless from them that life is always born anew. [N1,a,4]

To encompass both Breton and Le Corbusier—that would mean drawing the spirit of contemporary France like a bow, with which knowledge shoots the moment in the heart. [N1,a,5]
Marx lays bare the causal connection between economy and culture. For us, what matters is the thread of expression. It is not the economic origins of culture that will be presented, but the expression of the economy in its culture. At issue, in other words, is the attempt to grasp an economic process as perceptible Ur-phenomenon, from out of which proceed all manifestations of life in the arcades (and, accordingly, in the nineteenth century).

This research—which deals fundamentally with the expressive character of the earliest industrial products, the earliest industrial architecture, the earliest machines, but also the earliest department stores, advertisements, and so on—thus becomes important for Marxism in two ways. First, it will demonstrate how the milieu in which Marx’s doctrine arose affected that doctrine through its expressive character (which is to say, not only through causal connections); but, second, it will also show in what respects Marxism, too, shares the expressive character of the material products contemporary with it.

Method of this project: literary montage. I needn’t say anything. Merely show. I shall purloin no valuables, appropriate no ingenious formulations. But the rags, the refuse—these I will not inventory but allow, in the only way possible, to come into their own: by making use of them.

Bear in mind that commentary on a reality (for it is a question here of commentary, of interpretation in detail) calls for a method completely different from that required by commentary on a text. In the one case, the scientific mainstay is theology; in the other case, philology.

It may be considered one of the methodological objectives of this work to demonstrate a historical materialism which has annihilated within itself the idea of progress. Just here, historical materialism has every reason to distinguish itself sharply from bourgeois habits of thought. Its founding concept is not progress but actualization.

Historical “understanding” is to be grasped, in principle, as an afterlife of that which is understood; and what has been recognized in the analysis of the “afterlife of works,” in the analysis of “fame,” is therefore to be considered the foundation of history in general.

How this work was written: rung by rung, according as chance would offer a narrow foothold, and always like someone who scales dangerous heights and never allows himself a moment to look around, for fear of becoming dizzy (but also because he would save for the end the full force of the panorama opening out to him).

Overcoming the concept of “progress” and overcoming the concept of “period of decline” are two sides of one and the same thing.

A central problem of historical materialism that ought to be seen in the end: Must the Marxist understanding of history necessarily be acquired at the expense of the perceptibility of history? Or: in what way is it possible to conjure a heightened graphicness <Anschaulichkeit> to the realization of the Marxist method? The first stage in this undertaking will be to carry over the principle of montage into history. That is, to assemble large-scale constructions out of the smallest and most precisely cut components. Indeed, to discover in the analysis of the small individual moment the crystal of the total event. And, therefore, to break with vulgar historical naturalism. To grasp the construction of history as such. In the structure of commentary: Refuse of History.

A Kierkegaard citation in Wiesengrund, with commentary following: “One may arrive at a similar consideration of the mythical by beginning with the imagistic. When, in an age of reflection, one sees the imagistic prostrate ever so slightly and unobserved in a reflective representation and, like an antediluvian fossil, suggest another species of existence which washed away doubt, one will perhaps be amazed that the image could ever have played such an important role.” Kierkegaard wards off the “amazement” with what follows. Yet this amazement heralds the deepest insight into the interrelation of dialectic, myth, and image. For it is not as the continuously living and present that nature prevails in the dialectic. Dialectic comes to a stop in the image, and, in the context of recent history, it cites the mythical as what is long gone: nature as primal history. For this reason, the images—which, like those of the intérieur, bring dialectic and myth to the point of indistinction—are truly “antediluvian fossils.” They may be called dialectical images, to use Benjamin’s expression, whose compelling definition of “allegory” also holds true for Kierkegaard’s allegorical intention taken as a figure of historical dialectic and mythical nature. According to this definition, “in allegory the observer is confronted with the facies hippocratia of history, a petrified primordial landscape.” Theodor Wiesengrund-Adorno, Kierkegaard (Tübingen, 1933), p. 60.

Only a thoughtless observer can deny that correspondences come into play between the world of modern technology and the archaic symbol-world of mythology. Of course, initially the technologically new seems nothing more than that. But in the very next childhood memory, its traits are already altered. Every childhood achieves something great and irreplaceable for humanity. By the interest it takes in technological phenomena, by the curiosity it displays before any sort of invention or machinery, every childhood binds the accomplishments of technology to the old worlds of symbol. There is nothing in the realm of nature that from the outset would be exempt from such a bond. Only, it takes form not in the aura of novelty but in the aura of the habitual. In memory, childhood, and dream.

The momentum of primal history in the past is no longer masked, as it used to be, by the tradition of church and family—this at once the consequence and
condition of technology. The old prehistoric dread already envelops the world of our parents because we ourselves are no longer bound to this world by tradition. The perceptual worlds of Merkwelten break up more rapidly; what they contain of the mythic comes more quickly and more brutally to the fore; and a wholly different perceptual world must be speedily set up to oppose it. This is how the accelerated tempo of technology appears in light of the primal history of the present. \[\textit{Awakening}\] \[N2a,2\]

It’s not that what is past casts its light on what is present, or what is present its light on what is past; rather, image is that wherein what has been comes together in a flash with the now to form a constellation. In other words, image is dialectics at a standstill. For while the relation of the present to the past is purely temporal, continuous one, the relation of what has been to the now is dialectical: is not progression but image, suddenly emergent. Only dialectical images are genuine images (that is, not archaic); and the place where one encounters them is language. \[\textit{Awakening}\] \[N2a,3\]

In studying Simmel’s presentation of Goethe’s concept of truth,\(^5\) I came to see very clearly that my concept of origin in the \textit{Trauerspiel} book is a rigorous and decisive transposition of this basic Goethean concept from the domain of nature to that of history. Origin—it is, in effect, the concept of \textit{Ur}-phenomenon extracted from the pagan context of nature and brought into the Jewish contexts of history. Now, in my work on the Arcades I am equally concerned with fathoming an origin. To be specific, I pursue the origin of the forms and mutations of the Paris arcades from their beginning to their decline, and I locate this origin in the economic facts. Seen from the standpoint of causality, however (and that means considered as causes), these facts would not be primal phenomena; they become such only insofar as in their own individual development—“unfolding” might be a better term—they give rise to the whole series of the arcades’ concrete historical forms, just as the leaf unfolds from itself all the riches of the empirical world of plants. \[N2a,4\]

“As I study this age which is so close to us and so remote, I compare myself to a surgeon operating with local anesthetic: I work in areas that are numb, dead—yet the patient is alive and can still talk.” Paul Morand, \textit{1900} (Paris, 1931), pp. 6–7. \[N2a,5\]

What distinguishes images from the “essences” of phenomenology is their historical index. (Heidegger seeks in vain to rescue history for phenomenology abstractly through “historicity.”)\(^6\) These images are to be thought of entirely apart from the categories of the “human sciences,” from so-called habitus, from style, and the like. For the historical index of the images not only says that they belong to a particular time; it says, above all, that they attain to legibility only at a particular time. And, indeed, this acceding “to legibility” constitutes a specific critical point in the movement at their interior. Every present day is determined by the images that are synchronous with it: each “now” is the now of a particular recognizability. In it, truth is charged to the bursting point with time. (This point of explosion, and nothing else, is the death of the \textit{intention}, which thus coincides with the birth of authentic historical time, the time of truth.) It is not that what is past casts its light on what is present, or what is present its light on what is past; rather, image is that wherein what has been comes together in a flash with the now to form a constellation. In other words: image is dialectics at a standstill. For while the relation of the present to the past is purely temporal, the relation of what has been to the now is dialectical: not temporal in nature but figural \textit{bildhaft}. Only dialectical images are genuinely historical—that is, not archaic—images. The image that is read—which is to say, the image in the now of its recognizability—bears the highest degree the imprint of the perilous critical moment on which all reading is founded. \[N3,1\]

Resolute refusal of the concept of “timeless truth” is in order. Nevertheless, truth is not—as Marxism would have it—a merely contingent function of knowing, but is bound to a nucleus of time lying hidden within the knower and the known alike. This is so true that the eternal, in any case, is far more the ruffle on a dress than some idea. \[N3,2\]

Outline the story of \textit{The Arcades Project} in terms of its development. Its properly problematic component: the refusal to renounce anything that would demonstrate the materialist presentation of history as imagistic \textit{bildhaft} in a higher sense than in the traditional presentation. \[N3,3\]

A remark by Ernst Bloch apropos of \textit{The Arcades Project}: “History displays its Scotland Yard badge.” It was in the context of a conversation in which I was describing how this work—comparable, in method, to the process of splitting the atom—liberates the enormous energies of history that are bound up in the “once upon a time” of classical historiography. The history that showed things “as they really were” was the strongest narcotic of the century. \[N3,4\]

“The truth will not escape us,” reads one of Keller’s epigrams.\(^7\) He thus formulates the concept of truth with which these presentations take issue. \[N3a,1\]

“Primal history of the nineteenth century”—this would be of no interest if it were understood to mean that forms of primal history are to be recovered among the inventory of the nineteenth century. Only where the nineteenth century would be presented as originary form of primal history—in a form, that is to say, in which the whole of primal history groups itself anew in images appropriate to that century—only there does the concept of a primal history of the nineteenth century have meaning. \[N3a,2\]

Is awakening perhaps the synthesis of dream consciousness (as thesis) and waking consciousness (as antithesis)? Then the moment of awakening would be
identical with the "now of recognizability," in which things put on their true—surrealist—face. Thus, in Proust, the importance of staking an entire life on life's supremely dialectical point of rupture: awakening. Proust begins with an evocation of the space of someone waking up.

