May 12 – August 11, 2011

Mike Macnair, “No need for party?”
May 12, 2011

Chris Cutrone, “Platypus” letter of May 19, 2011

Watson Ladd, “De rigueur” letter of May 19, 2011

Macnair, “Theoretical dead end” May 19, 2011

Cutrone, “Fish nor fowl” letter of May 26, 2011

Macnair, “The study of history and the left’s decline” June 2, 2011


+ JP Nettl, “Socialist Classic” (1964)

Cutrone, “The philosophy of history” June 9, 2011

Macnair, “Divided by a common language?” June 30, 2011

Cutrone, “Useful Platypus” letter of July 7, 2011

Cutrone, “Defending Marxist Hegelianism” August 11, 2011

Critical theory

I got little from the opening plenary on ‘The politics of critical theory’ [on the Frankfurt School]. The speakers were: Chris Cutrone of Platypus and the School of the Art Institute of Chicago; the philosopher of technology and student of Herbert Marcuse, Andrew Feenberg of Simon Fraser University; Richard Westerman of the University of Chicago; and Nicholas Brown of the University of Illinois Chicago, as respondent to the three papers.

The plenary took as its starting point the publication by New Left Review in 2010 of translated excerpts from a set of notes by Greta Adorno of a series of conversations in 1956 between Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer with a view to producing a modern redraft of the Communist manifesto. This project got nowhere, and [as Andrew Feenberg pointed out] the Adorno-Horkheimer conversations are frequently absurd.

Feenberg, who is a ‘child of 68’, remarked also on the extent to which, in the conversations, Adorno and Horkheimer displayed fear of falling into Marcuse’s positions: these, he argued, had more connection to the real emancipatory possibilities of the post-war world than Adorno and Horkheimer’s theoreticisms.

Chris Cutrone has posted his paper, ‘Adorno’s Leninism’, on his provocatively (or perhaps merely pretentiously) titled blog The Last Marxist. It argues that the project of the Frankfurt School derived from the interventions of György Lukács (History and class consciousness) and Karl Korsch (Marxism and philosophy) in the 1920s, and these in turn from the ‘crisis of Marxism’ represented by the revisionist debate in the German Social Democratic Party in the 1890s and 1900s and the betrayal of August 1914, and the idea of Leninism as representing a philosophical alternative. So far, so John Rees or David Renton. Adorno, he argued, continued down to his death committed to a version of these ideas.

After the papers had been presented and Nicholas Brown had responded, there was a
brief and not particularly controversial question and answer session.

Debating politics

Saturday morning saw two 50-minute sessions of parallel workshops under the title, ‘Debating politics on the left today: differing perspectives’. In the first hour the choice was between the Maoist Revolutionary Communist Party of the USA (leader since 1975: Bob Avakian) and the Democratic Socialists of America (DSA). I went to the latter.

DSA claims to be the largest left group in the US with around 10,000 members, though the paid circulation of their paper is lower, at around 5,700 (and the Communist Party USA claimed, as of 2002, 20,000 members). The presentation made clear that the group essentially consists of activists in the left of the Democratic Party engaged in a range of campaigns for liberal good causes, plus some support for trade unionists in dispute. Its image of an alternative society is Sweden or Finland. It is committed to popular-frontist ‘coalitions’ and has in its constitution rejected any electoral intervention. It is, in short, not even Lib-Lab: the late 19th century Lib-Labs at least agitated for working class representation within the Liberal Party.

In the second hour the choice was between CPGB and the Marxist-Humanists US (one of the splinters from the News and Letters Collective founded by Raya Dunayevskaya). I presented the CPGB workshop. I gave a very brief capsule history of the Leninist and of the CPGB since 1991 and explained the nature of our orientation to ‘reforging a Communist Party’ through unification of the Marxists as Marxists, and on democratic centralism as an alternative to bureaucratic centralism.

The question-and-answer session which followed was lively, and I was pressed by Platypus-ers with the ideas that the divisions among the left groups were, in fact, principled ones which would prohibit any unity; and that programme was less fundamental than understanding history or the movement of the class struggle. I think I was able in the short time available to answer these points reasonably clearly: some divisions on the left do have a principled basis, but many do not, and in any case the divisions in the early Comintern were as wide or wider; a clear, short formal party programme is essential to party democracy.

A representative of the International Bolshevik Tendency argued that our view of democratic centralism amounted to going back on the fundamental gain represented by the 1903 split between Bolsheviks and Mensheviks: I pointed out that the Spartacist (and other far-left) dogmas around this split actually originated with Zinoviev’s *History of the Bolshevik Party* as a factional instrument against Trotsky and were subsequently promoted as part of the Stalin school of falsification. This argument shocked him.

Panels

In the afternoon there were three sets of parallel panel sessions under the general title, ‘Lessons from the history of Marxism’, with in theory 15 minutes break between them.

In the first period the choice was between ‘Marxism and the bourgeois revolutions’ and ‘Marxism and sexual liberation’. I have interests in both areas, but chose to go to the sexual liberation panel. It was evident from the panel blurb for ‘Marxism and the bourgeois revolutions’ that Platypus shares the common ‘new left’ error of imagining that bourgeois thought begins with the 18th century enlightenment, and that the bourgeois revolutions began with the French.[2]

It might be thought that Jonathan Israel’s massive excavation of the links of this period with prior Dutch and English politics, religion and thinkers, in *Radical enlightenment* (2001) and *Enlightenment contested* (2006), would have disturbed this approach and led to a return to Marx’s understanding of a much more prolonged historical process of transition to capitalism, including the first experiments in the Italian city-states and the Dutch and English revolutions (visible especially in the second half of *Capital* Vol 1).

But beginning with the French Revolution and late-enlightenment ideas is, in fact, a new left dogma. It is linked to the idea that the ‘Hegelian’ logic of the first part of volume 1 of Marx’s *Capital* can be read without reference to the broader claims of historical materialism about the history before fully developed capitalism. This approach is foundational to Lukács, Korsch and the Frankfurt school, who play an important role in Platypus’s thought.

Sexual liberation

The panel on ‘Marxism and sexual liberation’ featured four interesting papers. Pablo Ben critiqued the Reich/Marcuse conception that ‘sexual liberation’ would undermine the capitalist order. This idea informed the early gay men’s movement, and later the arguments of Pat Califia and others in the lesbian sadomasochism movement and its more general ‘sex-positive’ offshoots. The critique combined the ideas of Adorno in relation to the regulative power of capitalist economic relations over all aspects of social life with the point – well understood by historians of the issue since the 1970s – that ‘sexuality’ as such (ie, the link of sexual choices to personal ‘identities’) emerged under capitalism. This was a well argued and provocative paper. But I am not yet convinced that the detail of the theoretical approach is superior to that to which Jamie Gough and I argued in the misguided *Gay liberation in the 80s* (1985).

Greg Gabellas argued for an interpretation of Foucault as a critic of Reich starting out from French Maoism. This was again a useful paper, though with two missing elements. He did not flag up the extent to which Foucault’s historical claims about madness and the penitentiary, as well as about the history of sexuality, have been falsified by historians. And, though he identified Foucault’s tendency to marginalise class politics, he saw this as merely a product of the defeat of the left, rather than as an active intervention in favour of popular frontism. Hence he missed the extent to which the Anglo-American left academic and gay/lesbian movement reception of Foucault was closely tied to the defence of extreme forms of popular frontism by authors directly or indirectly linked to *Marxism Today*, for whom it was an instrument against the ‘class-reductionist’ ideas of Trotskyists.

Ashley Weger deployed the ‘typical Platypus’ combination of Adorno with elements of 1970s Spartacism to polemicise against the taboo/witch-hunt in relation to intergenerational sex, which she argued flowed from a fetishism of the ‘innocence’ of childhood and a refusal to recognise the sexual desires of youth. This paper was competently done and valuably provocative to current orthodoxies.

It nonetheless did not get as far as the British debate of the 1970s-80s on the same issue. This recognised that the other side of the coin (adult aspirations to intergenerational sex) also flows from fetishisms, of innocence and of powerlessness; and that statistically very much the larger part of intergenerational sex is father-daughter incest, which exploits family power relations for what is in substance non-consensual activity. Since an immediate transition to the ‘higher stage’ of communism is not to be expected, a revolutionary overthrow of the capitalist state order will not result in the immediate disappearance of this problem. Accordingly any immediate or ‘transitional’ programme point on the issue must take a form like that in the CPGB’s *Draft programme*: “Abolish age-of-consent laws. We recognise the right of individuals to enter into the sexual relations they choose, provided this does not conflict with the rights of others. Alternative legislation to protect children from sexual abuse.”

Jamie Keesling’s paper on the sexual emancipation of women was the weakest of the four papers, moving from Juliet Mitchell to the article, ‘How bad is rape?’ (which argues that compulsion to do routine labour is a more serious harm to the victim) to 1970s radical feminism (whose arguments she did not grasp or attack in depth), to Moishe Postone’s 2006, broadly Eustonite, ‘History and helplessness’, to Adorno. While various points were interesting, this did not add up to a coherent whole.

Four papers in 90 minutes, followed by brief comments from each speaker on the other papers, led to a very compressed Q&A session. Chris Cutrone asked for and got brief responses from the speakers to a general question...
about the relations between Marxism and liberal political theory, Pablo Ben’s being the most substantial response. A woman of British origin asked about the relation of issues of sexuality to ideas of gender and the division between public and private spheres (again an aspect of the debates of the 1970s-80s) and did not get a satisfactory response.

I have gone into this panel at length because it was intellectually one of the strongest in the convention. I would nonetheless assess that the speakers were operating at a lower theoretical level than that of the debates of the left in the British feminist and lesbian/gay movements in the 1970s-80s.

There are two reasons why that should be the case. The first is that in our 1970s-80s debates there was a real link between theoretical arguments and positive practical politics. Practical political choices force out the logical implications of theoretical positions in a way that theoretical critique on its own does not. The second is that the sub-Frankfurt School historical schema of the ‘defeat of the left’ stretching back to the ‘crisis of Marxism’ in the 1900s has a tendency to blind its adherents to the details of concrete history. By doing so, it permits schematic theory, which moves from arbitrarily chosen elements of the concrete to the abstract, but can never return to work up the concrete as a combination of abstractions.

**Maoism and lefts**

The second session offered a choice between a panel on ‘Badiou and post-Maoism: Marxism and communism today’ and one on ‘Art, culture and politics: Marxist approaches’, which offered consideration of the theories of art of Trotsky, Adorno and Walter Benjamin. I went to the panel on Alain Badiou, addressed to his *The communist hypothesis* [2010] and a debate which had already developed online between Chris Cutrone of Platypus and the Maoist or post-Maoist ‘Kasama project’. The panel was Chris Cutrone, Mike Ely and Joseph Ramsey of Kasama, and John Steele of Khukuri, all of whom defended Badiou; Mike Ely’s paper is available on Kasama, John Steele’s on Khukuri, and Cutrone’s on his blog.

Cutrone’s argument judges, I think correctly, that Badiou’s ‘communism’ is directly anti-Marxist. Cutrone therefore equally correctly appeals to the Second International and its left as the high point of the movement against capitalism to date: it was this movement that made possible 1917. But he tends not to interpret the strength of the late 19th century movement in terms of Marx’s and Engels’ idea of capitalism creating its own gravedigger in the proletariat, and hence the key to the movement being the political self-organisation of the working class.

Instead, he poses the need for an emancipatory movement to start from the conquests of capitalism which is, indeed, central to Marxism – in terms of the conquests of liberalism. The political logic of this intellectual move is the path followed by the Schachtmanites, by Adorno and Horkheimer, and more recently by the British Revolutionary Communist Party/Spiked and the Eustonites, towards the political right.

The final panel session offered a choice between ‘Marxism and political philosophy’ with the same late-enlightenment focus as the ‘bourgeois revolutions’ panel, here on ‘The classical figures of bourgeois political thought: Rousseau, Kant, Hegel’; and ‘The Marxism of the Second International radicals’. I attended the latter, featuring papers by Chris Cutrone, Greg Gabriellas, Ian Morrison and Marco Torres.

I may have missed something by arriving late, but I did not get much out of this panel beyond the stale new left orthodoxy about the sterility of the SPD majority which is, as I have already indicated, more clearly defended by British authors from the Clifftie tradition like Rees and Renton.

In Chris Cutrone’s paper I was struck by three specific features. The first is that he claimed that Marx and Engels were suspicious of political parties. This is plain nonsense and I have provided the evidence to the contrary in the second of my articles on electoral tactics: Marx and Engels argued from the 1840s to the 1890s in support of the working class forming itself into a political party.

The second, and related, feature is the claim that political parties were a new phenomenon in the late 19th century and suspect to earlier ‘classical liberals’. The latter part of this claim is true, but the former is simply false: if the Dutch Regent oligarchy did without formal parties, Whigs and Tories in Britain appeared in 1679-81, reappeared promptly in 1688-89, and continued to dominate political life until the Whigs were replaced by the Liberals in the mid-19th century. What was new in the late 19th century and with the SPD was highly organised, mass-membership political parties with democratic structures. This was a product of the political intervention of the proletariat as such and is reflected in the fact that in the US, where the proletariat has not succeeded in breaking into high politics, the Democrats and Republicans retain looser organisational forms.

The third feature was Cutrone’s reliance for analysis of the SPD on Peter Nettl’s 1965 article on the SPD as a ‘political model’. This is, to be blunt, unambiguously a work of cold war sociology, which seeks to force the conclusion that the only real choices available in politics are between reformist coalitions and something derived from the ‘actionism’ of Georges Sorel and the ultra-left. Its analysis of the SPD is apolitical-Weberian.

Nettl’s story reaches its climacticer with the betrayal of August 1914. But missing, accordingly, are, first, the later emergence of the USPD as a mass opposition, and, second, the fact that the working class did in fact use the SPD and its Austrian equivalent, the SPÖ, as organising instruments in the overthrow of the Hohenzollern and Habsburg monarchies in 1918-19. Of course, the leaderships held back to national horizons and created ‘democratic republics’, which were in reality bourgeois parliamentary-constitutional regimes. The circumstances fit better with a political account of the SPD’s and the wartime and post-war Kautskyties’ failure to serve the interests of the working class – because of their nationalism and false political ideas on the state – than with Nettl’s Weberian sociological story of political impotence through ‘isolationism’.

Platypus calls on us to recover the history of the left in order to understand and get beyond its present ‘death’. But in its own attempts to do so, the standard of historical work is slopy.

**Trotskyism**

The Saturday evening plenary on ‘The legacy of Trotskyism’ featured labour historian Bryan Palmer, of Trent University (Ontario, Canada); Jason Wright from the International Bolshevik Tendency; myself; and Richard Rubin from Platypus. The panel description contained the claim that, “As one Platypus writer has suggested, Trotsky is as out of place in the post-WWII world as Voltaire or Rousseau would have been in the world after the French Revolution. Trotsky, unlike Trotskyism, exemplifies the classical Marxism of the early 20th century, and that tradition certainly died with him.”

Bryan Palmer is a Trotskyist, and (as far as can be seen from online sources) one coming from the background of the part of the US Socialist Workers Party and its international tendency that did not break with Trotskyism in the 1980s. His speech made nods in the direction of Platypus’s claims, but asserted positively that the crash of 2008 showed the relevance of Marxism today; that the defeats of Trotsky, unlike Trotskyism, exemplifies the classical Marxism of the early 20th century, and that tradition certainly died with him.”

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Jason Wright gave the sort of speech that could be expected: revolutionary continuity runs through the Fourth International 1938-53, the International Committee 1953-61, the Revolutionary Tendency of the US SWP and, following it, the Spartacist League, from 1961 to the 1980s; and thereafter the IBT. The CPGB, he said in passing, breaks with the tradition of the pre-war socialist movement as well as that of Bolshevism by calling for votes for bourgeois candidates. I did not get an opportunity to reply to this at the meeting, but my recent three-part series on electoral principles and tactics can serve as a reply – to the extent that it is worth replying.

I criticised the formulations proposed in the panel description. In the first place ‘Trotskyism’ means an organised political movement formed on the basis of definite programmatic documents – those of the first four congresses of the Comintern, of the International Left Opposition and of the 1938 founding congress of the Fourth International. The Trotskyist movement has splintered into diverse fragments, but it is on its formally adopted positions that it is to be judged and criticised.

