V. The Analysis of Institutions

18

CEREMONIAL INSTITUTIONS

THAT CONTROL of conduct which we distinguish as ceremony, precedes the civil and ecclesiastical controls. It begins with sub-human types of creatures; it occurs among otherwise ungoverned savages; it often becomes highly developed where the other kinds of rule are little developed; it is ever being spontaneously generated afresh between individuals in all societies; and it envelops the more definite restraints which State and Church exercise. The primitiveness of ceremonial regulation is further shown by the fact that at first, political and religious regulations are little more than systems of ceremony, directed towards particular persons living and dead: the code of law joined with the one, and the moral code joined with the other, coming later. There is again the evidence derived from the possession of certain elements in common by the three controls, social, political, and religious; for the forms observable in social intercourse occur also in political and religious intercourse as forms of homage and forms of worship. More significant still is the circumstance that ceremonies may mostly be traced back to certain spontaneous acts which manifestly precede legislation, civil and ecclesiastical. Instead of arising by dictation or by agreement, which would imply the pre-established organization required for making and enforcing rules, they arise by modifications of acts performed for personal ends; and so prove themselves to grow out of individual conduct before social arrange-

From *The Principles of Sociology* (London: Williams and Norgate, 1876), vol. 2, part 4, pp. 34–35, 78–80, 102–3, 194–204.

ments exist to control it. Lastly we note that when there arises a political head, who, demanding subordination, is at first his own master of the ceremonies, and who presently collects round him attendants whose propitiatory acts are made definite and fixed by repetition, there arise ceremonial officials. Though, along with the growth of organizations which enforce civil laws and enunciate moral precepts, there has been such a decay of the ceremonial organization as to render it among ourselves inconspicuous; yet in early stages the body of officials who conduct propitiation of living rulers, supreme and subordinate, homologous with the body of officials who conduct propitiation of dead apothesized rulers, major and minor, is a considerable element of the social structure; and it dwindles only as fast as the structures, political and ecclesiastical, which exercise controls more definite and detailed, usurp its functions.

Carrying with us these general conceptions, let us now pass to the several components of ceremonial rule. We will deal with them under the heads—Trophies, Mutilations, Presents, Visits, Obeisances, Forms of Address, Titles, Badges and Costumes, Further Class Distinctions, Fashion, Past and Future of Ceremony. . . .

[Spencer has been considering the functions of bodily mutilation, especially circumcision.] That this interpretation applies to the custom as made known in the Bible, is clear. We have already seen that the ancient Hebrews, like the modern Abyssinians, practised the form of trophy-taking which necessitates this mutilation of the dead enemy; and as in the one case, so in the other, it follows that the vanquished enemy not slain but made prisoner, will by this mutilation be marked as a subject person. That circumcision was among the Hebrews the stamp of subjection, all the evidence proves. On learning that among existing Bedouins, the only conception of God is that of a powerful living ruler, the sealing by circumcision of the covenant between God and Abraham becomes a comprehensible ceremony. There is furnished an explanation of the fact that in consideration of a territory to be received, this mutilation, undergone by Abraham, implied that "the Lord" was

"to be *a* god unto" him; as also of the fact that the mark was to be borne not by him and his descendants only, as favoured individuals, but also by slaves not of his blood. . . .

If, as we have seen, trophy-taking as a sequence of conquest enters as a factor into those governmental restraints which conquest initiates, it is to be inferred that the mutilations originated by trophy-taking will do the like. The evidence justifies this inference. Beginning as marks of personal slavery and becoming marks of political and religious subordination, they play a part like that of oaths of fealty and pious self-dedications. Moreover, being acknowledgments of submission to a ruler, visible or invisible, they enforce authority by making conspicuous the extent of his sway. And where they signify class-subjection, as well as where they show the subjugation of criminals, they further strengthen the regulative agency.

If mutilations originate as alleged, some connexion must exist between the extent to which they are carried and the social type. On grouping the facts as presented by fifty-two peoples, the connexion emerges with as much clearness as can be expected. In the first place, since mutilation originates with conquest and resulting aggregation, it is inferable that simple societies, however savage, will be less characterized by it than the larger savage societies compounded out of such, and less than even semi-civilized societies. This proves to be true. Of peoples who form simple societies that practice mutilation either not at all or in slight forms, I find eleven —Fuegians, Veddahs, Andamanese, Dyas, Todas, Gonds, Santals, Bodo and Dhimals, Mishmis, Kamstchadales, Snake Indians; and these are characterized throughout either by absence of chieftainship, or by chieftainship of an unsettled kind. Meanwhile, of peoples who mutilate little or not at all, I find but two in the class of uncivilized compound societies; of which one, the Kirghiz, is characterized by a wandering life that makes subordination difficult; and the other, the Iroquois, had a republican form of government. Of societies practising mutilations that are moderate, the simple bear a decreased ratio to the compound: of the one class there are ten—Tasmanians, Tannese, New Guinea people, Karens, Nagas,

Ostyaks, Esquimaux, Chinooks, Comanches, Chipewayans; while of the other class there are five—New Zealanders, East Africans, Khonds, Kukis, Kalmucks. And of these it is to be remarked, that in the one class the simple headship, and in the other class the compound headship, is unstable. On coming to the societies distinguished by severer mutilations, we find these relations reversed. Among the simple I can name but three—the New Caledonians (among whom, however, the severer mutilation is not general), the Bushmen (who are believed to have lapsed from a higher social state), and the Australians (who have, I believe, similarly lapsed); while, among the compound, twenty-one may be named—Fijians, Sandwich Islanders, Tahitians, Tongans, Samoans, Javans, Sumatrans, Malagasy, Hottentots, Damaras, Bechuanas, Kaffirs, Congo people, Coast Negroes, Inland Negroes, Dahomans, Ashantees, Fulahs, Abyssinians, Arabs, Dacotahs.

In the second place, social consolidation being habitually effected by conquest, and compound and doubly-compound societies being therefore, during early stages, militant in their activities and types of structure, it follows that the connexion of the custom of mutilation with the size of the society is indirect, while that with its type is direct. And this the facts show us. If we put side by side those societies which are most unlike in respect of the practice of mutilation, we find them to be those which are most unlike as being wholly unmilitant in organization, and wholly militant in organization. At the one extreme we have the Veddas, Todas, Bodo and Dhimals; while, at the other extreme, we have the Fijians, Abyssinians, and ancient Mexicans.

Derived from trophy-taking, and developing with the development of the militant type, mutilations must, by implication, decrease as fast as the societies consolidated by militancy become less militant, and must disappear as the industrial type of structure evolves. That they do so, European history at large may be assigned in proof. And it is significant that in our own society, now predominantly industrial, such slight mutilations as continue are connected with that regulative part of the organization which militancy has bequeathed: there survive only the now-meaningless tattooings of sailors, the branding of deserters, and the cropping of the heads of felons. . . .

Spontaneously made among primitive men to one whose goodwill is desired, the gift thus becomes, as society evolves, the originator of many things.

To the political head, as his power grows, presents are prompted partly by fear of him and partly by the wish for his aid; and such presents, at first propitiatory only in virtue of their intrinsic worth, grow to be propitiatory as expressions of loyalty: from the last of which comes present-giving as a ceremonial, and from the first of which comes present-giving as tribute, eventually changing into taxes. Simultaneously, the supplies of food &c., placed on the grave of the dead man to please his ghost, developing into larger and repeated offerings at the grave of the distinguished dead man, and becoming at length sacrifices on the altar of the god, differentiate in an analogous way: the present of meat, drink, or clothes, at first supposed to beget goodwill because actually useful, becomes, by implication, significant of allegiance. Hence, making the gift grows into an act of worship irrespective of the value of the thing given; while, as affording sustenance to the priest, the gift makes possible the agency by which the worship is conducted. From oblations originate Church revenues.

Thus we unexpectedly come upon further proof that the control of ceremony precedes the political and ecclesiastical controls; since it appears that from actions which the first initiates, eventually result the funds by which the others are maintained.

When we ask what relations present-giving has to different social types, we note, in the first place, that there is little of it in simple societies where chieftainship does not exist or is unstable. Conversely, it prevails in compound and doubly-compound societies; as throughout the semi-civilized states of Africa, those of Polynesia, those of ancient America, where the presence of stable headships, primary and secondary, gives both the opportunity and the motive. Recognizing this truth, we are led to recognize the deeper truth that present-making, while but indirectly related to the social type as simple or compound, is directly related to it as more or less militant in organization. The desire to propitiate is great in proportion as the person to be propitiated is feared; and therefore the conquering chief, and still more the king who has made himself by force of arms ruler over many chiefs, is one whose

goodwill is most anxiously sought by acts which simultaneously gratify his avarice and express submission. Hence, then, the fact that the ceremony of making gifts to the ruler prevails most in societies that are either actually militant, or in which chronic militancy during past times has evolved the despotic government appropriate to it. Hence the fact that throughout the East where this social type exists everywhere, the making of presents to those in authority is everywhere imperative. Hence the fact that in early European ages, while the social activities were militant and the structures corresponded, loyal presents to kings from individuals and corporate bodies were universal; while donations from superiors to inferiors, also growing out of that state of complete dependence which accompanied militancy, were common. . . .

Other derivative class-distinctions are sequent upon differences of wealth; which themselves originally follow differences of power. From that earliest stage in which master and slave are literally captor and captive, abundance of means has been the natural concomitant of mastery, and poverty the concomitant of slavery. Hence where the militant type of organization predominates, being rich indirectly implies being victorious, or having the political supremacy gained by victory. It is true that some primitive societies furnish exceptions. . . . Naturally the honouring of wealth, beginning in these early stages, continues through subsequent stages; and signs of wealth hence become class-distinctions: so originating various ceremonial restrictions.

Carrying with us the two ruling ideas thus briefly exemplified, we shall readily trace the genesis of sundry curious observances. . . .

Of the various class-distinctions which imply superior rank by implying greater wealth, the most curious remain. I refer to certain inconvenient, and sometimes painful, traits, only to be acquired by those whose abundant means enable them to live without labour, or to indulge in some kind of sensual excess.

One group of these distinctions, slightly illustrated among ourselves by the pride taken in delicate hands, as indicating freedom from manual labour, is exhibited in marked forms in some societies that are comparatively little advanced. "The chiefs in

the Society Islands value themselves on having long nails on all, or on some, of their fingers." "Fijian kings and priests wear the finger nails long," says Jackson; and in Sumatra, "persons of superior rank encourage the growth of their hand-nails, particularly those of the fore and little fingers, to an extraordinary length." Everyone knows that a like usage has a like origin in China; where, however, long nails have partially lost their meaning: upper servants being allowed to wear them. But of personal defects similarly origining, China furnishes a far more striking instance in the cramped feet of ladies. Obviously these have become signs of class-distinction, because of the implied inability to labour, and the implied possession of means sufficient to purchase attendance.

Then, again, as marking rank because implying riches, we have undue, and sometimes excessive, fatness; either of the superior person himself or of his belongings. The beginnings of this may be traced in quite early stages; as among some uncivilized American peoples. "An Indian is *respectable* in his own community, in proportion as his wife and children look fat and well fed: this being a proof of his prowess and success as a hunter, and his consequent riches." From this case, in which the relation between implied wealth and implied power is directly recognized, we pass in the course of social development to cases in which, instead of the normal fatness indicating sufficiency, there comes the abnormal fatness indicating superfluity, and, consequently, greater wealth. In China, great fatness is a source of pride in a mandarin. Ellis tells us that corpulence is a mark of distinction among Tahitian females. Throughout Africa there prevails an admiration for corpulence in women, which, in some places, rises to a great pitch; as in Karague where the king has "very fat wives"—where, according to Speke, the king's sister-in-law "was another of those wonders of obesity, unable to stand excepting on all fours," and where, "as fattening is the first duty of fashionable female life, it must be duly enforced by the rod if necessary."

Still stranger are the marks of dignity constituted by diseases resulting from those excessive gratifications of appetite which wealth makes possible. Even among ourselves may be traced an association of ideas which thus originates. The story about a gentleman of the old school, who, hearing that some man of inferior

extraction was suffering from gout, exclaimed—"Damn the fellow; wasn't rheumatism good enough for him," illustrates the still-current idea that gout is a gentlemanly disease, because it results from that high living which presupposes the abundant means usually associated with superior position. Introduced by this instance, the instance which comes to us from Polynesia will seem not unnatural. "The habitual use of ava causes a whitish scurf on the skin, which among the heathen Tahitians was reckoned a badge of nobility; the common people not having the means of indulgence requisite to produce it." But of all marks of dignity arising in this way, or indeed in any way, the strangest is one which Ximenez tells us of as existing among the people of ancient Guatemala. The sign of a disorder, here best left unspecified, which the nobles were liable to, because of habits which wealth made possible, had become among the Guatemalans a sign "of greatness and majesty;" and its name was applied even to the deity!

How these further class-distinctions, though not, like preceding ones, directly traceable to militancy, are indirectly traceable to it, and how they fade as industrialism develops, need not be shown at length.

Foregoing instances make it clear that they are still maintained rigorously in societies characterized by that type of organization which continuous war establishes; and that they prevailed to considerable degrees during the past warlike times of more civilized societies. Conversely, they show that as, along with the rise of a wealth which does not imply rank, luxuries and costly modes of life have spread to those who do not form part of the regulative organization; the growth of industrialism tends to abolish these marks of class-distinction which militancy originates. No matter what form they take, all these supplementary rules debarring the inferior from usages and appliances characterizing the superior, belong to a social *régime* based on coercive co-operation; while that unchecked liberty which, among ourselves, the classes regulated have to imitate the regulating classes in habits and expenditure, belongs to the *régime* of voluntary co-operation.

19

POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS

THE MERE GATHERING of individuals into a group does not constitute them a society. A society, in the sociological sense, is formed only when, besides juxtaposition there is cooperation.So long as members of the group do not combine their energies to achieve some common end or ends, there is little to keep them together. They are prevented from separating only when the wants of each are better satisfied by uniting his efforts with those of others, than they would be if he acted alone.

Cooperation, then, is at once that which cannot exist without a society, and that for which a society exists. It may be a joining of many strengths to effect something which the strength of no single man can effect; or it may be an apportioning of different activities to different persons, who severally participate in the benefits of one another's activities. The motive for acting together, originally the dominant one, may be defence against enemies; or it may be the easier obtainment of food, by the chase or othewise; or it may be, and commonly is, both of these. In any case, however, the units pass from the state of perfect independence to the state of mutual dependence; and as fast as they do this they become united into a society rightly so called.