[3, N3a]

"If I insist on this mechanism of contradiction in the biography of a writer . . . it is because his train of thought cannot bypass certain facts which have a logic different from that of his thought by itself. It is because there is no idea he adheres to that truly holds up . . . in the face of certain very simple, elemental facts: that workers are starving down the barrels of cannons aimed at them by police, that war is threatening, and that fascism is already enthroned. . . . It behooves a man, for the sake of his dignity, to submit his ideas to these facts, and not to bend these facts, by some conjuring trick, to his ideas, however ingenious." Aragon, "D'Alfred de Vigny à Avdeenko," Commune, 2 (April 20, 1935), pp. 808–809. But it is entirely possible that, in contradicting my past, I will establish a continuity with that of another, which he in turn, as communist, will contradict. In this case, with the past of Louis Aragon, who in this same essay disavows his Paysan de Paris: "And, like most of my friends, I was partial to the failures, to what is monstrous and cannot survive, cannot succeed. . . . I was like them: I preferred error to its opposite" (p. 807).

[N3a, 4]

In the dialectical image, what has been within a particular epoch is always, simultaneously, "what has been from time immemorial." As such, however, it is manifest, on each occasion, only to a quite specific epoch—namely, the one in which humanity, rubbing its eyes, recognizes just this particular dream image as such. It is at this moment that the historian takes up, with regard to that image, the task of dream interpretation.

[N4, 1]

The expression "the book of nature" indicates that one can read the real like a text. And that is how the reality of the nineteenth century will be treated here. We open the book of what happened.

[N4, 2]

Just as Proust begins the story of his life with an awakening, so must every presentation of history begin with awakening; in fact, it should treat of nothing else. This one, accordingly, deals with awakening from the nineteenth century.

[N4, 3]

The realization of dream elements in the course of waking up is the canon of dialectics. It is paradigmatic for the thinker and binding for the historian. [N4, 4]

Raphael seeks to correct the Marxian conception of the normative character of Greek art: "If the normative character of Greek art is . . . an explicable fact of history. . . . we will have . . . to determine . . . what special conditions led to each renaissance and, in consequence, what special factors of . . . Greek art these renascences adopted as models. For the totality of Greek art never possessed a normative character; the renascences . . . have their own proper history. . . . Only a historical analysis can indicate the era in which the abstract notion of a 'norm' . . . of antiquity was born. . . . This notion was created solely by the Renaissance—that is, by primitive capitalism—and subsequently taken up by classicism, which . . . commenced to assign it its place in a historical sequence. Marx has not advanced along this way in the full measure of the possibilities of historical materialism." Max Raphael, Proudhon, Marx, Picasso (Paris <1933>), pp. 178–179.

[N4, 5]

It is the peculiarity of technological forms of production (as opposed to art forms) that their progress and their success are proportional to the transparency of their social content. (Hence glass architecture.)

[N4, 6]

An important passage in Marx: "It is recognized that where . . . the epic, for example . . . is concerned, . . . certain significant creations within the compass of art are possible only at an early stage of artistic development. If this is the case with regard to different branches of art within the sphere of the arts, it is not so remarkable that this should also be the case with regard to the whole artistic realm and its relation to the general development of the society." Cited without references (perhaps Theorien des Mehrwerts, vol. 1?) in Max Raphael, Proudhon, Marx, Picasso (Paris <1933>), p. 160.

[N4, 1]

The Marxian theory of art: one moment swaggering, and the next scholastic.

[N4, 2]


[N4, 3]

Strange remark by Engels concerning the "social forces": "But when once their nature is understood, they can, in the hands of the producers working together, be transformed from master demons into willing servants." (!) Engels, Die Entwicklung des Sozialismus von der Utopie zur Wissenschaft (1882).³

[N4, 4]

Marx, in the afterword to the second edition of Das Kapital: "Research has to appropriate the material in detail, to analyze its various forms of development, to trace out their inner connection. Only after this work is done can the actual movement be presented in corresponding fashion. If this is done successfully, then the life of the material is reflected back as ideal, then it may appear as if we had before us an a priori construction." Karl Marx, Das Kapital, vol 1, ed. Korsch (Berlin <1932>), p. 45.
The particular difficulty of doing historical research on the period following the close of the eighteenth century will be displayed. With the rise of the mass-circulation press, the sources become innumerable.

Michelet is perfectly willing to let the people be known as “barbarians.” “Barbarians! I like the word, and I accept the term.” And he says of their writers:

“Their love is boundless and sometimes too great, for they may devote themselves to details with the delightful awkwardness of Albrecht Dürer, or with the excessive polish of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, who does not conceal his art enough; and by this minute detail they compromise the whole. We must not blame them too much. It is . . . the luxuriance of their sap and vigor. . . . This sap wants to give everything at once—leaves, fruit, and flowers; it bends and twists the branches. These defects of many great works are often found in my books, which lack their good qualities. No matter!” J. Michelet, Le Peuple (Paris, 1846), pp. xxxvi–xxxvii.11

Letter from Wieseground of August 5, 1935: “The attempt to reconcile your ‘dream’ momentum—as the subjective element in the dialectical image—with the conception of the latter as model has led me to some formulations . . . With the vitiation of their use value, the alienated things are hollowed out and, as ciphers, they draw in meanings. Subjectivity takes possession of them insomuch as it invests them with intentions of desire and fear. And insomuch as defunct things stand in as images of subjective intentions, these latter present themselves as immemorial and eternal. Dialectical images are constellation between alienated things and incoming and disappearing meaning, are instantiated in the moment of indifference between death and meaning. While things in appearance are awakened to what is newest, death transforms the meanings to what is most ancient.” With regard to these reflections, it should be kept in mind that, in the nineteenth century, the number of “hollowed-out” things increases at a rate and on a scale that was previously unknown, for technical progress is continually withdrawing newly introduced objects from circulation.

“The critic can start from any form of theoretical or practical consciousness, and develop out of the actual forms of existing reality the true reality as what it ought to be, that which is its aim.” Karl Marx, Der historische Materialismus: Die Frühgeschichter, ed. Landshut and Mayer (Leipzig, 1932), vol. 1, p. 225 (letter from Marx to Ruge; Kreuzenach, September 1843).12 The point of departure invoked here by Marx need not necessarily connect with the latest stage of development. It can be undertaken with regard to long-vanished epochs whose “ought to be” and whose aim is then to be presented—not in reference to the next stage of development, but in its own right and as preformation of the final goal of history.

Engels says (Marx und Engels über Feuerbach: Aus dem Nachlass, Marx-Engels Archiv, ed. Rjanov, vol. 1 [Frankfurt am Main, 1926]), p. 300): “It must not be forgotten that law has just as little an independent history as religion.” What holds for law and religion holds for culture even more. It would be absurd for us to conceive of the classless society, its forms of existence, in the image of cultural humanity.

“Our election cry must be: Reform of consciousness not through dogmas, but through the analysis of mystical consciousness that is unclear to itself, whether it appears in a religious or a political form. Then people will see that the world has long possessed the dream of a thing—and that it only needs to possess the consciousness of this thing in order really to possess it.” Karl Marx, Der historische Materialismus: Die Frühgeschichter, ed. Landshut and Mayer, Leipzig (1932), vol. 1, pp. 226–227 (letter from Marx to Ruge; Kreuzenach, September 1843).14

A reconciled humanity will take leave of its past—and one form of reconciliation is gaiety. “The present German régime . . . , the nullity of the ancien régime exhibited for all the world to see, . . . is only the comedian of a world order whose real heroes are dead. History is thorough, and passes through many stages when she carries a worn-out form to burial. The last stage of a world-historical form is its comedy. The gods of Greece, who had already been mortally wounded in the Prometheus Bound of Aeschylus, had to die yet again—this time a comic death—in the dialogues of Lucian. Why does history follow this course? So that mankind may take leave of its past gaily.” Karl Marx, der historische Materialismus: Die Frühgeschichter, ed. Landshut and Mayer (Leipzig), vol. 1, p. 268 (“Zur Kritik der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie”).15 Surrealism is the death of the nineteenth century in comedy.