Secondly, ‘classical Marxism’ is an amalgam, like the ‘counterrevolutionary bloc of rights and Trotskyites’. In the sense in which it is used by Platypus, it derives from the new left’s, and hence the British SWP’s, attempt to paste together Marx, Lenin, Luxemburg, Trotsky, Lukács and Gramsci, in spite of their diverse and in some respects opposed political and theoretical positions. To say that ‘Trotskyism, unlike Trotskyism, exemplifies the classical Marxism of the early 20th century, and that tradition certainly died with him’ is therefore an empty claim. What is needed to understand the past of Marxist theory is to understand the political and theoretical disputes of the Comintern in the light of the political and theoretical disputes of the Second International and of the pre-1917 RSDLP.

Within this framework, in the first place the idea of separating Trotsky from post-war Trotskyism is wrong. Secondly, it is necessary, in order to progress, to critique the actual programmatic positions of the first four congresses of the Comintern and of Trotskyism, as I have attempted in Revolutionary Strategy (2008). The most fundamental point is the rejection of bureaucratic centralism. Thirdly, the failures of the Trotskyists are not all given by some Trotskyist (or ‘Pabloite’) original sin: there are lessons, albeit mostly negative, to be learned from the Trotskyists attempts to build small groups into something larger and to intervene in live politics.

Richard Rubin argued that revolutionary continuity is impossible; there is a fundamental discontinuity in politics and the main task is to understand it. Trotskyism is merely a historical relic. Trotsky insisted on the accidental character of the tragedy of the 20th century; but the idea of an accidental epoch is inconsistent with historical materialism. We have to be Marxists because there is no better way of thinking, but Marxism may be inadequate; the failure of Trotskyism expresses the antecedent crisis of Marxism. Both Stalinism and fascism were products of the failure of the German revolution. This ‘German question’ poses the question how the strongest Marxist party in the world, the SPD, could betray its own revolution. Since the objective conditions for socialism had matured, the explanation had to be the power of bourgeois ideology; both Trotsky and the Frankfurt school grappled with this problem.

The outcome of World War II represented a victory for the enlightenment, but a defeat of revolutionary possibilities. In the 1950s-60s Trotskyists as well as Maoists were prone to illusions in third-world nationalisms. The 1968 period offered a ‘Dionysian moment’ of revolution through pure ecstasy: the Trotskyists, except the Sparts, integrated themselves in the new left and lost the character of Trotskyism as a critique of the existing left. It was this aspect of Trotskyism as honest critique and fidelity to the October revolution that had to be redeemed.

The speakers were given an opportunity to respond to each other and this was followed by slightly longer than usual Q&A discussion. Four substantial issues were posed. In the first place it seemed to be the common view of the other panelists that the divisions of the Trotskyist left were in fact principled and unavoidable splits, a view which I rejected. Secondly, a questioner asked whether the evolution of some US ex-Trotskyists towards neo-conservatism reflected something about Trotskyism; on this there seemed to be general acceptance of a point I made, in response, that such an evolution is not found in Europe, while ex-Stalinists had also gone over to the right.

The third was whether defeats for your own imperialist power make revolution more likely, as Jason Wright argued – in my view falsely, except in the case of defeat in imperialist, or great-power, war. Pablo Ben raised from the floor the classic case of the Argentinean left’s shipwreck when it supported the military regime’s aggression in the 1982 South Atlantic war. Richard Rubin argued that defeatism was a moral obligation, but not one from which revolution could be expected. This, I think, understates the issue. Even if defeatism in our own country’s unjust wars cannot usually be expected either to cause a defeat or to bring on revolution campaigning on a defeatist stance educates as wide layers of the working class as possible in the need for political independence from the local capitalist state, and thereby prepares the political ground for circumstances in which revolution is on the immediate agenda.

The fourth and most general question was whether revolution is on the agenda and if so in what sense and whether a party is therefore called for. Bryan Palmer’s and Jason Wright’s answer to these questions was emphatically yes. Chris Cutrone’s (from the floor) and Richard Rubin’s was that the objective conditions were present, but the subjective conditions even for a party were not present. My own response was that proletarian revolution is on the historical agenda; that the weakness of proletarian organisation takes it off the short-term agenda; and that if Lenin’s ‘the ruling class cannot go on in the old way and the masses will not’ was to be placed on the immediate agenda the result would therefore be disastrous. But the result is precisely that the party question, and the tasks of patiently rebuilding the workers’ movement, are on the immediate agenda.

Notes

1. chriscutrone.platypus1917.org

Platypus critique

The Sunday morning plenary on ‘What is the Platypus critique?’, with three Platypus speakers, was in one way the oddest and in another the most symptomatic of the sessions. Spencer Leonard opened by saying that Platypus was sometimes said to have a line which combined Spartacist Trotskyism with Adorno. This was incorrect: Platypus does not have a political line. Rather it recognises that there is no present possibility of revolutionary political action, because of the deep-going crisis of Marxism. Its goal is therefore to bring the left to a recognition of its own failure and to address the theoretical issues. To this end it aims to ‘host the conversation’.

He was followed by Laurie Rojas, speaking to her organisational work for Platypus: this again focussed on the necessity (and difficulty) of addressing the left, but also emphasised the constant return of the necessity of the Platypus project. The final speaker was Ben Shepard, whose speech was interspersed by readings from Samuel Beckett, with Spencer Leonard attempting to take the other part – I take it using absurdism to indicate the present left’s absurdity; I am sorry to say that I found this sufficiently distracting that I can say no more about the points he made.

The plenary started late and the Q&A session was brief. One self-described “newbie” said from the floor that she felt at the end of the weekend rather as if she had accidentally wandered into a postgraduate philosophy seminar. A more accurate description would be a literary theory seminar. The panel on political theory which I missed might have had the analytical or phenomenological rigour found in philosophy seminars. But most of the theoretical papers I heard had the ‘neither quite rigorous philosophy nor quite rigorous history’ quality of many literary theory papers.


5. Public Culture 18, pp93-110; also available at various places on the web.

6. kasamaproject.org

7. Steele: www.khukuritheory.net/why-is-badiou-of-political-value; Cutrone: chriscutrone.platypus1917.org/?p=1144

8. Andrew Coates has made somewhat similar points against Slavoj Žižek, with whom Badiou is linked, in this paper (‘The leadership of “events”,’ March 3). Cf also James Turley’s review of Lenin reloaded (‘Hegel reloaded?’, December 13 2007).

9. He based this on the far left’s common but inaccurate exegesis of the statement in the Communist manifesto that “The Communists do not form a separate party opposed to the other working class parties” (in which, in fact, “the other working class parties” means only the Chartists and the related US National Reformers).

10. ‘Principles to shape tactics’ Weekly Worker April 21.

11. Past and Present No30, pp65-95; more on the same line in Nettl’s two-volume biography of Rosa Luxemburg (1966).

12. Nettl seeks to distinguish Luxemburg from the anarchists on the grounds that her version of activism was based on the spontaneous movement of the working class masses, not arbitrary ‘initiatives’ of the revolutionaries. But this shows only that, if Nettl had read Sorel at all, he had not done so with any care.


15. There is an older usage belonging to the cold war academy, in which ‘classical Marxism’ was used to mean a (caricatural) version of Marxism before Lenin.

On behalf of Platypus, let me express how greatly we appreciate Mike Macnair’s very thorough report on and critiques of the events at the recent Platypus convention in Chicago from April 29 to May 1, at which we were very happy and grateful to have his participation (“No need for party?”, May 12).

However, I disagree with how Macnair characterises Peter Nettl’s argument, which I referenced, specifically to show how Luxembourg’s and Lenin’s Marxist revolutionism offered an alternative to both opportunist reformism and (anarchist or Sorelian) actionism. I think Macnair avoids (or I didn’t present clearly enough) the issue I was raising about the inherent unavoidable authoritarianism of late 19th century mass (working class) parties that needed to be worked through by later Marxism (unlike circa 1848), and the problems of which Lenin and Luxemburg were aware, unlike the German Social Democratic Party centre [of Bebel and Kautsky] and later Stalinism (including Maoism).

Luxemburg’s pamphlets, Reform or revolution? and The mass strike, hone their critiques of the SPD and broader Second International precisely on this score, as does, more broadly, Trotsky’s Results and prospects [see especially the section on ‘The prerequisites of socialism’]. This concern, the problem of the raison d’être of the social democratic (and later communist) party, is less explicit, but nonetheless present as a key background issue in Lenin’s What is to be done? and The state and revolution, as well as his Leftwing communism and Imperialism pamphlets. The Second International radicals recognised, after Marx and Engels, the modern state and its political parties as phenomena of Bonapartism – that is, the need for proletarian socialist revolution.

On ‘the bourgeois revolution’, the historiography offered by some members of Platypus by way of perspective does not treat the 1789-1815 Great French Revolution as the ‘first’, but rather the last of the great bourgeois revolutions, and somewhat late at that, explaining in part its pathologies; and in the Marxist view 1830 and 1848 were already ‘proletarian’. The importance of the earlier Dutch and British experience is very much present in our minds as the original emergence of modern bourgeois society, such that bourgeois Britain was the bastion of reaction against the French revolution. So I think the perspective we tend to adopt in the Platypus approach to this history is not so ‘new leftist’/post-1960s as Macnair suspects.

Our general perspective in Platypus is that, for Marx, proletarian socialism not only potentially ‘negates’, but also importantly potentially ‘completes’, the bourgeois revolution at a global, world-historical scale, that the crisis of bourgeois society in capital is the need for socialism, but that socialism was not understood by Marx to be a final end-point: rather a potential new beginning for human history.

I look forward to the promised second part of Macnair’s critique of Platypus as a project. However, I would caution that it is important to note the actual basis of our project – that is, our “hosting the critical conversation on the left” (about Marxism), that we don’t think will take place without our project’s specific focus. This, and not any purported ‘Platypus positions’ to be derived, for instance, from my or other Platypus members’ writings, requires judgment and criticism. We’ve published the transcripts of most of our major public fora, so I think our project should be judged on the basis of whether these are productive. The convention that Macnair attended threatens to give a skewed perspective on our actual activities, which don’t usually put forward Platypus members’ takes so prominently or, in some instances, [nearly] exclusively as at our convention. There is a potentially important distinction between what we do as an organised project and the consensus of how we understand the need for our project – that is, our take on Marxism. As a project, we want to be judged on our practice rather than on our ‘theory’, whatever the latter’s limitations.
De rigueur

Watson Ladd

I thought Mike Macnair’s article on the Platypus convention was very interesting. The only thing I would want to raise for the sake of clarity, as opposed to a dispute over politics, is his invocation of philosophical rigour.

While it is true that philosophical rigour is part of a ruthless critique of anything existing, Adorno in *Minima moralia* writes: “The injunction to practise intellectual honesty usually amounts to sabotage of thought.” And he goes on to detail how the antithetical function of thought is undermined by this injunction.

Naturally, there is an issue with simply affirming or denouncing intellectual rigour: neither nonsense nor triviality will suffice as modes of thought today, nor could they ever, but I think that the issue Adorno raises of intellectual rigour falling into affirmation is a very real one. Indeed that is what has largely happened to analytic philosophy. Wittgenstein’s literary executor was Anscombe: while a brilliant philosopher, her Catholicism was compatible with her philosophy because of its irrelevance.

The real question about philosophical rigour is not textual analysis, but philosophy as a method of thought about our world and our place in it. In that respect the advent of philosophical rigour has been only one side of a defeat, either in the form of obtuse French theory or positivism that, while intriguing and better than its modern followers, cannot say much about the questions we all face today.

As for Mike’s account of the convention itself, while it is true that Richard Rubin did coin the excellent phrase, ‘neo-Kautskyan’, at Mike’s presentation and most of the Platypodes were sympathetic to his critique of your project, it is not true that a lot of us thought the splits in the Trotskyists were principled. I regret that there was not a chance to push the sectarians in the room on the principled or unprincipled nature of their splits. I think this was a result of how well Mike presented the case for unity as a practical matter, and indeed ‘Pythonism’ in splits has been a deeply ingrained feature in the movement on this side of the Atlantic as well – a fact we all know well in Platypus. Afterwards I heard quite a bit of sympathy and agreement around Mike’s position on the need for unity at this moment, although most also felt this would be insufficient for resurrecting the left.

Anyway, I am looking forward to the upcoming article on the Platypus project itself and following the CPGB with great interest.

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Theoretical dead end

Platypus: Is it a sect? Is it an academic grouping? Is it a theoretical dead end?

The US Platypus group is in the borderlands of two types of left, argues Mike Macnair in the second of two articles

In last week’s paper I reported on the third Platypus International Convention in Chicago, April 29-May 1. The concluding plenary discussed the ‘Platypus critique’, where speakers from the group denied that it had “a line”. This, and the convention as a whole, pose another question: the critique of the Platypus.

If it was really the case that the Platypus Affiliated Society had no political line or agenda, but merely aimed to ‘host the conversation’, then to critique it would be like offering a critique of large, vague academic ‘learned societies’ like the classicists’ American Philological Association or the English Lit crowd’s Modern Language Association.

Such a critique would only be worthwhile to the extent that the learned society in question already dominated the ‘conversation’ in question, and in doing so maintained an implicit line – like the idea of ‘western civilisation’, which had the effect of excluding work which did not comply from academic recognition. This situation certainly exists in the economists’ learned societies [exclusionary dominance of neoclassical microeconomics], and *de facto* exists in several Eng Lit societies [exclusionary dominance of postmodernism].

For a small group like Platypus such a critique would be pointless. In reality, however, Platypus both does not, and does, have a political line and agenda.

It does not have a political line and agenda in the sense that it does not call for votes for anyone, or vote on a platform or political positions which it is to defend in common. The comrades claim that because of the death of the left this is impossible without the prior theoretical critique which might, at some unspecified date in the future, make political action possible.

It does, however, have a political line and agenda – even if this was only the statement on its website: “Hence, to free ourselves, we declare that the left is dead. Or, more precisely, that we are all that is left of it.” This involves identification with “the left” or at least with its history; and a negative critique of the existing left. Other things apart, it would also be the classic claim of a sect.

Imperialism

In fact, there is more, and it centres on the issue of imperialism. Platypus’s claim that “the left is dead” is a claim motivated at the end of the day partly by the perception that the left has become so small as to be politically irrelevant, but also by the perception that the left has abandoned the project of general human emancipation.

The basis of this perception is expressed in a wide variety of articles on Platypus’s website – some by Platypus members, others expressed by their choices about who to interview or review. Here the idea of ‘Spartacism plus Adorno’, considered as critiques rather than as positive policy, has explanatory value.

From Spartacism come hostility to ‘statist feminism’, which allies with the right on sexual purity issues, and to other reactionary-utopian politics like ‘green’ arguments for ‘small is beautiful’, anti-technology, anti-globalisation, ideas of the peasantry or indigenous peoples as ‘showing the way’, and Maoism. From the political culture of Spartacism come the ‘in your face’ provocations like “the left is dead ...
we are all that is left of it’. With much, though not all, of the political substance of this cri-
tique of the contemporary left CGPGB comrades would agree, though we do not draw the sect conclusion.

From Adorno, and not from Spartacism, come defence of capitalist ‘high culture’ and hostility to riots for the sake of ‘resistance’ – and hos-
tility to the ‘anti-imperialism’ which demands that the left side with whoever is the current target of US military operations, even if they are obvious tyrants like the Ba’athists or Libyan Jamahiriya or clericalist reactionaries like the Iranian regime.

This last, of course, has led to the interpreta-
tion that Platypus is presently Eustonite: people who favour the victory of the US impe-
rialism’s military operations over the alternative on the basis of the unattractive character of the targets. The case was sharply made by Louis Proyect in 2010. His conclusion is:

“What we are dealing with is a section of the academic left that has become profoundly disoriented and succumbed to the pressure of living inside the US, the world’s largest and most dangerous hegemon in history. The pur-
pose of this article is to put a skull-and-bones sign next to the poisoned well they drink from, so as to warn any young graduate student to not drink the water at the risk of political death.”

There are two issues involved: one of politics and one of theory. The theory issue means specifically the theory of the problem Richard Rubin asked us to address in the Trotsky plen-
ary at the convention: the problem of the defeat of the German revolution of 1918-19 at the hands of the SPD leadership, or, more exactly, the limitation of the German revolution to the creation of a capitalist state and the actual participation of this state in counterrev-
olutionary military operations against the Russian Revolution.