But cooperation implies organization. If acts are to be effectually combined, there must be arrangements under which they are adjusted in their times, amounts, and characters.

From *The Principles of Sociology* (London: Williams and Norgate, 1876), vol. 2, part 5, pp. 244–48, 659–92, 306–10, 253–60, 727–30.

This social organization, necessary as a means to concerted action, is of two kinds. Though these two kinds generally co-exist, and are more or less interfused, yet they are distinct in their origins and natures. There is a spontaneous cooperation which grows up without thought during the pursuit of private ends; and there is a cooperation which, consciously devised, implies distinct recognition of public ends. The ways in which the two are respectively established and carried on, present marked contrasts.

Whenever, in a primitive group, there begins that cooperation which is effected by exchange of services—whenever individuals find their wants better satisfied by giving certain products which they can make best, in return for other products they are less skilled in making, or not so well circumstanced for making, there is initiated a kind of organization which then, and throughout its higher stages, results from endeavours to meet personal needs. Division of labour, to the last as at first, grows by experience of mutual facilitations in living. Each new specialization of industry arises from the effort of one who commences it to get profit; and establishes itself by conducing in some way to the profit of others. So that there is a kind of concerted action, with an elaborate social organization developed by it, which does not originate in deliberate concert. Though within the small sub-divisions of this organization, we find everywhere repeated the relation of employer and employed, of whom the one directs the actions of the other; yet this relation, spontaneously formed in aid of private ends and contained only at will, is not formed with conscious reference to achievement of public ends: these are not thought of. And though, for regulating trading activities, there arise agencies serving to adjust the supplies of commodities to the demands; yet such agencies do this not by direct stimulations or restraints, but by communicating information which serves to stimulate or restrain; and, further, these agencies grow up not for the avowed purpose of thus regulating, but in the pursuit of gain by individuals. So unintentionally has there arisen the elaborate division of labour by which production and distribution are now carried on, that only in modern days has there come a recognition of the fact that it has all along been arising.

On the other hand, cooperation for a purpose immediately concerning the whole society, is a conscious cooperation; and is carried on by an organization of another kind, formed in a different way. When the primitive group has to defend itself against other groups, its members act together under further stimuli than those constituted by purely personal desires. Even at the outset, before any control by a chief exists, there is the control exercised by the group over its members; each of whom is obliged, by public opinion, to join in the general defence. Very soon the warrior of recognized superiority begins to exercise over each, during war, an influence additional to that exercised by the group; and when his authority becomes established, it greatly furthers combined action. From the beginning, therefore, this kind of social cooperation is a conscious cooperation, and a cooperation which is not wholly a matter of choice—is often at variance with private wishes. As the organization initiated by it develops, we see that, in the first place, the fighting division of the society displays in the highest degree these same traits: the grades and divisions constituting an army, cooperate more and more under the regulation, consciously established, of agencies which override individual volitions—or, to speak strictly, control individuals by motives which prevent them from acting as they would spontaneously act. In the second place, we see that throughout the society as a whole there spreads a kindred form of organization—kindred in so far that, for the purpose of maintaining the militant body and the government which directs it, there are established over citizens, agencies which force them to labour more or less largely for public ends instead of private ends. And, simultaneously, there develops a further organization, still akin in its fundamental principle, which restrains individual actions in such wise that social safety shall not be endangered by the disorder consequent on unchecked pursuit of personal ends. So that this kind of social organization is distinguished from the other, as arising through conscious pursuit of public ends; in furtherance of which individual wills are constrained, first by the joint wills of the entire group, and afterwards more definitely by the will of a regulative agency which the group evolves.

Most clearly shall we perceive the contrast between these two

kinds of organization on observing that, while they are both instrumental to social welfare, they are instrumental in converse ways. That organization shown us by the division of labour for industrial purposes, exhibits combined action; but it is a combined action which directly seeks and subserves the welfares of individuals, and indirectly subserves the welfare of society as a whole by preserving individuals. Conversely, that organization evolved for governmental and defensive purposes, exhibits combined action; but it is a combined action which directly seeks and subserves the welfare of the society as a whole, and indirectly subserves the welfares of individuals by protecting the society. Efforts for self-preservation by the units originate the one form of organization; while efforts for self-preservation by the aggregate originate the other form of organization. In the first case there is conscious pursuit of private ends only; and the correlative organization resulting from this pursuit of private ends, growing up unconsciously, is without coercive power. In the second case there is conscious pursuit of public ends; and the correlative organization, consciously established, exercises coercion.

Of these two kinds of cooperation and the structures effecting them, we are here concerned only with one. Political organization is to be understood as that part of social organization which consciously carries on directive and restraining functions for public ends. It is true, as already hinted, and as we shall see presently, that the two kinds are mingled in various ways—that each ramifies through the other more or less according to their respective degrees of predominance. But they are essentially different in origin and nature; and for the present we must, so far as may be, limit our attention to the last. . . .

For preserving its corporate life, a society is impelled to corporate action; and the preservation of its corporate life is the more probable in proportion as its corporate action is the more complete. For purposes of offence and defence, the forces of individuals have to be combined; and where every individual contributes his force, the probability of success is greatest. Numbers, natures, and circumstances being equal, it is clear that of two tribes or two larger

societies, one of which unites the actions of all its capable members while the other does not, the first will ordinarily be the victor. There must be an habitual survival of communities in which militant cooperation is universal.

This proposition is almost a truism. But it is needful here, as a preliminary, consciously to recognize the truth that the social structure evolved by chronic militancy, is one in which all men fit for fighting act in concert against other societies. Such further actions as they carry on they can carry on separately; but this action they must carry on jointly.

A society's power of self-preservation will be great in proportion as, besides the direct aid of all who can fight, there is given the indirect aid of all who cannot fight. Supposing them otherwise similar, those communities will survive in which the efforts of combatants are in the greatest degree seconded by those of non-combatants. In a purely militant society, therefore, individuals who do not bear arms have to spend their lives in furthering the maintenance of those who do. Whether, as happens at first, the non-combatants are exclusively the women; or whether, as happens later, the class includes enslaved captives; or whether, as happens later still, it includes serfs; the implication is the same. For if, of two societies equal in other respects, the first wholly subordinates its workers in this way, while the workers in the second are allowed to retain for themselves the produce of their labour, or more of it than is needful for maintaining them; then, in the second, the warriors, not otherwise supported, or supported less fully than they might else be, will have partially to support themselves, and will be so much the less available for war purposes. Hence in the struggle for existence between such societies, it must usually happen that the first will vanquish the second. The social type produced by survival of the fittest, will be one in which the fighting part includes all who can bear arms and be trusted with arms, while the remaining part serves simply as a permanent commissariat.

An obvious implication, of a significance to be hereafter pointed out, is that the non-combatant part, occupied in supporting the combatant part, cannot with advantage to the self-preserving

power of the society increase beyond the limit at which it efficiently fulfils its purpose. For, otherwise, some who might be fighters are superfluous workers; and the fighting power of the society is made less than it might be. Hence, in the militant type, the tendency is for the body of warriors to bear the largest practicable ratio to the body of workers.

Given two societies of which the members are all either warriors or those who supply the needs of warriors, and, other things equal, supremacy will be gained by that in which the efforts of all are most effectually combined. In open warfare joint action triumphs over individual action. Military history is a history of the successes of men trained to move and fight in concert.

Not only must there be in the fighting part a combination such that the powers of its units may be concentrated, but there must be a combination of the subservient part with it. If the two are so separated that they can act independently, the needs of the fighting part will not be adequately met. If to be cut off from a temporary base of operations is dangerous, still more dangerous is it to be cut off from the permanent base of operations; namely, that constituted by the body of non-combatants. This has to be so connected with the body of combatants that its services may be fully available. Evidently, therefore, development of the militant type involves a close binding of the society into a whole. As the loose group of savages yields to the solid phalanx, so, other things equal, must the society of which the parts are but feebly held together, yield to one in which they are held together by strong bonds.

But in proportion as men are compelled to cooperate, their self-prompted actions are restrained. By as much as the unit becomes merged in the mass, by so much does he lose his individuality as a unit. And this leads us to note the several ways in which evolution of the militant type entails subordination of the citizen.

His life is not his own, but is at the disposal of his society. So long as he remains capable of bearing arms he has no alternative but to fight when called on; and, where militancy is extreme, he cannot return as a vanquished man under penalty of death.

Of course, with this there goes possession of such liberty only as military obligations allow. He is free to pursue his private ends only when the tribe or nation has no need of him; and when it has need of him, his actions from hour to hour must conform, not to his own will but to the public will.

So, too, with his property. Whether, as in many cases, what he holds as private he so holds by permission only, or whether private ownership is recognized, it remains true that in the last resort he is obliged to surrender whatever is demanded for the community's use.

Briefly, then, under the militant type the individual is owned by the State. While preservation of the society is the primary end, preservation of each member is a secondary end—an end cared for chiefly as subserving the primary end.

Fulfilment of these requirements, that there shall be complete corporate action, that to this end the non-combatant part shall be occupied in providing for the combatant part, that the entire aggregate shall be strongly bound together, and that the units composing it must have their individualities in life, liberty, and property, thereby subordinated, presupposes a coercive instrumentality. No such union for corporate action can be achieved without a powerful controlling agency. On remembering the fatal results caused by division of counsels in war, or by separation into factions in face of an enemy, we see that chronic militancy tends to develop a despotism; since, other things equal, those societies will habitually survive in which, by its aid, the corporate action is made complete.

And this involves a system of centralization. The trait made familiar to us by an army, in which under a commander-in-chief there are secondary commanders over large masses, and under these tertiary ones over smaller masses, and so on down to the ultimate divisions, must characterize the social organization at large. A militant society requires a regulative structure of this kind, since, otherwise, its corporate action cannot be made most effectual. Without such grades of governing centres diffused throughout the non-combatant part as well as the combatant part, the entire forces of the aggregate cannot be promptly put forth. Unless the

workers are under a control akin to that which the fighters are under, their indirect aid cannot be insured in full amount and with due quickness.

And this is the form of a society characterized by *status*—a society, the members of which stand one towards another in successive grades of subordination. From the despot down to the slave, all are masters of those below and subjects of those above. The relation of the child to the father, of the father to some superior, and so on up to the absolute head, is one in which the individual of lower status is at the mercy of one of higher status.

Otherwise described, the process of militant organization is a process of regimentation, which, primarily taking place in the army, secondarily affects the whole community.

The first indication of this we trace in the fact everywhere visible, that the military head grows into a civil head—usually at once, and, in exceptional cases, at last, if militancy continues. Beginning as leader in war he becomes ruler in peace; and such regulative policy as he pursues in the one sphere, he pursues, so far as conditions permit, in the other. Being, as the non-combatant part is, a permanent commissariat, the principle of graduated subordination is extended to it. Its members come to be directed in a way like that in which the warriors are directed—not literally, since by dispersion of the one and concentration of the other exact parallelism is prevented; but, nevertheless, similarly in principle. Labour is carried on under coercion; and supervision spreads everywhere. . . .

On inspecting sundry societies, past and present, large and small, which are, or have been, characterized in high degrees by militancy, we are shown, *a posteriori*, that amid the differences due to race, to circumstances, and to degrees of development, there are fundamental similarities of the kinds above inferred *a priori*. Modern Dahomey and Russia, as well as ancient Peru, Egypt, and Sparta, exemplify that owning of the individual by the State in life, liberty, and goods, which is proper to a social system adapted for war. And that with changes further fitting a society for warlike

activities, there spread throughout it an officialism, a dictation, and a superintendence, akin to those under which soldiers live, we are shown by imperial Rome, by imperial Germany, and by England since its late aggressive activities.

Lastly comes the evidence furnished by the adapted characters of the men who compose militant societies. Making success in war the highest glory, they are led to identify goodness with bravery and strength. Revenge becomes a sacred duty with them: and acting at home on the law of retaliation which they act on abroad, they similarly, at home as abroad, are ready to sacrifice others to self: their sympathies, continually deadened during war, cannot be active during peace. They must have a patriotism which regards the triumph of their society as the supreme end of action; they must possess the loyalty whence flows obedience to authority; and that they may be obedient they must have abundant faith. With faith in authority and consequent readiness to be directed, naturally goes relatively little power of initiation. The habit of seeing everything officially controlled fosters the belief that official control is everywhere needful; while a course of life which makes personal causation familiar and negatives experience of impersonal causation, produces an inability to conceive of any social processes as carried on under self-regulating arrangements. And these traits of individual nature, needful concomitants as we see of the militant type, are those which we observe in the members of actual militant societies. . . .

More effective still in weakening those primitive political divisions initiated by militancy, is increasing industrialism. This acts in two ways—firstly, by creating a class having power derived otherwise than from territorial possessions or official positions; and, secondly, by generating ideas and sentiments at variance with the ancient assumptions of class-superiority. As we have already seen, rank and wealth are at the outset habitually associated. Existing uncivilized peoples still show us this relation. . . . Indeed it is manifest that before the development of commerce, and while possession of land could alone give largeness of means, lordship and riches were directly connected; so that, as Sir Henry

Maine remarks, "the opposition commonly set up between birth and wealth, and particularly wealth other than landed property, is entirely modern." When, however, with the arrival of industry at that stage in which wholesale transactions bring large profits, there arise trades who vie with, and exceed, many of the landed nobility in wealth; and when by conferring obligations on kings and nobles, such traders gain social influence; there comes an occasional removal of the barrier between them and the titled classes. . . . In proportion as men are habituated to maintain their own claims while respecting the claims of others, which they do in every act of exchange, whether of goods for money or of services for pay, there is produced a mental attitude at variance with that which accompanies subjection; and, as fast as this happens, such political distinctions as imply subjection, lose more and more of that respect which gives them strength.

Class-distinctions, then, date back to the beginnings of social life. Omitting those small wandering assemblages which are so incoherent that their component parts are ever changing their relations to one another and to the environment, we see that wherever there is some coherence and some permanence of relation among the parts, there begin to arise political divisions. Relative superiority of power, first causing a differentiation at once domestic and social, between the activities of the sexes and the consequent positions of the sexes, presently begins to cause a differentiation among males, shown in the bondage of captives: a master-class and a slave-class are formed.

Where men continue the wandering life in pursuit of wild food for themselves or their cattle, the groups they form are debarred from doing more by war than appropriate one another's units individually; but where men have passed into the agricultural or settled state, it becomes possible for one community to take possession bodily of another community, along with the territory it occupies. When this happens there arise additional class-divisions. The conquered and tribute-paying community, besides having its headmen reduced to subjection, has its people reduced to a state such that, while they continue to live on their lands, they yield up, through

the intermediation of their chiefs, part of the produce to the conquerors: so foreshadowing what eventually becomes a serf-class.