Marx (Marx und Engels über Feuerbach: Aus dem Nachlass, Marx-Engels Archiv, vol. 1 (Frankfurt am Main, 1928), p. 301): “There is no history of politics, law, science, etc., of art, religion, etc.”16

Die heilige Familie, on the subject of Bacon’s materialism: “Matter, surrounded by a sensuous poetic glamor, seems to attract man’s whole entity with winning smiles.”17

“I regret having treated in only a very incomplete manner those facts of daily existence—food, clothing, shelter, family routines, civil law, recreation, social relations—which have always been of prime concern in the life of the great majority of individuals.” Charles Seignobos, Histoire sincère de la nation française (Paris, 1933), p. xi.

Ad notam a formula of Valéry’s: “What distinguishes a truly general phenomenon is its fertility.”18

Barbarism lurks in the very concept of culture—as the concept of a fund of values which is considered independent not, indeed, of the production process in which
these values originated, but of the one in which they survive. In this way they
serve the apotheosis of the latter (word uncertain), barbaric as it may be.

To determine how the concept of culture arose, what meaning it has had in
different periods, and what needs its institution corresponded to. It could, insof-
far as it signifies the sum of "cultural riches," turn out to be of recent origin; certainly
it is not yet found, for example, in the cleric of the early Middle Ages who waged
his war of annihilation against the teachings of antiquity.

Michelet—an author who, wherever he is quoted, makes the reader forget the
book in which the quotation appears.

To be underlined: the painstaking delineation of the scene in the first writings
on social problems and charity, like Naville, De la Charité légale; Fréjier, Des Classes
dangereuses; and various others.

"I cannot insist too strongly on the fact that, for an enlightened materialist like
Lafargue, economic determinism is not the "absolutely perfect instrument" which
"can provide the key to all the problems of history." André Breton, Position

All historical knowledge can be represented in the image of balanced scales, one
tray of which is weighted with what has been and the other with knowledge of
what is present. Whereas on the first the facts assembled can never be too
humble or too numerous, on the second there can be only a few heavy, massive
weights.

"The only attitude worthy of philosophy . . . in the industrial era is . . . restraint.
The "scientificity" of a Marx does not mean that philosophy renounces its task . . .
rather, it indicates that philosophy holds itself in reserve until the predominance
of an unworthy reality is broken." Hugo Fischer, Karl Marx und sein Verhältnis

It is not without significance that Engels, in the context of the materialist concep-
tion of history, lays emphasis on classical. For the demonstration of the dialect-
ic of development, he refers to laws "which the actual historical process itself
provides, insofar as every momentum can be considered to be at the point of its
Engels und der Aufstieg der Arbeiterbewegung in Europa (Berlin 1933), pp. 434–
435.

Engels in a letter to Mehring, July 14, 1893: "It is above all this semblance of an
independent history of state constitutions, of systems of law, of ideological concep-
tions in every separate domain, that dazzles most people. If Luther and Calvin

‘overcome’ the official Catholic religion, or Hegel ‘overcomes’ Fichte and Kant, or
Rousseau with his republican Contrat social indirectly ‘overcomes’ the constitu-
tional Montesquieu, this is a process which remains within theology, philosophy,
or political science, represents a stage in the history of these particular spheres of
thought and never passes beyond the sphere of thought. And since the bourgeois
illusion of the eternity and finality of capitalist production has been added to this,
even the overcoming of the mercantilists by the physiocrats and Adam Smith is
regarded as a sheer victory of thought; not as the reflection in thought of changed
economic facts, but as the finally achieved correct understanding of actual condi-
tions subsisting always and everywhere.” Cited in Gustav Mayer, Friedrich
Engels, vol. 2, Engels und der Aufstieg der Arbeiterbewegung in Europa (Berlin),

"What Schlosser could say in response to these reproaches [of peevish moral
rigor], and what he would say, is this: that history and life in general, unlike
novels and stories, do not teach a lesson of superficial joie de vivre, even to the
happily constituted spirit and senses; that the contemplation of history is more
likely to inspire, if not contempt for humanity, then a somber vision of the world
and strict principles for living; that, at least on the very greatest judges of the
world and humankind, on men who knew how to measure outward affairs by their
own inner life, on a Shakespeare, Dante, or Machiavelli, the way of the world
always made the sort of impression that conduces to seriousness and severity."
G. G. Gervinus, Friedrich Christoph Schlosser (Leipzig, 1861), in Deutsche Denk-

The relation of technology to the theory of reproduction deserves to be stud-
ied. "Traditions . . . relate to written communications, in general, as reproduction
of the latter by pen relates to reproduction by the press, as successive copies of a
book relate to its simultaneous printings." Karl Gustav Jochmann, Uber die
Sprache (Heidelberg, 1828), pp. 259–260 ("Die Rückschritte der Poesie.").

Roger Caillois, “Paris, mythe moderne” (Nouvelle Revue française, 25, no. 284
[May 1, 1937], p. 699), gives a list of the investigations that one would have to
undertake in order to illuminate the subject further. (1) Descriptions of Paris
that antedate the nineteenth century (Marivaux, Restif de la Bretonne); (2) the
struggle between Girondins and Jacobins over the relation of Paris to the provinces;
the legend of the days of revolution in Paris; (3) secret police under the Empire
and the Restoration; (4) preniture morale of Paris in Hugo, Balzac, Baudelaire; (5)
ojective descriptions of the city: Dulaure, Du Camp; (6) Vigny, Hugo (Paris
affame in L'Année terrible), Rimbaud.

Still to be established is the connection between presence of mind and the
"method" of dialectical materialism. It's not just that one will always be able to
detect a dialectical process in presence of mind, regarded as one of the highest
forms of appropriate behavior. What is even more decisive is that the dialectician cannot look on history as anything other than a constellation of dangers which he is always, as he follows its development in his thought, on the point of avertmg.

"Revolution is a drama perhaps more than a history, and its pathos is a condition as imperious as its authenticity." Blanqui, cited in Geoffroy, L'Enfermé (Paris, 1926), vol. 1, p. 232.

Necessity of paying heed over many years to every casual citation, every fleeting mention of a book.

To contrast the theory of history with the observation by Grillparzer which Edmond Jaloux translates in "Journaux intimes" (Le Temps, May 23, 1937): "To read into the future is difficult, but to see purely into the past is more difficult still. I say purely, that is, without involving in this retrospective glance anything that has taken place in the meantime." The "purity" of the gaze is not just difficult but impossible to attain.

It is important for the materialist historian, in the most rigorous way possible, to differentiate the construction of a historical state of affairs from what one customarily calls its "reconstruction." The "reconstruction" in empathy is one-dimensional. "Construction" presupposes "destruction."

In order for a part of the past to be touched by the present instant <Aktualität>, there must be no continuity between them.

The fore- and after-history of a historical phenomenon show up in the phenomenon itself on the strength of its dialectical presentation. What is more: every dialectically presented historical circumstance polarizes itself and becomes a force field in which the confrontation between its fore-history and after-history is played out. It becomes such a field insofar as the present instant interpenetrates it. <See N7a, 8.> And thus the historical evidence polarizes into fore- and after-history always anew, never in the same way. And it does so at a distance from its own existence, in the present instant itself—like a line which, divided according to the Apollonian section, experiences its partition from outside itself.

Historical materialism aspires to neither a homogeneous nor a continuous exposition of history. From the fact that the superstructure reacts upon the base, it follows that a homogeneous history, say, of economics exists as little as a homogeneous history of literature or of jurisprudence. On the other hand, since the different epochs of the past are not all touched in the same degree by the present day of the historian (and often the recent past is not touched at all; the present fails to "do it justice"), continuity in the presentation of history is unattainable.

Telescopy of the past through the present.

The reception of great, much admired works of art is an ad putes ire. 21

The materialist presentation of history leads the past to bring the present into a critical state.


My thinking is related to theology as blotting pad is related to ink. It is saturated with it. Were one to go by the blotter, however, nothing of what is written would remain.

It is the present that polarizes the event into fore- and after-history.

On the question of the incompleteness of history, Horkheimer's letter of March 16, 1937: "The determination of incompleteness is idealistic if completeness is not comprised within it. Past injustice has occurred and is completed. The slain are really slain. . . . If one takes the lack of closure entirely seriously, one must believe in the Last Judgment. . . . Perhaps, with regard to incompleteness, there is a difference between the positive and the negative, so that only the injustice, the horror, the sufferings of the past are irreparable. The justice practiced, the joys, the works, have a different relation to time, for their positive character is largely negated by the transience of things. This holds first and foremost for individual existence, in which it is not the happiness but the unhappiness that is sealed by death." The corrective to this line of thinking may be found in the consideration that history is not simply a science but also and not least a form of remembrance <Eingedenken>. What science has "determined," remembrance can modify. Such mindfulness can make the incomplete (happiess) into something complete, and the complete (suffering) into something incomplete. That is theology; but in remembrance we have an experience that forbids us to conceive of history as fundamentally atological, little as it may be granted us to try to write it with immediately theological concepts.