Politics

The issue of politics is simple. Suppose a movement which seeks general human eman-
cipation. In fact today as in 1900, albeit in dif-
ferent juridical forms, there is a hierarchy of countries. Countries higher up the global pecking order feel free to assist ‘their’ corpor-
ations to bribe officials in countries lower down the pecking order. If ‘unacceptable’ ac-
tions are taken by the governments of countries lower down, they feel free to inter-
cede with covert support to minority and terrorist groups, and so on. And, when push comes to shove, they intervene with direct military force.

It should be clear that general human emancipation is inconsistent with the hierarchy of countries, and that a movement which claims to seek general human emancipation but gives political support to this hierarchy is engaged in political doublethink.

At the same time, only Lenin’s theory of impe-
rialism – that it represents the final stage of capitalism and World War I the opening of a terminal crisis or Zusammnenbruch – gives support to the conclusion drawn by the Comin-
tern and maintained by Trotsky, that communists in imperialist countries must not only oppose the imperialist actions of their own countries, but also seek the victory of the nationalist movement of the subordinated country, even if it is authoritarian or clerical-
reactoryn character. Not even Bukharin’s or Luxemburg’s theories, which are closest to Lenin’s, support this conclusion.

And, in fact, the evidence of 20th century histo-
ry is unambiguously clear that both the theory of terminal crisis [Trotsky’s ‘death agony of capitalism’] and the political conclusion drawn from it of alliance of the workers’ movement with petty bourgeois nationalists in the ‘anti-
imperialist united front’ are false – as false and as disproved as the theory of phlogiston.

These circumstances require advocates of general human emancipation in countries high up the pecking order to pursue a two-sided policy in relation to their own countries’ coer-
cive operations against countries lower down. On the one hand, it is necessary to oppose these operations clearly, unambiguously and as far as possible practically. On the other, it is also necessary to give political solidarity and what practical support can be given to eman-
cipatory movements in the countries targeted – and therefore to avoid stupidly prettifying tyrants, local Bonapartes, clerical reactionary-
es, etc, merely because they may from time to time talk ‘anti-imperialist’ talk.

To err on either side of this line once or twice or even several times is merely to err. To de-
vlop a consistent position one side or another of this line is to become a political agent of the system of global hierarchy: i.e., to oppose gen-
eral human emancipation.

The ‘anti-imperialist’ left gives political sup-
port to people who are the US’s enemies now but have been their allies in the past and may well be again in the future; in doing so it makes itself an enemy of the local workers’ movement in the country in question, and more concretely aids the regimes against the exiles of the workers’ movements.

Groups like the Alliance for Workers’ Liberty and the Eustonites, by focusing their fire only on ‘third world’ tyrants without simultaneously up-front and explicitely opposing imperialist operations, become ‘useful idiots’ for the im-
perialist states – whose operations in the subordinated countries are as tyrannical as their opponents.

Richard Rubin in the Trotsky plenary said that defeatism is a moral obligation, but not one which could be expected to lead to revolution. What I have said so far is broadly consistent with this. This is because I have taken as the starting point only the Platypus claim that the left has died because it has abandoned the aim of general human emancipation, and supposed only that the movement is to fight for general human emancipation. It still follows that the movement cannot be true to itself as a move-
ment for general human emancipation without its sections in the countries higher up the global hierarchy displaying explicit, up-front and active opposition to this hierarchy, and therefore to the blockade and war operations of their own countries.

Chris Cutrone is Platypus’s [presumably elect-
ed] president. He writes, not infrequently, on Middle Eastern affairs in its journal, Platypus Review. His language in these articles is at best Delphic – obscure and capable of multiple interpretations. Cutrone is [as an academic] a pupil of Moishe Postone, and says openly that his politics are influenced by Postone. Postone unambiguously is an Eustonite or a left Zionist of a variety not dissimilar to the AWL. Some of Cutrone’s analyses of Middle East politics shows signs, like the AWL’s analysis, of being taken from the overseas outlets of Tel Aviv. Louis Proyect argues that Cutrone’s language (and that of other Platypus writers) is, rather than Delphic, Aesopian: obscure, and contains code which actually signals private [here Eustonite or AWLish] commitments.

A number of Platypus supporters responded to Proyect’s posting. They took the opportunity to assert their critique of the left. They insisted that Platypus Review is an open magazine and – as Spencer Leonard said in the closing plen-
ary at the convention – that Platypus does not have a line. They said that they do not support ‘humanitarian interventions’ – which is the code also used by the AWL. But they did not take the opportunity to say upfront that they as a group or as individuals oppose these ‘sanc-
tions’ and military actions – still less that they would campaign to stop them, even at the level of publishing anti-war or anti-sanctions mate-
rial in Platypus Review.

Cutrone’s address to the convention – on ‘The anti-fascist v anti-imperialist ’left’: some genealogies and prospects’ – may have sig-
nalled a change in direction. I do not know because I missed the speech and he has not [yet] put it up on his blog.

In the absence of a shift, the problem is that the balance of the Platypus Review’s coverage is AWLish. It is not strictly Eustonite, since it does not openly support ‘wars for democracy’. But it uses the same sort of ‘how can we con-
demn evasions as AWL leader Sean Matgamana. If anything, it is to the right of the Matgamanae, who do have practical com-
mittments in the British workers’ movement and a willingness to attempt to project a (de-
flective) line for concrete support for independent working class politics in the Mid-
dle East.
Remember that I have not said anything more than that the absence of opposition to the global hierarchy of countries is as much an abandonment of the project of general human emancipation as is the ‘anti-imperialism of idiots’ that gives political support to local reaction and authoritarianism as offering in some way an alternative to the global hierarchy. I have not asserted Lenin’s or any other theory of imperialism. It is merely that both Platypus’s claim not to have a political line and its claim to represent a reassertion of the emancipatory project of Marxism are belied by the one-sided character of Platypus Review’s coverage of these issues.

It would, of course, be possible to maintain a pro-imperialist or neutral line if Platypus were willing to abandon the critique of the existing left as anti-emancipatory. All that would be needed would be to assert that the immediate general emancipation of humanity is impossible and that it is first necessary to pass through capitalism via imperialism. Platypus is a third of the way to this position, since it asserts that emancipation has to be built on the basis of the conquests of capitalism. Step two is to assert that the material or ‘objective’ conditions for socialist revolution had not matured as of 1917 (or 1938). This point has been clearly argued by Moshé Machover in 1999, and, from within the ‘Lukácian’ tradition to which Platypus adheres, by István Mészáros, in Beyond capital (1995). Platypus seems (from what Richard Rubin said in the Trotsky plenary) to reject it.

Step three would be to argue that objective conditions have not yet matured; that their maturing involves the complete global displacement of pre-capitalist social relations; and that this can only be accomplished through the agency of imperialism. This would then be substantially the theory of Bill Warren’s Imperialism, pioneer of capitalism (1980). It would also be the theory of Bernstein in the Bernstein-Bax debate of 1896-97 and of the ‘social-imperialists’ in the 1900s. Whatever its merits (I should emphasise that I think that beyond the second step the merits are negligible: see my 2004 series on imperialism), this approach would involve abandoning Platypus’s critique of the existing left as ‘dead’ because it has abandoned the emancipatory project of Marxism. The reason would be that such a theory would also deny the possibility of immediate general emancipation: it would say that the next step is full global capitalism and global liberalism, to make a future general emancipation possible.

The ‘anti-imperialist’ line which supports the targets of US attacks does not deny that future general emancipation is desirable: rather, it says that the next step on this road is general global Stalinism and Stalinoid nationalism, to make a future general emancipation possible. The difference between two such approaches can be no more than one of theoretical, empirical and practical plausibility, not one of moral repudiation of one’s own moral premises.

Theory

In the Trotsky plenary at the Platypus convention, as I reported in last week’s article, Richard Rubin of Platypus argued that both fascism and Stalinism resulted from the defeat of the German revolution; and that this ‘German question’ posed the question of how the strongest Marxist party in the world, the SPD, could betray its own revolution. Since the objective conditions for socialism had matured, the explanation had to be the power of bourgeois ideology, and both Trotsky and the Frankfurt school had grappled with this problem.

This outline narrative has two huge gaps. The first is the basis of the ‘crisis of Marxism’. The second is the explanation of the problem of the 1914 betrayal. Actually offered by Lenin, the Comintern and Trotsky, which is not the power of ideology, but the effects of imperialism.

Marxism is distinct from pre-Marxist socialisms and communisms in a very simple way: that it asserts that communism is not a simple act of moral will, but reflects the objective interests of the proletariat in the class conflict inherent in capitalism, so that the proletariat as a class can be expected at the end of the day to become (in broad terms) communist. It is thus the role of the proletariat which produces the result that for Marxists capitalism is the necessary precursor of communism.

Mass working class support for forms of reformism and gradualism, or – as in England before 1900 or the USA today – for capitalist parties, is generally taken to be the basis of the ‘crisis of Marxism’. This is because it calls into question the claim that the class struggle between capital and proletariat forms a material basis for communism. Communism then reverts to being an ethical imperative, to be approached through moral persuasion on a cross-class basis or through one or another form of voluntarist minority action – or rejected.

In 1917-19 and again in 1943-48 this ‘crisis of Marxism’ argument was utterly implausible. But in the period of stability and prosperity in the 1890s-1900s, and the returned stability and prosperity of the 1950s-60s – and also in a sense especially since the fall of the USSR – it has again become attractive.

I have argued in Revolutionary strategy (chapter 2) that there are both positive and negative empirical grounds for defending the Marxist conception today in spite of the overall negative evolution since the 1970s. Marc Mulholland in two articles published in Critique in 2009 and 2010 has offered much more elaborated theoretical reasons for supposing a proletarian will to collectivism.

The actual explanation of the betrayal of August 1914 offered at the time independently by Lenin and Zinoviev, and by Trotsky, was the effects of imperialism on the working class of the imperialist countries and its organisations: that is, that a section of the class was ‘bought off’ by the spoils of imperialism. Trotsky continued to defend this view down to his death. Bukharin’s Imperialism and world economy took a slightly different angle, seeing the working class movement as tied to the capitalists through concessions organised by the imperialist state. Herman Gorter’s Imperialism, the World War and social democracy (1914) had aspects of both the Bukharin view and Luxemburg’s arguments (below).

Now this view may be right or it may be wrong, but it is not just Maoism or ‘New Left’-ism. It is the product precisely of some of the ‘classical Marxists’ or ‘second International lefts’, whose legacy Platypus says it is concerned to redeem in order to enable a 21st century left to be reborn. It demands a precise and serious critique, which cannot be undertaken just on the basis of the modern Maoist caricature of it and the Trotskyist imitators of Maoism.

I have argued elsewhere that the Lenin-Zinoviev and Trotsky version of this analysis in terms of imperialism buying off top sections of the working class is false, but the Bukharin version is broadly correct, and can be extended to understand the existence of reformism and dominance of nationalism in the modern ‘third world’.

One of the ‘second International lefts’, of course, did not adopt this line. It is Luxemburg, not Trotsky, who offered a really ‘accidental’ explanation of the political collapse of the SPD – and hence of the epoch – in terms of Kautsky’s (alleged) theoretical gradualism and did not attempt to ground this characterisation in any material process of change. In this Luxemburg, as against Lenin and Trotsky, is followed by Korsch in Marxism and philosophy.

This line genuinely does imply that – as Richard Rubin argued – the failure of the German revolution has to be explained by the power of bourgeois ideology, or of alienation, reification and commodity fetishism. This sort of argument and not Lenin (except in an extremely dematerialised form) or Trotsky is the context of Lukács’s History and class consciousness. The next step is that taken by the Frankfurt school people: to attempt to integrate alienation, reification and commodity fetishism with Freudian psychoanalysis. In other words, we arrive at the salience of the Frankfurt school for theory by rejecting the salience of imperialism in the explanation of the political collapse of the Second International.

But there is a theoretical as well as a political price to be paid for this choice. I have written on the political price or prices before the explanation of reformism by the self-reproduction of capitalist order provides a theory which demands both an ‘actionism’, which is either ultra-left or opportunistic or
both, and the epistemological commitments that support the form of the small bureaucrati-
centralist sect. In the specific case of the Frankfurt school the upshot is just a politics of
despair. But Platypus in a sense embraces both the politics of despair and the need for
critique (il faut cultiver son jardin théorétique), so these points are secondary.

The theoretical price is the expulsion of history
from theory. This may seem a paradoxical
statement, since all the variants derived under
Lukácsian and similar interpretations – includ-
ing, for example, Postone – insist that theory
must be historicised and that transhistorical
claims about human nature, etc must be ex-
pelled from Marx (or foisted on Engels) to
achieve a properly historicised theory. That
means one which focuses purely on the cri-
tique of capitalist modernity.

To take this turn, however, is to prohibit actual
comprehension. It is like asking for drug ther-
apy or surgery to remove your long-term
memory in the hope that it will get rid of ‘dis-
tractions’ from the present. In reality, no such
focus on capitalist modernity is possible: ‘the
pre-modern’ remains as a silent other, albeit
in a mutilated form, against which ‘capitalist
modernity’ is identified. In reality, our ability
to identify change depends on recognising also
continuities. So the expulsion of the longer-
term history of which capitalism is part results
in a loss of vision of change within capital-
ism.[13]

It turns out, indeed, that to defend this scheme
of ‘historicised’ theory, it is necessary to falsify
the very local history of the enlightenment,
Marxism and the workers’ movement (exa-
amples in last week’s article). Even if the students
who form Platypus’s base do not have political
but only theoretical aims, they will find that
this scheme is a theoretical trap. What will be
driven to fill the ‘absence’ of the ‘transhistori-
cal’ is either some form of liberalism – or, as
in Alasdair MacIntyre, Thomas Aquinas.[14]

Classifying the Platypus

Platypus takes its name from an anecdote
about Engels:

“A story is told about Karl Marx’s collaborator
and friend, Friedrich Engels, who, in his youth,
as a good Hegelian idealist, sure about the
purposive, rational evolution of nature and of
the place of human reason in it, became indig-
nant when reading about a platypus, which he
supposed to be a fraud perpetrated by English
taxidermists. For Engels, the platypus made
no sense in natural history.

Later, Engels saw a living platypus at a Brit-
ish zoo and was chagrined. Like Marx a good
materialist, and a thinker receptive to Dar-
win’s theory of evolution, which dethroned a
human-centred view of nature, Engels came to
respect that ‘reason’ in history, natural or
otherwise, must not necessarily accord with
present standards of human reason.

“This is a parable we find salutary to under-
standing the condition of the left today.”[15]

The Engels story is an embroidered version
of one Engels told about himself in a letter to
Conrad Schmidt in 1895, for a purpose rather
different to that which the group Platypus uses
it. Schmidt had (as can be seen from Engels’
letters) raised empirical objections to the idea
of the general rate of profit in volume 3 of
Marx’s Capital, and therefore wished to “de-
grade the law of value to a fiction”.

Engels’ response is that direct empirical con-
firmation or disconfirmation of individual
concepts is not to be expected. After other
examples, Engels comes to that of concepts in
biology and the platypus:

“From the moment we accept the theory of
evolution all our concepts of organic life cor-
respond only approximately to reality.
Otherwise there would be no change: on the
day when concepts and reality completely
coincide in the organic world development
comes to an end ... How, without bringing one
or both concepts into conflict with reality are
you going to get from the egg-laying reptile
to the mammal, which gives birth to living young?
And in reality we have in the monotremata a
whole sub-class of egg-laying mammals: in
1843, I saw the eggs of the duck-bill in Man-
chester and with arrogant narrow-mindedness
mocked at such stupidity – as if a mammal
could lay eggs – and now it has been proved!
So do not behave to the conceptions of value in
the way I had later to beg the duck-bill’s par-
don fort!”[16]

The merits or otherwise of Engels’ arguments
as a matter of philosophy are violently debata-
able. But it should be clear that Engels’ point
is not, contrary to Platypus, ‘that ‘reason’ in
history, natural or otherwise, must not neces-
sarily accord with present standards of human
reason’, but a considerably narrower philo-
osophical point: that concepts are necessarily
in imperfect agreement with the perceptible
world.