From the beginning the militant class, being by force of arms the dominant class, becomes the class which owns the source of food—the land. During the hunting and pastoral stages, the warriors of the group hold the land collectively. On passing into the settled state, their tenures become partly collective and partly individual in sundry ways, and eventually almost wholly individual. But throughout long stages of social evolution, landowning and militancy continue to be associated.

The class-differentiation of which militancy is the active cause, is furthered by the establishment of definite descent, and especially male descent, and by the transmission of position and property to the eldest son of the eldest continually. This conduces to inequalities of position and wealth between near kindred and remote kindred; and such inequalities once initiated, tend to increase; since it results from them that the superior get greater means of maintaining their power by accumulating appliances for offence and defence.

Such differentiation is augmented, at the same time that a new differentiation is set up, by the immigration of fugitives who attach themselves to the most powerful member of the group: now as dependents who work, and now as armed followers—armed followers who form a class bound to the dominant man and unconnected with the land. And since, in clusters of such groups, fugitives ordinarily flock most to the strongest group, and become adherents of its head, they are instrumental in furthering those subsequent integrations and differentiations which conquests bring about.

Inequalities of social position, bringing inequalities in the supplies and kinds of food, clothing, and shelter, tend to establish physical differences; to the further advantage of the rulers and disadvantage of the ruled. And beyond the physical differences, there are produced by the respective habits of life, mental differences, emotional and intellectual, strengthening the general contrast of nature.

When there come the conquests which produce compound

societies, and, again, doubly compound ones, there result superpositions of ranks. And the general effect is that, while the ranks of the conquering society become respectively higher than those which existed before, the ranks of the conquered society become respectively lower.

The class-divisions thus formed during the earlier stages of militancy, are traversed and obscured as fast as many small societies are consolidated into one large society. Ranks referring to local organization are gradually replaced by ranks referring to general organization. Instead of deputy and sub-deputy governing agents who are the militant owners of the sub-divisions they rule, there come governing agents who more or less clearly form strata running throughout the society as a whole—a concomitant of developed political administration.

Chiefly, however, we have to note that while the higher political evolution of large social aggregates, tends to break down the divisions of rank which grew up in the small component social aggregates, by substituting other divisions, these original divisions are still more broken down by growing industrialism. Generating a wealth that is not connected with rank, this initiates a competing power; and at the same time, by establishing the equal positions of citizens before the law in respect of trading transactions, it weakens those divisions which at the outset expressed inequalities of position before the law.

As verifying these interpretations, I may add that they harmonize with the interpretations of ceremonial institutions already given. When the conquered enemy is made a slave, and mutilated by taking a trophy from his body, we see simultaneously originating the deepest political distinction and the ceremony which marks it; and with the continued militancy that compounds and re-compounds social groups, there goes at once the development of political distinctions and the development of ceremonies marking them. And as we before saw that growing industrialism diminishes the rigour of ceremonial rule, so here we see that it tends to destroy those class-divisions which militancy originates, and to establish quite alien ones which indicate differences of position consequent on differences of aptitude for the various functions which an industrial society needs. . . .

The stones composing a house cannot be otherwise used until the house has been pulled down. If the stones are united by mortar, there must be extra trouble in destroying their present combination before they can be re-combined. And if the mortar has had centuries in which to consolidate, the breaking up of the masses formed is a matter of such difficulty, that building with new materials becomes more economical than rebuilding with the old.

I name these facts to illustrate the truth that any arrangement stands in the way of re-arrangement; and that this must be true of organization, which is one kind of arrangement. When, during the evolution of a living body, its component substance, at first relatively homogeneous, has been transformed into a combination of heterogeneous parts, there results an obstacle, always great and often insuperable, to any considerable further change: the more elaborate and definite the structure the greater being the resistance it opposes to alteration. And this, which is conspicuously true of an individual organism, is true, if less conspicuously, of a social organism. Though a society, formed of discrete units, and not having had its type fixed by inheritance from countless like societies, is much more plastic, yet the same principle holds. As fast as its parts are differentiated—as fast as there arise classes, bodies of functionaries, established administrations, these, becoming coherent within themselves and with one another, struggle against such forces as tend to modify them. The conservatism of every long-settled institution daily exemplifies this law. Be it in the antagonism of a church to legislation interfering with its discipline; be it in the opposition of an army to abolition of the purchase-system; be it in the disfavour with which the legal profession at large has regarded law-reform; we see that neither in their structures nor in their modes of action, are parts that have once been specialized easily changed.

As it is true of a living body that its various acts have as their common end self-preservation, so is it true of its component organs that they severally tend to preserve themselves in their integrity. And, similarly, as it is true of a society that maintenance of its existence is the aim of its combined actions, so it is true of its separate classes, its sets of officials, its other specialized parts, that the dominant aim of each is to maintain itself. Not the function to

be performed, but the sustentation of those who perform the function, becomes the object in view: the result being that when the function is needless, or even detrimental, the structure still keeps itself intact as long as it can. In early days the history of the Knights Templars furnished an illustration of this tendency. Down to the present time we have before us the familiar instance of trade-guilds in London, which having ceased to perform their original duties, nevertheless jealously defend their possessions and privileges. The convention of Royal Burghs in Scotland, which once regulated the internal municipal laws, still meets annually though it has no longer any work to do. And the accounts given in *The Black Book* of the sinecures which survived up to recent times, yield multitudinous illustrations.

The extent to which an organization resists re-organization, we shall not fully appreciate until we observe that its resistance increases in a compound progression. For while each new part is an additional obstacle to change, the formation of it involves a deduction from the forces causing change. If, other things remaining the same, the political structures of a society are further developed —if existing institutions are extended or fresh ones set up—if for directing social activities in greater detail, extra staffs of officials are appointed; the simultaneous results are—an increase in the aggregate of those who form the regulating part, and a corresponding decrease in the aggregate of those who form the part regulated. In various ways all who compose the controlling and administrative organization, become united with one another and separated from the rest. Whatever be their particular duties, they are similarly related to the governing centres of their departments, and, through them, to the supreme governing centre; and are habituated to like sentiments and ideas respecting the set of institutions in which they are incorporated. Receiving their subsistence through the national revenue, they tend towards kindred views and feelings respecting the raising of such revenue. Whatever jealousies there may be between their divisions, are over-ridden by sympathy when any one division has its existence or privileges endangered; since the interference with one division may spread to others. Moreover, they all stand in similar relations to the rest of the community,

whose actions are in one way or other superintended by them; and hence are led into allied beliefs respecting the need for such superintendence and the propriety of submitting to it. No matter what their previous political opinions may have been, men cannot become public agents of any kind without being biassed towards opinions congruous with their functions. So that, inevitably, each further growth of the instrumentalities which control, or administer, or inspect, or in any way direct social forces, increases the impediment to future modifications, both positively by strengthening that which has to be modified, and negatively, by weakening the remainder; until at length the rigidity becomes so great that change is impossible and the type becomes fixed.

Nor does each further development of political organization increase the obstacles to change, only by increasing the power of the regulators and decreasing the power of the regulated. For the ideas and sentiments of a community as a whole, adapt themselves to the *régime* familiar from childhood, in such wise that it comes to be looked upon as natural. In proportion as public agencies occupy a larger space in daily experience, leaving but a smaller space for other agencies, there comes a greater tendency to think of public control as everywhere needful, and a less ability to conceive of activities as otherwise controlled. At the same time the sentiments, adjusted by habit to the regulative machinery, become enlisted on its behalf, and adverse to the thought of a vacancy to be made by its absence. In brief, the general law that the social organism and its units act and re-act until congruity is reached, implies that every further extension of political organization increases the obstacle to re-organization, not only by adding to the strength of the regulative part, and taking from the strength of the part regulated, but also by producing in citizens thoughts and feelings in harmony with the resulting structure, and out of harmony with anything substantially different. Both France and Germany exemplify this truth. M. Comte, while looking forward to an industrial state, was so swayed by the conceptions and likings appropriate to the French form of society, that his scheme of organization for the ideal future, prescribes arrangements characteristic of the militant type, and utterly at variance with the industrial

type. Indeed, he had a profound aversion to that individualism which is a product of industrial life and gives the character to industrial institutions. So, too, in Germany, we see that the socialist party, who are regarded and who regard themselves as wishing to re-organize society entirely, are so incapable of really thinking away from the social type under which they have been nurtured, that their proposed social system is in essence nothing else than a new form of the system they would destroy. It is a system under which life and labour are to be arranged and superintended by public instrumentalities, omnipresent like those which already exist and no less coercive: the individual having his life even more regulated for him than now.

While, then, the absence of settled arrangements negatives cooperation, yet cooperation of a higher kind is hindered by the arrangements which facilitate cooperation of a lower kind. Though without established connexions among parts, there can be no combined actions; yet the more extensive and elaborate such connexions grow, the more difficult does it become to make improved combinations of actions. There is an increase of the forces which tend to fix, and a decrease of the forces which tend to unfix; until the fully-structured social organism, like the fully-structured individual organism, becomes no longer adaptable.

In a living animal, formed as it is of aggregated units originally like in kind, the progress of organization implies, not only that the units composing each differentiated part severally maintain their positions, but also that their progeny succeed to those positions. . . .

In a society also, establishment of structure is favoured by the transmission of positions and functions through successive generations. The maintenance of those class-divisions which arise as political organization advances, implies the inheritance of a rank and a place in each class. The like happens with those sub-divisions of classes which, in some societies, constitute castes, and in other societies are exemplified by incorporated trades. Where custom or law compels the sons of each worker to follow their father's occupation, there result among the industrial structures obstacles to change analogous to those which result in the regulative structures

from impassable divisions of ranks. India shows this in an extreme degree; and in a less degree it was shown by the craft-guilds of early days in England, which facilitated adoption of a craft by the children of those engaged in it, and hindered adoption of it by others. Thus we may call inheritance of position and function, the principle of fixity in social organization.

There is another way in which succession by inheritance, whether to class-position or to occupation, conduces to stability. It secures supremacy of the elder; and supremacy of the elder tends towards maintenance of the established order. A system under which a chief-ruler, sub-ruler, head of clan or house, official, or any person having the power given by rank or property, retains his place until at death it is filled by a descendant, in conformity with some accepted rule of succession, in a system under which, by implication, the young, and even the middle-aged, are excluded from the conduct of affairs. So, too, where an industrial system is such that the son, habitually brought up to his father's business, cannot hold a master's position till his father dies, it follows that the regulative power of the elder over the processes of production and distribution, is scarcely at all qualified by the power of the younger. Now it is truth daily exemplified, that increasing rigidity of organization, necessitated by the process of evolution, produces in age an increasing strength of habit and aversion to change. Hence it results that succession to place and function by inheritance, having as its necessary concomitant a monopoly of power by the eldest, involves a prevailing conservatism; and thus further insures maintenance of things as they are.

Conversely, social change is facile in proportion as men's places and functions are determinable by personal qualities. Members of one rank who establish themselves in another rank, in so far directly break the division between the ranks; and they indirectly weaken it by preserving their family relations with the first, and forming new ones with the second; while, further, the ideas and sentiments pervading the two ranks, previously more or less different, are made to qualify one another and to work changes of character. Similarly if, between sub-divisions of the producing and distributing classes, there are no barriers to migration, then, in pro-

portion as migrations are numerous, influences physical and mental, following inter-fusion, alter the natures of their units; at the same time that they check the establishment of differences of nature caused by differences of occupation. Such transpositions of individuals between class and class, or group and group, must, on the average, however, depend on the fitnesses of the individuals for their new places and duties. Intrusions will ordinarily succeed only where the intruding citizens have more than usual aptitudes for the businesses they undertake. Those who desert their original functions, are at a disadvantage in the competition with those whose functions they assume; and they can overcome this disadvantage only by force of some superiority: must do the new thing better than those born to it, and so tend to improve the doing of it by their example. This leaving of men to have their careers determined by their efficiencies, we may therefore call the principle of change in social organization.

As we saw that succession by inheritance conduces in a secondary way to stability, by keeping authority in the hands of those who by age are made most averse to new practices, so here, conversely, we may see that succession by efficiency conduces in a secondary way to change. Both positively and negatively the possession of power by the young facilitates innovation. While the energies are overflowing, little fear is felt of those obstacles to improvement and evils it may bring, which, when energies are failing, look formidable; and at the same time the greater imaginativeness that goes along with higher vitality, joined with a smaller strength of habit, facilitates acceptance of fresh ideas and adoption of untried methods. Since, then, where the various social positions come to be respectively filled by those who are experimentally proved to be the fittest, the relatively young are permitted to exercise authority, it results that succession by efficiency furthers change in social organization, indirectly as well as directly.

Contrasting the two, we thus see that while the acquirement of function by inheritance conduces to rigidity of structure, the acquirement of function by efficiency conduces to plasticity of structure. Succession by descent favours the maintenance of that which exists. Succession by fitness favours transformation, and makes possible something better. . . .

As with the militant type then, so with the industrial type, three lines of evidence converge to show us its essential nature. Let us set down briefly the several results, that we may observe the correspondences among them.

On considering what must be the traits of a society organized exclusively for carrying on internal activities, so as most efficiently to subserve the lives of citizens, we find them to be these. A corporate action subordinating individual actions by uniting them in joint effort, is not longer requisite. Contrariwise, such corporate action as remains has for its end to guard individual actions against all interferences not necessarily entailed by mutual limitation: the type of society in which this function is best discharged, being that which must survive, since it is that of which the members will most prosper. Excluding, as the requirements of the industrial type do, a despotic controlling agency, they imply, as the only congruous agency for achieving such corporate action as is needed, one formed of representatives who serve to express the aggregate will. The function of this controlling agency, generally defined as that of administering justice, is more specially defined as that of seeing that each citizen gains neither more nor less of benefit than his activities normally bring; and there is thus excluded all public action involving any artificial distribution of benefits. The *régime* of status proper to militancy having disappeared, the *régime* of contract which replaces it has to be universally enforced; and this negatives interferences between efforts and results by arbitrary apportionment. Otherwise regarded, the industrial type is distinguished from the militant type as being not both positively regulative and negatively regulative, but as being negatively regulative only. With this restricted sphere for corporate action comes an increased sphere for individual action; and from that voluntary corporation which is the fundamental principle of the type, arise multitudinous private combinations, akin in their structures to the public combination of the society which includes them. Indirectly it results that a society of the industrial type is distinguished by plasticity; and also that it tends to lose its economic autonomy, and to coalesce with adjacent societies.