The unequivocally regressive function which the doctrine of archaic images has for Jung comes to light in the following passage from the essay "Über die Beziehungen der analytischen Psychologie zum dichterischen Kunstwerk": "The creative process . . . consists in unconscious activation of the archetype and in an . . . elaboration of this original image into the finished work. By giving it shape, the artist in some measure translates this image into the language of the present. . . . Therein lies the social significance of art: . . . it conjures up the forms in which the Zeitgeist, the spirit of the age, is most lacking. The unsatisfied yearning
of the artist reaches back to the primordial image in the unconscious which is best fitted to compensate the ... oned sidedness of the spirit of the age. This image his longings seize on, and as he ... brings it to consciousness, the image changes its form until it can be accepted by the minds of his contemporaries, according to their powers." C. G. Jung, Seelenprobleme der Gegenwart (Zürich, Leipzig, and Stuttgart, 1932), p. 71.8 Thus, the esoteric theory of art comes down to making archetypes “accessible” to the “Zeitgeist.”

[N8,2]

In Jung’s production there is a belated and particularly emphatic elaboration of one of the elements which, as we can recognize today, were first disclosed in explosive fashion by Expressionism. That element is a specifically clinical nihilism, such as one encounters also in the works of Benn, and which has found a camp follower in Céline. This nihilism is born of the shock imparted by the interior of the body to those who treat it. Jung himself traces the heightened interest in psychic life back to Expressionism. He writes: “Art has a way of anticipating future changes in man’s fundamental outlook, and expressionist art has taken this subjective turn well in advance of the more general change.” See Seelenprobleme der Gegenwart (Zürich, Leipzig, and Stuttgart, 1932), p. 415—“Das Seelenproblem des modernen Menschen”). In this regard, we should not lose sight of the relations which Lukács has established between Expressionism and Fascism. (See also K7a,4.)

[N8a,1]


[N8a,2]

Julien Benda, in Un Régulier dans le siècle, cites a phrase from Fustel de Coulanges: “If you want to relive an epoch, forget that you know what has come after it.” That is the secret Magna Charta for the presentation of history by the Historical School, and it carries little conviction when Benda adds: “Fustel never said that these measures were valid for understanding the role of an epoch in history.”

[N8a,3]

Pursue the question of whether a connection exists between the secularization of time in space and the allegorical mode of perception. The former, at any rate (as becomes clear in Blanqui’s last writing), is hidden in the “worldview of the natural sciences” of the second half of the century. (Secularization of history in Heidegger.)

[N8a,4]

Goethe saw it coming; the crisis in bourgeois education. He confronts it in Wilhelm Meister. He characterizes it in his correspondence with Zelter.

[N8a,5]

Wilhelm von Humboldt shifts the center of gravity to languages; Marx and Engels shift it to the natural sciences. But the study of languages has economic functions, too. It comes up against global economics, as the study of natural sciences comes up against the production process. Scientific method is distinguished by the fact that, in leading to new objects, it develops new methods. Just as form in art is distinguished by the fact that, opening up new contents, it develops new forms. It is only from without that a work of art has one and only one form, that a treatise has one and only one method.

[N9,2]

On the concept of “rescue”; the wind of the absolute in the sails of the concept. (The principle of the wind is the cyclical.) The trim of the sails is the relative.

[N9,3]

What are phenomena rescued from? Not only, and not in the main, from the discredit and neglect into which they have fallen, but from the catastrophe represented very often by a certain strain in their dissemination, their “enshrinement as heritage”—They are saved through the exhibition of the fissure within them.—There is a tradition that is catastrophe.

[N9,4]

It is the inherent tendency of dialectical experience to dissipate the semblance of eternal sameness, and even of repetition, in history. Authentic political experience is absolutely free of this semblance.

[N9,5]

What matters for the dialectician is to have the wind of world history in his sails. Thinking means for him: setting the sails. What is important is how they are set. Words are his sails. The way they are set makes them into concepts.

[N9,6]

The dialectical image is an image that emerges suddenly, in a flash. What has been is to be held fast—as an image flashing up in the now of its recognizability. The rescue that is carried out by these means—and only by these—can operate solely for the sake of what in the next moment is already irretrievably lost. In this connection, see the metaphorical passage from my introduction to Jochmann, concerning the prophetic gaze that catches fire from the summits of the past.26

[N9,7]

Being a dialectician means having the wind of history in one’s sails. The sails are the concepts. It is not enough, however, to have sails at one’s disposal. What is decisive is knowing the art of setting them.

[N9,8]

The concept of progress must be grounded in the idea of catastrophe. That things are “status quo” is the catastrophe. It is not an ever-present possibility but what in each case is given. Thus Strindberg (in To Damascus!),27 hell is not something that awaits us, but this life here and now.

[N9a,1]

It is good to give materialist investigations a truncated ending.

[N9a,2]

To the process of rescue belongs the firm, seemingly brutal grasp.
The dialectical image is that form of the historical object which satisfies Goethe’s requirements for the object of analysis: to exhibit a genuine synthesis. It is the primal phenomenon of history.

The enshrinement or apologia is meant to cover up the revolutionary moments in the occurrence of history. At heart, it seeks the establishment of a continuity. It sets store only by those elements of a work that have already emerged and played a part in its reception. The places where tradition breaks off—hence its peaks and crags, which offer footing to one who would cross over them—it misses.

Historical materialism must renounce the epic element in history. It blows the epoch out of the reified “continuity of history.” But it also explodes the homogeneity of the epoch, interspersing it with ruins—that is, with the present.

In every true work of art there is a place where, for one who removes there, it blows cool like the wind of a coming dawn. From this it follows that art, which has often been considered refractory to every relation with progress, can provide its true definition. Progress has its seat not in the continuity of elapsing time but in its interferences—where the truly new makes itself felt for the first time, with the sobriety of dawn.

For the materialist historian, every epoch with which he occupies himself is only prehistory for the epoch he himself must live in. And so, for him, there can be no appearance of repetition in history, since precisely those moments in the course of history which matter most to him, by virtue of their index as “fore-history,” become moments of the present day and change their specific character according to the catastrophic or triumphant nature of that day.

Scientific progress—like historical progress—is in each instance merely the first step, never the second, third, or n+1—supposing that these latter ever belonged not just to the workshop of science but to its corpus. That, however, is not in fact the case; for every stage in the dialectical process (like every stage in the process of history itself), conditioned as it always is by every stage preceding, brings into play a fundamentally new tendency, which necessitates a fundamentally new treatment. The dialectical method is thus distinguished by the fact that, in leading to new objects, it develops new methods, just as form in art is distinguished by the fact that it develops new forms in delineating new contents. It is only from without that a work of art has one and only one form, that a dialectical treatise has one and only one method.

Definitions of basic historical concepts: Catastrophe—to have missed the opportunity. Critical moment—the status quo threatens to be preserved. Progress—the first revolutionary measure taken.

If the object of history is to be blasted out of the continuum of historical succession, that is because its monadological structure demands it. This structure first comes to life in the extracted object itself. And it does so in the form of the historical confrontation that makes up the interior (and, as it were, the bowels) of the historical object, and into which all the forces and interests of history enter on a reduced scale. It is owing to this monadological structure that the historical object finds represented in its interior its own fore-history and after-history. (Thus, for example, the fore-history of Baudelaire, as educated by current scholarship, resides in allegory; his after-history, in Jugendstil.)

Forming the basis of the confrontation with conventional historiography and “enshrinement” is the polemic against empathy (Grillparzer, Fustel de Coulanges).

The Saint-Simonian Barrault distinguishes between époques organiques and époques critiques. See U15a.4.) The derogation of the critical spirit begins directly after the victory of the bourgeoisie in the July Revolution.

The destructive or critical momentum of materialist historiography is registered in that blasting of historical continuity with which the historical object first constitutes itself. In fact, an object of history cannot be targeted at all within the continuous elapse of history. And so, from time immemorial, historical narration has simply picked out an object from this continuous succession. But it has done so without foundation, as an expedient; and its first thought was then always to reinsert the object into the continuum, which it would create anew through empathy. Materialist historiography does not choose its objects arbitrarily. It does not fasten on them but rather springs them loose from the order of succession. Its provisions are more extensive, its occurrences more essential.

[For] the destructive momentum in materialist historiography is to be conceived as the reaction to a constellation of dangers, which threatens both the burden of tradition and those who receive it. It is this constellation of dangers which the materialist presentation of history comes to engage. In this constellation is comprised its actuality; against its threat, it must prove its presence of mind. Such a presentation of history has as goal to pass, as Engels puts it, “beyond the sphere of thought.”