The ‘conceptual difficulty’ with the platypus,
of course, is that it and other monotremes are
animals somewhere in the borderlands be-
tween, or overlapping, the taxonomical classes
of birds or reptiles, which lay eggs, and mam-
mals, which give birth and suckle their young.
It is, however, in modern times regarded, for
reasons of evolutionary-history analysis, as a
type of mammal.

In this sense, if not in the sense of an existent
impossibility, the Platypus Affiliated Society is
rightly named. It is a group somewhere in the
borderlands between, or overlapping, two
sorts of left.

The first is the political-activist left: groups
from Labour leftwards in this country, from
the left wing of the Democrats leftwards in
the US. This left consists primarily of organised
parties and groups, secondarily of ‘independents’ [or sects of one member] who participate in
left, broad-front campaigns and other initia-
tives. It is linked, even if imperfectly, to the
broader workers’ movement [trade unions,
cooperatives, mass workers’ parties], and
attempts to intervene in public politics in pur-
suit of definite short-term and long-term
goals, usually expressed through a public
press.

The second is the academic left: academics
who would regard themselves as ‘being of the
left in relation to their academic work. [This is
not the same thing as working in a university,
while being either a militant and political trade
unionist or, outside of work, involved in the
political-activist left.] This left consists pri-
marily of individual academics, linked together
by leftist academic journals, annual confer-
ences and similar events. To the extent that it
intervenes in public politics it does so by indi-
vidual attempts to act as ‘public intellectuals’
through contributions to the capitalist media.

The Platypus Affiliated Society looks from one
angle like an organisation of the political activ-
ist left; from another angle like a part of the
academic left. At present, judging from its con-
vention, it should probably be located, in
spite of the ambiguities, on the academic side
of the divide. Apart from the Saturday morning
workshops on left groups, the format was that
of an academic conference (papers, ‘respond-
ents’, short Q&A sessions), not that of a
political conference. The Frankfurt school
commitments, the denial of the possibility of
political action as such and the obscurely
AWLish line on the ‘war on terror’ all give
Platypus some degree of academic credibility.

It is therefore to be judged as a theoretical
project, more than as a political project. My
judgement is that, though the group is right
that the ‘anti-imperialist front’ and the rest
of the orthodoxy of the left is a dead end, Plat-
ypus’s theoretical project is also a dead end as
tory.

Notes

1. ‘No need for party?’, May 12.
2. louisproy-
 ect.wordpress.com/2010/04/25/q-
what-is-a-platypus-a-an-american-
eustonite
3. M Machover, ‘The 20th century in
retrospect’ Workers’ Liberty No59,
1999; www.matzen.org/index.asp?u=101
&p=20th; Machover’s email ex-
change with Dov Schoss, linked at
the end of that page, is also useful
on the issues involved.
4. Bernstein-Bax debate in H Tudor
and JM Tudor (eds) Marxism and so-
cial democracy: the revisionist
debate 1896-98 (Cambridge 1998)
chapter 2. Later social-imperialists:
the targets of Kautsky’s polemics in
4. Postone’s argument in Time, labour and social domination Cambridge 1993 is at the end of the day a variant of it: “the working class is integral to capitalism rather than the embodiment of its negation” (emphasis added, p17). For Marx, as opposed to Postone, the working class was both integral to capitalism and the embodiment of its negation.
5. 'Marx, the proletariat and the "will to socialism"' (2009) 37 Critique pp319-43; "Its patrimony, its unique wealth!" Labour-power, working class consciousness and crises (2010) 38 Critique pp375-417. Comrade Mulholland is not a CPGB supporter and is, obviously, not responsible for any use I may make of his argument.
6. VI Lenin Socialism and war (1915) chapter 1: www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1915/s+w/ch01.htm#v21I70h-129 Imperialism, the highest stage of capitalism, having been written with a view to the tsarist censorship, is less explicit. L Trotsky War and the International (1914) chapter 10: www.marxists.org/archive/trotsky/1914/war/part3.htm#ch10
7. Where is Britain going? (1925) chapter 5: www.marxists.org/archive/trotsky/britain/wibg/ch05.htm; Their morals and ours (1938): www.marxists.org/archive/trotsky/1938/morals/morals.htm
14. This is, incidentally, my reason for believing that the theory of sexuality Jamie Gough and I defended in outline in 1985 has more explanatory power than Pablo Ben’s ‘Frankfurt’ version. Because our account begins with matters prior to capitalism and their persistence within capitalism, it also grasps more fully the transformations of sexualities within capitalist development over the last three centuries.
15. Cf my ‘Sects and “new left” disillusionment’ Weekly Worker April 15 2010.
16. platypus1917.org/about/what-is-a-platypus
17. Eg, Louis Althusser in Reading Capital (online at readingcapital.blogspot.com/2007/02/marx-and-his-discoveries.html) gives the letter to Schmidt as an example of Engels’ “empiricism” and departure from Marx; contra J Rees, ‘Engels’ Marxism’ International Socialism 1994, No65: pubs.socialistreviewindex.org
The problem is, He didn’t tell us which was which, and maybe he didn’t know himself. And Tariq laughed. He understood exactly what I was saying, and he didn’t dispute it."

We interpret this to mean that both Halliday and Ali turned to the right, or that both are disintegrated (or decomposed) remnants of the death of the left and therefore worth critical consideration. And not only Halliday, but also the aforementioned Hitchens and Makiya, could legitimately claim that they didn’t abandon the left so much as the left abandoned them.

The ideal conversation we in Platypus would like to have hosted, when we first launched our project, would have been a debate on the ‘war on terror’ between Tariq Ali, Alex Callinicos, Halliday, Hitchens and Makiya (with perhaps Slavoj Žižek thrown in for fun). In such a debate, we don’t think anyone would have represented the left that the world needs today — hence the need for such a conversation. For we think that they are all wrong and, hence, all ‘right’. As a project, Platypus is about exposing and putting forward a need: the present absence of a true left. We don’t have answers, only questions.

On the issue of ‘imperialism’, I dispute the supposed distinction of a voluntaristic (or opportunistic) versus structural-historical approach to the problem of, eg, Luxemburg versus Bukharin. I think that Luxemburg, Lenin in and Trotsky found that the ‘imperialist’ phase of ‘monopoly capital’ and the changing ‘organic composition of capital’ [at a global scale] by the turn of the 20th century had been the product of the successes of the workers’ movement in the core capitalist countries. They found this success to have advanced the crisis of capital. In other words, the social democratic workers’ movement had itself brought about the crisis of capital, or ‘imperialism’ as capitalism’s ‘highest’ or last stage [Lenin]: that is, the eve of revolution. Lenin, Luxemburg and Trotsky thought that the social workers’ movement was part of and not extrinsic to the history of capital. This meant, for Luxemburg, that the workers were responsible for the world war and thus historically obligated to bring about socialism and avant barbarism. This was not merely a moral injunction.

Moreover, what the Second International radicals meant by ‘imperialism’ was inter-imperialism, not core-periphery relations. The emphasis on the latter was the hallmark of the post-World War II new left and its derangement on the problem of global capital in history.

So it is not, for us, a matter of waiting for the world to become entirely liberalised or uniformly bourgeois in social relations before the struggle for socialism can commence (which would indeed be like Beckett’s Waiting for Godot or Endgame), but rather recognition that the problem of ‘imperialism’ has been a symptomatic of capital’s historical over-ripeness for revolution, at least since 1914-19, if not significantly long before.

When Platypus says that the ‘left is dead’, what we mean is that the rottenness of the world today is the historical legacy and responsibility of the left (and the failure of Marxism). As a project, we are neither ‘academic’ nor ‘activist’ [neither fish nor fowl], but rather about provoking recognition [blocked by both academicism and activism] of this long overdue and festering task, which we think is found in historical Marxism, but buried under many layers of regressive obfuscation from which it needs to be disinterred.

We don’t think that this task can be formulated straightforwardly politically, programmatically, but only indirectly, through pointed and acutely symptomatic conversation that can have a transformative effect ideologically. This will not involve Platypus developing some theoretical framework before better practice, but rather our doing something that will need to be accompanied, in a ‘division of labour’, by a reinvigorated workers’ movement. We think the ideological work we are doing is hosting and pointedly curating the conversation that can have an effect, however indirectly, on freeing up and potentially revalorising the idea of socialism and a Marxist approach that we think would be necessary — if for now at some distance from immediately practical questions — for such a workers’ movement.
The study of history and the left’s decline

Dealing with the present demands not useful myths, writes Mike Macnair, but a real understanding of the past.

If the issues are linked, to work through them demands a degree of separation. I will address in turn the questions why understanding the history is important; the problem of how to attempt to understand it; the problem of Peter Netti’s diagnosis of the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) in which both Bernstein and Luxemburg are preferable to Bebel and Kautsky, and comrade Cutrone’s diagnosis of this as displaying an issue about the ‘necessary authoritarianism’ of the SPD; and the question of imperialism, as an issue in the pre-World War I socialist movement, and as an issue of the larger history, ‘ripeness for revolution’, and the diagnosis of our own future.

Memory and history

I begin with something which I have referred to before. Memory is indispensable to conscious engagement with the recalcitrant material world. ‘The present’ is a concept without a direct referent: rather, it refers to a presumption, which we have to make every moment we are awake, that the immediate future will be more or less like the immediate past. We therefore constantly predict the future, and act, on the basis of probabilistic inductive inferences from the past. We cannot avoid doing so. Theories, whether in experimental sciences or in observational ones (astronomy, evolutionary biology and history count among observational sciences), are systematised from inductive inferences from the past to the future, not counterposed to them.

From this point of view the study of history is indispensable to politics. In reality, even those bourgeois politicians who deny its significance in public consider in private the historical development of elections, party affiliations and ‘public opinion’. Hence, serious engagement with history would be essential, however successful the left was. To refuse it would either be to refuse all understanding, or to adopt de facto some unexamined history.

There is a subtle difference between this conception and Platypus’s engagement with history and specifically with the history of the movement. Platypus’s engagement with history is intimately connected with its particular conception of the decline of the left.

Thus Ben Blumberg, introducing a 2009 panel on that issue: ‘[Platypus] was brought together by a shared realisation that the social and cultural theory of Theodor Adorno and other members of the Frankfurt Institute for Social Research contained the legacy of the revolutionary Marxism of the antecedent period. This realisation was coupled with another: to claim that Adorno’s theoretical ideas were the legacy of the practical politics of Lenin, Luxemburg and Trotsky put Platypus at odds in numerous respects with the existing left... By falsely resolving the problem of theory and practice the left has relinquished the defining feature of its politics and ceased to be the left at all. This has profound effects on the development of the history of capitalism, in which the left traditionally has acted as a transformative catalyst. Because its politics no longer mediate theory and practice, the left has begun to decompose. Following Adorno, Platypus calls this process historical regression’ (emphases added). [3]

Or the panel description at the April convention on ‘The Marxism of the Second International radicals’: ‘How were the Second International radicals, importantly, critics, and not merely advocates, of their own political movement? What is the legacy of these figures today, after the 20th century – as Walter Benjamin said in his 1940 “Theses on the philosophy of history”, against the grain of their time, reaching beyond it? How did Lenin, Luxemburg, Trotsky and Lukács contribute to the potential advancement and transformation of Marxism, in and through the crisis of Marxism in the early 20th century? How can we return to these figures productively, today, to learn the lessons of their history?’ [4]

These are not histories of the ordinary self-location of politics in the world as it moves. They are attempts at the redemption of a ‘usable past’ on the assumption of a total break in political and theoretical continuity. Platypus is not, of course, unique in this. Many tendencies and many authors try to look back to a “true Marxism”, whether this is to be found in Marx without Engels, Marx and Engels without the Second International, the Second International without the Third, the first four congresses of the Third without its later history (mainly Trotskyists), pre-war Trotskyism (Al Richardson and others) or pre-“Pabloite” Trotskyism.

My Revolutionary strategy (2008) argues for an attempt to understand where we are, at the level of the practical political problem of left unity, through understanding the history. But it also precisely argues against the idea that the film of history can be rolled back (p66) or that there is an uncorrupted historical theoretical moment to be found. There are in my view bad mistakes in Marx and Engels, which were amplified in the Second International, and fundamental errors in the views of the first four congresses of the Comintern, and so on; and these have to be addressed with the benefit of hindsight in order to construct a politics for the future.

Equally, the recent experiences of the organised Left form, for one part of the basis on which we are to look for a way forward: like the partial strengths of the post-1945 communist parties as working class organisations in spite of their nationalist, bureaucratic and class-collaborationist politics, or the failures of far-left groups in Portugal in 1974-75, or the partial successes of ‘unitary’ projects like Rifondazione Comunista ending in ultimate failure. None are to be ruled out of consideration by political ‘original sins’ or ‘historical regression’.

Historical method

These different purposes of historical inquiry for politics have implications for differences in the method of historical inquiry. Platypus’s distinction from other forms of search for a redemptive retrieval of the lost past is that following Benjamin and Adorno what is...
sought as a ‘usable past’ is to be a historical myth. To use phrases from Benjamin, “setting alight the sparks of hope in the past”, “the name of Blanqui, whose distant thunder had made the preceding century tremble”, a view of the past which calls forth working class “hate” and “spirit of sacrifice” and makes possible a “leap into the open sky of history”.

There is a strange paradox in using such an approach as a critique of a left whose decline is – as is obvious to most people, Platypus included – predicated ultimately on the shadow of Stalinism and its failure. This is that the historical lineage of the role of myth and the “leap into the open sky of history” in fact runs from the part of the Second International left influenced by Sorel and similar thinkers, through the Bogdanov-Lunacharsky Vpervye faction in the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party, through the ‘military opposition’ in the Russian Civil War, through elements of the left wings of both majority and minority in the later 1920s Russian Communist Party, to – the adventurism of the first five-year plan and the ‘third period’, high-period Stalinism, and the Maoism of the ‘great leap forward’.

For the argument I have put forward above, in contrast, the purpose of historical inquiry is to grasp the processes of historical change in which we are – unavoidably – embedded in order to make choices between real available options. These political choices are in my view no different in principle from individual choices in everyday life. Memory mistakes and belief in false theories (which are built on inadequately tested claims about the past) can have real and catastrophic implications. My grandmother was lucky not to be run down when, in her 90s, she set out to cycle to town, forgetting that traffic speeds and density on the road passing her house had changed since the 1930s; my mother was less lucky when her belief in treating her ‘neuralgia’ with homeopathy and other ‘alternative remedies’ led to late diagnosis of lymphoma.

The phenomenon in which ‘official communist’ parties in the periphery countries since World War II have believed in strategic alliances with the ‘national bourgeoisie’, ending with the CP massacred or discredited and marginalised, is, I think, no more than errors of the same type scaled up to that of collective decision-making. In this view, Benjamin’s, or Adorno’s, philosophies of history and the search for usable myths make such errors more, not less, likely.

How do we attempt to get a more accurate grasp of the history in which we are embedded, in order to make better choices?

The elementary principles of historical source criticism (assessing biases of the witness, closeness to the event described, consistency of evidence, corroboration, antecedent probability of the narrative, and so on) are originally derived from legal approaches to evidence of recent events used in court, and the same approaches also form a substratum of the assessment of the reliability of observational and experimental evidence in the physical sciences. In the legal context it is clear that certainty is unavailable and the court must act on probabilistic information. Scientific and technical breakthrough was made possible when this was accepted in the physical sciences, in place of the ‘certain’ textual authority of scripture and ancient authors.

In history, which continued to be seen as an art, the breakthrough to source criticism was later and more gradual. Once it had happened, historical inquiry acquired a partially cumulative character, as enquiry in the physical sciences has acquired a definitely cumulative character.

Marx is (just) this side of the source-critical watershed in history: hence the concrete documentation of the second part of Capital/Vol 1, hence the critical notes published as Theories of surplus value, hence his elaborate critical notebooks on pre-capitalist property forms, as yet imperfectly published.

The Frankfurt school, in contrast, wanted to step back from this approach to one which philosophised from the standpoint of ‘critique of what is’, but which picked and chose odd snippets of history which would serve its, ultimately moral, purposes. This is evident as much in Adorno’s and Horkheimer’s Dialectic of enlightenment as in Benjamin on the philosophy of history.

It is for these reasons that in my report I characterised many of the papers at the Platypus convention as “neither quite rigorous philosophy nor quite rigorous history”. Watson Ladd in his letter quotes Adorno’s comment in Minima moralia that “The injunction to practise intellectual honesty usually amounts to sabbage of thought.” Comrade Ladd admits that “neither nonsense nor triviality will suffice as modes of thought today”.