The question next considered was, whether these traits of the industrial type as arrived at by deduction are inductively verified;

and we found that in actual societies they are visible more or less clearly in proportion as industrialism is more or less developed. Glancing at those small groups of uncultured people who, wholly unwarlike, display the industrial type in its rudimentary form, we went on to compare the structures of European nations at large in early days of chronic militancy, with their structures in modern days characterized by progressing industrialism; and we saw the differences to be of the kind implied. We next compared two of these societies, France and England, which were once in kindred states, but of which the one has had its industrial life much more repressed by its militant life than the other; and it became manifest that the contrasts which, age after age, arose between their institutions, were such as answer to the hypothesis. Lastly, limiting ourselves to England itself, and first noting how recession from such traits of the industrial type as had shown themselves, occurred during a long war-period, we observed how, during the subsequent long period of peace beginning in 1815, there were numerous and decided approaches to that social structure which we concluded must accompany developed industrialism.

We then inquired what type of individual nature accompanies the industrial type of society; with the view of seeing whether, from the character of the unit as well as from the character of the aggregate, confirmation is to be derived. Certain uncultured peoples whose lives are passed in peaceful occupations, proved to be distinguished by independence, resistance to coercion, honesty, truthfulness, forgivingness, kindness. On contrasting the characters of our ancestors during more warlike periods with our own characters, we see that, with an increasing ratio of industrialism to militancy, have come a growing independence, a less-marked loyalty, a smaller faith in governments, and a more qualified patriotism; and while, by enterprising action, by diminished faith in authority, by resistance to irresponsible power, there has been shown a strengthening assertion of individuality, there has accompanied it a growing respect for the individualities of others, as is implied by the diminution of aggressions upon them and the multiplication of efforts for their welfare.

To prevent misapprehension it seems needful, before closing, to

explain that these traits are to be regarded less as the immediate results of industrialism than as the remote results of non-militancy. It is not so much that a social life passed in peaceful occupations is positively moralizing, as that a social life passed in war is positively demoralizing. Sacrifice of others to self is in the one incidental only; while in the other it is necessary. Such aggressive egoism as accompanies the industrial life is extrinsic; whereas the aggressive egoism of the militant life is intrinsic. Though generally unsympathetic, the exchange of services under agreement is now, to a considerable extent, and may be wholly, carried on with a due regard to the claims of others—may be constantly accompanied by a sense of benefit given as well as benefit received; but the slaying of antagonists, the burning of their houses, the appropriation of their territory, cannot but be accompanied by vivid consciousness of injury done them, and a consequent brutalizing effect on the feelings—an effect wrought, not on soldiers only, but on those who employ them and contemplate their deeds with pleasure. The last form of social life, therefore, inevitably deadens the sympathies and generates a state of mind which prompts crimes to trespass; while the first form, allowing the sympathies free play if it does not directly exercise them, favours the growth of altruistic sentiments and the resulting virtues.

20

THE TRUTH OF RELIGION

[SPENCER has been extolling the virtues of not yielding to partial attitudes.] The general principle above illustrated must lead us to anticipate that the diverse forms of religious belief, which have existed and which still exist, have all a basis in some ultimate fact. Judging by analogy the implication is, not that any one of them is altogether right, but that in each there is something right more or less disguised by other things wrong. It may be that the soul of truth contained in erroneous creeds is extremely unlike most, if not all, of its several embodiments; and indeed if, as we have good reason to assume, it is much more abstract than any of them, its unlikeness necessarily follows. But some essential variety must be looked for. To suppose that these multiform conceptions should be one and all *absolutely* groundless, discredits too profoundly that average human intelligence from which all our individual intelligences are inherited.

To the presumption that a number of diverse beliefs of the same class have some common foundation in fact, must in this case be added a further presumption derived from the omnipresence of the beliefs. Religious ideas of one kind or other are almost universal. Grant that among all men who have passed a certain stage of intellectual development, there are found vague notions concerning the origin and hidden nature of surrounding things, and there arises

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From *First Principles*, 6th ed. (London: Williams and Norgate [1862], 1904), pp. 9–11; *The Principles of Sociology* (London: Williams and Norgate, 1876), vol. 3, part 6, pp. 160–75.

the inference that such notions are necessary products of progressing intelligence. Their endless variety serves but to strengthen this conclusion: showing as it does a more or less independent genesis —showing how, in different places and times, like conditions have led to similar trains of thought, ending in analogous results. A candid examination of the evidence quite negatives the supposition that creeds are priestly inventions. Even as a mere question of probabilities it cannot rationally be concluded that in every society, savage and civilized, certain men have combined to delude the rest in ways so analogous. Moreover, the hypothesis of artificial origin fails to account for the facts. It does not explain why, under all changes of form, certain elements of religious belief remain constant. It does not show how it happens that while adverse criticism has from age to age gone on destroying particular theological dogmas, it has not destroyed the fundamental conception underlying those dogmas. Thus the universality of religious ideas, their independent evolution among different primitive races, and their great vitality, unite in showing that their source must be deep-seated. In other words, we are obliged to admit that if not supernaturally derived as the majority contend, they must be derived out of human experiences, slowly accumulated and organized.

Should it be asserted that religious ideas are products of the religious sentiment which, to satisfy itself, prompts imaginations that it afterwards projects into the external world, and by-and-by mistakes for realities, the problem is not solved, but only removed farther back. Whence comes the sentiment? . . .

Two suppositions only are open to us; the one that the feeling which responds to religious ideas resulted, along with all other human faculties, from an act of special creation; the other that it, in common with the rest, arose by a process of evolution. If we adopt the first of these alternatives, universally accepted by our ancestors and by the immense majority of our contemporaries, the matter is at once settled: man is directly endowed with the religious feeling by a creator; and to that creator it designedly responds. If we adopt the second alternative, then we are met by the questions —What are the circumstances to which the genesis of the religious feeling is due? and—What is its office? Considering, as we must on

this supposition, all faculties to be results of accumulated modifications caused by the intercourse of the organism with its environment, we are obliged to admit that there exist in the environment certain phenomena or conditions which have determined the growth of the religious feeling; and so are obliged to admit that it is as normal as any other faculty. Add to which that as, on the hypothesis of a development of lower forms into higher, the end towards which the progressive changes tend, must be adaptation to the requirements of life, we are also forced to infer that this feeling is in some way conducive to human welfare. Thus both alternatives contain the same ultimate implication. We must conclude that the religious sentiment is either directly created or is developed by the slow action of natural causes, and whichever conclusion we adopt requires us to treat the religious sentiment with respect. . . .

Unlike the ordinary consciousness, the religious consciousness is concerned with that which lies beyond the sphere of sense. A brute thinks only of things which can be touched, seen, heard, tasted, etc.; and the like is true of the young child, the untaught deaf-mute, and the lowest savage. But the developing man has thoughts about existences which he regards as usually intangible, inaudible, invisible; and yet which he regards as operative upon him. What suggests this notion of agencies transcending perception? How do these ideas concerning the supernatural evolve out of ideas concerning the natural? The transition cannot be sudden; and an account of the genesis of religion must begin by describing the steps through which the transition takes place.

The ghost-theory exhibits these steps quite clearly. We are shown by it that the mental differentiation of invisible and intangible being from visible and tangible beings progresses slowly and unobtrusively. In the fact that the other-self, supposed to wander in dreams, is believed to have actually done and seen whatever was dreamed—in the fact that the other-self when going away at death, but expected presently to return, is conceived as a double equally material with the original; we see that the supernatural agent in its primitive form, diverges very little from the natural

agent—is simply the original man with some added powers of going about secretly and doing good or evil. And the fact that when the double of the dead man ceases to be dreamed about by those who knew him, his non-appearance in dreams is held to imply that he is finally dead, shows that these earliest supernatural agents are conceived as having been temporary existences: the first tendencies to a permanent consciousness of the supernatural, prove abortive.

In many cases no higher degree of differentiation is reached. The ghost-population, recruited by deaths on the one side but on the other side losing its members as they cease to be recollected and dreamed about, does not increase; and no individuals included in it come to be recognized through successive generations as established supernatural powers. Thus the Unkulunkulu, or old-old one, of the Zulus, the father of the race, is regarded as finally or completely dead; and there is propitiation only of ghosts of more recent date. But where circumstances favour the continuance of sacrifices at graves, witnessed by members of each new generation who are told about the dead and transmit the tradition, there eventually arises the conception of a permanently-existing ghost or spirit. A more marked contrast in thought between supernatural beings and natural beings is thus established. There simultaneously results an increase in the number of these supposed supernatural beings, since the aggregate of them is now continually added to; and there is a strengthening tendency to think of them as everywhere around, and as causing all unusual occurrences.

Differences among the ascribed powers of ghosts soon arise. They naturally follow from observed differences among the powers of living individuals. Hence it results that while the propitiations of ordinary ghosts are made only by their descendants, it comes occasionally to be thought prudent to propitiate also the ghosts of the more dreaded individuals, even though they have no claims of blood. Quite early there thus begin those grades of supernatural beings which eventually become so strongly marked.

Habitual wars, which more than all other causes initiate these first differentiations, go on to initiate further and more decided ones. For with those compoundings of small societies into greater ones, and re-compounding of these into still greater, which war

effects, there, of course, with the multiplying gradations of power among living men, arises the idea of multiplying gradations of power among their ghosts. Thus in course of time are formed the conceptions of the great ghosts or gods, the more numerous secondary ghosts or demi-gods, and so on downwards—a pantheon: there being still, however, no essential distinction of kind; as we see in the calling of ordinary ghosts *manes*-gods by the Romans and *elohim* by the Hebrews. Moreover, repeating as the other life in the other world does, the life in this world, in its needs, occupations, and social organization, there arises not only a differentiation of grades among supernatural beings in respect of their powers, but also in respect of their characters and kinds of activity. There come to be local gods, and gods reigning over this or that order of phenomena; there come to be good and evil spirits of various qualities; and where there has been by conquest a posing of one society upon another, each having its own system of ghost-derived beliefs, there results an involved combination of such beliefs, constituting a mythology.

Of course primitive ghosts being doubles like their originals in all things; and gods (when not the living members of a conquering race) being doubles of the more powerful men; it results that they are primarily conceived as no less human than other ghosts in their physical characters, their passions, and their intelligences. Like the doubles of the ordinary dead, they are supposed to consume the flesh, blood, bread, wine, given to them; at first literally, and later in a more spiritual way by consuming the essences of them. They not only appear as visible and tangible persons, but they enter into conflicts with men, are wounded, suffer pain: the sole distinction being that they have miraculous powers of healing and consequent immortality.

Here, indeed, there needs a qualification; for not only do various peoples hold that gods die a first death (as naturally happens where they are members of a conquering race, called gods because of their superiority), but, as in the case of Pan, it is supposed, even among the cultured, that there is a second and final death of a god, like that second and final death of a man supposed among existing savages. With advancing civilization the divergence of the

supernatural being from the natural being becomes more decided. There is nothing to check the gradual de-materialization of the ghost and of the god; and this de-materialization is insensibly furthered in the effort to reach consistent ideas of supernatural action: the god ceases to be tangible, and later he ceases to be visible or audible.

Along with this differentiation of physical attributes from those of humanity, there goes on more slowly a differentiation of mental attributes. The god of the savage, represented as having intelligence scarcely if at all greater than that of the living man, is deluded with ease. Even the gods of the semi-civilized are deceived, make mistakes, repent of their plans; and only in case of time does there arise the conception of unlimited vision and universal knowledge. The emotional nature simultaneously undergoes a parallel transformation. The grosser passions, originally conspicuous and carefully ministered to by devotees, gradually fade, leaving only the passions less related to corporeal satisfactions; and eventually these, too, become partially de-humanized.

Ascribed characters of deities are continually adapted and re-adapted to the needs of the social state. During the militant phase of activity, the chief god is conceived as holding insubordination the greatest crime, as implacable in anger, as merciless in punishment; and any alleged attributes of milder kinds occupy but small space in the social consciousness. But where militancy declines and the harsh despotic form of government appropriate to it is gradually qualified by the form appropriate to industrialism, the foreground of the religious consciousness is increasingly filled with those ascribed traits of the divine nature which are congruous with the ethics of peace: divine love, divine forgiveness, divine mercy, and now the characteristics enlarged upon.

To perceive clearly the effects of mental progress and changing social life, thus stated in the abstract, we must glance at them in the concrete. If, without foregone conclusions, we contemplate the traditions, records, and monuments, of the Egyptians, we see that out of their primitive ideas of gods, brute or human, there were evolved spiritualized ideas of gods, and finally of a god; until the priesthoods of later times, repudiating the earlier ideas, described

them as corruptions: being swayed by the universal tendency to regard the first state as the highest—a tendency traceable down to the theories of existing theologians and mythologists. Again, if, putting aside speculations, and not asking what historical value the *Iliad* may have, we take it simply as indicating the early Greek notion of Zeus, and compare this with the notion contained in the Platonic dialogues; we see that Greek civilization had greatly modified (in the better minds, at least) the purely anthropomorphic conception of him: the lower human attributes being dropped and the higher ones transfigured. Similarly, if we contrast the Hebrew God described in early traditions, man-like in appearance, appetites, and emotions, with the Hebrew God as characterized by the prophets, there is shown a widening range of power along with a nature increasingly remote from that of man. And on passing to the conceptions of him which are now entertained, we are made aware of an extreme transfiguration. By a convenient obliviousness, a deity who in early times is represented as hardening men's hearts so that they may commit punishable acts, and as employing a lying spirit to deceive them, comes to be mostly thought of as an embodiment of virtues transcending the highest we can imagine.

Thus, recognizing the fact that in the primitive human mind there exists neither religious idea nor religious sentiment, we find that in the course of social evolution and the evolution of intelligence accompanying it, there are generated both the ideas and sentiments which we distinguish as religious; and that through a process of causation clearly traceable, they traverse those stages which have brought them, among civilized races, to their present forms. . . .

Those who think that science is dissipating religious beliefs and sentiments, seem unaware that whatever of mystery is taken from the old interpretation is added to the new. Or rather, we may say that transference from the one to the other is accompanied by increase; since, for an explanation which has a seeming feasibility, science substitutes an explanation which, carrying us back only a

certain distance, there leaves us in presence of the avowedly inexplicable.

