

assets, though KdF eventually grew to become a large business enterprise. KdF commissioned two cruise liners as part of its tourism, and also subsidized the development of the Volkswagon (People's Car)—though because of the war the "beetle" did not go into civilian production until after the war, during which it was solely produced as a jeep for the military. The goals of KdF were defined by Deutsche Arbeitsfront Secretary Gerhard Starcke in 1940: "We did not send our workers on vacations aboard their own ships and build them huge seaside resorts just for the fun of it. . . . We did it only so that we might bring [them] back to [their] workplaces with new strength and purpose." *The Encyclopedia of the Third Reich*, ed. Christian Zentner and Friedemann Bedürftig, trans. Amy Hackett (New York: Macmillan, 1991), vol. 2, pp. 922–24, 1005–06 (quotation, p. 924); and James Taylor and Warren Shaw, *The Third Reich Almanac* (New York: World Almanac, 1987), p. 323.

On the Social Situation of Music

1. OUTLINE, PRODUCTION

No matter where music is heard today, it sketches in the clearest possible lines the contradictions and flaws which cut through present-day society; at the same time, music is separated from this same society by the deepest of all flaws produced by this society itself. And yet, society is unable to absorb more of this music than its ruins and external remains. The role of music in the social process is exclusively that of a commodity; its value is that determined by the market. Music no longer serves direct needs nor benefits from direct application, but rather adjusts to the pressures of the exchange of abstract units. Its value—wherever such value still exists at all—is determined by use: it subordinates itself to the process of exchange. The islands of pre-capitalistic "music making"¹—such as the nineteenth century could still tolerate—have been washed away: the techniques of radio and sound film, in the hands of powerful monopolies and in unlimited control over the total capitalistic propaganda machine, have taken possession of even the innermost cell of musical practices of domestic music making. Even in the nineteenth century the possibility of the domestic cultivation of music—like the entirety of bourgeois private life—represented only the reverse side of a social corpus, whose surface was totally determined by production through private capital. The dialectic of capitalistic development has further eliminated even this last immediacy offered by music—in itself already an illusion, for in it the balance between individual production and understanding by society was threatened. Since Wagner's *Tristan*, this balance has been totally destroyed. Through the total absorption of both musical production and consumption by the capitalistic process, the alienation of music from man has become complete.

This process involved, of course, the objectification and rationalization of music, its separation from the simple immediacy of use which had once defined it as art and granted it permanence in contrast to its definition in terms of mere ephemeral sound. At the same time, it was this process which invested music with the power of far-reaching sublimation of drives and the cogent and binding expression of humanity. Now, however, rationalized music has fallen victim to the same dangers as rationalized society, within which class interests bring rationalization to a halt as soon as it threatens to turn against class conditions themselves. This situation has now left man in a state of rationalization which—as soon as the possibility of his further dialectic development is blocked—crushes him between unresolved contradictions. The same force of reification which constituted music as art has today taken music from man and left him with only an illusion [*Schein*] thereof. This force of reification could not simply be reconverted to immediacy without returning art to the state in which it found itself before the division of labor. Music, however, insofar as it did not submit to the command of the production of commodities, was in this process robbed of its social responsibility and exiled into an hermetic space within which its contents are removed. This is the situation from which every observation upon the social position of music which hopes to avoid the deceptions which today dominate discussions of the subject must proceed. These deceptions exist for the sake of concealing the actual situation and, further, as an apology for music which has allowed itself to be intimidated economically. They are also the result of the fact that music itself, under the superior power of the music industry developed by monopoly capitalism, became conscious of its own reification and of its alienation from man. Meanwhile, music, lacking proper knowledge of the social process—a condition likewise socially produced and sustained—blamed itself and not society for this situation, thus remaining in the illusion that the isolation of music was itself an isolated matter, namely, that things could be corrected from the side of music alone with no change in society. It is now necessary to face the hard fact that the social alienation of music—that assembly of phenomena for which an overhasty and unenlightened musical reformism employs derogatory terms such as individualism, charlatanism, and technical esotericism—is itself a matter of social fact and socially produced. For this reason, the situation cannot be corrected within music, but only within society: through the change of society. The question regarding the possible dialectic contribution which music can make toward such change remains open: however, its contribution will be slight, if it—from within its own resources—endeavors only to establish an immediacy