To thinking belongs the movement as well as the arrest of thoughts. Where thinking comes to a standstill in a constellation saturated with tensions—there the dialectical image appears. It is the caesura in the movement of thought. Its position is naturally not an arbitrary one. It is to be found, in a word, where the tension between dialectical opposites is greatest. Hence, the object constructed in the materialist presentation of history is itself the dialectical image. The latter is identical with the historical object; it justifies its violent expulsion from the continuum of historical process.
The archaic form of primal history, which has been summoned up in every epoch and now once more by Jung, is that form which makes semblance in history still more delusive by mandating nature as its homeland. [N11,1]

To write history means giving dates their physiognomy. [N11,2]

The events surrounding the historian, and in which he himself takes part, will underlie his presentation in the form of a text written in invisible ink. The history which he lays before the reader comprises, as it were, the citations occurring in this text, and it is only these citations that occur in a manner legible to all. To write history thus means to cite history. It belongs to the concept of citation, however, that the historical object in each case is torn from its context. [N11,3]

On the elementary doctrine of historical materialism. (1) An object of history is that through which knowledge is constituted as the object's rescue. (2) History decays into images, not into stories. (3) Wherever a dialectical process is realized, we are dealing with a monad. (4) The materialist presentation of history carries along with it an immanent critique of the concept of progress. (5) Historical materialism bases its procedures on long experience, common sense, presence of mind, and dialectics. (On the monad: N10a,3.) [N11,4]

The present determines where, in the object from the past, that object's fore-history and after-history diverge so as to circumscribe its nucleus. [N11,5]

To prove by example that only Marxism can practice great philology, where the literature of the previous century is concerned. [N11,6]

"The regions which were the first to become enlightened are not those where the sciences have made the greatest progress." Turgot, Oeuvres, vol. 2 (Paris, 1844), pp. 601–602 ("Second discours sur les progrès successifs de l'esprit humain"). The thought is taken up in the later literature, and also in Marx. [N11,7]

In the course of the nineteenth century, as the bourgeoisie consolidated its positions of power, the concept of progress would increasingly have forfeited the critical functions it originally possessed. (In this process, the doctrine of natural selection had a decisive role to play: it popularized the notion that progress was automatic. The extension of the concept of progress to the whole of human activity was furthered as a result.) With Turgot, the concept of progress still had its critical functions. In particular, the concept made it possible to direct people's attention to retrograde tendencies in history. Turgot saw progress, characteristically, as guaranteed above all in the realm of mathematical research. [N11,1]

"But what a spectacle the succession of men's opinions presents! There I seek the progress of the human mind, and I find virtually nothing but the history of its errors. Why is its course—which is so sure, from the very first steps, in the field of mathematical studies—so unsteady in everything else, and so apt to go astray?... In this slow progression of opinions and errors,... I fancy that I see those first leaves, those sheaths which nature has given to the newly growing stems of plants, issuing before them from the earth, and withering one by one as other sheaths come into existence, until at last the stem itself makes its appearance and is crowned with flowers and fruit—a symbol of late-emerging truth." Turgot, Oeuvres, vol. 2 (Paris, 1844), pp. 600–601 ("Second discours sur les progrès successifs de l'esprit humain"). [N11,2]

A times to progress still exists in Turgot: "In later times,... it was necessary for them, through reflection, to take themselves back to where the first men had been led by blind instinct. And who is not aware that it is here that the supreme effort of reason lies?" Turgot, Oeuvres, vol. 2, p. 610. This limit is still present in Marx; later it is lost. [N11,3]

Already with Turgot it is evident that the concept of progress is oriented toward science, but has its corrective in art. (At bottom, not even art can be ranged exclusively under the concept of regression; neither does Jochmann's essay develop this concept in an unqualified way.) Of course, Turgot's estimate of art is different from what ours would be today. "Knowledge of nature and of truth is as infinite as they are; the arts, whose aim is to please us, are as limited as we are. Time constantly brings to light new discoveries in the sciences; but poetry, painting, and music have a fixed limit which the genius of languages, the imitation of nature, and the limited sensibility of our organs determine. The great men of the Augustan age reached it, and are still our models." Turgot, Oeuvres, vol. 2 (Paris, 1844), pp. 605–606 ("Second discours sur les progrès successifs de l'esprit humain"). Thus a programmatic renunciation of originality in art! [N12,1]

"There are elements of the arts of taste which could be perfected with time—for example, perspective, which depends on optics. But local color, the imitation of nature, and the expression of the passions are of all times." Turgot, Oeuvres, vol. 2 (Paris, 1844), p. 658 ("Plan du second discours sur l'histoire universelle"). [N12,2]

Militant representation of progress. "It is not error that is opposed to the progress of truth; it is indolence, obstinacy, the spirit of routine, everything that contributes to inaction. The progress of even the most peaceful of arts among the ancient peoples of Greece and their republics was punctuated by continual wars. It was like the Jews building the walls of Jerusalem with one hand while defending them with the other. Their spirits were always in ferment, their hearts always high with adventure, and each day was a further enlightenment." Turgot, Oeuvres, vol. 2 (Paris, 1844), pp. 672 ("Pensées et fragments"). [N12,3]

Presence of mind as a political category comes magnificently to life in these words of Turgot: "Before we have learned to deal with things in a given position, they have already changed several times. Thus, we always perceive events too
late, and politics always needs to foresee, so to speak, the present.” Turgot, *Oeuvres*, vol. 2 (Paris, 1844), p. 673 (“Pensées et fragments”).35

“The... radically altered landscape of the nineteenth century remains visible to this day, at least in traces. It was shaped by the railroads... The focal points of this historical landscape are present wherever mountain and tunnel, canyon and viaduct, torrent and funicular, river and iron bridge... reveal their kinship.... In all their singularity, these things announce that nature has not withdrawn, amid the triumph of technological civilization, into the nameless and inchoate, that the pure construction of bridge or tunnel did not in itself... usurp the landscape, but that river and mountain at once took their side, and not as subjugated adversaries but as friendly powers.... The iron locomotive that disappears into the mountain tunnel... seems... to be returning to its native element, where the raw material out of which it was made lies slumbering.” Dolf Sternberger, *Panorama, oder Ansichten vom 19. Jahrhundert* (Hamburg, 1938), pp. 34-35.

The concept of progress had to run counter to the critical theory of history from the moment it ceased to be applied as a criterion to specific historical developments and instead was required to measure the span between a legendary invention and a legendary end of history. In other words: as soon as it becomes the signature of historical process as a whole, the concept of progress bespeaks an uncritical hypostatization rather than a critical interrogation. This latter may be recognized, in the concrete exposition of history, from the fact that it outlines regression at least as sharply as it brings any progress into view. (Thus Turgot, Jochmann.)

Lotze as critic of the concept of progress: “In opposition to the readily accepted doctrine that the progress of humanity is ever onward and upward, more cautious reflection has been forced to make the discovery that the course of history takes the form of spirals—some prefer to say epicycloids. In short, there has never been a dearth of thoughtful but veiled acknowledgments that the impression produced by history on the whole, far from being one of unalloyed elevation, is preponderantly melancholy. Unprejudiced consideration will always lament and wonder to see how many advantages of civilization and special charms of life are lost, never to reappear in their integrity.” Hermann Lotze, *Mikrokosmos*, vol. 3 (Leipzig, 1864), p. 21.

Lotze as critic of the concept of progress: “It is not... clear how we are to imagine one course of education as applying to successive generations of men, allowing the later of these to partake of the fruits produced by the unrewarded efforts and often by the misery of those who went before. To hold that the claims of particular times and individual men may be scorned and all their misfortunes disregarded if only mankind would improve overall is, though suggested by noble feelings, merely enthusiastic thoughtlessness. ... Nothing is progress which does not mean an increase of happiness and perfection for those very souls which had suffered in a previous imperfect state.” Hermann Lotze, *Mikrokosmos*, vol. 3 (Leipzig, 1864), p. 23.

If the idea of progress extended over the totality of recorded history is something peculiar to the satiated bourgeoisie, then Lotze represents the reserves called up by those on the defensive. But contrast Hölderlin: “I love the race of men who are coming in the next centuries.”

A thought-provoking observation: “It is one of the most noteworthy peculiarities of the human heart that so much selfishness in individuals coexists with the general lack of envy which every present day feels toward its future.” This lack of envy indicates that the idea we have of happiness is deeply colored by the time in which we live. Happiness for us is thinkable only in the air that we have breathed, among the people who have lived with us. In other words, there vibrates in the idea of happiness (this is what that noteworthy circumstance teaches us) the idea of salvation. This happiness is founded on the very despair and desolation which were ours. Our life, it can be said, is a muscle strong enough to contract the whole of historical time. Or, to put it differently, the genuine conception of historical time rests entirely upon the image of redemption. (The passage is from Lotze, *Mikrokosmos*, vol. 3 [Leipzig, 1864], p. 49.)

Denial of the notion of progress in the religious view of history: “History, however it may move forward or fluctuate hither and thither, could not by any of its movements attain a goal lying out of its own plane. And we may spare ourselves the trouble of seeking to find, in mere onward movement upon this plane, a progress which history is destined to make not there but by an upward movement at each individual point of its course forward.” Hermann Lotze, *Mikrokosmos*, vol. 3 (Leipzig, 1864), p. 49.