Under one of its aspects scientific progress is a gradual transfiguration of Nature. Where ordinary perception saw perfect simplicity it reveals great complexity; where there seemed absolute inertness it discloses intense activity; and in what appears mere vacancy it finds a marvellous play of forces. Each generation of physicists discovers in so-called "brute matter," powers which but a few years before the most instructed physicists would have thought incredible; as instance the ability of a mere iron plate to take up the complicated aerial vibrations produced by articulate speech, which, translated into multitudinous and varied electric pulses, are re-translated a thousand miles off by another iron plate and again heard as articulate speech. When the explorer of Nature sees that quiescent as they appear, surrounding solid bodies are thus sensitive to forces which are infinitesimal in their amounts—when the spectroscope proves to him that molecules on the Earth pulsate in harmony with molecules in the stars—when there is forced on him the inference that every point in space thrills with an infinity of vibrations passing through it in all directions; the conception to which he tends is much less that of a Universe of dead matter than that of a Universe everywhere alive: alive if not in the restricted sense, still in a general sense.

This transfiguration which the inquiries of physicists continually increase, is aided by that other transfiguration resulting from metaphysical inquiries. Subjective analysis compels us to admit that our scientific interpretations of the phenomena which objects present, are expressed in terms of our own variously-combined sensations and ideas—are expressed, that is, in elements belonging to consciousness, which are but symbols of the something beyond consciousness. Though analysis afterwards reinstates our primitive beliefs, to the extent of showing that behind every group of phenomenal manifestations there is always a *nexus*, which is the reality that remains fixed amid appearances which are variable; yet we are shown that this *nexus* of reality is for ever inaccessible to consciousness. And when, once more, we remember that the activi-

ties constituting consciousness, being rigorously bounded, cannot bring in among themselves the activities beyond the bounds, which therefore seem unconscious, though production of either by the other seems to imply that they are of the same essential nature; this necessity we are under to think of the external energy in terms of the internal energy, gives rather a spiritualistic than a materialistic aspect to the Universe: further thought, however, obliging us to recognize the truth that a conception given in phenomenal manifestations of this ultimate energy can in no wise show us what it is.

While the beliefs to which analytic science thus leads, are such as do not destroy the object-matter of religion, but simply transfigure it, science under its concrete forms enlarges the sphere for religious sentiment. From the very beginning the progress of knowledge has been accompanied by an increasing capacity for wonder. Among savages, the lowest are the least surprised when shown remarkable products of civilized art: astonishing the traveller by their indifference. And so little of the marvellous do they perceive in the grandest phenomena of Nature, that any inquiries concerning them they regard as childish trifling. This contrast in mental attitude between the lowest human beings and the higher human beings around us, is paralleled by contrasts among the grades of these higher human beings themselves. It is not the rustic, nor the artizan, nor the trader, who sees something more than a mere matter of course in the hatching of a chick; but it is the biologist, who, pushing to the uttermost his analysis of vital phenomena, reaches his greatest perplexity when a speck of protoplasm under the microscope shows him life in its simplest form, and makes him feel that however he formulates its processes the actual play of forces remains unimaginable. Neither in the ordinary tourist nor in the deer-stalker climbing the mountains above him, does a highland glen rouse ideas beyond those of sport or of the picturesque; but it may, and often does, in the geologist. He, observing that the glacier-rounded rock he sits on has lost by weathering but half an inch of its surface since a time far more remote than the beginnings of human civilization, and then trying to conceive the slow denudation which has cut out the whole valley, has thoughts of time and of power to which they are strangers—thoughts which,

already utterly inadequate to their objects, he feels to be still more futile on noting the contorted beds of gneiss around, which tell him of a time, immeasurably more remote, when far beneath the Earth's surface they were in a half-melted state, and again tell him of a time, immensely exceeding this in remoteness, when their components were sand and mud on the shores of an ancient sea. Nor is it in the primitive peoples who supposed that the heavens rested on the mountain tops, any more than in the modern inheritors of their cosmogony who repeat that "the heavens declare the glory of God," that we find the largest conceptions of the Universe or the greatest amount of wonder excited by contemplation of it. Rather, it is in the astronomer, who sees in the Sun a mass so vast that even into one of his spots our Earth might be plunged without touching its edges; and who by every finer telescope is shown an increased multitude of such suns, many of them far larger.

Hereafter as heretofore, higher faculty and deeper insight will raise rather than lower this sentiment. At present the most powerful and most instructed mind has neither the knowledge nor the capacity required for symbolizing in thought the totality of things. Occupied with one or other division of Nature, the man of science usually does not know enough of the other divisions even rudely to conceive the extent and complexity of their phenomena; and supposing him to have adequate knowledge of each, yet he is unable to think of them as a whole. Wider and stronger intellect may hereafter help him to form a vague consciousness of them in their totality. We may say that just as an undeveloped musical faculty, able only to appreciate a simple melody, cannot grasp the variously-entangled passages and harmonies of a symphony, which in the minds of composer and conductor are unified into involved musical effects awakening far greater feeling than is possible to the musically uncultured; so, by future more evolved intelligences, the course of things now apprehensible only in parts may be apprehensible all together, with an accompanying feeling as much beyond that of the present cultured man, as his feeling is beyond that of the savage.

And this feeling is not likely to be decreased but to be increased by that analysis of knowledge which, while forcing him to agnosti-

cism, yet continually prompts him to imagine some solution of the Great Enigma which he knows cannot be solved. Especially must this be so when he remembers that the very notions, origin, cause and purpose, are relative notions belonging to human thought, which are probably irrelevant to the Ultimate Reality transcending human thought; and when, though suspecting that explanation is a word without meaning when applied to this Ultimate Reality, he yet feels compelled to think there must be an explanation.

But one truth must grow ever clearer—the truth that there is an Inscrutable Existence everywhere manifested, to which he can neither find nor conceive either beginning or end. Amid the mysteries which become the more mysterious the more they are thought about, there will remain the one absolute certainty, that he is ever in presence of an Infinite and Eternal Energy, from which all things proceed.

21

AN ECCLESIASTICAL SYSTEM AS A SOCIAL BOND

ONCE MORE WE must return to the religious idea and the religious sentiment in their rudimentary forms, to find an explanation of the part played by ecclesiastical systems in social development.

Though ancestor-worship has died out, there survive among us certain of the conceptions and feelings appropriate to it, and certain resulting observances, which enable us to understand its original effects, and the original effects of those cults immediately derived from it. I refer more especially to the behaviour of descendants after the death of a parent or grand-parent. Three traits, of which we shall presently see the significance, may be noted.

When a funeral takes place, natural affection and usage supporting it, prompt the assembling of the family or clan: of children especially, of other relations to a considerable extent, and in a measure of friends. All, by taking part in the ceremony, join in that expression of respect which constituted the original worship and still remains a qualified form of worship. The burial of a progenitor consequently becomes an occasion on which, more than on any other, there is a revival of the thoughts and feelings appropriate to relationship, and a strengthening of the bonds among kindred.

An incidental result which is still more significant, not unfrequently occurs. If antagonisms among members of the family exist,

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From *The Principles of Sociology* (London: Williams and Norgate, 1876), vol. 3, part 6, pp, 95–106.

they are not allowed to show themselves. Being possessed by a common sentiment towards the dead, and in so far made to sympathize, those who have been at enmity have their animosities to some extent mitigated; and not uncommonly reconciliations are effected. So that beyond a strengthening of the family-group by the gathering together of its members, there is a strengthening of it caused by the healing of breaches.

One more co-operative influence exists. The injunctions of the deceased are made known; and when these have reference to family-differences, obedience to them furthers harmony. Though it is true that directions concerning the distribution of property often initiate new quarrels, yet in respect of pre-existing quarrels, the known wish of the dying man that they should be ended, is influential in causing compromise or forgiveness; and if there has been a desire on his part that some particular course or policy should be pursued after his death, this desire, even orally expressed, tends very much to become a law to his descendants, and so to produce unity of action among them.

If in our days these influences still have considerable power, they must have had great power in days when there was a vivid conception of ancestral ghosts as liable to be made angry by disregard of their wishes, and able to punish the disobedient. Evidently the family-cult in primitive times, must have greatly tended to maintain the family bond: alike by causing periodic assemblings for sacrifice, by repressing dissensions, and by producing conformity to the same injunctions.

Rising as we do from the ordinary father to the patriarch heading numerous families, propitiation of whose ghost is imperative on all of them, and thence to some head of kindred clans who, leading them to conquest, becomes after death a local chief god, above all others feared and obeyed; we may expect to find in the cults everywhere derived from ancestor-worship, the same influence which ancestor-worship in its simple original form shows us. We shall not be disappointed. Even concerning peoples so rude as the Ostyaks, we find the remark that "the use of the same consecrated spot, or the same priest, is also a bond of union;" and higher races yield still clearer evidence. Let us study it under the heads above indicated.

The original tribes of the Egyptians, inhabiting areas which eventually become the *nomes*, were severally held together by special worships. The central point in each "was always, in the first place, a temple, about which a city became formed." And since "some animals, sacred in one province, were held in abhorrence in another"—since, as we have seen, the animal-naming of ancestral chiefs, revered within the tribe but hated beyond it, naturally originated this; we have reason for concluding that each local bond of union was the worship of an original ancestor-god.

Early Greek civilization shows like influences at work. . . .

The like happened in Italy. Concerning the Etruscans, Mommsen says—"Each of these leagues consisted of twelve communities, which recognized a metropolis, especially for purposes of worship, and a federal head or rather a high-priest." It was thus with the Latins too. Alba was the chief place of the Latin League; and it was also the place at which the tribes forming the league assembled for their religious festivals: such union as existed among them was sanctified by a cult in which all joined. A kindred fact is alleged of ancient Rome. "The oldest constitution of Rome is religious throughout," says Seeley. "Institutions suggested by naked utility come in later, and those which they practically supersede are not abolished, but formally retained on account of their religious character."

Though generally in such cases the need for joint defence against external enemies is the chief prompter to federation; yet in each case the federation formed is determined by that community of sacred rites which from time to time brings the dispersed divisions of the same stock together, and keeps alive in them the idea of a common origin as well as the sentiment appropriate to it.

Though Christendom has not exemplified in any considerable degree a like consolidating effect—though its worship, being an adopted one, has not supplied that bond which results where the worship is of some great founder of the tribe or traditional god of the race; yet it can hardly be questioned that unity of creed and ceremony has to some extent served as an integrating principle. Though Christian brotherhood has not been much displayed among Christian peoples, still, it has not been absolutely a mere name. Indeed it is manifest that since similarity of thought and

sympathy of feeling must further harmony by diminishing reasons for difference, agreement in religion necessarily favours union.

Still more clearly shown is the parallelism between suspension of family animosities at funerals, and temporary cessation of hostilities between clans on occasions of common religious festivals.

Already I have pointed out that among some of the uncivilized, burial places of chiefs become sacred, to the extent that fighting in them is forbidden: one of the results being the initiation of sanctuaries. Naturally an interdict against quarrels at burial-places, or sacred places where sacrifices are to be made, tends to become an interdict against quarrels with those who are going there to sacrifice. The Tahitians would not molest an enemy who came to make offerings to the national idol; and among the Chibchas pilgrims to Iraca (Sogamoso) were protected by the religious character of the country even in time of war. These cases at once recall cases from ancient European history. . . .

And then beyond these various influences indirectly aiding consolidation, come the direct influences of judgments supposed to come from God through an inspired person—Delphian oracle or Catholic high-priest. "As men of a privileged spiritual endowment" the priests of Delphi were "possessed of the capacity and mission of becoming in the name of their god the teachers and counsellors, in all matters, of the children of the land"; and obviously, in so far as their judgments concerning inter-tribal questions were respected, they served to prevent wars. In like manner belief in the pope as a medium through whom the divine will was communicated, tended in those who held it to cause subordination to his decisions concerning international disputes, and in so far to diminish the dissolving effects of perpetual conflicts: instance the acceptance of his arbitration by Philip Augustus and Richard I. under threat of ecclesiastical punishment; instance the maintenance of peace between the king of Castile and Portugal by Innocent III. under penalty of excommunication; instance Eleanor's invocation—"has not God given you the power to govern nations;" instance the formal enunciation of the theory that the pope was supreme judge in disputes among princes.

No less clearly do the facts justify the analogy above pointed out between the recognized duty of fulfilling a deceased parent's wishes, and the imperative obligation of conforming to a divinely-ordained law.

Twice in six months within my own small circle of friends, I have seen exemplified the subordination of conduct to the imagined dictate of a deceased person: the first example being yielded by one who, after long hesitation, decided to alter a house built by his father, but only in such way as he thought his father would have approved; the second being yielded by one who, not himself objecting to play a game on Sunday, declined because he thought his late wife would not have liked it. If in such cases supposed wishes of the dead become transformed into rules of conduct, much more must expressed injunctions tend to do this. And since maintenance of family-union is an end which such expressed injunctions are always likely to have in view—since the commands of the dying patriarch, or the conquering chief, naturally aim at prosperity of the clan or tribe he governed; the rules or laws which ancestor-worship originates, will usually be of a kind which, while intrinsically furthering social cohesion, further it also by producing ideas of obligation common to all.

Already I have pointed out that, among primitive men, the customs which stand in place of laws, embody the ideas and feelings of past generations; and, religiously conformed to as they are, exhibit the rule of the dead over the living. From usages of the Veddahs, the Scandinavians, and the Hebrews, I there drew evidence that in some cases the ghosts of the dead are appealed to for guidance in special emergencies; and I gave proof that, more generally, apotheosized men or gods are asked for directions: instances being cited from accounts of Egyptians, Peruvians, Tahitians, Tongans, Samoans, Hebrews, and sundry Aryan peoples. Further, it was shown that from particular commands answering special invocations, there was a transition to general commands passing into permanent laws: there being in the bodies of laws so derived, a mingling of regulations of all kinds—sacred, secular, public, domestic, personal. . . .

Evidently bodies of laws regarded as supernaturally given by

the traditional god of the race, originating in the way shown, habitually tend to restrain the anti-social actions of individuals towards one another, and to enforce concerted action in the dealings of the society with other societies: in both ways conducing to social cohesion.

The general influence of Ecclesiastical Institutions is conservative in a double sense. In several ways they maintain and strengthen social bonds, and so conserve the social aggregate; and they do this in large measure by conserving beliefs, sentiments, and usages which, evolved during earlier stages of the society, are shown by its survival to have had an approximate fitness to the requirements, and are likely still to have it in great measure. Elsewhere (*Study of Sociology*, Chap. V) I have, for another purpose, exemplified the extreme resistance to change offered by Ecclesiastical Institutions, and this more especially in respect of all things pertaining to the ecclesiastical organization itself. Here let me add a further series of illustrations. . . .