which is not only socially restraining today, but by no means reconstructible or even desirable, thus contributing to the disguise of the situation. The question is further to what degree music—insofar as it might intervene in the social process—will be in a position to intervene as *art*. Regardless of the answers which might be given, here and now music is able to do nothing but portray within its own structure the social antinomies which are also responsible for its own isolation. Music will be better, the more deeply it is able to express—in the antinomies of its own formal language—the exigency of the social condition and to call for change through the coded language of suffering. It is not for music to stare in helpless horror at society: it fulfills its social function more precisely when it presents social problems through its own material and according to its own formal laws—problems which music contains within itself in the innermost cells of its technique. The task of music as art thus enters into a parallel relationship to the task of social theory. If the immanent development of music were established as an absolute—as the mere reflection of the social process—the only result would be a sanction of the fetish character of music which is the major difficulty and most basic problem to be represented by music today. On the other hand, it is clear that music is not to be measured in terms of the existing society of which it is the product and which, at the same time, keeps music in a state of isolation. It is the prerequisite of every historical-materialistic method which hopes to be more than a mere exercise in “intellectual history” that under no conditions is music to be understood as a “spiritual” phenomenon, abstract and far-removed from actual social conditions, which can anticipate through its imagery any desire for social change independently from the empirical realization thereof. It thus becomes obvious that the relation of present-day music and society is highly problematic in all its aspects. This relation shares its aporias with social theory: at the same time, however, it shares the attitudes which this theory expresses—or ought to express—toward these aporias. In a certain sense, the *character of cognition* is to be demanded of any music which today wishes to preserve its right to existence. Through its material, music must give clear form to the problems assigned it by this material which is itself never purely natural material, but rather a social and historical product; solutions offered by music in this process stand equal to theories. Social postulates are offered, the relationship of which to praxis might be, to be sure, extremely mediated and difficult or which, at any rate, cannot be realized without great difficulty. It is these postulates, however, which decide whether and how the entrance into social reality might be made. The short circuit: such music is incom-

prehensible, esoteric-private, thus reactionary, and must, therefore, be rejected: such music is constructed upon the foundation of a romantic concept of primitive musical immediacy which gives rise to the opinion that the empirical consciousness of present-day society—a consciousness promoted in unenlightened narrow-mindedness and, indeed, promoted even to the point of neurotic stupidity in the face of class domination for the purpose of the preservation of this consciousness—might be taken as the positive measure of a music no longer alienated, but rather the property of free men. Politics must not be permitted to draw abstractions from this state of consciousness which is necessarily of central concern to the social dialectic, nor is cognition to allow the definition of its boundaries by a consciousness produced by class domination and which further as the class consciousness of the proletariat extends the wounds of mutilation by means of the class mechanism. Music is under the same obligation as the-ory to reach out beyond the current consciousness of the masses. Theory, however, stands in a dialectic relation to praxis, upon which it makes demands and from which it also accepts demands; in the same manner, music which has achieved self-consciousness of its social function will enter into a dialectic relation to praxis. This is to be achieved not through the self-subordination of music to "use" which it could do here and now only through definition of itself as a commodity and which would grant it only an illusion of immediacy, but rather by developing within music itself—in agreement with the state of social theory—all those elements whose objective is the overcoming of class domination. This music must do even where this development takes place in social isolation, confined to the cells of music during the period of class domination. It might be possible for the most advanced compositional production of the present—solely under the pressure of the immanent development of its problems—to invalidate basic bourgeois categories such as the creative personality and expression of the soul of this personality, the world of private feelings and its trans-figured inwardness, setting in their place highly rational and transparent principles of construction. Even this music, however, would remain dependent upon bourgeois production processes and could not, consequently, be viewed as "classless" or the actual music of the future, but rather as music which fulfills its dialectic cognitive function most exactly. Within present society, such music encounters a vehement resistance which sur-passes the resistance against all use music and communal music [*Ge-bruchs- und Gemeinschaftsmusik*];² no matter how literary or political its accents might be. Nonetheless, this resistance seems to indicate that the

dialectic function of this music is already perceptible in praxis, even if only as a negative force, as "destruction."