In my opinion, however, the method in Benjamin, in Dialectic of enlightenment and in Minima moralia, produces precisely occasional interesting apercus buried in a mass of nonsense and triviality. The idea that this method is counterposed to “obtuse French theory” (i.e., postmodernism, Foucaultianism, etc) is illusory: it is, rather, a forebear of the literary theory on offer in today’s academy.

The question of source-critical method then affects the specific issues of history and theory to which I referred in the beginning: Nettl on the SPD, ‘authoritarianism’, imperialism, and ripeness for revolution.

Nettl

In the case of Nettl, the issue is that the historian has to be understood as a witness to the research he reports; and it is necessary both to check the report against other witnesses (other historians of the SPD) and, where practically possible, against the primary sources (easier now that so much is online). It is also necessary to evaluate the witness’s biases.

Peter Nettl was a child of Viennese émigrés from fascism, and came to the UK in 1936 at the age of 10. Unlike many émigrés, his father had a subsisting interest in a textile firm in Bradford, and Nettl was therefore privately educated. Called up in 1944, he was in 1945 at the age of 21 commissioned as a major in the British intelligence, presumably in order to give him sufficient rank to be taken seriously in the interrogation of German prisoners in Berlin, to which he was immediately assigned.

On demobilisation he went to St John’s College, Oxford and took the ‘accelerated degree’ made available to veterans. He obtained a first class and was immediately offered a teaching job at St John’s and Brasenose College. However, he took only a one-year tutorship. In this period he published The eastern zone and Soviet policy in Germany 1945-50 (Oxford 1950). The book is a conventional early cold war piece.

He then went to work in his father’s textile firm – initially in Bradford, but thereafter as a global travelling salesman. While doing this job, he published a few pretty orthodox papers on issues in economics, and reviews of German Democratic Republic publications for International Affairs. The latter suggests that he may have retained links to the ‘intelligence community’ in this period.

In 1961 he took a visiting fellow position at Nuffield College, Oxford, where he stayed until appointed in 1963 to a lectureship in politics at Leeds University. The SPD as a political model dates to 1964, two years before the publication of his biography of Rosa Luxemburg (1964). The latter was followed by Political mobilisation (1967), The Soviet achievement (1967), which reads Soviet history in terms of Weberian modernisation theory, and International systems and the modernisation of societies (1968). In 1968 he was appointed to a professorship in political sociology at the University of Pennsylvania, but died in a plane crash shortly afterwards.

Hanson in his memoir of Nettl describes him as having moved from field to field, and in particular from history (the biography of Luxembourg) to sociology. It is, however, far from clear that the biography of Luxemburg was motivated by a desire to ‘do history’. Nor is it a product of sympathy for the political left or for Marxism, of which there is no evidence in Nettl’s other work.

Rather, ‘The SPD as a political model’ shows a primary motivation to understand the SPD-like aspects of nationalistic and revolutionary political parties, in broadly Weberian terms, in connection with ‘decolonisation’ and ‘modernisation’. Behind that lies – it can be guessed – practical questions for British policymakers’ understanding of and relationships with nationalist ‘inheritor parties’ after decolonisation. The biography of Luxembourg
was a by-product of these goals, albeit a very large one.

This is, I think, reflected in the fact that reviews by historians (as opposed to political scientists) of both the Luxemburg biography and The Soviet achievement commented that Nettl was quite cavalier in his treatment of those historical facts which appeared to him to be only contingently relevant to the arguments of the books.

A 1980 review essay by Richard Breitman discusses a substantial body of literature on the pre-1914 SPD, which gives sharply different theoretical accounts of the SPD’s evolution: witnesses of similar standing to Nettl – ie, non-Marxist historians and sociologists of politics – who do not corroborate his account.

I will not go into depth on direct confrontation between Nettl’s account and the primary sources, but there is one small significant point. Nettl treats Robert Michels’ Political parties (1911) as an unqualified primary source for SPD practice and for what comrade Cutrone calls “authoritarianism”. But Nettl takes no account whatever of Michels’ political bias: ie, that at the time of writing Michels was a revolutionary socialist (after World War I he followed another semi-socialist leftist of the pre-war period, Benito Mussolini, into fascism).

Authoritarianism

Comrade Cutrone writes in his first letter: “I think Macnair avoids ... the issue I was raising about the inherent unavoidable authoritarianism of late 19th century mass (working class) parties that needed to be worked through by later Marxism (unlike circa 1848), and the problems of which Lenin and Luxemburg were unaware, unlike the German Social Democratic party centre (Bebel and Kautsky) and later Stalinism (including Maoism).”

“Authoritarianism” is a slippery word. Early citations in the Oxford English Dictionary are from 1879 – “Men who are authoritarian by nature, and cannot imagine that a country should be orderly save under a military despotism”; and 1882 – “Communists of the ‘authoritarian’ type.”

The first sense of ‘authoritarianism’ means a politics which denies the legitimacy of political dissent and the possibility of the accountability of authorities to those below. It may be military in character, as in the quotation, or clericalist. Modern bourgeois sociologists distinguish authoritarianism in this sense from the [worse] totalitarianism, meaning fascism, Stalinism or sub-Stalinist nationalist regimes.

The real distinction is that ‘totalitarianism’ engage in land reform (Mussolini, Mugabe) or job creation schemes at capitalist expense (Hitler), while ‘authoritarians’, like Franco or Pinochet, permit a sphere independent of the state: ie, the capitalist market.

The second sense of ‘authoritarianism’ means, in Bakuninist hands, a politics which admits any sort of authority or binding collective decisions at all. In liberal-libertarian hands, it means any politics in which decisions for the common good are capable of binding ‘free individuals’, meaning property owners. Non-property owners are left under such a regime with the [perfectly free!] choice of submission or starvation.

Which version does comrade Cutrone mean in relation to the SPD? Nettl means simply that the SPD was not liberal-libertarian: “The English or American notion of limited government, that it might be better to do without certain activities if they involved authoritative regulation or control, was utterly alien.”

If what is meant is that the legitimacy of dissent, and accountability to those below, were rejected, Breitman (cited above) discusses Susanne Miller’s Burghfrieden und Klassenkampf (1974) as showing that the SPD leadership only became authoritarian in this sense in and after 1914: ie, because of the choice to support the Reich in the war. In doing so, it raised up the USP as an opposition.

Engels, in On authority (1872), offered a critique of the Bakuninist version. Marx, in his unpublished Conspectus of Bakunin’s statism and anarchy (1874), makes similar points. The issue was not therefore one which arose after Marx’s time.

I do not mean to deny that the SPD was substantially bureaucratised before 1914 – though not, as yet, an authoritarianism (sense 1) or ‘totalitarianism’ of the bureaucracy like the Luxemburg-Jojiches-Dzerzhinsky Social Democracy of the Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania, Stalinism or the modern ‘20th Leninists’ (Stalin fans, Maoists, ‘orthodox’ Trotskyists). Nor do I mean to deny that bureaucratic rule is a real problem facing the workers’ movement and the left.

The problem is, rather, what the alternative to the dictatorship of the bureaucracy is. If it is to be liberalism-libertarianism, we should give up on any alternative to the present-day social order, because ‘it might be better to do without certain activities if they involved authoritative regulation or control’ is no more than an ideology of capitalist society.

If it is to be diluted Bakuninism, as in Sorel, Michels and in an even more diluted form the Trotsky of Our political tasks and Results and prospects, we should also give up. In the first place, mass-strikism without permanent party organisation has been repeatedly tried and as repeatedly failed. Secondly, as Bakunin was the first to admit, as Luxemburg and her comrades showed in the SDKPL and mass-strikist groups have shown repeatedly since, the attempt to move the masses into action, as opposed to winning them to a political programme, inexorably demands the ‘invisible dictatorship’, the small and conspiratorial group of illuminati which directs the ‘spontaneous will to revolt’ of the masses.

The option which has not really been tried is political civic republicanism: This means the rejection, not of all subordination to the collective, but of permanent subordination to decision-makers. It means recognition that we have to take binding collective decisions, and that this will involve delegating individuals as leaders/managers, and so on. But, on the other hand, it means insistence that these people are subordinated to the membership

[and ultimately the masses] through freedom of information, speech and horizontal communication, and association against the existing leadership. In my opinion – not a CPGB view – it also involves term limits for leaders and managers, etc, at all levels.

Imperialism

In his second letter comrade Cutrone writes: “Moreover, what the Second International radicals meant by ‘imperialism’ was inter-imperialism, not core-periphery relations. The emphasis on the latter was the hallmark of the post-World War II new left and its derangement on the problem of global capital in history.”

This claim is a commonplace from somewhere in the historiography (I have also heard it from Marc Mulholland). The problem is that it cannot really survive confrontation with the primary sources.

In early usage, it is true that ‘imperialism’ did not mean ‘colonialism’, but rather the adoption of imperial styles and titles (Louis Napoleon in 1852, Wilhelm I in 1871, queen Victoria in 1877) and of ‘Napoleonic’ militarism and centralised bureaucracy. ‘Colonialism’ rather attracted the label, ‘colonial policy’, in early SPD and Second International debates.

‘Imperialism’ came to be attached to ‘colonial policy’ through Joseph Chamberlain’s advocacy of colonialism as a solution to ‘the social problem’ under the name of imperialism. Chamberlain’s imperialism was then critiqued in the book of that name by Hobson in 1902, which was rapidly known to the left. Hence, though the SPD debate of 1907-08 was still conducted under the name of ‘colonial policy’, ‘colonial policy’ appears as an aspect of ‘imperialism’ in Hilferding’s Finance capital (1911).

And, as I cited in my second article, Hobson’s and Hilferding’s usage is the one found in Lenin and Zinoviev, Bukharin, Trotsky and Gorter’s books on the causes of World War I.

The idea that the Second International was unconcerned with “core-periphery relations” cannot survive any look at the ‘colonial policy’ debates. The whole ‘revisionist debate’ in a
sense began with the Bernstein-Bax exchange of 1896–97 about Marxists’ attitude to the colonial expansion of capitalism. Kautsky responded on this specific issue in a three-part series in 1898. The issue flared up again after the SPD’s defeat in the 1907 ‘Hottentot election’ – which was, as its name indicates, fought on the issue of the Reich’s dirty colonial war in what is now Namibia.

If “the Second International radicals” is to include the Lenin of the war and the early Comintern, the claim is manifest nonsense. Since I have cited some of the relevant texts in a reply to Arthur Bough (Letters, May 12), I will not repeat them here.

Before the passage I have just quoted, comrade Cutrone argues in his second letter that ‘Luxemburg, Lenin and Trotsky doubted that the ‘imperialist’ phase of ‘monopoly capital’, and the changing ‘organic composition of capital’ (at a global scale) by the turn of the 20th century had the product of the successes of the workers’ movement in the core capitalist countries. They found this success to have advanced the crisis of capital. In other words, the social democratic workers’ movement had itself brought about the crisis of capital, or ‘imperialism’ as capitalism’s ‘highest’ or last stage (Lenin); that is, the eve of revolution. Lenin, Luxemburg and Trotsky thought that the socialist workers’ movement was part of and not extrinsic to the history of capital. This meant, for Luxemburg, that the workers were responsible for the world war and thus historically obligated to bring about socialism and avert barbarism. This was not a merely moral injunction.\footnote{I would be very interested to see real evidence for this proposition as a claim about what Lenin, Luxemburg and Trotsky wrote – as opposed to what they might have written. My own reading of the texts is that Lenin and Trotsky at least believed that imperialism made possible concessions to sections of the working class, rather than that it was required by the offensive of the working class.}

I will admit that there is evidence from the political discourse of bourgeois imperialists, like Joseph Chamberlain, that imperialism was needed as a response to the rise of the workers’ movement. The problem is this. The export of capital to colonial possessions and periphery states goes back to Venice and Genoa in the late Middle Ages. The ascendency of financial capital in Britain long predates the 1870s and is, in fact, a necessity of the rule of the capitalist class as such. The peculiar form of ‘fusion’ of financial and industrial capital which Hilferding identified as a novelty turns out to have remained specific to ‘civil law’ countries and has never reached the ‘Anglo-Saxon sphere’.\footnote{I will admit that there is evidence from the political discourse of bourgeois imperialists, like Joseph Chamberlain, that imperialism was needed as a response to the rise of the workers’ movement. The export of capital to colonial possessions and periphery states goes back to Venice and Genoa in the late Middle Ages. The ascendency of financial capital in Britain long predates the 1870s and is, in fact, a necessity of the rule of the capitalist class as such. The peculiar form of ‘fusion’ of financial and industrial capital which Hilferding identified as a novelty turns out to have remained specific to ‘civil law’ countries and has never reached the ‘Anglo-Saxon sphere’.\footnote{I would be very interested to see real evidence for this proposition as a claim about what Lenin, Luxemburg and Trotsky wrote – as opposed to what they might have written. My own reading of the texts is that Lenin and Trotsky at least believed that imperialism made possible concessions to sections of the working class, rather than that it was required by the offensive of the working class.}'}

\section*{Over-ripe?}

Comrade Cutrone says that “the problem of ‘imperialism’ has been a symptom of capital’s historical over-ripeness for revolution, at least since 1914-19, if not significantly long before”. Though “capital’s historical over-ripeness for revolution” is orthodox Trotskyism from the Transition programme, it has two problems in this context. The first is that if it is to describe ‘symptoms’, those of imperialism, which go all the way back to the creation of the first proto-bourgeois and bourgeois states, the idea of ‘ripeness’ loses all meaning.\footnote{I would be very interested to see real evidence for this proposition as a claim about what Lenin, Luxemburg and Trotsky wrote – as opposed to what they might have written. My own reading of the texts is that Lenin and Trotsky at least believed that imperialism made possible concessions to sections of the working class, rather than that it was required by the offensive of the working class.}

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What we need in this situation is not a useful myth of the past to inspire the spirit of revolt: it is a real understanding of the past in order to make real choices about options in the future.\footnote{I would be very interested to see real evidence for this proposition as a claim about what Lenin, Luxemburg and Trotsky wrote – as opposed to what they might have written. My own reading of the texts is that Lenin and Trotsky at least believed that imperialism made possible concessions to sections of the working class, rather than that it was required by the offensive of the working class.}
A couple of factual points regarding JP Nettl and his political sympathies ([The study of history and the left’s decline], June 2). Firstly, he was a supporter of the Labour Party. I heard him address a Labour Party election meeting in 1959 in Shipley. Secondly, he contributed a book review to International Socialism in 1964 (www.marxists.org/history/etol/newspaper/is/1964/no016/nettl.htm).

**Socialist Classic**

**JP Nettl**

From International Socialism, No.16, Spring 1964, p.31.


This is a paperback edition of a now unobtainable reprint of this minor Socialist classic, which the same publishers brought out in 1951 in their series, Rare Masterpieces of Philosophy and Science. At the present price it comes within the reach of both amateur and professional students interested in Socialism. The original book has a curious history. Written almost in one solid sitting by the author in 1912, it bears all the traces of inspiration and speed; it is a single vast continuous lecture. Contemporary reviewers were impressed not so much by the merits of its arguments as by the extraordinary daring of a Socialist ‘improving’ Marx’s economics. After 1918 the book benefitted from a great deal of explicitly Communist criticisms. It was singled out as the most representative text for the extreme ‘objective’ view of capitalist collapse – the theory of spontaneity, or Luxemburgism for short. As such it was attacked by Lenin, Bukharin and others, who found in it an unwitting justification for the hated Kautsky.

In fact it is not one book but three. Firstly, an attempt to solve the innate difficulties of Marxist economics. What began as a completion of the argument about compound reproduction in Capital Vol. III, finished in fact as an attempt to analyse the economic contradictions of capitalist society in a neater but quite different form. This aspect, couched in the sophistication of modern economic concepts and terms is discussed in an excellent, rigorous, yet sympathetic foreword by Joan Robinson, for which alone the book is worth reprinting.

Secondly, it is an exercise in economic history – Rosa Luxemburg’s great strength. In the middle sections of the book the influence of colonialism both on the colonised societies and on the colonisers is discussed with vivid examples and much learning. Though this material has now largely been superseded by more thorough and modern work, it is typical of Rosa Luxemburg’s style and method.