Of course while thus resisting changes of usage, ecclesiastical functionaries have resisted with equal or greater strenuousness, changes of beliefs; since any revolution in the inherited body of beliefs, tends in some measure to shake all parts of it, by diminishing the general authority of ancestral teaching. This familiar aspect of ecclesiastical conservatism, congruous with the aspects above exemplified, it is needless to illustrate.

Again, then, the ghost-theory yields us the needful clue. As, before, we found that all religious observances may be traced back to funeral observances; so here, we find these influences which ecclesiastical institutions exert, have their germs in the influences exerted by the feelings entertained towards the dead. The burial of a late parent is an occasion on which the members of the family gather together and become bound by a renewed sense of kinship; on which any antagonism among them is temporarily or permanently extinguished; and on which they are further united by being subject in common to the deceased man's wishes, and made, in so far, to act in concert. The sentiment of filial piety thus manifesting

itself, enlarges in its sphere when the deceased man is the patriarch, or the founder of the tribe, or the hero of the race. But be it in worship of a god or funeral of a parent, we ever see the same three influences—strengthening of union, suspension of hostilities, reinforcement of transmitted commands. In both cases the process of integration is in several ways furthered.

Thus, looking at it generally, we may say that ecclesiasticism stands for the principle of social continuity. Above all other agencies it is that which conduces to cohesion; not only between the coexisting parts of a nation, but also between its present generation and its past generations. In both ways it helps to maintain the individuality of the society. Or, changing somewhat the point of view, we may say that ecclesiasticism, embodying in its primitive form the rule of the dead over the living, and sanctifying in its more advanced forms the authority of the past over the present, has for its function to preserve in force the organized product of earlier experiences *versus* the modifying effects of more recent experiences. Evidently this organized product of past experiences is not without credentials. The life of the society has, up to the time being, been maintained under it; and hence a perennial reason for resistance to deviation. If we consider that habitually the chief or ruler, propitiation of whose ghost originates a local cult, acquired his position through successes of one or other kind, we must infer that obedience to the commands emanating from him, and maintenance of the usages he initiated, is, on the average of cases, conducive to social prosperity so long as conditions remain the same; and that therefore this intense conservatism of ecclesiastical institutions is not without a justification.

Even irrespective of the relative fitness of the inherited cult to the inherited social circumstances, there is an advantage in, if not indeed a necessity for, acceptance of traditional beliefs, and consequent conformity to the resulting customs and rules. For before an assemblage of men can become organized, the men must be held together, and kept ever in presence of the conditions to which they have to become adapted; and that they may be thus held, the coercive influence of their traditional beliefs must be strong. So great are the obstacles which the anti-social traits of the savage

offer to that social cohesion which is the first condition to social progress, that he can be kept within the needful bonds only by a sentiment prompting absolute submission—submission to secular rule reinforced by that sacred rule which is at first in unison with it. And hence, as I have before pointed out, the truth that in whatever place arising—Egypt, Assyria, Peru, Mexico, China—social evolution throughout all its earlier stages has been accompanied not only by extreme subordination to living kings, but also by elaborate worships of the deities originating from dead kings.

22

JOINT-STOCK COMPANIES

EARLY STAGES in the genesis of what is now called joint-stock enterprise, are instructive as showing, in several ways, how progress of each kind depends on several kinds of preceding progress; and as also showing how any industrial structure, specialized into the form now familiar to us, arose out of an indefinite germ in which it was mingled with other structures.

The creation of the accumulated fund we call capital, depends on certain usages and conditions. Among peoples who, besides burying with the dead man his valuables, sometimes even killed his animals and cut down his fruit trees, no considerable masses of property could be aggregated. The growth of such masses was also prevented by constant wars, which now absorbed them in meeting expenses and now caused the loss of them by capture. Yet a further prevention commonly resulted from appropriations by chiefs and kings. Their unrestrained greed either made saving futile, or by forcing men to hoard what they saved, rendered it useless for reproductive purposes.

Another obstacle existed. Going back, as the idea of capital does, to days when cattle and sheep mainly formed a rich man's movable property, and indicating, as the word does, the number of "heads" in his flocks and herds, it is clear that no fund of the kind which the word now connotes was possible. Cattle and sheep could

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From *The Principles of Sociology* (London: Williams and Norgate, 1896), vol. 3, part 8, pp. 517–25; "Railway Morals and Railway Policy" (1854), reprinted in *Essays*, vol. 2 (1868), pp. 251–87.

not be disposed of at will. There was only an occasional market for large numbers; and the form of payment was ordinarily not such as rendered the amount easily available for commercial purposes. A money economy had to be well established; and even then, so long as money consisted exclusively of coin, large transactions were much restricted. Only along with the rise of a credit-currency of one or other kind, could individual capital or compound capital take any great developments.

Again, the form of partnership which joint-stock companies exhibit, had to be evolved out of simple partnerships, having their roots in family-organizations and gild-organizations. Fathers and sons, and then larger groups of relatives carrying on the same business, naturally, on emerging from the communal state, fell into one or other form of joint ownership and division of profits. And we may safely infer that the gild-organization afterwards evolved, which, considered in its general nature, was a partnership for purposes of defence and regulation, further educated men in the ideas and practices which the joint-stock system implies. Those who constantly combined their powers in pursuit of certain common interests, were led occasionally to combine their individual possessions for common interests—to form large partnerships.

A further needful remark is that these early companies were not wholly industrial but were partly militant. Already, when contemplating gilds, we have seen in them the spirit of antagonism common to all social structures in their days, when nobles fought against one another or joined against the king, when the people of towns had to defend themselves against feudal tyrannies, and when town was against town. Like the gilds, the early combinations of traders which foreshadowed companies, had defence and aggression within their functions. Even now industry is in a considerable measure militant, and it was then still more militant. . . .

The last stage in the development of these industrial associations which have compound capitals has still to be named. In modern forms of them we see the regulative policy, once so pronounced, reduced to its least degree. Both by the central government and by local governments, individuals were, in early days,

greatly restricted in the carrying on of their occupations; and at the same time the combinations they formed for the protection and regulation of their industries, were formed by governmental authority, general or local, for which they paid. Of the various hindrances to combinations, originally for regulating industries but eventually for carrying on industries, the last was removed in 1855. Up to that time it had been held needful that the public should be safeguarded against wild and fraudulent schemes, by requiring that each shareholder should be liable to the whole amount of his property for the debts of any company he joined. But at length it was concluded that it would suffice if each shareholder was liable only to the amount of his shares; provided that his limited liability was duly notified to men at large.

Everyone knows the results. Under the limited-liability system many bubble-companies, analogous to those of old times, have arisen, and there has been much business under the winding-up Acts: the public has often proved itself an incompetent judge of the projects brought before it. But many useful undertakings have been proposed and carried out. One unanticipated result has been the changing of private trading concerns into limited-liability companies; whether with benefit may be questioned. But the measure has certainly yielded advantage by making it possible to raise capital for relatively small industries of speculative kinds. It has been beneficial, too, in making available for industrial purposes, numberless savings which otherwise would have been idle: absorption of them into the general mass of reproductive capital being furthered by the issue of shares of small denominations. So that now stagnant capital has almost disappeared.

Before leaving the topic it is proper to point out that in this case, as in other cases, coerciveness of regulation declines politically, ecclesiastically, and industrially at the same time. Many facts have shown us that while the individual man has acquired greater liberty as a citizen and greater religious liberty, he has also acquired greater liberty in respect of his occupations; and here we see that he has simultaneously acquired greater liberty of combination for industrial purposes. Indeed, in conformity with the universal law of rhythm, there has been a change from excess of

restriction to deficiency of restriction. As is implied by legislation now pending, the facilities for forming companies and raising compound capitals have been too great. Of sundry examples here is one. Directors are allowed to issue prospectuses in which it is said that those who take shares will be understood to waive the right to know the contents of certain preliminary agreements, made with promoters—are allowed to ask the public to subscribe while not knowing fully the circumstances of the case. A rational interpretation of legal principles would have negatived this. In any proper contract the terms on both sides are distinctly specified. If they are not, one of the parties to the contract is bound completely while the other is bound incompletely—a result at variance with the very nature of contract. Where the transaction is one that demands definiteness on one side while leaving the other side indefinite, the law should ignore the contract as one that cannot be enforced. . . .

Believers in the intrinsic virtues of political forms, might draw an instructive lesson from the politics of our railways. If there needs a conclusive proof that the most carefully-framed constitutions are worthless, unless they be embodiments of the popular character—if there needs a conclusive proof, that governmental arrangements in advance of the time will inevitably lapse into congruity with the time; such proof may be found over and over again repeated in the current history of joint-stock enterprises.

As devised by Act of Parliament, the administrations of our public companies are almost purely democratic. The representative system is carried out in them with scarcely a check. Shareholders elect their directors, directors their chairman; there is an annual retirement of a certain proportion of the board, giving facilities for superseding them; and, by this means, the whole ruling body may be changed in periods varying from three to five years. Yet, not only are the characteristic vices of our political state reproduced in each of these mercantile corporations—some even in an intenser degree—but the very form of government, while remaining nominally democratic, is substantially so remodelled as to become a miniature of our national constitution. The direction, ceasing to fulfil its theory as a deliberative body whose members possess like

powers, falls under the control of some one member of superior cunning, will, or wealth, to whom the majority become so subordinate, that the decision on every question depends on the course he takes. Proprietors, instead of constantly exercising their franchise, allow it to become on all ordinary occasions a dead letter: retiring directors are so habitually reëlected without opposition, and have so great a power of insuring their own election when opposed, that the board becomes practically a close body; and it is only when the misgovernment grows extreme enough to produce a revolutionary agitation among the shareholders, that any change can be effected.

Thus, a mixture of the monarchic, the aristocratic, and the democratic elements, is repeated with such modifications only as the circumstances involve. The modes of action, too, are substantially the same: save in this, that the copy outruns the original. Threats of resignation, which ministries hold out in extreme cases, are commonly made by railway-boards to stave off a disagreeable inquiry. By no means regarding themselves as servants of the shareholders, directors rebel against dictation from them; and frequently construe any amendment to their proposals into a vote of want of confidence. At half-yearly meetings, disagreeable criticism and objections are met by the chairman with the remark, that if the shareholders cannot trust his colleagues and himself, they had better choose others. With most, this assumption of offended dignity tells; and, under the fear that the company's interests may suffer from any disturbance, measures quite at variance with the wishes of the proprietary are allowed to be carried.

The parallel holds yet further. If it be true of national administrations, that those in office count on the support of all public *employés*; it is not less true of incorporated companies, that the directors are greatly aided by their officials in their struggles with shareholders. If, in times past, there have been ministries who spent public money to secure party ends; there are, in times present, railway-boards who use the funds of the shareholders to defeat the shareholders. Nay, even in detail, the similarity is maintained. Like their prototype, joint-stock companies have their expensive election contests, managed by election committees, employing election agents; they have their canvassing with its sundry illegitimate ac-

companiments; they have their occasional manufacture of fraudulent votes. And, as a general result, that class-legislation, which has been habitually changed against statesmen, is now habitually displayed in the proceedings of these trading associations: constituted though they are on purely representative principles. . . . [A long catalogue of abuses and corruptions, initiated by directors, against shareholders' interests, follows.]

Need we any longer wonder, then, at the persistence of Railway Companies in seemingly reckless competition and ruinous extensions? Is not this obstinate continuance of a policy that has year after year proved disastrous, sufficiently explicable on contemplating the many illegitimate influences at work? Is it not manifest that the small organized party always outmanœuvres the large unorganized one? Consider their respective characters and circumstances. Here are the shareholders diffused throughout the whole kingdom, in towns and country houses; knowing nothing of each other, and too remote to coöperate were they acquainted. Very few of them see a railway journal; not many a daily one; and scarcely any know much of railway politics. Necessarily a fluctuating body, only a small number are familiar with the Company's history—its acts, engagements, policy, management. A great proportion are incompetent to judge of the questions that come before them, and lack decision to act out such judgments as they may form—executors who do not like to take steps involving much responsibility; trustees fearful of interfering with the property under their care, lest possible loss should entail a lawsuit; widows who have never in their lives acted for themselves in any affair of moment; maiden ladies, alike nervous and innocent of all business knowledge; clergymen whose daily discipline has been little calculated to make them acute men of the world; retired tradesmen whose retail transactions have given them small ability for grasping large considerations; servants possessed of accumulated savings and cramped notions; with sundry others of like helpless character—all of them rendered more or less conservative by ignorance or timidity, and proportionately inclined to support those in authority. To these should be added the class of temporary shareholders, who, having bought stock on speculation, and knowing that a revolution in the Com-

pany is likely to depress prices for a time, have an interest in supporting the board irrespective of the goodness of its policy.

Turn now to those whose efforts are directed to railway expansion. Consider the constant pressure of local interests—of small towns, of rural districts, of landowners: all of them eager for branch accommodation; all of them with great and definite advantages in view; few of them conscious of the loss those advantages may entail on others. Remember the influence of legislators, prompted, some by their constituents, some by personal aims, and encouraged by the belief that additional railway facilities are in every case nationally beneficial; and then calculate the extent to which, as stated to Mr. Cardwell's committee, Parliament has "excited and urged forward" Companies into rivalry. Observe the temptations under which lawyers are placed—the vast profits accruing to them from every railway contest, whether ending in success or failure; and then imagine the magnitude and subtlety of their extension manœuvring. Conceive the urgency of the engineering profession; to the richer of whom more railway-making means more wealth; to the mass of whom more railway-making means daily bread. Estimate the capitalist-power of contractors; whose plant when employed brings great gain. Then recollect that to lawyers, engineers, and contractors the getting up and executing of new undertakings is a business—a business to which every energy is directed; in which long years of practice have given great skill; and to the facilitation of which, all means tolerated by men of the world are thought justifiable.

Finally, consider that the classes interested in carrying out new schemes, are in constant communication, and have every facility for combined action. . . . Is it any wonder then, that the widespread, ill-informed, unorganized body of shareholders, standing severally alone, and each preoccupied with his daily affairs, should be continually outgeneralled by the comparatively small but active, skilful, combined body opposed to them, whose very occupation is at stake in gaining the victory?