From a social perspective, present-day musical activity, production and consumption can be divided drastically into that which unconditionally recognizes its commodity character and, refusing any dialectic interven-tion, orients itself according to the demands of the market and that which in principle does not accept the demands of the market. A somewhat dif-ferent view: music of the first category—passive and undialectic—takes its place on the side of society; the second, on the side of music. The traditional distinction between "light" and "serious" music, sanctioned by bourgeois musical culture, ostensibly corresponds to this division. But only ostensi-bly. For a great share of supposedly "serious" music adjusts itself to the demands of the market in the same manner as the composers of light music, even if this is done under the cover of an economically untrans-parent "fashion" or through the calculation of the demands of the market into production. The disguise of the market function of such music through the concept of personality or simplicity or "life" serves only to transfigure it and to increase its market value indirectly. On the other hand, it is precisely "light" music—tolerated by present-day society, despised and exploited in the same way as prostitution with which it is not compared in vain—with its "skirt seductively raised," which develops certain ele-ments portraying the satisfaction of the drive of present society, whose official claims, however, stand in conflict to such satisfaction. In a certain sense, such music thus transcends the society which it supposedly serves. In the distinction between light and serious music, the alienation of man and music is reflected only through distortion, in the same manner, namely, as this alienation is seen by the bourgeoisie. An effort is made to exempt "serious" music from an alienation shared to an equal degree by Stravinsky's *Symphony of Psalms* and the latest hit song of Robert Stolz.³ Blame for this alienation is assigned under the label of "kitsch" only to that music which, as an exact reaction to the constellation of drives within this society, is the only music suitable to it; it is, however, this very suit-ability which disavows this society. For this reason, the distinction between light and serious music is to be replaced by a different distinction which views both halves of the musical globe equally from the perspective of alienation: as halves of a totality which to be sure could never be recon-structed through the addition of the two halves.

Musical production which in the narrower sense does not subordinate itself unconditionally to the law of the market—that is, "serious" music

with the exception of the obviously quantitatively dominant music, which likewise serves the market in disguise—is that music that expresses alienation. A rather crude scheme can be established: the first type of music is that which, without consciousness of its social location or out of indifference toward it, presents and crystallizes its problems and the solutions thereto in a merely immanent manner. To a degree, it resembles the monad of Leibniz; it “represents,” to be sure, not a pre-established harmony, but certainly an historically produced dissonance, namely, social antinomies. This first type, as “modern” music is the only music which offers a serious shock to the listener, is represented essentially by Arnold Schoenberg and his school. The second type includes music which recognizes the fact of alienation as its own isolation and as “individualism” and further raises this fact to the level of consciousness; it does so, however, only within itself, only in aesthetic and form-immanent terms. It thus attempts to annul this insight without respect for actual society. For the most part, it would achieve this through recourse to stylistic forms of the past, which it views as immune to alienation, without seeing that such forms cannot be reconstituted within a completely changed society and through completely changed musical material. This music can be called *objectivism*, insofar as it—without becoming involved in any social dialectic—would like to evoke the image of a non-existent “objective” society or, in terms of its intentions, of a “fellowship.” In the highly capitalistic-industrial nations, *neo-classicism* is a major component of objectivism; in the undeveloped, agrarian countries, it is *folklore*. The most effective author of objectivism who in a highly revealing manner manifests each of these major directions—one after the other, but never simultaneously—is Igor Stravinsky. The third type is a hybrid form. Hand in hand with objectivism, this composer proceeds from the cognition of alienation. At the same time, he is socially more alert than the objectivist and recognizes the solutions offered by his colleague as illusion. He denies himself the positive solution and contents himself with permitting social flaws to manifest themselves by means of a flawed invoice which defines itself as illusory with no attempt at camouflage through attempts at an aesthetic totality. In his effort, he employs the formal language belonging in part to the bourgeois musical culture of the nineteenth century, in part to present-day consumer music. These means are used to reveal the flaws which he detects. Through his destruction of aesthetic formal immanence, this type of composer transcends into the literary realm. Extensive objective correspondences between this third type and French surrealism justify speaking in this case of *surrealistic* music. Such music was developed out of

Stravinsky's middle period—above all, out of *L'Histoire du soldat*. It has been developed most consequently in the works which Kurt Weill produced together with Bert Brecht, particularly *The Three Penny Opera* and *Mahagonny*. The fourth type involves music which attempts to break through alienation from within itself, even at the expense of its immanent form. This is normally identified as “use music.” However, it is precisely this typical use music—especially as it is produced on order for radio and theater—which gives evidence of such obvious dependence upon the market that it cannot enter into the present discussion. That which demands attention is rather the effort to produce “communal music”; this direction developed out of neo-classicism and is represented by Hindemith and the proletarian choral works of Hanns Eisler.