Connection, in Lotze, between the idea of progress and the idea of redemption: “The reason of the world would be turned to unreason if we did not reject the thought that the work of vanishing generations should go on forever benefiting only those who come later, and being irreparably wasted for the workers themselves” (p. 50). This cannot be, “unless the world itself, and all the flourishes about historical development, are to appear as mere vain and unintelligible noise.... That in some mysterious way the progress of history affects them, too—it is this conviction that first entitles us to speak as we do of humanity and its history” (p. 51). Lotze calls this the “thought of the preservation and restoration of all things” (p. 52).

Cultural history, according to Bernheim, developed out of the positivism of Comte; Beloch’s *Greek History* (vol. 1), 2nd edition, 1912] is, according to him, a textbook example of Comtean influence. Positivist historiography “disregarded the state and political processes, and saw in the collective intellectual development of society the sole content of history.... The elevation... of cultural history to the only subject worthy of historical research!” Ernst Bernheim, *Mit-
telartliche Zeitanschauungen in ihrem Einfluss auf Politik und Geschichtsschreibung (Tübingen, 1918), p. 8. \[N14.1\]

"The logical category of time does not govern the verb as much as one might expect. Strange as it may seem, the expression of the future does not appear to be situated on the same level of the human mind as the expression of the past and of the present. . . . The future often has no expression of its own; or if it has one, it is a complicated expression without parallel to that of the present or the past." . . . "There is no reason to believe that prehistoric Indo-European ever possessed a true future tense" (Meillet). Jean-Richard Bloch, "Langage d’utilité, langage poétique" (Encyclopédie française, vol. 16 [16–50], 10). \[N14.2\]

Simmel touches on a very important matter with the distinction between the concept of culture and the spheres of autonomy in classical Idealism. The separation of the three autonomous domains from one another preserved classical Idealism from the concept of culture that has so favored the cause of barbarism. Simmel says of the cultural ideal: "It is essential that the independent values of aesthetic, scientific, ethical, . . . and even religious achievements be transcended, so that they can all be integrated as elements in the development of human nature beyond its natural state." Georg Simmel, Philosophie des Geldes (Leipzig, 1900), pp. 476–477. \[N14.3\]

"There has never been a period of history in which the culture peculiar to it has given the whole of humanity, or even the whole of that one nation which was specially distinguished by it. All degrees and shades of mediaeval barbarism, of mental obser- vulosis, and of physical wretchedness have always been found in juxtaposition with cultural refinement of life . . . and free participation in the benefits of civil order." Hermann Lotze, Mikrokosmos, vol. 3 (Leipzig, 1864), pp. 23–24. \[N14a.1\]

To the view that "there is progress enough if . . . while the mass of mankind remains mired in an uncivilized condition, the civilization of a small minority is constantly struggling upward to greater and greater heights," Lotze responds with the question: "How, upon such assumptions, can we be entitled to speak of one history of mankind?" Lotze, Mikrokosmos, vol. 3, p. 25. \[N14a.2\]

"The way in which the culture of past times is for the most part handed down," Lotze says, "leads directly back to the very opposite of that at which historical development should aim; it leads, that is, to the formation of an instinct of culture, which continually takes up more and more of the elements of civilization, thus making them a lifeless possession, and withdrawing them from the sphere of that conscious activity by the efforts of which they were at first obtained" (p. 28). Accordingly: "The progress of science is not . . . directly, human progress; it would be this if, in proportion to the increase in accumulated truths, there were also an increase in men’s concern for them . . . and in the clearness of their insight concerning them." Lotze, Mikrokosmos, vol. 3, p. 29. \[N14a.3\]

Lotze on humanity: "It cannot be said that men grow to what they are with a consciousness of this growth, and with an accompanying remembrance of their previous condition." Lotze, Mikrokosmos, vol. 3, p. 31. \[N14a.4\]

Lotze’s vision of history can be related to Stifter’s: "that the unruly will of the individual is always restricted in its action by universal conditions not subject to arbitrary will—conditions which are to be found in the laws of spiritual life in general, in the established order of nature . . ." Lotze, Mikrokosmos, vol. 3, p. 34. \[N14a.5\]

To be compared with Stifter’s preface to Bunte Steine (Colored Stones): "Let us at the outset regard it as certain that a great effect is always due to a great cause, never to a small one." Histoire de Jules César, vol. 1 (Paris, 1865) (Napoléon III). \[N14a.6\]

A phrase which Baudelaire coins for the consciousness of time peculiar to someone intoxicated by hashish can be applied in the definition of a revolutionary historical consciousness. He speaks of a night in which he was absorbed by the effects of hashish: "Long though it seemed to have been . . . yet it also seemed to have lasted only a few seconds, or even to have had no place in all eternity." (Baudelaire, Œuvres, ed. Le Dantec (Paris, 1931).) vol. 1, pp. 298–299. \[N15.1\]

At any given time, the living see themselves in the midday of history. They are obliged to prepare a banquet for the past. The historian is the herald who invites the dead to the table. \[N15.2\]

On the dieetics of historical literature. The contemporary who learns from books of history to recognize how long his present misery has been in preparation (and this is what the historian must inwardly aim to show him) acquires thereby a high opinion of his own powers. A history that provides this kind of instruction does not cause him sorrow, but arms him. Nor does such a history arise from sorrow, unlike that which Flaubert had in mind when he penned the confession: "Few will suspect how depressed one had to be to undertake the resuscitation of Carthage." It is pure curiosité that arises from and deepens sorrow. \[N15.3\]

Example of a "cultural historical" perspective in the worse sense. Huizinga speaks of the consideration displayed for the life of the common people in the pastoral of the late Middle Ages. "Here, too, belongs that interest in rags and tatters which . . . is already beginning to make itself felt. Calendar miniatures note with pleasure the threadbare knees of reapers in the field, while paintings
accentuate the rags of mendicants. . . . Here begins the line that leads through Rembrandt’s etchings and Murillo’s beggar boys to the street types of Steen."


“The past has left images of itself in literary texts, images comparable to those which are imprinted by light on a photosensitive plate. The future alone possesses developers active enough to scan such surfaces perfectly. Many pages in Marivaux or Rousseau contain a mysterious meaning which the first readers of these texts could not fully decipher.” André Monglod, *Le Preromantisme françois*, vol. 1, *Le Héro préromantique* (Grenoble, 1930), p. xii. [N15a,1]

A revealing vision of progress in Hugo, “Paris incendié” (L’Année terrible):

What! Sacrifice everything! Even the granary!
What! The library, arch where dawn arises,
Unfathomable ABC of the ideal, where progress,
Eternal reader, leans on its elbows and dreams . . . [N15a,2]

On the style one should strive for: “It is through everyday words that style bites into and penetrates the reader. It is through them that great thoughts circulate and are accepted as genuine, like gold or silver imprinted with a recognized seal. They inspire confidence in the person who uses them to make his thoughts more understandable; for one recognizes by such usage of common language a man who knows life and the world, and who stays in touch with things. Moreover, these words make for a frank style. They show that the author has long ruminated the thought or the feeling expressed, that he has made them so much his own, so much a matter of habit, that for him the most common expressions suffice to express ideas that have become natural to him after long deliberation. In the end, what one says in this way will appear more truthful, for nothing is so clear, when it comes to words, than those we call familiar; and clarity is something so characteristic of the truth that it is often confused with it.” Nothing more subtle than the suggestion: be clear so as to have at least the appearance of truth. Offered in this way, the advice to write simply—which usually harbors resentment—has the highest authority. J. Joubert, *Œuvres* (Paris, 1883), vol. 2, p. 293 (“Du Style,” no. 99). [N15a,3]

The person who could develop the Joubertian dialectic of precepts would produce a styleists worth mentioning. For example, Joubert recommends the use of “everyday words” but warns against “colloquial language,” which “expresses things relevant to our present customs only” (“Du Style,” no. 67 < *Œuvres*, vol. 2, p. 286>). [N16,1]

“All beautiful expressions are susceptible of more than one meaning. When a beautiful expression presents a meaning more beautiful than the author’s own, it should be adopted.” J. Joubert, *Œuvres* (Paris, 1883), vol. 2, p. 276 (“Du Style,” no. 17). [N16,2]

With regard to political economy, Marx characterizes as “its vulgar element” above all “that element in which is mere reproduction—that is, representation of appearance.” Cited in Korsch, *Karl Marx (manuscrit)*, vol. 2, p. 22. [N16,3]

Concept of nature in Marx: “If in Hegel . . . ‘physical nature likewise encroaches on world history,’ then Marx conceives nature from the beginning in social categories. Physical nature does not enter directly into world history; rather, it enters indirectly, as a process of material production that goes on, from the earliest moment, not only between man and nature but also between man and man. Or, to use language that will be clear to philosophers as well: in Marx’s rigorously social science, that pure nature presupposed by all human activity (the economic natura naturans) is replaced everywhere by nature as material production (the economic natura naturata)—that is, by a social ‘matter’ mediated and transformed through human social activity, and thus at the same time capable of further change and modification in the present and the future.” Korsch, *Karl Marx*, vol. 3, p. 3. [N16,4]