"But how about the directors?" it will perhaps be asked. "How can they be parties to those obviously unwise undertakings? They are themselves shareholders: they gain by what benefits the pro-

prietary at large; they lose by what injures it. And if without their consent, or rather their agency, no new scheme can be adopted by the Company, the classes interested in fostering railway enterprise are powerless to do harm."

This belief in the identity of directional and proprietary interests, is the fatal error commonly made by shareholders. It is this which, in spite of many bitter experiences, leads them to be so careless and so trustful. "Their profit is our profit; their loss is our loss; they know more than we do; therefore let us leave the matter to them." Such is the argument which more or less definitely passes through the shareholding mind—an argument of which the premises are vicious, and the inference disastrous. Let us consider it in detail.

Not to dwell upon the disclosures that have in years past been made respecting the share-trafficking of boards, and the large profits realized by it—disclosures which alone suffice to disprove the assumed identity between the interests of directors and proprietary—and taking for granted that little, if any, of this now takes place; let us go on to notice the still-prevailing influences which render this apparent unity of purpose illusive. The immediate interest which directors have in the prosperity of the Company, is often much less than is supposed. Occasionally they possess only the bare qualification of £1,000 worth of stock. In some instances even this is partly nominal. Admitting, however, as we do frankly, that in the great majority of cases the full qualification, and much more than the qualification, is held; yet it must be borne in mind that the indirect advantages which a wealthy member of a board may gain from the prosecution of a new undertaking, will often far outweigh the direct injury it will inflict on him by the depreciation of his shares. A board usually consists, to a considerable extent, of gentlemen residing at different points throughout the tract of country traversed by the railway they control: some of them landowners; some merchants or manufacturers; some owners of mines or shipping. Almost always these are advantaged more or less by a new branch or feeder. Those in close proximity to it, gain either by enhanced value of their lands, or by increased facilities of transit for their commodities. Those at more remote parts of the

main line, though less directly interested, are still frequently interested in some degree: for every extension opens up new markets either for produce or raw materials; and if it is one effecting a junction with some other system of railways, the greater mercantile conveniences afforded to directors thus circumstanced, become important.

Obviously, therefore, the indirect profits accruing to such from one of these new undertakings, may more than counterbalance the direct loss upon their railway investments; and though there are, doubtless, men far too honourable to let such considerations sway them, yet the generality can scarcely fail to be affected by temptations so strong. Then we have further to remember the influences brought to bear upon directors having seats in Parliament.

23

LABOUR IN INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY

FOR THE REVOLUTION which gave to the Factory System its modern character, arose from the substitution of steam-power for water-power. One result was that, being no longer dependent on supply of water, the variations in which led to variations in activity of production, processes of manufacture were made continuous. Another result was that wide distribution of factories was no longer necessitated by wide distribution of water-power. Factories and the people working in them became clustered in large masses to which there was no limit; and there followed increased facilities both for bringing raw materials and taking away manufactured products. So that beyond the integration of many machines in one mill there came the integration of many mills in one town.

But now, from considering this evolution as a mechanical progress and as a progress in industrial organization, let us go on to consider it in relation to the lives of workers. Here its effects, in some respects beneficial, are in many respects detrimental. Though in his capacity of consumer the factory-hand, in common with the community, profits by the cheapening of goods of all kinds, including his own kind, yet in his capacity of producer he loses heavily—perhaps more heavily than he gains.

More and more of his powers, bodily and mental, are rendered superfluous. The successive improvements of the motor-agency

From *The Principles of Sociology* (London: Williams and Norgate, 1896), vol. 3, part 8, pp. 514–16, 526–27, 541–43, 559–63, 566–79.

itself show this effect. Originally the steam-engine required a boy to open and shut the steam valves at the proper moments. Presently the engine was made to open and shut its own valves, and human aid was to that extent superseded. For a time, however, it continued needful for regulating the general supply of steam. When the work the engine had to do was suddenly much increased or decreased, the opening through which the steam passed from the boiler had to be enlarged or diminished by an attendant. But for the attendant there was presently substituted an unintelligent apparatus—the governor. Then, after an interval, came a self-stoking apparatus, enabling the engine itself to supply fuel to its steam-generator. Now this replacing of muscular and mental processes by mechanical processes, has been going on not only in the motor but in the vast assemblages of machines which the motor works. From time to time each of them has been made to do for itself something which was previously done for it; so that now it stops itself, or part of itself, at the proper moment, or rings a bell when it has finished an appointed piece of work. To its attendant there remains only the task of taking away the work done and giving other work, or else of rectifying its shortcomings: tying a broken thread for instance.

Clearly these self-adjustments, continually decreasing the sphere for human agency, make the actions of the workman himself relatively automatic. At the same time the monotonous attention required, taxing special parts of the nervous system and leaving others inactive, entails positive as well as negative injury. And while the mental nature becomes to the implied extent deformed, the physical nature, too, undergoes degradations; caused by breathing vitiated air at a temperature now in excess now in defect, and by standing for many hours in a way which unduly taxes the vascular system. If we compare his life with the life of the cottage artisan he has replaced, who, a century ago, having a varied muscular action in working his loom, with breaks caused by the incidents of the work, was able to alternate his indoor activities with outdoor activities in garden or field, we cannot but admit that this industrial development has proved extremely detrimental to the operative.

In their social relations, too, there has been an entailed retrogression rather than a progression. The wage-earning factory-hand

does, indeed, exemplify entirely free labour, in so far that, making contracts at will and able to break them after short notice, he is free to engage with whomsoever he pleases and where he pleases. But this liberty amounts in practice to little more than the ability to exchange one slavery for another; since, fit only for his particular occupation, he has rarely an opportunity of doing anything more than decide in what mill he will pass the greater part of his dreary days. The coercion of circumstances often bears more hardly on him than the coercion of a master does on one in bondage.

It seems that in the course of social progress, parts, more or less large, of each society, are sacrificed for the benefit of the society as a whole. In the earlier stages the sacrifice takes the form of mortality in the wars perpetually carried on during the struggle for existence between tribes and nations; and in later stages the sacrifice takes the form of mortality entailed by the commercial struggle, and the keen competition entailed by it. In either case men are used up for the benefit of posterity; and so long as they go on multiplying in excess of the means of subsistence, there appears no remedy. . . .

Trade Unions

Among those carrying on their lives under like conditions, whether in respect of place of living or mode of living, there arise in one way diversities of interests and in another way unities of interests. In respect of place of living this is seen in the fact that members of a tribe or nation have unity of interests in defending themselves against external enemies, while internally they have diversities of interests prompting constant quarrels. Similarly in respect of mode of living. Those who pursue like occupations, being competitors, commonly have differences, as is implied by the proverb "Two of a trade can never agree;" but in relation to bodies of men otherwise occupied, their interests are the same, and sameness of interests prompts joint actions for defence. In preceding chapters history has shown how this general law was illustrated in old times among traders. Now we have to observe how in modern times it is illustrated among their employés.

Union of artisans for maintenance of common advantages is traceable in small societies, even before master and worker are differentiated. . . . Apparently without formal combination there is thus a tacit agreement to maintain certain rates of payment. Something of kindred nature is found in parts of Africa. Reade says that a sort of trade-union exists on the Gaboon, and those who break its rules are ill-treated. The natives on the coast endeavour to keep all the trade with the white man in their own hands; and if one from any of the bush tribes is detected selling to the white man, it is thought a breach of law and custom. But the trade-union as we now know it, obviously implies an advanced social evolution. There is required in the first place a definite separation between the wage-earner and the wage-payer; and in the second place it is requisite that considerable numbers of wage-earners shall be gathered together; either as inhabitants of the same locality or as clustered migratory bodies, such as masons once formed. Of course fulfilment of these conditions was gradual, but when it had become pronounced, "The workmen formed their Trade-Unions against the aggressions of the then rising manufacturing lords, as in earlier times the old freemen formed their Frith-Gilds against the tyranny of mediæval magnates, and the free handicraftsmen their Craft-Gilds against the aggressions of the Old-burghers." Not that there was a lineal descent of trade-unions from craft-gilds. Evidence of this is lacking and evidence to the contrary abundant. Though very generally each later social institution may be affiliated upon some earlier one, yet it occasionally happens that social institutions of a kind like some which previously existed, arise *de novo* under similar conditions; and the trade-union furnishes one illustration. Akin in nature though not akin by descent, the trade-union is simply a gild of wage-earners. . . . [Spencer proceeds to evaluate their contemporary functions.]

Returning from this incidental criticism let us ask what are the effects of the trade-union policy, pecuniarily considered. After averaging the results over many trades in many years, do we find the wage-earner really benefited in his "Standard of Life"? . . . [He discusses first agricultural, then industrial workers, arguing that to artificially raise wages may force the industry to go elsewhere.]

One striking lesson furnished by English history should show trade-unionists that permanent rates of wages are determined by other causes than the wills of either employers or employed. When the Black Death had swept away a large part of the population (more than half it is said) so that the number of workers became insufficient for the work to be done, wages rose immensely, and maintained their high rate notwithstanding all efforts to keep them down by laws and punishments. Conversely, there have been numerous cases in which strikes have failed to prevent lowering of wages when trade was depressed. Where the demand for labour is great, wages cannot be kept down; and where it is small, they cannot be kept up.

What then are we to say of trade-unions? Under their original form as friendly societies—organizations for rendering mutual aid —they were of course extremely beneficial; and in so far as they subserve this purpose down to the present time, they can scarcely be too much lauded. Here, however, we are concerned not with the relations of their members to one another, but with their corporate relations to employers and the public. Must we say that though one set of artisans may succeed for a time in getting more pay for the same work, yet this advantage is eventually at the expense of the public (including the mass of wage-earners), and that when all other groups of artisans, following the example, have raised their wages, the result is a mutual cancelling of benefits? Must we say that while ultimately failing in their proposed ends, trade-unions do nothing else than inflict grave mischiefs in trying to achieve them?

This is too sweeping a conclusion. They seem natural to the passing phase of social evolution, and may have beneficial functions under existing conditions. Everywhere aggression begets resistance and counter-aggression; and in our present transitional state, semi-militant and semi-industrial, trespasses have to be kept in check by the fear of retaliatory trespasses.

Judging from their harsh and cruel conduct in the past, it is tolerably certain that employers are now prevented from doing unfair things which they would else do. Conscious that trade-unions

are ever ready to act, they are more prompt to raise wages when trade is flourishing than they would otherwise be; and when there comes times of depression, they lower wages only when they cannot otherwise carry on their businesses.

Knowing the power which unions can exert, masters are led to treat the individual members of them with more respect than they would otherwise do: the *status* of the workman is almost necessarily raised. Moreover, having a strong motive for keeping on good terms with the union, a master is more likely than he would else be to study the general convenience of his men, and to carry on his works in ways conducive to their health. There is an ultimate gain in moral and physical treatment if there is no ultimate gain in wages.

Then in the third place must be named the discipline given by trade-union organization and action. Considered under its chief aspect, the progress of social life at large is a progress in fitness for living and working together; and all minor societies of men formed within a major society—a nation—subject their members to sets of incentives and restraints which increase their fitness. The induced habits of feeling and thought tend to make men more available than they would else be, for such higher forms of social organization as will probably hereafter arise. . . .

[Spencer then turns to evaluate the various forms of co-operative movement, which sought to provide a communitarian alternative to laissez-faire capitalism.] Apparently, however, there is more reason to accept the unfavourable interpretation of the evidence than the favourable interpretation; since both *a priori* and *a posteriori* it is manifest that destructive causes, hard to withstand, are ever at work. To secure business-management adequately intelligent and honest, is a chronic difficulty. Even supposing external transactions to be well and equitably conducted, adverse criticisms upon them are almost certain to be made by some of the members: perhaps leading to change of management. Then come the difficulties of preserving internal harmony. In cooperative workshops the members receive weekly wages at trade-union rates, and are ranked as higher or lower by the foreman. Officials are paid at better rates according to their values

and responsibilities, and these rates are fixed by the committee. When the profits have been ascertained, they are divided among all in proportion to the amounts they have earned in wages or salaries. Causes of dissension are obvious. One who receives the lowest wages is dissatisfied—holds that he is as good a worker as one who gets higher wages, and resents the decision of the foreman: probably ascribing it to favouritism. Officials, too, are apt to disagree with one another, alike in respect of power and remuneration. Then among the hand-workers in general there is pretty certain to be jealousy of the brain-workers, whose values they under-estimate; and with their jealousies go reflections on the committee as unfair or as unwise. In these various ways the equilibrium of the body is frequently disturbed, and in course of time is very likely to be destroyed.

Must we then say that self-governing combinations of workers will never answer? The reply is that one class of the difficulties above set forth must ever continue to be great, though perhaps not insuperable, but that the other and more serious class may probably be evaded.

These members of industrial copartnerships, paying themselves trade-union wages, are mostly imbued with trade-union ideas and feelings. Among these is a prejudice against piece-work, quite naturally resulting from experience. Finding what a given piece of work ordinarily costs in day-wages, the employer offers to pay the workman for it at a certain lower rate; leaving him to get, by extra diligence, more work done and a larger payment. Immediately, the quantity executed is greatly increased, and the workman receives considerably more than he did in wages—so much more that the employer becomes dissatisfied, thinks he is giving too large a sum by the piece, and cuts down the rate. Action and reaction go on until, very generally, there is an approximation to the earnings by day-wages: the tendency, meanwhile, having been so to raise the employer's standard, that he expects to get more work out of the workman for the same sum.

But now, has not the resulting aversion to piece-work been unawares carried into another sphere, in which its effects must be

quite different? Evils like these arising from antagonistic interests, cannot arise where there are no antagonistic interests. Each co-operator exists in a double capacity. He is a unit in an incorporated body standing in the place of employer; and he is a worker employed by this incorporated body. Manifestly, when, instead of an employing master, alien to the workers, there is an employing master compounded of the workers, the mischiefs ordinarily caused by piece-work can no longer be caused. Consider how the arrangement will work.

The incorporated body, acting through its deputed committee, gives to the individual members work at a settled rate for an assigned quantity—such rate being somewhat lower than that which, at the ordinary speed of production, would yield the ordinary wages. The individual members, severally put into their work such ability as they can and such energy as they please; and there comes from them an output, here of twenty, there of twenty-five, and occasionally of thirty per cent. greater than before. What are the pecuniary results? Each earns in a given time a greater sum, while the many-headed master has a larger quantity of goods to dispose of, which can be offered to buyers at somewhat lower prices than before; with the effect of obtaining a ready sale and increased returns. Presently comes one of the recurring occasions for division of profits. Through the managing body, the many-headed master gives to every worker a share which, while larger all round, is proportionate in each case to the sum earned. What now will happen in respect of the rate paid for piece-work? The composite master has no motive to cut down this rate: the interests of the incorporated members being identical with the interests of the members individually taken. But should there arise any reason for lowering the piece-work price, the result must be that what is lost to each in payment for labour, is regained by him in the shape of additional profit. Thus while each obtains exactly the remuneration due for his work, *minus* only the cost of administration, the productive power of the concern is greatly increased, with proportionate increase of returns to all: there is an equitable division of a larger sum.