Arnold Schoenberg decried the resistance that each new work encounters as intellectualistic, destructive, abstract and esoteric, not unlike the resistance shown toward psychoanalysis. Actually, he does manifest extensive correspondences to Freud—not, to be sure, in terms of the concrete thematic content of his music, divorced from all psychological references, but rather in terms of social structure. Like Freud and Karl Kraus,⁴ whose efforts toward the purification of language find a counterpart in Schoenberg's music, this composer, also from Vienna, is to be counted among the dialectic phenomena of bourgeois individualism—taking the word in its most general sense—which work in their supposedly “specialized” areas of problems without respect for a presupposed social totality. In these areas, however, they achieve solutions which suddenly change and turn unnoticed against the prerequisites of individualism; such solutions are in principle denied to a socially oriented bourgeois reformism which must pay for its insights, aimed as they are at totality but never reaching the basis thereof, with “mediating” and—consequently—camouflaging mechanisms. Freud, in order to arrive at objective symbols and finally at an objective dialectic of human consciousness in history, had to carry out the analysis of individual consciousness and subconsciousness. Kraus, in order to perfect the concept of socialism in the sphere of the “superstructure” for a second time, as it were, did nothing but confront bourgeois life with its own norm of correct individual behavior, thus revealing, in turn, to individuals their own norm: according to the same scheme, Schoenberg has annulled the expressive music of the private bourgeois individual, pursuing—as it were—its own consequences, and put in its place a different music, into whose music no social function falls—indeed, which even severs the last communication with the listener. However, this music leaves all other music of the age far behind in terms of immanently musical

quality and dialectic clarification of its material. He thus offers such a perfected and rational total organization that it cannot possibly be compatible with the present social constitution, which then unconsciously through all its critical representatives takes up an offensive position and calls upon nature for assistance against the attack of consciousness encountered in Schoenberg. In him, for perhaps the first time in the history of music, consciousness has taken hold of the natural material of music and seized control of it. In Schoenberg, however, the breakthrough of consciousness is not idealistic: it is not to be understood as the production of music out of pure spirit. It is much rather a type of dialectic in the strictest sense. For the movement perfected by Schoenberg proceeds from questioning how this movement is situated within the material itself. The productive force which incites this movement involves the reality of a psychic drive—the drive, namely, toward undisguised and uninhibited expression of the psyche and of the unconscious *per se*. This is found most precisely in the works of Schoenberg's middle period, including *Erwartung*, *Die glückliche Hand* and the Little Piano Pieces, which place his work in direct relationship to psychoanalysis. However, this drive is confronted by an objective problem: how can material which has achieved the highest technical development—that is, the material which Schoenberg inherited from Wagner on the one hand and, on the other, from Brahms as well—subordinate itself to radical expression of the psychic? It can do this only by submitting itself to thorough change: this namely, it must surrender all alleged connections and obligations which stand in the way of freedom of movement of individual expression; these connections are the reflection of an "agreement" of bourgeois society with the psyche of the individual which is now renounced by the sufferings of the individual. These are the traditional musical symmetrical relations in that they are based upon the technique of repetition—no matter what form it might take—and—again in agreement with Karl Kraus and also in harmony with the architectural intentions of Adolf Loos⁵—that this technique further takes the form of criticism of every type of *ornamentation*. In view of the limitation of all musical elements this criticism does not restrict itself merely to musical *architecture*, the symmetry and ornamentation of which it negates; it extends equally to the harmonic correlation of tectonic symmetrical relations and *tonality*, simultaneously touched by dissonance as the vehicle of the radical principle of expression; with the decline of the tonal scheme, *counterpoint*—previously subject to chordal limitation—is emancipated and produces that form of polyphony known as "linearity." Finally, the total homogenous *sound*, supported by the substance of traditional orchestral

string tutti, is attacked. Schoenberg's really central achievement—which, by the way, has never been properly appreciated from the traditional perspective of observation, is that he, from his earliest works on, for example, in the Lieder op. 6—never behaved "expressionistically," superimposing subjective intentions upon heterogeneous material in an authoritarian and inconsiderate manner. Instead, every gesture with which he intervenes in the material configuration is at the same time an answer to questions directed to him by the material in the form of its own immanent problems. Every subjective-expressive achievement of Schoenberg is simultaneously the resolution of objective-material contradictions which continued to exist in the Wagnerian technique of chromatic sequence and in the diatonic technique of variation employed by Brahms as well. Schoenberg is by no means an esoteric to be reserved for a specialized and socially irrelevant history of music, but rather a figure to be projected upon the social dialectic from the perspective of his dialectic of musical material. This is justified by the fact that he—in the form of material problems which he inherited, accepted, and continued—found present in the problems of society that produced this material and in which the contradictions of this society are defined as technical problems. That Schoenberg's solutions to technical problems are socially relevant in spite of their isolation is proven by his replacement within all his works, in spite and because of his own expressive origins, of any private fortuitousness which might have been viewed quite correctly as a type of anarchic musical production with an objective principle of order which is never imposed upon the material from the exterior, but rather extracted from the material itself and brought into relationship with it by means of an historical process of rational transparency. This is the meaning of the revolution which technologically took the form of "twelve-tone composition." In the very moment in which the total musical material is subjected to the power of expression, expression itself is extinguished—as though it were animated only by the resistance of the material, itself "alienated" and alien to the subject. Subjective criticism of instances of ornamentation and repetition leads to an objective, non-expressive structure which, in place of symmetry and repetition, determines the exclusion of repetition within the cell, i.e., the use of all twelve tones of the scale before the repetition of a tone from within the scale. This same structure further prevents the "free," arbitrary, constructively unrelated insertion of any one tone into the composition. In corresponding manner, the expressively obligatory leading tone harmonic is replaced by a complementary one. Radical freedom from all objective norms imposed upon music from the exterior is coordinated with the most extreme rigidity