Finally, the book provides a review of ‘Socialist’ economic writings from Sismondi to the Russian legal Marxists – vividly written and highly polemical. The only thing the book does not do is to solve ‘imperialism’, which, as Rosa Luxemburg well knew, was essentially a domestic and not a colonial problem. Historically the importance of the book is largely due to its material sources for my and other Platypus members’ views. But I do not think that what Macnair calls a “source-critical” approach to history should be attempted with reference to historians’ biographies, which does not clarify but potentially compounds the problem of philosophy of history.

On JP Nettl, I would like to point to his substantial essay on ‘Ideas, intellectuals, and structures of dissent.’ I dispute Macnair’s characterisation of Nettl’s concerns. I think Nettl’s biography of Luxemburg was his life-work and not ancillary. Nettl was a liberal/non-Marxist, so there are perhaps some issues to be taken with his work on Luxemburg, but Nettl’s views as a political scientist were drawn from his long and close study of Luxemburg and her relation to Marxism, not applied by Nettl to Luxemburg from elsewhere. For him, the history of Marxism raised questions about the possibilities of politics per se. Hence, the importance of Nettl’s argument.

Thus, his article on ‘The German Social Democratic Party 1890–1914 as political model’ argued that Luxemburg’s views, as expressed in Reform or revolution? and The mass strike, among other writings, were not actionist, but concerned with the transformation of the SPD, in which the Marxist left had a stake. Luxemburg and Lenin were not opposed to the formation of workers’ political parties as necessary instruments of emancipation, but they were aware of the dangers inherent in this, from a Marxist perspective on the historical development of capital, in which such workers’ organisations (including labour unions) were inevitably bound up. In other words, how, for example, the SPD was a phenomenon of the history of capital, or, more precisely, how the workers’ movement for socialism was part of the historical development of capital, and did not somehow oppose it from outside.

In this sense, there was an affinity of Eduard Bernstein’s views on ‘evolutionary socialism’ with Luxemburg’s, but they drew the opposite political conclusions: where Bernstein found the transformation of capital through reforms to be ameliorative, Luxemburg found a deepening crisis. This was Luxemburg’s thesis in Reform or revolution? – only reformists separated social reform from political revolution, because Marxism recognised that reforms deepened the crisis of capital and made revolution not less, but more necessary.

**Benjamin and Adorno**

I dispute Macnair’s characterisation of Benjamin’s and Adorno’s philosophy of history as attempting to generate “useful myths”. Rhetorical and literary style aside, Benjamin and especially Adorno were rigorous Marxists and Hegelians who engaged the issues of historian.

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**Letter**

Ian Birchall

A couple of factual points regarding JP Nettl and his political sympathies ([The study of history and the left’s decline], June 2). Firstly, he was a supporter of the Labour Party. I heard him address a Labour Party election meeting in 1959 in Shipley. Secondly, he contributed a book review to International Socialism in 1964 (www.marxists.org/history/etol/newspaper/is/1964/no016/nettl.htm).

**Facts**

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**Socialist Classic**

**JP Nettl**

From International Socialism, No.16, Spring 1964, p.31.


This is a paperback edition of a now unobtainable reprint of this minor Socialist classic, which the same publishers brought out in 1951 in their series, Rare Masterpieces of Philosophy and Science. At the present price it comes within the reach of both amateur and professional students interested in Socialism. The original book has a curious history. Written almost in one solid sitting by the author in 1912, it bears all the traces of inspiration and speed; it is a single vast continuous lecture. Contemporary reviewers were impressed not so much by the merits of its arguments as by the extraordinary daring of a Socialist ‘improving’ Marx’s economics. After 1918 the book benefitted from a great deal of explicitly Communist criticisms. It was singled out as the most representative text for the extreme ‘objective’ view of capitalist collapse – the theory of spontaneity, or Luxemburgism for short. As such it was attacked by Lenin, Bukharin and others, who found in it an unwitting justification for the hated Kautsky.

In fact it is not one book but three. Firstly, an attempt to solve the innate difficulties of Marxist economics. What began as a completion of the argument about compound reproduction in Capital Vol. III, finished in fact as an attempt to analyse the economic contradictions of capitalist society in a neater but quite different form. This aspect, couched in the sophistication of modern economic concepts and terms is discussed in an excellent, rigorous, yet sympathetic foreword by Joan Robinson, for which alone the book is worth reprinting.

Secondly, it is an exercise in economic history – Rosa Luxemburg’s great strength. In the middle sections of the book the influence of colonialism both on the colonised societies and on the colonisers is discussed with vivid examples and much learning. Though this material has now largely been superseded by more thorough and modern work, it is typical of Rosa Luxemburg’s style and method.

Finally, the book provides a review of ‘Socialist’ economic writings from Sismondi to the Russian legal Marxists – vividly written and highly polemical. The only thing the book does not do is to solve ‘imperialism’, which, as Rosa Luxemburg well knew, was essentially a domestic and not a colonial problem. Historically the importance of the book is largely due to its material sources for my and other Platypus members’ views. But I do not think that what Macnair calls a “source-critical” approach to history should be attempted with reference to historians’ biographies, which does not clarify but potentially compounds the problem of philosophy of history.

On JP Nettl, I would like to point to his substantial essay on ‘Ideas, intellectuals, and structures of dissent.’ I dispute Macnair’s characterisation of Nettl’s concerns. I think Nettl’s biography of Luxemburg was his life-work and not ancillary. Nettl was a liberal/non-Marxist, so there are perhaps some issues to be taken with his work on Luxemburg, but Nettl’s views as a political scientist were drawn from his long and close study of Luxemburg and her relation to Marxism, not applied by Nettl to Luxemburg from elsewhere. For him, the history of Marxism raised questions about the possibilities of politics per se. Hence, the importance of Nettl’s argument.

Thus, his article on ‘The German Social Democratic Party 1890–1914 as political model’ argued that Luxemburg’s views, as expressed in Reform or revolution? and The mass strike, among other writings, were not actionist, but concerned with the transformation of the SPD, in which the Marxist left had a stake. Luxemburg and Lenin were not opposed to the formation of workers’ political parties as necessary instruments of emancipation, but they were aware of the dangers inherent in this, from a Marxist perspective on the historical development of capital, in which such workers’ organisations (including labour unions) were inevitably bound up. In other words, how, for example, the SPD was a phenomenon of the history of capital, or, more precisely, how the workers’ movement for socialism was part of the historical development of capital, and did not somehow oppose it from outside.

In this sense, there was an affinity of Eduard Bernstein’s views on ‘evolutionary socialism’ with Luxemburg’s, but they drew the opposite political conclusions: where Bernstein found the transformation of capital through reforms to be ameliorative, Luxemburg found a deepening crisis. This was Luxemburg’s thesis in Reform or revolution? – only reformists separated social reform from political revolution, because Marxism recognised that reforms deepened the crisis of capital and made revolution not less, but more necessary.

**Benjamin and Adorno**

I dispute Macnair’s characterisation of Benjamin’s and Adorno’s philosophy of history as attempting to generate “useful myths”. Rhetorical and literary style aside, Benjamin and especially Adorno were rigorous Marxists and Hegelians who engaged the issues of historian.
cal materialism’, as manifested after the failure of Marxism. Benjamin and Adorno were not postmodernists avant la lettre, despite their spurious late pomo popularity. Rather, Benjamin and Adorno, like Lukács and Korsch (from whom they took direct inspiration), followed Luxemburg’s and Lenin’s judgments about the crisis of Marxism as the crisis of bourgeois society that Marxism itself, as part of the ideology and practical political leadership of the international social democratic workers’ movement, had brought about.

Benjamin and Adorno challenged the linear-progressive conception of history, recovering from the history of Marxism what might appear to be an obscure point but one addressed, for example, by Plekhanov as history moving in a ‘knotted line,’ and by Lenin as history moving in ‘spirals’ of repetition and crisis. This Hegelian-Marxist approach to the dialectics of history was digested usefully by Lukács, as a discussion of historical “moment” and “process” in ‘Tailism and the dialectic’ (Lukács’s unpublished 1925 defence of History and class consciousness).

**Hegel and Kant**

The Hegelian – and Kantian – point is that the relation between theory and practice is not one of empirical deduction from trial and error, in which an always imperfect theory is corrected, but ‘inductive’, in that the concrete ‘material’ object of practice is the concretisation of abstractions, and, furthermore, the object of practice is indeed first and foremost the human subject: ie, the ‘subject-object’ of transformation.

The question is the adequacy of the relation of theory and practice. Metaphysical [‘theoretical’] categories refer not to a world extrinsic to human subjectivity, but to the world constituted socially in and through such categories, which are always eminently practical as well as theoretical. So, in the most pertinent example, the ‘commodity form’ is, for Marxists, a category of social relations, which gives it an effective social reality, different from physical nature. Macnair seems not to have attended to the Kantian revolution in philosophy, from which Hegel, Marx, Lukács, Benjamin and Adorno followed.

How this matters for the philosophy of history is that history is not a compendium of past facts, but a social relation of the ‘present’ with itself. The past is not ‘past’ but present, and present ‘historically’. So, for Benjamin and Adorno (following Lukács and Korsch, who, in turn, followed Lenin, Luxemburg, and Marx and Engels on this point), the question was how to reckon the history of Marxism and the greater socialist workers’ movement as an asymptotic view of knowledge, in which, as Benjamin put it, mordantly citing, in his ‘Theses on the philosophy of history’, Dietzgen as pathological example of social democratic progressivism, ‘Every day our cause becomes clearer and people get smarter. History has proved otherwise.’

**Philosophy**

Benjamin’s and Adorno’s challenge to such a ‘progressive’ view of history, which they thought was ideologically blinding, was not irrationalism any more than Hegel was. It does not call for ‘myth’, but a different philosophy of history than the empiricist-deductive one. Dialectics is not a matter of estimating probability, but grasping inherent possibility in history.

As Adorno put it, in his 1942 essay ‘Reflections on class theory’, in response to both Benjamin’s ‘Theses and Marx’s and Engels’ Communist manifesto,’ According to [Marxian] theory, history is the history of class struggles. But the concept of class is bound up with the emergence of the proletariat ... By exposing the historical necessity that had brought capitalism into being, political economy became the critique of history as a whole ... All history is the history of class struggles because it was always the same thing: namely, prehistory. This gives us a pointer to what history is. From the most recent form of injustice, a steady light reflects back on history as a whole. Only in this way can theory enable us to use the full weight of history to gain an insight into the present without succumbing in resignation to the burden of the past. [Marxism has been praised] on account of its dynamism ... DYNAMISM is merely one side of dialectic: it is the side preferred by the belief in practicality ... The other, less popular aspect of dialectic is its static side ... The law that, according to the Hegelian dialectic, governs the restlessly destructive unfolding of the ever-new consists in the fact that at every moment the ever-new is also the old lying close at hand. The new does not add itself to the old, but is the old in distress.”

**Abuse of theory**

Nettl has a great line about how Kautsky attempted to ‘invest certain observed phenomena with the normative sanction of Marxist theory’. Nettl cited Parvus against Kautsky: ‘All the guts knocked out of [Marxism]. Out of Marx’s good raw dough Kautsky made Matzes’. Kautsky abused theory, making it serve as justification or rationalisation – as most ‘Marxists’ do – rather than as a provocation to the self-reflection of consciousness, in the Hegelian sense.

While it may be tempting to oppose such apparent static/immobilised (or ‘contemplative’) consciousness with actionism, Lukács knew well that the opposition of static and dynamic was an antinomy of capital itself, that capital moved through a dialectic of the antinomy of the dynamic and the static in history. This is where the recovery of the Hegelian dimension of Marxism was critical: Marxism itself had become ‘vulgarised’ in its self-understanding, and had failed in taking a dialectical approach to itself as a historical phenomenon, as a symptom of the history of capital. Marxism had succumbed to the ‘bourgeois’ (pre-Kantian) view of (linear) progress through trial and error, the asymptotic view of knowledge, in which, as Benjamin put it, mordantly citing, in his ‘Theses on the philosophy of history’, Dietzgen as pathological example of social democratic progressivism, ‘Every day our cause becomes clearer and people get smarter. History has proved otherwise.’

**Authoritarianism**

This brings me around to the issues of authoritarianism and imperialism, which have different usage for me than the colloquial ones. Adorno co-authored the famous study on The authoritarian personality. This followed from the earlier Frankfurt School Studies on authority and the family.

A commonplace misunderstanding of Frankfurt School critical theory is that it attempted to synthesise Marxist and Freudian psychoanalytic approaches, but this view is mistaken. Rather, Freudian psychoanalysis was itself taken by Adorno et al to be a symptom of the historical development of capital. Freud’s categories were taken to be descriptive and then resituated, critically, in a Marxian view of historical development of society. In this view, Marx was not ignorant of Freudian insights, but rather it was only as a function of the later social-historical development of capital that human ‘psychology’ appeared as it did to Freud.

A contemporary of Benjamin and Adorno, Wilhelm Reich, in his early work on ‘ideology as a material force’, published later in his book The mass psychology of fascism [1933], pointed to how Marxism had failed to apprehend the ‘progressive’ character of fascism; in other words, how fascism had expressed, however pathologically, the social-historical transformation of capital in the early 20th century better than ‘vulgar’, economic-determinist Marxism had been able to do. Hence, fascism’s ideological and political victory over Marxism. For Reich, [the failure of] Marxism was responsible for fascism. Fascism expressed the workers’ ‘fear of freedom’, which Marxism, in its false rationalism of ‘economic interest’, had failed to overcome. Workers had a subjective, ‘psychological’ interest in unfreedom that Marxism needed to address.

What this meant to Benjamin and Adorno, following Lukács’s view on reification, was that Marxism had failed to address authoritarianism dialectically, as a function of the transformation of capital. In the Marxian view, the workers’ movement for socialism is itself the most important ‘self-contradictory’ and
self-aliened phenomenon of the history of capital. This is why Marx began with the critique of political economy, or, why the ‘critique of political economy’ is the critique of the necessary and symptomatic consciousness of the socialist workers’ movement.

**Imperialism**

What I raised in my May 26 letter concerning the changed organic composition of capital is this: that the ‘mass’ proletarianisation of the core capitalist countries was the result, as Marx discussed in Capital Vol 1 on ‘the working day’, of politically variable social conditions of wage labour that, with increased worker empowerment, cause a shift from variable to constant capital, or from labour-time-intensive sweatshop to automated machine production, requiring ever less labour input and resulting in ever greater value-crises.

This, in turn, affected the conditions of colonialism. Whereas colonies in the classical bourgeois era of the emergence of modern capital were sites of market expansion, in the late era of ‘imperialism’ or ‘monopoly capital’, colonies become raw material resource-extraction zones feeding metropolitan industry. The humanity of not only those who were thus colonised, but also of the metropolitan proletariat hence became superfluous – not even a ‘reserve army of unemployed’, but a fascist rabble, subject to more or less despotic authoritarian politics. This was already true of the post-1848 world Marx addressed in Bonapartism (also evinced contemporaneously by Bismarck and Disraeli), but became even more so subsequently. The question is why the workers supported authoritarian politics, and how the workers’ movement for socialism was not free of this effect. (In this sense, Hayek’s critique of socialism in The road to serfdom is apposite.

This is the world in which we continue to live today, but without the proximal history of the late 19th-early 20th century social democratic workers’ movement and its Marxist political leadership that, in a ‘dialectical’ (self-contradictory) way, participated in the history that brought these conditions into being – producing the need for world revolution that is Marxism’s legacy.

**Notes**

1. M Macnair, ‘No need for party?’ Weekly Worker May 12; and Theoretical dead end’, May 19.
5. Past and Present No 30, April 1965.
7. See Lenin’s 1915 Granat Encyclopaedia entry on Karl Marx.
10. F Hayek The road to serfdom Chicago 1944.

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**Divided by a common language?**

The Frankfurt school methodology employed by Platypus is worse than useless, argues Mike Macnair

The US Platypus grouping aims, as its comrades have told us before, to “host the conversation” about the past and future of the left (in the group’s own terms, about the left’s non-existence and necessity).

Conversation, however, requires mutual comprehension, or – to put it another way – some degree of common ground. If I address you in Latin and you reply in Japanese, but neither of us understands the other language, we are attempting to interact, but it would be bizarre to call this attempt a “conversation”.