Consider now the moral effects. Jealousies among the workers

disappear. A cannot think his remuneration too low as compared with that of B, since each is now paid just as much as his work brings. Resentment against a foreman, who ranks some above others, no longer finds any place. Overlooking to check idleness becomes superfluous: the idling almost disappears, and another cause of dissension ceases. Not only do the irritations which superintendence excites decrease, but the cost of it decreases also; and the official element in the concern bears a reduced ratio to the other elements. The governing functions of the committee, too, and the relations of the workers to it, become fewer; thus removing other sources of internal discord: the chief remaining source being the inspection of work by the manager or committee, and refusal to pass that which is bad.

A further development may be named. Where the things produced are easily divisible and tolerably uniform in kind, work by the piece may be taken by single individuals; but where the things are so large, and perhaps complex (as in machinery), that an unaided man becomes incapable, work by the piece may be taken by groups of members. In such cases, too, in which the proper rate is difficult to assign, the price may be settled by an inverted Dutch auction, pursuing a method allied to that of the Cornish miners. Among them,

> an undertaking "is marked out, and examined by the workmen during some days, thus affording them an opportunity of judging as to its difficulty. Then it is put up to auction and bid for by different gangs of men, who undertake the work as co-operative piece-work, at so much per fathom": the lot being subsequently again bid for as a whole.

In the case now supposed, sundry pieces of work, after similar inspection, would be bid for on one of the recurring occasions appointed. Offering each in turn at some very low price, and meeting with no response, the manager would, step by step, raise the price, until presently one of the groups would accept. The pieces of work thus put up to auction, would be so arranged in number that towards the close, bidding would be stimulated by the thought of having no piece of work to undertake: the penalty being em-

ployment by one or other of the groups at day-wages. Now good bargains and now bad bargains, made by each group, would average one another; but always the good or bad bargain of any group would be a bad or good bargain for the entire body.

What would be the character of these arrangements considered as stages in industrial evolution? We have seen that, in common with political regulation and ecclesiastical regulation, the regulation of labour becomes less coercive as society assumes a higher type. Here we reach a form in which the coerciveness has diminished to the smallest degree consistent with combined action. Each member is his own master in respect of the work he does; and is subject only to such rules, established by majority of the members, as are needful for maintaining order. The transition from the compulsory cooperation of militancy to the voluntary cooperation of industrialism is completed. Under present arrangements it is incomplete. A wage-earner, while he voluntarily agrees to give so many hours work for so much pay, does not, during performance of his work, act in a purely voluntary way: he is coerced by the consciousness that discharge will follow if he idles, and is sometimes more manifestly coerced by an overlooker. But under the arrangement described, his activity becomes entirely voluntary.

Otherwise presenting the facts, and using Sir Henry Maine's terms, we see that the transition from *status* to contract reaches its limit. So long as the worker remains a wage-earner, the marks of *status* do not wholly disappear. For so many hours daily he makes over his faculties to a master, or to a cooperative group, for so much money, and is for the time owned by him or it. He is temporarily in the position of a slave, and his overlooker stands in the position of a slave-driver. Further, a remnant of the *régime of status* is seen in the fact that he and other workers are placed in ranks, receiving different rates of pay. But under such a mode of cooperation as that above contemplated, the system of contract becomes unqualified. Each member agrees with the body of members to perform certain work for a certain sum, and is free from dictation and authoritative classing. The entire organization is based on contract, and each transaction is based on contract. . . .

Socialism

Some socialists, though probably not many, know that their ideal modes of associated living are akin to modes which have prevailed widely during early stages of civilization, and prevail still among many of the uncivilized, as well as among some of the civilized who have lagged behind. In the chapter on "Communal Regulation" were given examples of communism as practised by tribes of Red men, by various Hindus, and by some unprogressive peoples in Eastern Europe. Further instances of each class will serve to exhibit at once the virtues of these methods of combined living and working and their vices. . . .

When with the fact that these Slavonic house-communities under modern conditions of comparative peace and commercial activity, are dissolving, we join the fact that they were formed during times of chronic war and remained coherent during such times; when we add that such communities are still coherent among the Montenegrins, whose active militancy continues; when we add, further, that maintenance of this combined living by American Indians has similarly gone along with perpetual intertribal conflicts; we are shown again, as before that in these small social unions, as in the larger social unions including them, the subordination of the individual to the group is great in proportion as the antagonism to other groups is great. Be it in the family, the cluster of relatives, the clan, or the nation, the need for joint action against alien families, clans, nations, &c., necessitates the merging of individual life in group-life.

Hence the socialist theory and practice are normal in the militant type of society, and cease to be normal as fast as the society becomes predominantly industrial in its type.

A state of universal brotherhood is so tempting an imagination, and the existing state of competitive strife is so full of miseries, that endeavours to escape from the last and enter into the first are quite natural—inevitable even. Prompted by consciousness of the grievous inequalities of condition around, those who suffer and those who sympathize with them, seek to found what they think an

equitable social system. In the town, sight of a rich manufacturer who ignores the hands working in his mill, does not excite in them friendly feeling; and in the country, a ploughman looking over the hedge as a titled lady drives by, may not unnaturally be angered by the thought of his own hard work and poor fare in contrast with the easy lives and luxuries of those who own the fields he tills. After contemplating the useless being who now lounges in club-rooms and now rambles through game-preserves, the weary artisan may well curse a state of things in which pleasure varies inversely as desert; and may well be vehement in his demand for another form of society.

How numerous have been the efforts to set up such a form, and how numerous the failures, it is needless to show. Here it will suffice to give one of the most recent examples—that of the South Australian village-settlements. . . .

Of course this failure, like multitudinous such failures elsewhere, will be ascribed to mistake or mismanagement. Had this or that not been done everything would have gone well. That human beings as now constituted cannot work together efficiently and harmoniously in the proposed way, is not admitted; or, if by some admitted, then it is held that the mischiefs arising from defective natures may be prevented by a sufficiently powerful authority—that is, if for those separate groups one great organization centrally controlled is substituted. And it is assumed that such an organization, maintained by force, would be beneficial not for a time only but permanently. Let us look at the fundamental errors involved in this belief.

In an early division of this work, "Domestic Institutions," the general law of species-life was pointed out and emphasized—the law that during immature life benefit received must be great in proportion as worth is small, while during mature life benefit and worth must vary together. "Clearly with a society, as with a species, survival depends on conformity to both of these antagonist principles. Import into the family the law of the society, and let children from infancy upwards have life-sustaining supplies proportioned to their life-sustaining labours, and the society disap-

pears forthwith by death of all its young. Import into the society the law of the family, and let the life-sustaining supplies be great in proportion as the life-sustaining labours are small, and the society decays from increase of its least worthy members and decrease of its most worthy members." Now, more or less fully, the doctrine of collectivists, socialists, and communists, ignores this distinction between the ethics of family-life and the ethics of life outside the family. Entirely under some forms, and in chief measure under others, it proposes to extend the *régime* of the family to the whole community. This is the conception set forth by Mr. Bellamy in *Looking Backwards*; and this is the conception formulated in the maxim—"From each according to his capacity, to each according to his needs."

In low grades of culture there is but vague consciousness of natural causation; and even in the highest grades of culture at present reached, such consciousness is very inadequate. Fructifying causation—the production of many effects each of which becomes the cause of many other effects—is not recognized. The socialist does not ask what must happen if, generation after generation, the material well-being of the inferior is raised at the cost of lowering that of the superior. Even when it is pointed out, he refuses to see that if the superior, persistently burdened by the inferior, are hindered in rearing their own better offspring, that the offspring of the inferior may be as efficiently cared for, a gradual deterioration of the race must follow. The hope of curing present evils so fills his consciousness that it cannot take in the thought of the still greater future evils his proposed system would produce.

Such mitigations of the miseries resulting from inferiority as the spontaneous sympathies of individuals for one another prompt, will bring an average of benefit; since, acting separately, the superior will not so far tax their own resources in taking care of their fellows, as to hinder themselves from giving their own offspring better rearing than is given to the offspring of the inferior. But people who, in their corporate capacity, abolish the natural relation between merits and benefits, will presently be abolished themselves. Either they will have to go through the miseries of a slow decay, consequent on the increase of those unfit for the busi-

ness of life, or they will be overrun by some people who have not pursued the foolish policy of fostering the worst at the expense of the best.

At the same time that it is biologically fatal, the doctrine of the socialists is psychologically absurd. It implies an impossible mental structure.

A community which fulfils their ideal must be composed of men having sympathies so strong that those who, by their greater powers, achieve greater benefits, willingly surrender the excess to others. . . . The character of all is to be so noble that it causes continuous sacrifice of self to others, and so ignoble that it continuously lets others sacrifice to self. These traits are contradictory. The implied mental constitution is an impossible one.

Still more manifest does its impossibility become when we recognize a further factor in the problem—love of offspring. Within the family parental affection joins sympathy in prompting self-sacrifice, and makes it easy, and indeed pleasurable, to surrender to others a large part of the products of labour. But such surrender made to those within the family-group is at variance with a like surrender made to those outside the family-group. Hence the equalization of means prescribed by communistic arrangements, implies a moral nature such that the superior willingly stints his own progeny to aid the progeny of the inferior. He not only loves his neighbour as himself but he loves his neighbour's children as his own. The parental instinct disappears. One child is to him as good as another.

Of course the advanced socialist, otherwise communist, has his solution. Parental relations are to be superseded, and children are to be taken care of by the State. The method of Nature is to be replaced by a better method. From the lowest forms of life to the highest, Nature's method has been that of devolving the care of the young on the adults who produced them—a care at first shown feebly and unobtrusively, but becoming gradually more pronounced, until, as we approach the highest types of creatures, the lives of parents, prompted by feelings increasingly intense, are more and more devoted to the rearing of offspring. But just as, in

the way above shown, socialists would suspend the natural relation between effort and benefit, so would they suspend the natural relation between the instinctive actions of parents and the welfare of progeny. The two great laws in the absence of either of which organic evolution would have been impossible, are both to be repealed! . . .

Reduced to its ultimate form, the general question at issue between socialists and anti-socialists, concerns the mode of regulating labour. Preceding chapters have dealt with this historically —treating of regulation that is paternal, patriarchal, communal, or by a gild—of regulation that has the form of slavery or serfdom—of regulation under arrangements partially free or wholly free. These chapters have illustrated in detail the truth, emphasized at the outset, that political, ecclesiastical, and industrial regulations simultaneously decrease in coerciveness as we ascend from lower to higher types of societies: the modern industrial system being one under which coerciveness approaches a minimum. Though now the worker is often mercilessly coerced by circumstances, and has nothing before him but hard terms, yet he is not coerced by a master into acceptance of these terms.

But while the evils which resulted from the old modes of regulating labour, not experienced by present or recent generations, have been forgotten, the evils accompanying the new mode are keenly felt, and have aroused the desire for a mode which is in reality a modified form of the old mode. There is to be a reinstitution of *status*, not under individual masters but under the community as master. No longer possessing themselves and making the best of their powers, individuals are to be possessed by the State; which, while it supports them, is to direct their labours. Necessarily there is implied a vast and elaborate administrative body—regulators of small groups, subject to higher regulators, and so on through successively superior grades up to a central authority, which coordinates the multitudinous activities of the society in their kinds and amounts. Of course the members of this directive organization must be adequately paid by workers; and the tacit assumption is that the required payment will be, at first

and always, much less than that which is taken by the members of the directive organization now existing—employers and their staffs; while submission to the orders of these State-officials will be more tolerable than submission to the orders of those who pay wages for work.

A complete parallelism exists between such a social structure and the structure of an army. It is simply a civil regimentation parallel to the military regimentation; and it establishes an industrial subordination parallel to the military subordination. In either case the rule is—Do your task and take your rations. In the working organization as in the fighting organization, obedience is requisite for maintenance of order, as well as for efficiency, and must be enforced with whatever rigour is found needful. Doubtless in the one case as in the other, multitudinous officers, grade over grade, having in their hands all authority and all means of coercion, would be able to curb that aggressive egoism illustrated above, which causes the failures of small socialistic bodies: idleness, quarrels, violence, would be prevented, and efficient work insisted upon. But when from regulation of the workers by the bureaucracy we turn to the bureaucracy itself, and ask how it is to be regulated, there is no such satisfactory answer. Owning, in trust for the community, all the land, the capital, the means of transit and communication, as well as whatever police and military force had to be maintained, this all-powerful official organization, composed of men characterized on the average by an aggressive egoism like that which the workers display, but not like them under any higher control, must inevitably advantage itself at the cost of the governed: the elective powers of the governed having soon failed to prevent it; since, as is perpetually shown, a large unorganized body cannot cope with a small organized one. Under such conditions there would be an increasing deduction from the aggregate produce by those new ruling classes, a widening separation of them from the ruled, and a growing assumption of superior rank. There must arise a new aristocracy for the support of which the masses would toil; and which, being consolidated, would wield a power far beyond that of any past aristocracy. Let any one contemplate the doings of the recent Trade Union Congress (Septem-

ber, 1896), whence delegates from societies that had tolerated non-unionists were expelled, whence reporters of papers having employés not belonging to printers unions were obliged to withdraw, and where wholesale nationalization of property (which necessarily implies confiscation) was approved by four to one; and then ask what scruples would restrain a bureaucracy pervaded by this temper.

Of course nothing will make socialists foresee any such results. Just as the zealous adherent of a religious creed, met by some fatal objection, feels certain that though he does not see the answer yet a good answer is to be found; or just as the lover to whom defects of his mistress are pointed out, cannot be made calmly to consider what will result from them in married life; so the socialist, in love with his scheme, will not entertain adverse criticisms, or gives no weight to them if he does. Illustrations like those above given, accumulated no matter to what extent, will not convince him that the forms of social organization are determined by men's natures, and that only as their natures improve can the forms become better. He will continue to hope that selfish men may be so manipulated that they will behave unselfishly—that the effects of goodness may be had without the goodness. He has unwavering faith in a social alchemy which out of ignoble natures will get noble actions.