of immanent structure, so that music by its own forces eliminates at least within itself alienation as a matter of subjective formation and objective material. Music thus moves toward that for which Alois Hába coined the beautiful expression "musical style of freedom."⁶ To be sure, music overcomes inward alienation only through the perfected expression thereof on its exterior. And if one were to assume that the immanent overcoming of the aporias of music were consistently possible, this would be nothing more than a romantic transfiguration of craftsmanship, including that of Schoenberg, and of the finest of contemporary music, tantamount to the failure to recognize these very aporias. For with the choice of text for his most recent opera *Von heute auf morgen*, a glorification of bourgeois marriage in contrast to libertinage, unreflectingly contrasting "love" and "fashion," Schoenberg nevertheless subordinates his own music to a bourgeois private sphere attacked by his music in terms of its objective character. Certain classicistic inclinations within the overall formal architecture which can be detected in Schoenberg's most recent works might well point in the same direction. Above all: the question is whether the ideal of the hermetic work of art, resting within itself, which Schoenberg inherited from classicism and to which he remains true can be reconciled with the means which he has defined and, further, whether such a concept of a work of art, as totality and cosmos, can still be upheld at all. It might well be that at their deepest level Schoenberg's works stand in opposition to this ideal; the impulse resulting from the total absence of illusion in them offers proof thereof—this impulse was expressed in his struggle against ornamentation and still more strongly in the sobriety of his present musical diction—and in the diction of the texts as well—it might well be that the secret which dwells within his work is hostility toward art: according to its implicit claims, the intention of this work is to force the autonomous work of art, as Beethoven knew it, sufficient unto itself and all-powerful in its symbolism, back into existence again by means both thoroughly and historically rationalized. However, the possibility of such reconstruction is—as in the case of Kraus's attempted reconstruction of a pure language—a doubtful undertaking. Here, and to be sure only here and not in the unpopularity of his work, Schoenberg's social insight reaches the boundary of this work; not only are the limits of his talent defined, but rather the limits of the function of talent per se. This boundary is not to be crossed through music alone. Schoenberg's student Alban Berg established residence at this boundary. In terms of compositional technique, his work represents to a certain degree the reverse line of association between Schoenberg's advanced work and that of the previous generation: Wagner,

Mahler and, in many respects, Debussy as well. However, this line is drawn from the perspective of Schoenberg's niveau, which embraces his technical achievements: extreme variation and through-construction and also the twelve-tone method are applied to older chromatic material, including the leading tone, as happens in Schoenberg's works, without "repealing" it: the expressive function is thus preserved. Even if Berg, more so than Schoenberg, remains thereby bound to bourgeois-individualistic music—in the conventional categories of style criticism: the New German school—he nonetheless breaks free of it in other areas as completely as does Schoenberg. Berg's dialectic is carried out within the realm of musical expression, which cannot be repudiated unconditionally as "individualistic," as the advocates of an empty and collectivistic New-Matter-of-Factness incessantly proclaim.⁷ The question of expression can be answered rather only in concrete terms, only according to the substratus of expression, of that which is expressed, and in terms of the validity of the expression itself. If this question is seriously asked within the realm of bourgeois-individualistic music of expression, it becomes apparent that this music of expression is questionable not only as music, but as expression as well: similar to practices in many of the "psychological" novels of the nineteenth century, it is not at all the psychic reality of the subject in question which is expressed, but rather a fictive, stylized and, in many respects, counterfeited reality which is encountered in both cases. In music the interlacing of the psychological concept of expression with that of the style of romanticism is an indication of this state of affairs. If music is successful in breaking through the fictive psychological substratus thus through the Wagnerian heroic-erotic image of man, penetrating into the actual substratus, then the function of music regarding the bourgeois individual changes. It is then no longer the intention of music to transfigure the individual, establishing him as a norm, but rather to disclose his misery and his suffering, which are concealed by psychological as well as musical convention; by expressing the misery—or the vileness—of the individual without abandoning him to his isolation, but rather by objectifying this misery, music turns in the final analysis against the order of things within which it has its origins as such, just as does the expressed individual have his roots as an individual, but which in music attains to consciousness of itself and of its despair. As soon as such music—for its part sufficiently related in its content to psychoanalysis and not in vain at home in the regions of dream and insanity—eradicates the conventional psychology of expression. It decomposes the contours of the surface thereof and constructs out of the particles of musical expression a new language by means