Korsch provides the following reformulation of the Hegelian triad in Marxian terms: “The Hegelian ‘contradiction’ was replaced by the struggle of the social classes; the dialectical ‘nutation,’ by the proletariat; and the dialectical ‘synthesis,’ by the proletarian revolution.” Korsch, *Karl Marx*, vol. 3, p. 45. [N16,5]

Restriction of the materialist conception of history in Korsch: “As the material mode of production changes, so does the system of mediations existing between the material base and its political and juridical superstructure, with its corresponding social forms of consciousness. Hence, the general propositions of materialist social theory concerning the relations between economy and politics or economy and ideology, or concerning such general concepts as class and class struggle, . . . have a different meaning for each specific epoch and, strictly speaking, are valid, in the particular form Marx gave them within the present bourgeois society, only for this society. . . . Only for contemporary bourgeois society, where the spheres of economy and politics are formally and entirely separated from each other, and where workers as citizens of the state are free and possessed of equal rights, does the scientific demonstration of their actual ongoing lack of freedom in the economic sphere have the character of a theoretical discovery.” Korsch, vol. 3, pp. 21–22. [N16a,1]

Korsch makes “the seemingly paradoxical observation (which is nonetheless . . . suited to the final and most mature form of Marxian science) that in the materialist social theory of Marx the ensemble of social relations, which bourgeois sociologists treat as an independent domain . . . , already is investigated according to its objec-
A citation from Marx on the mutability of nature (in Korsch, *Karl Marx*, vol. 3, p. 9): "Even the naturally grown variations of the human species, such as differences of race... can and must be abolished in the historical process."

Doctrine of the superstructure, according to Korsch: "Neither 'dialectical causality' in its philosophical definition, nor scientific 'causality' supplemented by 'interactions,' is sufficient to determine the particular kinds of connections and relations existing between the economic 'base' and the juridical and political 'superstructure,...' together with the 'corresponding' forms of consciousness....

Twentieth-century natural science has learned that the 'causal' relations which the researcher in a given field has to establish for that field cannot be defined in terms of a general concept or law of causality, but must be determined specifically for each separate field. *"[See Philipp Frank, *Das Kausalgesetz und seine Grenzen* (The Law of Causality and Its Limits) (Vienna, 1932).]... The greater part of the results... obtained by Marx and Engels consist not in theoretical formulations of the new principle but in its specific application to a series of... questions, which are either of fundamental practical importance or of an extremely subtle nature theoretically.... *"[Here, for example, belong the questions raised by Marx at the end of the 1857 'Introduction' to the *Grundrisse* (pp. 779ff.), and which concern the 'unequal development' of different spheres of social life: unequal development of material production vis-à-vis artistic production (and of the various arts among themselves), the level of education in the United States as compared to that of Europe, unequal development of the relations of production as legal relations, and so forth.] The more precise scientific determination of the present context is still a task for the future.... a task whose center will lie, once again, not in theoretical formulation but in the further application and testing of the principles implicit in Marx's work. Nor should we adhere too strictly to the words of Marx, who often used his terms only figuratively—as, for instance, in describing the connections under consideration here as a relation between 'base' and 'superstructure,' as a 'correspondence,' and so on.... In all these cases, the Marxian concepts (as Sorel and Lenin, among the later Marxists, understood best) are not intended as new dogmatic fetters, preestablished conditions which must be met in some particular order by any 'materialist' investigation. They are, rather, a wholly undogmatic guide to research and action." Korsch, *Karl Marx* (manuscript), vol. 3, pp. 93–96.

Materialist conception of history and materialist philosophy: "The formulas of materialist history that were applied by Marx and Engels... solely to the... investigation of bourgeois society, and transferred to other historical periods only with suitable elaboration, have been detached by the Marxist epigones from this specific application, and in general from every historical connection; and out of so-called historical materialism they have made a universal... sociological theory. From this... leveling... of materialist theory of society, it was only a step to the idea that once again today—or especially today—it was necessary to shore up the historical and economic science of Marx, not only with a general social philosophy but even with a... universal materialist worldview embracing the totality of nature and society. Thus, the... scientific forms into which the real kernel of eighteenth-century philosophical materialism had evolved... were ultimately carried back to what Marx himself had once unmistakably repudiated as 'the philosophical phrases of the Materialists about matter.' Materialist social science... does not need... any such philosophic support. This most important advance... carried out by Marx was later overlooked even by... 'orthodox' interpreters of Marx.... They have thus reintroduced their own backward attitudes into a theory which Marx had consciously transformed from a philosophy into a science. It is the almost grotesque historical fate of the Marx-orthodoxy that, in repulsing the attacks of revisionists, it ultimately arrives, on all important issues, at the very same standpoint as that taken by its adversaries. For example, the leading representative of this school... Plekhanov, in his eager pursuit of that 'philosophy' which might be the true foundation of Marxism, finally hit upon the idea of presenting Marxism as 'a form of Spinoza's philosophy freed by Feuerbach of its theological addendum.'" Korsch, *Karl Marx* (manuscript), vol. 3, pp. 29–31.

Korsch cites Bacon, from the *Novum Organum*: "'Recte enim veritas temporis filia dicitur non auctoritas.' On that authority of all authorities, *time*, he had based the superiority of the new bourgeois empirical science over the dogmatic science of the Middle Ages." Korsch, *Karl Marx* (manuscript), vol. 1, p. 72.

"For the positive use, Marx replaces the overweening postulate of Hegel that the truth must be concrete with the rational principle of specification.... The real interest lies... in the specific traits through which each particular historical society is distinguished from the common features of society in general and in which, therefore, its development is comprised.... In the same manner, an exact social science cannot form its general concepts by simply abstracting from some and retaining other more or less arbitrarily chosen characteristics of the given historical form of bourgeois society. It can secure the knowledge of the general contained in that particular form of society only by the minute investigation of all the historical conditions underlying its emergence from another state of society and from the actual modification of its present form under exactly established conditions.... Thus, the only genuine laws in social science are laws of development." Korsch, *Karl Marx* (manuscript), vol. 1, pp. 49–52.

The authentic concept of universal history is a messianic concept. Universal history, as it is understood today, is an affair of obscurantists.
The now of recognizability is the moment of awakening. (Jung would like to distance awakening from the dream.)

In his characterization of Leopardi, Sainte-Beuve declares himself "persuaded . . . that the full value and originality of literary criticism depends on its applying itself to subjects for which we have long possessed the background and all the immediate and more distant contexts." C.-A. Sainte-Beuve, Portraits contemporains, vol. 4 (Paris, 1882), p. 365. On the other hand, it must be admitted that the absence of certain of the conditions demanded here by Sainte-Beuve can have its value. A lack of feeling for the most delicate nuances of the text can itself cause the reader to inquire more attentively into the least of facts within the social relations underlying the work of art. Moreover, the insensitivity to fine shades of meaning can make readily procure for one (thanks to clearer apprehension of the contours of the work) a certain superiority to other critics, insofar as the feeling for nuances does not always go together with the gift for analysis.

Critical remarks on technical progress show up quite early. The author of the treatise On Art (Hippocrates?): "I believe that the inclination . . . of intelligence is to discover any one of those things that are still unknown, if indeed it is better to have discovered them than not to have done so at all." Leonardo da Vinci: "How and why I do not write of my method of going underwater for as long as I can remain there without eating: if I neither publish nor divulge this information, it is because of the wickedness of men who would avail themselves of it to commit murder at the bottom of the sea—by staving in ships and sinking them with their crews." Bacon: "In . . . The New Atlantis . . . he entrusts to a specially chosen commission the responsibility for deciding which new inventions will be brought before the public and which kept secret." Pierre-Maxime Schuhl, Machinisme et philosophe (Paris, 1938), pp. 7, 35.—"The bombers remind us of what Leonardo da Vinci expected of man in flight: that he was to ascend to the skies 'in order to seek snow on the mountaintops and bring it back to the city to spread on the sweltering streets in summer'" (Schuhl, Machinisme et philosophe, p. 95).

It may be that the continuity of tradition is mere semblance. But then precisely the persistence of this semblance of persistence provides it with continuity.