We may, for that matter, be ‘divided by a common language’ (as is commonly said of Britain and the US). For a simple example, the ‘No solicitors’ sign not uncommonly found on building entrances in the US bans door-to-door sellers, not lawyers. If we use the same words for different entities or processes, we will talk at cross-purposes.

I raise this issue because comrades Cutrone’s response to my criticisms concludes by attempting to explain specialised senses in which he uses the terms ‘authoritarianism’ and ‘imperialism’. In both cases the senses he uses are, in my opinion, unhelpful.

The underlying problem is to find common ground from which conversation is possible. I have argued before that there is negligible chance of the left finding such common ground on the basis of seeking philosophical agreement. This problem is more acute in relation to Platypus, precisely because the Hegelian commitments make the philosophical argument more ‘closed’ to ideas and information from its outside than more conventional forms of Hegelian Marxism.

For this reason, I am not going to engage directly with comrade Cutrone’s epistemological claims about the so-called “Kantian revolution in philosophy” (which in my opinion is merely a part of the process of transition from enlightenment to counter-enlightenment thought), except very briefly at the end of this article. In addition, to elaborate on the politics of epistemology and theoretical method from Locke and Spinoza to the present would take too long and too much space for now.

In my May 19 article, ‘Theoretical dead end’, I attempted to find this common ground necessary to any conversation: in the project of general human emancipation. This is a project which – as an aim – we in CPGB, and the whole global self-identified Marxist left, share with Platypus.

Indeed, in a certain sense the common ground goes further. The self-identified anti-imperialist left advocates de facto alliance of the left with ‘resistance’ to the US even if it is clericalist (the Iranian regime) or Stalinoid shading into hereditary monarchy (the Gaddafi family-led Jamahiriya in Libya, the Assad family-led form of Ba’athism in Syria). The self-identified ‘anti-fascist left’ (Eustonites, Alliance for Workers’ Liberty and so on) advocates de facto alliance with the western democracies against the clericalist and Stalinoid-monarchist regimes and movements. Platypus comrades say that both sides have abandoned the project of general human emancipation (though their fire has, at least until recently, been most heavily concentrated against the ‘anti-imperialist left’). CPGB comrades, I think, agree that both the ‘anti-imperialist left’ and ‘anti-fascist left’ represent political dead-ends. Here is, in principle, a
degree of common ground which could represent a starting point for a conversation.

For it to be a possible starting point does, however, require us to be speaking broadly the same language. And from comrade Cutrone’s June 9 article it seems that we are speaking different theoretical languages.

**Imperialism**

On imperialism, it is regretfully necessary to trace through the shifts in the arguments. In my May 19 article I used ‘imperialism’ in the way it has been used conventionally on the left since – at the latest – World War I: to mean the systematic subordination of some nations to others, connected with economic superexploitation. I argued, first, that as a matter of politics the project of general human emancipation required upfront public opposition to this systematic subordination and not only to domestic forms of subordination.

Secondly, I made the point that the Hegelian Marxist explanation of the ‘crisis of Marxism’ was opposed to the explanation of reformism in terms of the effects of imperialism – in the sense of the ability of states to redistribute economic gains from the subordination of other countries – offered by an important part of the ‘Second International lefts’: Lenin, Zinoviev, Trotsky, Bukharin and Gorster, among others. I suggested that Bukharin’s version at least had more explanatory power in relation to the concrete history than Lukácsian or other Hegelian Marxist accounts of the ‘crisis of Marxism’.

In his May 26 letter comrade Cutrone responded to this aspect of my argument [1] that “Luxemburg, Lenin and Trotsky found that the ‘imperialist’ phase of ‘monopoly capital’ and the changing ‘organic composition of capital’ [at a global scale] by the turn of the 20th century had been the product of the successes of the workers’ movement in the core capitalist countries” and [2] that “what the Second International radicals meant by ‘imperialism’ was inter-imperialism, not core-periphery relations. The emphasis on the latter was the hallmark of the post-World War II new left and its derangement on the problem of global capital in history.”

My June 2 reply was largely addressed to issues of historical method, which engage the epistemological question, and why these should matter to the political left. I responded to the specific points on imperialism with the observations as to point [2] that, though this is a commonplace in the historiography, it cannot survive confrontation with the primary sources; and, as to point [1], that “I would be very interested to see real evidence for this proposition as a claim about what Lenin, Luxemburg and Trotsky wrote – as opposed to what they might have written.” I went on further to argue that the symptoms of imperialism go back to the beginnings of capital class rule, and to ask the question: (3) “So what is new after the 1870s?”

Comrade Cutrone’s June 9 article does not reply to any of these points. Instead, he steps sideways to a different argument. I will, therefore, take him as conceding [1] that there is no evidence in the writings of Luxemburg, Lenin and Trotsky for his reading of their views on imperialism; and [2] that I am correct that the ‘Second International radicals’ were concerned with core-periphery relations, not just with ‘inter-imperialism’.

I do not take him as conceding the third point, since, though he has not attempted to answer it, his new point attempts to reassert the idea of ‘imperialism’ as a response to the rise of the workers’ movement in a different way.

Comrade Cutrone’s new point is that:

> [T]he ‘mass’ proletarianisation of the core capitalist countries was the result, as Marx discussed in *Capital* Vol 1 on ‘the working day’, of politically variable social conditions of wage labour that, with increased worker empowerment, cause a shift from variable to constant capital, or from labour-time-intensive sweatshop to automated machine production, requiring ever less labour input and resulting in ever greater value-crises.

> “This, in turn, affected the conditions of colonialism. Whereas colonies in the classical bourgeois era of the emergence of modern capital were sites of market expansion, in the late era of ‘imperialism’ or ‘monopoly capital’, colonies become raw material resource-extraction zones feeding metropolitan industry. The humanity of not only those who were thus colonised, but also of the metropolitan proletariat hence became superfluous – not even a ‘reserve army of unemployed’, but a fascist rabble, subject to more or less desperate authoritarian politics.”

This side-step *dodges* both the political issue of the attitude of Marxists to the subordination of some nations to others, and the issue of the relative explanatory power of Hegelian Marxist accounts and of the theory of imperialism in relation to the ‘crisis of Marxism’ around 1900. It does so by shifting the issue into that of ‘authoritarianism’ – to which it will be necessary to return separately later.

The argument is independently false, for two reasons. The first concerns the shift from variable to constant capital. If this was primarily a response to the rise of the workers’ movement, we would expect to see it first emerging as the workers’ movement is strengthened and begins to make an impact on wages and the length of the working day. But in fact new, labour-saving technology involving a relative increase in constant capital already began to develop under conditions of wholly unfree labour in the sugar-cane industry, and of semi-free labour in cotton mills – to a considerable extent worked by the forced ‘apprenticeship’ of unemployed youth under the old Poor Law.

Equally, we would expect to see old labour-intensive technology exported to the periphery, where labour is *prima facie* cheaper; but in fact, though this does happen, we also see new capital-intensive technology exported to the periphery (for example, railways in the 19th century).

Why? The answer has two aspects. The first is that the working day is not only subject to social limits, but also to a physical maximum; and the wage is also subject to a physical minimum of subsistence goods. Suppose capital succeeds in driving wages down to this mini-mum and hours up to this maximum, it will still be the case that improving the productivity of labour will lead to an increase in relative surplus value.

The second is that capitals are, in fact, in competition with one another, and the first capital to introduce technology which improves labour productivity will therefore gain not only improved relative surplus value, but also an improved share of total profits relative to other capitals. Hence each individual capital has an interest in introducing labour-saving technology even if absolute surplus value is already maximised.

Secondly, the early modern ‘periphery’ was already “raw material resource-extraction zones feeding metropolitan industry” in the sugar-cane colonies feeding the late medieval Venetian sugar end-processing industry, and a *fortiori* in the eastern European ‘second serfdom’, which fed raw materials to the Dutch republic and England.

Conversely, however, there is no conflict at all between the colonies being “sites of market expansion” and “raw material resource-extraction zones”. Leave aside the market for capital goods in transportation and first-stage processing: if a formerly peasant and artisan population is forced into wage-labour (or even merely into putting out production), domestic production of basic goods will be reduced and a secondary market will be created for food, clothes, etc.

**Authoritarianism**

This point can be briefer. I said in my June 2 article that ‘authoritarianism’ can have more than one meaning, and asked which comrade Cutrone was using. I pointed out that unless a Bakuninist or libertarian/liberal sense is being used, the late 19th-early 20th century workers’ movement cannot be described as ‘authoritarian’ without violent distortion.

Comrade Cutrone responds that he is using Adorno’s co-authored *The authoritarian personality* (1950) and Wilhelm Reich’s *The mass psychology of fascism* (1933; translated 1946); in particular, he paraphrases Reich as arguing
that “Fascism expressed the workers’ ‘fear of freedom’, which Marxism, in its false rationalism of ‘economic interest’, had failed to overcome.”

This response, however, does not in the least answer my question about what comrade Cutrone means by ‘authoritarianism’ as a political phenomenon: is ‘authoritarianism’ to mean a politics which denies the legitimacy of political dissent and the possibility of the accountability of authorities to those below? Or a politics which admits any sort of authority or binding collective decisions at all? Or any politics in which decisions for the common good are capable of binding ‘free individuals’, meaning property owners?

In fact, it involves him in further difficulties. Following the Frankfurt school, he claims that “Fascism expressed the workers’ ‘fear of freedom’”, and, quoted above, that “The humanity of not only those who were thus colonised, but also of the metropolitan proletariat hence became superfluous – not even a ‘reserve army of unemployed’, but a fascist rabble, subject to more or less desperate authoritarian politics.”

But these claims suppose that the workers actually voted for the fascists – and that they did so because the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) had already habituated them to ‘authoritarianism’ (whatever that is to mean). The reality is very different. The Nazis did pick up working class voters and supporters – from the countryside and the small towns, among atomised workers who had previously voted for one of the kaleidoscopic array of rightwing parties in the Weimar Republic. However, the urban-industrial core of the support of the SPD and Communist Party of Germany (KPD) was not tempted, even in 1932, by Hitler’s rightist demagogy. The Frankfurt school explanation of the victory of Hitler is thus hollow at its core.

At root, explaining the failure of the SPD to defeat Hitler does not in the least require any such theoretical fantasies. Quite simply, sometimes civil war is unavoidable and necessary. The SPD was unwilling to fight a civil war it could have won in 1918-21, and still unwilling even to attempt to fight a civil war in 1933. The KPD’s fantasies of ‘social-fascism’ and ‘after Hitler, us’ rendered it equally useless. The world, and in particular Europe’s Jews and the other targets of the Holocaust, paid in 1939-45 the price of the SPD’s pacifism and constitutionalism in 1918-21 and 1933. But to call pacifism and constitutionalism ‘authoritarianism’ would be obvious nonsense.

Evidence

I say here and in relation to imperialism that comrade Cutrone’s arguments simply fail to explain the historical evidence. In a sense he responds in advance to this by denying the relevance of the evidence, when he says that “history is not a compendium of past facts” and that “the concrete ‘material’ object of practice is the concretisation of abstractions”. This latter is a confused version of Marx’s argument in Grundrisse, chapters 1, section 3, on the method of political economy.

To quote just a little of this argument: “The concrete is concrete because it is the concentration of many determinations, hence unity of the diverse. It appears in the process of thinking, therefore, as a process of concentration, as a result, not as a point of departure, even though it is the point of departure in reality and hence also the point of departure for observation and conception.” [emphasis added] and “Hegel fell into the illusion of conceiving the real as the product of thought concentrating itself, probing its own depths, and unfolding itself out of itself, by itself, whereas the method of rising from the abstract to the concrete is only the way in which thought appropriates the concrete, reproduces it as the concrete in the mind. But this is by no means the process by which the concrete itself comes into being.”

The boot is in my opinion on exactly the other foot. It is possible that Platypus might, by “hosting the conversation”, serve a useful anti-sectarian purpose in near-future politics. It is also possible that it serves a useful political purpose by hammering home the bankruptcy of both the ‘anti-imperialist’ and ‘anti-fascist’ left (though it needs to step up on its critique of the latter). But as a “guide to history” its Frankfurt school methodology is worse than useless.

The problem is that comrade Cutrone’s “history is not a compendium of past facts” amounts, in substance, to the denial of Marx’s point that the concrete “is the point of departure in reality and hence the point of departure for observation and conception”. This denial leads to starting from the abstractions of Hegel’s Phenomenology of spirit. Instead of working up the perceptible concrete “as a concentration of many determinations”, this method works up a fantasy of the concrete which is inconsistent with the perceptible and recalcitrant concrete.

“To add verisimilitude to an otherwise bald and unconvincing narrative”, more or less arbitrarily selected corroborating material is added. In comrade Cutrone’s account of the SPD this corroborating role is played by Nettl, James Joll’s The Second International [1955] and Carl Schorske’s German Social Democracy [1954] – all cold war products, not confronted with the post-cold war historiography. This follows Hegel’s method in the Philosophy of right: [2]

The method is, in fact, Hegelian at precisely the point at which Marx broke with Hegel.

Platypus on June 4 held a discussion of my critique. The blurb for the meeting contains the comments that "Marxism could be considered [today, and perhaps also in the past] as either: (1) a guide to action; or (2) a guide to history. We would pose the latter, Marxism as a guide to history, against the typical sectarian ‘left’ rationale for (or, eg, anarchist or liberal, rejection of Marxism as a guide to action); and “We would, indeed, maintain (controversially) that Marxism has always been primarily a ‘guide to history’ rather than a ‘guide to action’, or, more precisely, that it has only been a guide to action through being a guide to history.” [3]

Notes


3. For this reason I respond only in this footnote to comrade Cutrone’s objections to my comments on Peter Nettl, and to Ian Birchall’s points (Letters, June 9) that Nettl was a Labour supporter in 1959 [at the height of the ‘Butskellite’ Labour-Tory consensus] and contributed a review of Luxemburg’s The accumulation of capital to International Socialism in 1964. On comrade Birchall’s points I would refer him to Jim Higgins’ 1966 review of Nettl’s biography of Luxemburg (www.marxists.org/archive/higgins/1966/xx/luxlen.htm): evidently Higgins did not regard Nettl as in any sense a comrade, though he thought he had “carried out a useful and long overdue service”. Nettl’s 1964 review, in spite of where it appeared, placed particular stress on Joan Robinson’s left-Keynesian critique of Marxist political economy. Comrade Cutrone objects to my consideration of the politics of Nettl’s writing apart from the biography as partially explanatory of Nettl’s interpretive choices in relation to the SPD. I am not persuaded by this objection. I see no reason to suppose that the biography of Luxemburg was Nettl’s “life-work” (Cutrone), as opposed to the product of three years’ intensive full-time research by a man who was characterised in Hanson’s memoir of him as both polylingual and a speed-reader, who was otherwise occupied before 1960, and who produced three more books at great speed between 1966 and 1968. I note, moreover, that comrade Cutrone responds to this point about Nettl, but offers no response at all to my citation of Breitman’s review of more recent literature on the SPD, which offers other interpretations.

apprentice and the early industrial labour market’, www.ehs.org.uk/ehs/conference2007/Assets/HoneymanIIB.doc, which refers to a good deal of earlier literature.
5. Sugar-cane: JH Galloway op cit. ‘Second servdom’: B Kagarlitsky Empire of the periphery London 2008, chapters 4-9 is a convenient discussion of one example.
7. www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1857/grundrisse/ch01.htm#3
9. Weekly Worker 873 Thursday July 07 2011

Letter

Useful Platypus

Chris Cutrone

I am writing to respond to Mike Macnair’s critique ([Divided by a common language], June 30) of my article on ‘The philosophy of history’ [June 9].

JP Nettl’s biography of Rosa Luxemburg can be plausibly considered his life work and not ancillary to his primary intellectual concerns because it was the product of almost 20 years of thinking, not the three years of intensive writing that produced his book. Nettl’s preface clearly indicates this. Immediately after World War II, his imagination was captured by the history of pre-World War I Marxism in the German Social Democratic Party and Luxembourg in particular, but the controversial nature of the subject made him ruminate long on it and forego available sources of support for his study of it, before publishing his 1,000-page book in 1966. Let’s be clear: Nettl was not a Marxist. But that should not anathematise any insights he may have had.