of musical immanence; this converges with Schoenberg's constructive language in spite of the totally different course by which this goal is approached. This dialectic evolves within Berg's works and it is this alone which permits an understanding of his composition of Büchner's tragedy *Wozzeck* in its full significance. A parallel to fine arts is perhaps permissible; Berg's relation to the expressive music of the late nineteenth and beginning twentieth century parallels that of Kokoschka's portraits to those of the impressionists.⁸ The authentic portrayal of the individual psyche, both of the bourgeois psyche and of the proletarian psyche which is produced by the bourgeoisie, is suddenly transformed in *Wozzeck* into an intention of social criticism, without of course destroying the frame of aesthetic immanence. It is the deep paradox of Berg's work, in which social antagonism is work-immanently defined, that this critical development is possible in reference to material from the past which is now made transparent by his criticism. This can be observed in one of the most significant scenes in *Wozzeck*, the great scene in the tavern, and here Berg's method intersects with that of the surrealists. At the same time, it is this reference—at least in terms of the drama—which has protected Berg's work from total isolation and elicited a certain resonance from the bourgeois audience. Even if this resonance is rooted in the misunderstanding of *Wozzeck* as the last "music drama" of Wagnerian coinage, it permits a certain amount of that quality in *Wozzeck* which manifests a dark and dangerous current originating in the caves of the unconscious to trickle into prevailing consciousness through the channels of misunderstanding. Finally, within this context, brief reference must be made to the third representative of the Schoenberg School: Anton Webern. Unquestionable as the extraordinary musical quality of Webern's work is, the social interpretation of this work presents great difficulty and it cannot be more than touched upon here. [In Webern.] loneliness and alienation from society—conditioned in Schoenberg by the formal structure of his work—become thematic and are transformed into content: the declaration of the inexpressible and of total alienation is asserted by every sound of his music. If one were to apply the basic concept of immanent dialectics, which constitutes the foundation of the Schoenberg School, to Webern, one would have to employ a sub-title from Kierkegaard—who is sufficiently close to Webern—and speak of "dialectic lyricism."⁹ For here the most extremely individual differentiation, a dissolution of the material used which musically goes far beyond Schoenberg and expressively beyond Berg, is employed for no other purpose than this: for the liberation of a type of natural language of music, of pure sound, which Webern denied without fail in the regression

to a natural material, to tonality and to the "natural" overtone relations. To produce the image of nature within historical dialectics: that is the intention of Webern's music and the riddle which it offers. As a riddle, it offers an answer totally contrary to all nature-romanticism. This riddle will be solved only much later.

The virtuosity of Stravinsky and his followers forms an exact antithesis to the mastery of Schoenberg and his school; here the game is opposed to the absence of illusion; the seductively arbitrary change of masks, whose wearers are consequently identical but empty, is set against responsible dialectics, the substratum of which transforms itself in sudden changes. The music of objectivism is socially all the more transparent than that of the Schoenberg School, the less compactly and densely it turns upon itself in its technology. For that reason the social interpretation of objectivism must proceed from the objectivists' technical method. In every objectivist music the attempt is made to correct the alienation of music from within, that is to say, without any clear view of social reality; however, this is not attempted through further pursuit of its immanent dialectic, which is reproached as alien to nature, individualistic and overly differentiated. Absurdly enough, Stravinsky once compared Schoenberg with Oscar Wilde. The musically immanent correction of alienation is rather sought through regression to older, totally pre-bourgeois musical forms, within which an effort is made to affirm an original natural state of music—indeed, it might be said, a musical anthropology appropriate to the being of man and his bodily constitution is the objectivist goal. This explains the inclination of all objectivism to dance forms and to rhythms originating in the dance; they are thought to be elevated above historical change and accessible to every age. Objectivism distinguishes itself from the concept of stylistic history so important to romanticism, defined in an extreme formula as the "sound of legend" in Schumann; this process involves not only the contrasting of a past musical condition with the negative present-day situation as something positive which it longingly hopes to reinstitute, but even to a greater degree the construction in the past of the image of something absolutely valid which might be realized here and now just as at any other time. This is why objectivism in its theoretical pronouncements has attacked romanticism so vehemently. From a practical-musical perspective, however, all this means is that the regression of objectivism to its historical models—regardless of whether genuine or false rustic folk music, medieval polyphony or the "pre-classic" concertante style is involved—does not aim merely at the reinstitution of these models; only in exceptional cases has objectivism, in the form of stylistic copy, undertaken such reinstitution.