Proust, apropos of a citation (from a letter by <Gueuze> Balzac to M. de Forges) which he evidently borrowed from Montesquieu, to whom his comments are addressed. (The passage may contain a nonsensical slip of the pen or a printer's error.) "It was fifteen days ago that I removed it [that is, the citation] from my proof sheets . . . My book will no doubt be too little read for there to have been any risk of tarnishing your citation. Furthermore, I withdrew it less for your sake than for the sake of the sentence itself. In fact, I believe there exists for every beautiful sentence an imprescriptible right which renders it inalienable to all tak-
ers except the one for whom it waits, according to a destination which is its destiny." Correspondance générale de Marcel Proust, vol. 1, Lettres à Robert de Montesquiou (Paris, 1930), pp. 73–74.40

The pathological element in the notion of "culture" comes vividly to light in the effect produced on Raphael, the hero of The Wild Ass's Skin, by the enormous stock of merchandise in the four-story antique shop into which he ventures. "To begin with, the stranger compared . . . three showrooms—crammed with the relics of civilizations and religions, deities, royalties, masterpieces of art, the products of debauchery, reason and unreason—to a mirror of many facets, each one representing a whole world. . . . The young man's senses ended by being numbed at the sight of so many national and individual existences, their authenticity guaranteed by the human pledges which had survived them. . . . For him this ocean of furnishings, inventions, fashions, works of art, and relics made up an endless poem. . . . He clutched at every joy, grasped at every grief, made all the formulas of existence his own, and . . . generously dispersed his life and feelings over the images of that empty, plastic nature. . . . He felt smothered under the debris of fifty vanished centuries, nauseated with this surfact of human thought, crushed under the weight of luxury and art. . . . Alike in its caprices to our modern chemistry, which would reduce creation to one single gas, does not the soul distill fearful poisons in the rapid concentration of its pleasures . . . or its ideas? Do not many men perish through the lightning action of some moral acid or other, suddenly injected into their innermost being?" Balzac, La Peau de cha-grin, ed. Flammarion (Paris), pp. 19, 21–22, 24,41

Some theses by Focillon which have appearances on their side. Of course, the materialist theory of art is interested in dispelling such appearance. "We have no right to confuse the state of the life of forms with the state of social life. The time that gives support to a work of art does not give definition either to its principle or to its specific form" (p. 93). "The combined activity of the Capetian monar-chy, the episcopacy, and the townspeople in the development of Gothic cathedrals shows what a decisive influence may be exercised by the alliance of social forces. Yet no matter how powerful this activity may be, it is still by no means qualified to solve problems in pure statics, to combine relationships of values. The various masons who bonded two ribs of stone crossing at right angles beneath the north tower of Bayeux . . ., the creator of the choir at Saint-Denis, were geometers working on solids, and not historians interpreting time. [!] The most attentive study of the most homogeneous milieu, of the most closely woven concatenation of circumstances, will not serve to give us the design of the towers of Laon" (p. 89). It would be necessary to follow up on these reflections in order to show, first, the difference between the theory of milieu and the theory of the forces of production, and, second, the difference between a "reconstruction" and a historical interpretation of works. Henri Focillon, Vie des formes (Paris, 1934).42
Focillon on technique: “It has been like some observatory whence both sight and study might embrace within one and the same perspective the greatest possible number of objects and their greatest possible diversity. For technique may be interpreted in various ways: as a vital force, as a theory of mechanics, or as a mere convenience. In my own case as a historian, I never regarded technique as the automatism of a ‘craft,’ nor as . . . the recipes of a ‘cuisine’; instead I saw it as a whole poetry of action and . . . as the means for attaining metamorphoses. It has always seemed to me that . . . the observation of technical phenomena not only guarantees a certain controllable objectivity, but affords entrance into the very heart of the problem, by presenting it to us in the same terms and from the same point of view as it is presented to the artist.” The phrase italicized by the author marks the basic error. Henri Focillon, *Vie des formes* (Paris, 1934), pp. 53–54.43

The “activity on the part of a style in the process of self-definition . . . is generally known as an ‘evolution,’ this term being here understood in its broadest and most general sense. Biological science checked and modulated the concept of evolution with painstaking care; archaeology, on the other hand, took it simply as . . . a method of classification. I have elsewhere pointed out the dangers of ‘evolution’: its deceptive orderliness, its single-minded directness, its use, in those problematic cases . . . , of the expedient of ‘transitions,’ its inability to make room for the revolutionary energy of inventors.” Henri Focillon, *Vie des formes* (Paris, 1934), pp. 11–12.44

Prostitution, Gambling

Love is a bird of passage.
—Nouveau tableau de Paris, ou Observation sur les mœurs et usages des Parisiens au commencement du XIX siècle (Paris, 1828), vol. 1, p. 37

. . . in an arcade,
Women are as in their boudoir.

Hasn’t his eternal vagabondage everywhere accustomed him to reinterpreting the image of the city? And doesn’t he transform the arcade into a casino, into a gambling den, where now and again he stakes the red, blue, yellow jetsins of feeling on women, on a face that suddenly surfaces (will it return his look?), on a mute mouth (will it speak)? What, on the baize cloth, looks out at the gambler from every number—luck, that is—here, from the bodies of all the women, winks at him as the chimera of sexuality: as his type. This is nothing other than the number, the cipher, in which just at that moment luck will be called by name, in order to jump immediately to another number. His type—that’s the number that pays off thirty-six-fold, the one on which, without even trying, the eye of the voluptuary falls, as the ivory ball falls into the red or black compartment. He leaves the Palais-Royal with bulging pockets, calls to a whore, and once more celebrates in her arms the communion with number, in which money and riches, absolved from every earthen weight, have come to him from the fates like a joyous embrace returned to the full. For in gambling hall and bordello, it is the same supremely sinful delight: to challenge fate in pleasure. Let unsuspecting idealists imagine that sensual pleasure, of whatever stripe, could ever determine the theological concept of sin. The origin of true lechery is nothing else but this scaling of pleasure from out of the course of life with God, whose covenant with such life resides in the name. The name itself is the cry of naked lust. This sober thing, faultless in itself—the name—knows no other adversary than the fate that takes its place in whoring and that forges its arsenal in superstition. Thus in gambler and prostitute that superstition which arranges the figures of fate and
Frisby (London: Routledge, 1990), p. 477. The last phrase can be rendered more literally as “the all too pressing nearness.”


63. Ibid., p. 380.


N [On the Theory of Knowledge, Theory of Progress]


3. “Restoration of all things!” Derived from Jewish apocalyptic, Stoic, and Neo-platonico-Gnostic traditions, the concept originally referred to the recurrence of a specific planetary constellation.


7. This sentence could not be found among Keller’s epigrams. [R.T.


15. Ibid., p. 66 (italics added).


21. Benjamin’s reference to the “apollonischen Schnitt” remains obscure. The French translator of the Passagen-Werk renders this as “section d’or” (“golden section”), while the Italian translators offer the emendation “taglio di Apelle” (“Apelles’ section”),
with reference to the fourth-century B.C. Greek painter who, in a contest, divided a narrow line by one yet narrower and of a different color.

22. This phrase (literally, "to go to the many") means "to do for all." It occurs, for example, in Herodotus: "And now he's gone, joined the great majority" ("Temen obst ad placos"). The Satyricon, trans. William Arrowsmith (New York: New American Library, 1959), p. 50 (ch. 42). (Thanks to William Wyant for this reference.)


26. Blanqui's last work is L'Éternité par les autres; see D5a.1, and the entries following. Heidegger's outline of a Problemgeschichte ("history of problems") in Being and Time, paragraph 3, may stand behind Benjamin's reference to the philosopher here.

27. See Benjamin, GS, vol. 2, p. 578. [R.T.]


29. Marx and Engels, Selected Correspondence, p. 434 (Engels to Mehring, July 14, 1893).


31. Ibid., pp. 44, 46.

32. Ibid., p. 58. Benjamin has "perfection" for "reflection." Lines is Latin for "boundary," "limit.

33. Ibid., p. 52.

34. Ibid., p. 105.


37. Ibid., p. 146.


40. Ibid., p. 171.


44. Ibid., p. 148.

45. Ibid., pp. 151–152.

46. Ibid., p. 154.

47. Ibid., p. 157.


50. This passage is not found in the English-language edition of The Wining of the Middle Ages (New York: Anchor, 1954).


53. Korsch, Karl Marx, p. 182.

54. Ibid., p. 234.


58. Korsch, Karl Marx, p. 83. Quotation from Bacon is from the Novum Organum, book 1: "For it is rightly said that truth is the daughter of time and not of authority."


60. The citation is from Gust de Balzac, letter of March 7, 1634: "And because I am not avareous either in eye or in soul, I consider the emeralds of your peacocks as great a prize as those of the lapidary." In Proust, Correspondance, vol. 2: 1896–1901, ed. Philip Kolb (Paris: Pion, 1976), pp. 52–53. Proust's letter is dated by the editor mid-April 1896. The book in question is Les Plaisirs et les Jours.


63. Ibid., pp. 102–103.

64. Ibid., p. 47.

O [Prostitution, Gambling]

1. This passage is drawn from Reminiscences and Recollections of Captain Gronow: Being Anecdotes of the Camp, Court, Clubs, and Society, 1810–1860, vol. 1 (New York: Scribner and Welford, 1889), pp. 122–123 ("The Salon des Étrangers in Paris"), a text originally written in English. (Thanks to Susan Jackson for this reference.) We translate here the informative German translation used by Benjamin. On the Salon (Cercle) des Étrangers, see the Guide to Names and Terms, and "First Sketches," L7.19; Benjamin's "Marquis de Sévry" seems to be a mistake for the Marquis de Livry mentioned by Gronow (pp. 120–121).


3. Ibid., p. 60.

4. Schwelle, cognate with the English word "stilt," has the root sense of "board," "structural support," "foundation beam." According to current information, it is etymologically unrelated to schwelle.