On ‘imperialism’ and ‘authoritarianism’, I was concerned to show their interrelated character, which I sketched only in very broad outline: the general historical trend of post-1848 Bonapartism, all the way up to the present. As Marx and Engels put it, Bonapartism expressed a situation in which the capitalists could no longer and the workers could not yet rule society (see Engels’ 1891 introduction to Marx’s The civil war in France). I agree with Mike Macnair that, for example, Bukharin’s explanation of imperialism’s effect on the socialist workers’ movement, the political compromise of the metropolitan workers with respect to their national states, is better than the idea that they were economically ‘bought off’ (I disagree, however, that the latter was Lenin’s and Trotsky’s essential perspective). I agree as well that the virtue of such an emphatically political explanation is that it can account for similar phenomena in the periphery.

But this raises the issue of what I have called ‘authoritarianism’ or willing support for the status quo and hostility to alternatives, and the subjectivity for doing so, again. Why are the workers more often conservative, even virulently and self-destructively so, than not? The explanation of (some) workers’ support for fascism by reference to their peripheral character (ie, the unemployed or ‘lumpenised’) is what indeed ‘dodges the issue’. While the SPD and KPD’s refusals to fight a civil war against fascism in Germany in 1918-21 and circa 1933 may have been of decisive, conjunctural importance, this itself is what requires explanation (it also leaves aside the Italian case). It cannot be laid simply on bad leadership – on the parties’ bad decisions – without reference to the workers’ fear, or lack of support for better action, which was broken, however briefly, in Germany in 1918-19, but precisely as a civil war among the workers. The contrast of 1918-19 with 1933 could not be clearer: as Adorno put it, 1919 already decided what came later (see Those twenties Columbia 1998).

The issue of Hegelianism is a difficult one: how to include the ‘subjective factor in history’. I think this turns on how one understands Marx’s critique of Hegel. I don’t think that Marx’s reference to the ‘real’ is in an empiricist sense, but rather in Hegel’s sense of the actuality of the rational in the real. The issue turns on the relation of essence and appearance, or, with what necessity things appear as they do. What is essential is what is practical, and what is practical is subjective as well as objective. Theoretical reflection on the subjective must use metaphysical categories that are not merely handy, but actually constitutive of social practices in which one is a subject. The commodity form is not a generalisation from experience.

All of this, however, is largely beside the point regarding Platypus. For the conversation we seek to host is not between ourselves and others, but much more widely on the avowed left, and among those with far greater experience than what is available among our own members. We serve only to facilitate, even if we have to elbow our way in, provocatively, to make the space for such conversation, otherwise foreclosed. We consider the need for such conversation to be more ideological than practical at present.

I am glad that comrade Macnair recognises that Platypus may “serve a useful anti-sectarian purpose in near-future politics. It is also possible that it serves a useful political purpose by hammering home the bankruptcy of both the ‘anti-imperialist’ and ‘anti-fascist’ left.” This is precisely what we intend, though I think it is potentially much more. If Platypus does successfully what Macnair thinks it might, I for one will be happy to allow the ‘guide to history’ through which we understand our own efforts to be considered a ‘useful myth’.

Letter

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Defending Marxist Hegelianism against a Marxist critique

Chris Cutrone of the US Platypus group takes issue with Mike Macnair

I am writing in response to Mike Macnair’s 2003 critical review of books by John Rees and David Renton, cited in Macnair’s critique of Platypus [‘No need for party?’ Weekly Worker May 12 2011]. I wish to refer also to my three letters and article in response.

I find Macnair’s analysis and critique of the political motivations and potential consequences of Rees’s affirmative account of Marxist Hegelianism compelling and good. I agree with Macnair’s conclusion that, despite Rees’s former affiliation with the SWP/UK leader Alex Callinicos’s anti-Hegelian Althusserianism, Rees considering ‘historical experience summed up in theory’ was intrinsically connected to the SWP’s concept of the party as one which “centralises experience”, with all the problems such a conception entails.

I wish to offer a rejoinder to Macnair’s idea that such problematic conceptions of theory and political practice have roots in Lenin, Luxembourg and Lukács, Macnair’s analysis of whom I find to be false. Also, I do not think that Macnair quite gets Hegel, although I agree with his characterisation that “philosophy - as such - is inherently only a way of interpreting the world”, and so limits Hegel’s work for the political purposes under consideration. Furthermore, I agree with Macnair’s interpretation of Lenin with respect to the purposes of his polemical defence of Marxist approaches to philosophy in Materialism and empirio-criticism [1908]. Moreover, I agree with his central point that philosophical agreement cannot be the basis of agreement on political action.

However, as Nicholas Brown responded to comrade Macnair’s question at the opening plenary on ‘The politics of critical theory’ of the Platypus convention in Chicago on April 29, it is not possible to ‘Hegelianise’ Marx, because Marx was more Hegelian than Hegel himself. That is, Marx tried to achieve the ‘Hegelian’ self-consciousness of his own historical moment. The question is, what relevance has Marx’s Hegelianism today, and what is the relevance of taking such a Hegelian approach to the history of Marxism subsequent to Marx?

Lukács, Lenin, Luxembourg

I disagree that Lukács’s “subject” of history is the point of view or relative perspective of the proletariat as the revolutionary agent that must assert its “will”. Rather, I take Lukács to be following Lenin and Luxembourg (and Marx) quite differently than Macnair seems to think, in that the workers’ movement for socialism is the necessary mediation for grasping the problem of capital in its “totality”, that the workers must not remake the world in their image, but rather lead society more generally beyond capital. Hence, as Macnair characterises the approach of the Kautskyan “centre” of the Second International, the socialist workers’ movement must be a leading, practical force in democratic struggles beyond the workers’ own (sectional) interests in the transformation of society as a whole.

I disagree that Lenin made a virtue of necessity in the Russian Revolution after October 1917 and adopted a voluntarist (and Substitutionalist) conception of the working class and the political party of communism. Rather, Lenin consistently criticised and politically fought against these tendencies of Bolshevism and in the early Third International, I do not think that Lenin’s newly found ‘Hegelianism’ after 1914 was the means by which he achieved (mistakenly) rapprochement with the ‘left’. The key is Luxembourg. I do not think she was a semi-syndicalist spontaneous/voluntarist, or that she neglected issues of political mediation: she was not an ‘ultra-left’. I take her pamphlet, The mass strike, the political party, and the trade unions [1906], to have an entirely different political purpose and conclusion. It was not an argument in favour of the mass strike as a tactic, let alone strategy, but rather an analysis of the significance of the mass strike in the 1905 Russian Revolution as a historical phenomenon, inextricably bound up in the development of capital at a global scale, and how this tasked and challenged the social democratic workers’ movement (the Second International and the SPD in particular) to reformulate its approach and transform itself under such changed historical conditions, specifically with regard to the relation of the party to the unions.

Luxembourg’s perspective was neither anarch-syndicalist/spontaneous nor vanguardist, but rather dialectical. The mass strike was not a timeless principle. For Luxembourg, 1905 showed that the world had moved into an era of revolutionary struggle that demanded changes in the workers’ movement for socialism. A contradiction had developed between the social democratic party’s own associated labour unions, or ‘social democracy’ had become a self-contradictory phenomenon in need of transformation.

Furthermore, I take Lenin’s critiques of Kautsky for being “non-dialectical” to be very specific. This is not a critique of Kautsky ‘philosophically’ (although it does speak to his bad practices as a theorist), but politically. It is about Kautsky’s non-dialectical approach to politics: that is, the relation of theory and practice, or of social being and consciousness, in and through the concrete mediations of the historically constituted workers’ movement. Kautsky failed in this. Lenin agreed with Luxembourg in her Junius pamphlet [1915] that the problem was Kautsky thinking that the SPD’s Marxism (that is, what became Kautsky’s USPD) could “hide like a rabbit” during World War I and resume the struggle for socialism afterward. Or, as Lenin put it in his Imperialism: the highest stage of capitalism [1916] and Socialism and war [1915], contra Kautsky’s theory of ‘ultra-imperialism’, the world war must be seen as a necessary and not accidental outcome of the historical development of capitalism, and so a crisis that was an opportunity for revolutionary transformation, and not merely, as Kautsky thought, a derailment into barbarism to be resisted. This was the essential basis for agreement between Luxembourg and Lenin 1914-19.

I do not think the separation of the pre-World War I Lenin from Luxembourg is warranted, especially considering their close collaboration, both in the politics of the Russian movement and in the Second International more generally, throughout the period 1905-12 and again 1914-19. Throughout their careers, Lenin and Luxembourg (and Trotsky) were exemplars of the Second International left, or ‘radicals’ in the movement. They all more or less mistook Kautsky to be one of their own before August 1914. Also, Kautsky himself changed, at various points and times - which is not to say that Lenin, Luxembourg and Trotsky never changed.

But the question is the nature and character of such change, and how these figures allow us to grasp the history of Marxism. It is not about learning from their trials and errors, I think, but rather from the example of their ‘consciousness’, not merely theoretically, but practically. Moreover, the history of Marxism must be approached as part and parcel, and the highest expression, of the history of post-1848 capital.

Hegelianism

Lukács’s ‘Hegelian’ point was that “subjective” struggles for transformation take place in and through “necessary forms of appearance” that misrecognise their “objective” social realities, not in terms of imperfect approximations or more or less true generalised abstractions, but specifically as a function of the “alienated” and “reified” social and political dynamics of capital. Capital is “objective” in a specific way, and so poses historically specific problems for subjectivity.

The reason for Marxists distinguishing their approach from Hegel is precisely historical: that a change in society took place between
Hegel’s and Marx’s time that causes Hegelian categories, as those of an earlier, pre-Industrial Revolution era of bourgeois society, to become inverted in truth, or reversed in intention. Marx’s idea was that the "contradiction" of bourgeois society had changed. Thus the dialectical "law of motion" was specific to the problem of capital and not a transhistorical principle of [social] action and thought. Marx’s society was not Hegel’s. The meaning of Hegel had changed, just as the meaning of the categories of bourgeois society had changed. Labour-time as value had become not productive [if not unproblematically] - as in Hegel’s and Adam Smith’s time, the era of ‘manufacture’ - but destructive of society; as a form of social mediation, wage-labour had become self-contradictory and self-undermining in the Industrial Revolution, hence the ‘crisis of capital’.

One fundamental disagreement I have with Macnair’s approach, in which I think I follow Lenin, Luxemburg, Lukács and Marx, is with the idea that the potential transformation of capitalist society involves the confrontation of two antithetical social principles, of the workers (collectivism) vs the capitalists (individual private property). Capital, as Marx understood it, is not based on the mode of existence of the capitalists, falsely generalised to society as a whole, but rather that of the workers. This is not a top-down, but a bottom-up, view - shared by Smith, for example. As Lukács put it, the fate of the worker becomes that of "society as a whole". The contradiction of capital is the contradiction of the workers - not the capitalists' - existence in society. For Marx, capital is a social mode of production and not merely a relation of production. As a mode of production, capital has become increasingly self-contradictory. As a function of capital’s historical development, through the Industrial Revolution, in which the workers’ own increasing demands for bourgeois rights, to realise the value of their labour, and not merely capitalist competition, played a key, indispensable role, bourgeois society became self-contradictory and self-undermining. That is, the workers centrally or at base constituted the self-destructive, social-historical dynamic of capital through their labouring and political activity. This development culminated in the crisis of world war and revolution 1914-19.

As Lenin put it in The state and revolution, the social relations of bourgeois society - namely, the mutual exchange of labour as the form of social solidarity in capital - could only be transformed gradually and thus "wither away," and not be abolished and replaced at a stroke. The proletarian socialist revolution was supposed to open the door to this transformation. The potential for emancipated humanity expressed in communism that Marx recognised in the modern history of capital is not assimilable without remainder to pre- or non-Marxian socialism.

As Marx put it, "Communism is the necessary form and the dynamic principle of the immediate future, but communism as such is not the goal of human development, the form of human society." This was because, according to Marx, "Communism is a dogmatic abstraction and ... only a particular manifestation of the humanistic principle and is infected by its opposite, private property." Marx was not the pre-eminent communist of his time, but rather its critic, seeking to push it further. Marxism was the attempted Hegelian self-consciousness of proletarian socialism as the subject-object of capital.

As Lukács’s contemporary, Karl Korsch, pointed out in Marxism and philosophy (1923), by the late 19th century historians such as Dilthey had observed that “ideas contained in a philosophy can live on not only in philosophy, but equally well in positive sciences and social practice, and that this process precisely began on a large scale with Hegel’s philosophy.” For Korsch, this meant that 'philosophical' problems in the Hegelian sense were not matters of theory, but practice. From a Marxian perspective, however, it is precisely the problem of capitalist society that is posed at the level of practice.

Korsch went on to argue that "what appears as the purely ‘ideal’ development of philosophy in the 19th century can in fact only be fully and essentially grasped by relating it to the concrete historical development of bourgeois society as a whole." Korsch’s great insight, shared by Lukács, took this perspective from Luxemburg and Lenin, who grasped how the history of the socialist workers’ movement and Marxism was a key part - indeed the crucial aspect - of this development, in the first two decades of the 20th century.

The problem we have faced since then is that the defeat of the workers’ movement for socialism has not meant the stabilisation, but rather the degeneration, disintegration and decomposition, of bourgeois society - without the concomitant increase, but rather the re-configuration, of possibilities for moving beyond it. This shows that the crisis of Marxism was a crisis of bourgeois society, or the highest and most acute aspect of the crisis of capital: bourgeois society has suffered since then from the failure of Marxism.

Crisis of Marxism

The ‘crisis of Marxism’, in which Lenin, Luxemburg and Trotsky took part (especially in 1914-19, but also in the period leading up to this, most significantly from 1905 on), and Lukács tried to address ‘theoretically’ in History and class consciousness and related writings of the early 1920s, was [the highest practical expression of] the crisis of bourgeois society.

This crisis demanded a Marxist critique of Marxism, or a ‘dialectical’ approach to Marxism itself: that is, a recognition of Marxism’s political, as being a self-contradictory and so potentially self-undermining historical phenomenon [a phenomenon of history - hence the title of Lukács’s book, History and class consciousness], itself subject to necessary ‘reification’ and ‘misrecognition’ that could only be worked through ‘immanently’. This meant regaining the ‘Hegelian’ dimension, or the ‘self-consciousness’ of Marxism. This is because Marxism, as an expression of the workers’ ‘class-consciousness’, was - and remains - entirely ‘bourgeois’, if in extremis. While self-contradictory in its development, the socialist workers’ movement, including its Marxist self-consciousness, pointed beyond itself, dialectically - as consciousness of the bourgeois epoch as a whole does.

I follow Adorno’s characterisation of the problem of workers consciousness and the necessary role of intellectuals, which he took from Lenin, in his letter to Walter Benjamin of March 18 1936: “The proletariat ... is itself a product of bourgeois society ... the actual consciousness of actual workers ... [has] absolutely no advantage over the bourgeois except ... interest in the revolution, but otherwise bear[s] all the marks of mutilation of the typical bourgeois character. This prescribes our function for us clearly enough - which I certainly do not mean in the sense of an activist conception of ‘intellectuals’ ... It is not bourgeois idealism if, in full knowledge and without mental prohibitions, we maintain our solidarity with the proletariat instead of making of our own necessity a virtue of the proletariat, which itself experiences the same necessity and needs us for knowledge as much as we need the proletariat to make the revolution.”

The problem we face today, I think, is the opacity of the present, due to our lack of a comparably acute, self-contradictory and dialectical expression of the crisis of capital that Marxism’s historical self-consciousness, in theory and practice, once provided.

Notes

1. “‘Classical Marxism” and grasping the dialectic’ Weekly Worker September 11 2003.
2. See also Mike Macnair’s ‘Theoretical dead end’, May 19; ‘The study of history and the left’s decline’, June 2; and ‘Divided by a common language?’ June 30.
6. G Lukács Reification and the consciousness of the proletariat (1922) part 1, ‘The phenomenon of reification’ in History and class consciousness: studies in Marxist dialectics Cambridge MA 1971, pp1: www.marxists.org/archive/lukacs/works/history/hcc05.htm
7. See V.I. Lenin *The state and revolution* chapter 5, ‘The economic basis of the withering away of the state’, part 3, ‘The first phase of communist society’:
www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1917/staterev/ch05.htm#s3

8. K. Marx *Economic and philosophic manuscripts* (1844), manuscript 3, section 2, ‘Private property and communism’:
www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1844/manuscripts/comm.htm

www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1843/letters/43_09.htm


11. Ibid p40.