In the breadth of its production, however, objectivism does endeavor under the banner of "New Objectivity," dutifully emphasizing its contemporaneity and the fact that it has arrived, to apply old and presumably eternal models to its actual material: to the same harmonically free material, predisposed to polyphony and emancipated from the pressures of expression, which proceeds from the dialectic of the Schoenberg School and is taken over undialectically by objectivism. The formation of a highly differentiated material, manifesting all the signs of the division of labor, but doing so in a static naturalistic manner pre-dating the division of labor: that is, the ideal of musical objectivism.

In this process inescapable contemporary social analogies become apparent. The estate-corporative organization of a highly industrial economic context is manifested, which in objectivist music appears as a conforming image: it appears that the sovereign composer stands in free control of the supposed musical organism, in much the same way that in fascism a "leadership elite" [*Führerelite*] appears to be in control, while in truth power over the social "organism" lies in the hands of monopoly capitalism. When a dissonance is to be introduced or when a suspended note is to be resolved is decided neither by a pre-established scheme, annulled after all by the actual material, nor by structural immanence, the rational order of which is negated precisely in the name of nature, but only by the inclination, namely, the "taste" of the composer. Tempting as the analogy is and no matter how much of the true state of affairs it might reveal, it is not to be made responsible for cognition without the expression of resistance. In the Russian emigrant Stravinsky or even in a neo-classicist such as Casella, who is so very ambitious in cultural politics, the relation to fascism is beyond question.¹⁰ The social interpretation of music, however, is not concerned with the individual consciousness of authors, but rather with the function of their work. And this is where the difficulties begin. First of all, if the association of objectivism with fascism is to be understood as something actual, categories of mediation must be found and the mediation itself must be explained. The mechanism of mediation is, however, still unknown. It could be revealed most readily by an analysis of the state of affairs in fashion, which—as demonstrated, for example, in Stravinsky's case by his generally familiar dependencies—does not permit the essential formal elements of neo-classicism to define themselves through the asking of immanent-technical questions. These elements were rather first deposited from outside the work and were then later transposed into the technical immanence of the work of art. Fashion itself, however, points back judiciously to social and economic facts. This indicates that a solution of

the problem of mediation in music has by no means been found; it is rather only that the location of the problem has been designated with greater precision. And furthermore, in the interpretation of objectivism in regard to fascism, problems of content must be confronted. These difficulties are caused by the same state of alienation, the immanent-aesthetic eradication or concealment of which objectivism sets as its task. Even if it were assumed that in terms of intention and objective structure this were indeed the music of the most progressive class within monopoly capitalism, this class would still remain unable either to understand or to consume this music. In the effort of objectivism to overcome alienation only in terms of artistic imagery, alienation is permitted to continue unchanged in reality. The technical specialization of music has progressed so far that an audience is no longer in a position to comprehend this music, even when it is an objective expression of the ideology of the audience itself. In addition, ideological forces of other types, such as the concept of "education" [*Bildung*] as an accumulation of spiritual goods out of the past, have a far greater musical effect upon the audience than the immediate configuration of its social ideals in music; this audience is already too far removed from music to place central importance upon such configurations. It might well be that Stravinsky's music reflects upper-bourgeois ideology far more precisely than, for example, the music of Richard Strauss, the upper-bourgeois composer of the last generation; even so, the upper bourgeoisie will nonetheless suspect Stravinsky as a "destroyer" and prefer to hear Strauss in his stead—but prefer even more to hear Beethoven's Seventh Symphony. In this way, alienation complicates the social equation. It is manifested, however, in immanent-aesthetic terms as well—and this might well be the true source of the distrust of the upper bourgeoisie against "its" music. The incorrectness of the structure within itself, within which the contradiction between the affirmed formal intentions and the actual state of the material remains unresolved, corresponds to the arbitrariness—the negative arbitrariness—with which the composer disposes over his material. This he does with no preformation of the material in any objectively obligatory manner and without any unequivocal judgment upon musical justice and injustice pronounced by the inner construction of the musical constellation itself.

The greatest justice is done to the material by compositional practices such as those encountered in the significant Hungarian composer and folksong scholar Béla Bartók; he refutes the fiction of formal objectivity and goes back instead to a pre-objective, truly archaic material, which, however, is very closely related to current material precisely in its particular dis-

solution. Radical folklorism in the rational through-construction of his particular material is, consequently, amazingly similar to the practices of the Schoenberg School. In the realm of objectivism, however, Bartók is a totally singular phenomenon; his earlier collaborator Kodály,¹¹ on the other hand, falsified authentic folklore as a romantic dream image of unified folkish life which denounces itself through the contrast of primitivizing melody and sensuously soft, late-impressionistic harmony. Stravinsky's games of masks¹² are protected from demasking of this type by his highly precise and cautious artistic understanding. It is his great and dangerous accomplishment, dangerous to himself as well, that his music uses the knowledge of its coercive antinomy in presenting itself as a game. It does this, however, never simply as a game and never as applied art: rather, it maintains a position of continual hovering between game and seriousness and between styles as well, which makes it almost impossible to call it by name and within which irony hinders any comprehension of the objectivist ideology. This, however, is the background of a despair which is permitted every expression, since no single expression suits it correctly; at the same time it brings the game of masks into relief against its dismal background. Within this oscillation a game might become seriousness at any moment and change suddenly into satanic laughter, mocking society with the possibility of a non-alienated music; it is this which makes the reception of Stravinsky as a fashionable composer whose pretention simultaneously elevates his music impossible. It is precisely the artistic security with which he recognizes the impossibility of a positive-aesthetic solution of the antinomies conditioned by society, recognizing, at the same time, the social antinomy itself which makes him suspicious in the eyes of the upper bourgeoisie. In his best and most exposed works—such as *L'Histoire du soldat*—he provokes contradiction. In contrast to all other objectivist authors, Stravinsky's superiority within his métier endangers the consistent ideological positivity of his style, as this is demanded of him by society: consequently, in his case as well, artistic logical consistence becomes socially dialectical. It is only with the *Symphony of Psalms* that he seems to have warded off the suspicion of prevailing powers against big-city "studio" art, decadence and disintegration.

The essential social function of Hindemith is the decontamination of Stravinsky's objectivism by means of the naïveté with which he assimilates it. His objectivism offers a picture of consistent seriousness; artificial security becomes artisan respectability, whereby the idea of the artisan as a "music maker" again corresponds to the ideas of a state of production not based upon the production and reproduction in music. Hindemith's satanic

irony regarding "healthy humor," the health of which indicates the unreflected state of nature in objectivism, disturbed by the grin of Stravinsky's masks and his humor regarding aggressive irony, no matter whether it is avant-garde irony or snobbish irony, both reveal his principal reconciliation with social conditions. Stravinsky's despair—this totally historical despair driven to the boundary of schizophrenia in *L'Histoire du soldat*—is the expression of a subjectivity achieved only through fragments and ghosts of past objective musical language. In Hindemith, this despair is moderated to a naturalistic, unresolved, but still undialectic, melancholy, which looks upon death as an eternal state of affairs similar to numerous intentions of contemporary philosophy, evading concrete social contradictions under the banner of "existentialism" and thus subordinating itself willingly to the anthropological super-historical ideals of objectivism. Stravinsky absorbed social contradictions into artistic antinomy and gave them form; Hindemith conceals them and for that reason his blind configurations turn out to be filled with contradictions. The more perceptive technical eye, which is able to penetrate the surface of consistently interlocking movement and infallible security of instrumentation within the acoustic inventory, locates the flaw of Hindemith's technique everywhere: it discovers the differences between arbitrary material employed as motifs and would-be rigidity of form; between the principal unrepeatability of the components and the forms of repetition which grant surface continuity; between terraced architecture on a large scale and the lack of discrimination, along with the necessity of ordering, in the ordering of the individual terraces. All of this happens simply because "objective" architecture does not embrace the individual productive impulses as a prescribed organizational principle, but rather is imposed upon them by compositional arbitrariness, resulting in a false façade under the sign of the New Objectivity. The thematic content of objectivism here remains arbitrary, just as it is in Stravinsky and, to be sure, in the legions of his followers; it is arbitrary in the sense that it is interchangeable and replaceable according to changing ideological needs, and it is not unequivocally predetermined by a social constitution and nowhere is it that order for which music might bear witness; it is rather a class order, to be concealed by music under the sign of its humanity. Now mere formal objectivity, totally lacking in content, is offered in its emptiness as thematic content, objectivity for the sake of objectivity, as is often the case in Stravinsky; this obscure vacuity is thus praised as an irrational natural force, now, as in Hindemith, it is introduced as proof of a community, as such is often formed as a petit bourgeois protest against capitalistic forms of mechanization or in the manner in