in August 1753. By then, Rousseau's Preface to "Narcissus" had appeared, and Bordes appended some comments on it to his own text.

This Preface of a second letter to Bordes remained unpublished during Rousseau's lifetime. It was first published in Oeuvres et correspondance inédites de J.-J. Rousseau, edited by M. G. Sterckseisen-Maultou and Jules Levallois (Michel Lévy fils, Paris, 1861), pp. 317-322. It is reprinted with notes by Bouchardy in OC III, 103-107; and by Launay in the Intégrale Oeuvres complètes, vol. ii, pp. 190-192; the full text of Bordes's Second Discourse is reprinted in Tente, Polemik, pp. 623-681.

1. I do not see why Reading je ne vois pas with the Intégrale (Launay) edition and as the sense requires, instead of je revois pas with OC.
2. [my duty] is to tell the truth or what I take to be the truth Cp. Last Reply [73]; in this spirit, Rousseau took as his motto the phrase viatim impendere vero, "to dedicate life to truth"; he discusses this motto most fully in the fourth of the Recreations of the Solitary Walker. He always stressed that not everyone has "the sad task of telling people the truth." Emile, for example, explicitly does not (Emile v; OC IV, 859, tr. 474).
3. [my portrait] Maurice Quentin Latour's elegant and frequently reproduced pastel of Rousseau first shown at the summer Salon of 1753.
4. This sad and great System Rousseau had referred to his "system" for the first time in the Preface to "Narcissus" [13]. It is his only published reference to it. He now refers to it five times in the course of this brief draft. He may have been prompted to do so by the beginning of the Bordes text to which he is here replying: "I had looked upon M. Rousseau's first Discourse as nothing more than a paradox, and that was the tone in which I answered him. His last reply has revealed a settled system . . ."
5. most men, degenerated from their primitive goodness Rousseau had first referred to man's natural goodness in his Last Reply [37]*, also addressed to Bordes; he develops this central theme of his thought most fully in the Second Discourse, and in the Emile.

SECOND DISCOURSE (pages 111-222)

In his Confessions, immediately after remarking that in the Preface to "Narcissus" he had revealed his principles more fully than in any of his previous writings, Rousseau goes on to say: "I soon had the opporunity to unfold them fully in a work of the utmost importance; for it was, I believe, in that same year of 1753 that the program of the Academy of Dijon about the origin of inequality among men was published.

I was struck by this great question, and surprised that the Academy had dared to propose it. But since it had had the courage to do so, I could surely have the courage to address it, and that is what I undertook to do." To collect his thoughts, he spent a week walking in the forest of Saint Germain, seeking and finding "the image of the first times."

"These meditations resulted in the Discourse on Inequality, a work more to Diderot's taste than any of my other writings, and for which his advice was more useful to me, but which in all of Europe found only a very few readers who understood it, and of these none wished to talk about it. It had been written to compete for the prize, so I entered it, convinced though I was in advance that it would not receive it, and well aware that it is not for pieces cut from such cloth that Academy prizes are endowed" (Conf. VII; OC I, 388f.).

In the event he was proved right. The jury did not even read the Discourse in its entirety, "because of its length, and its bad tradition, etc."

The topic had been announced in the November 1753 issue of the Mercure de France; Rousseau left Paris on 1 June 1754, with the Discourse completed, except for the Epistle Dedictory which he judged it more prudent to sign and date on soil not under either French or Genevan jurisdiction (Conf. VIII; OC I, 392). Official permission for the book to be sold in France was granted in May 1755.

The circumstances surrounding the 1754 Dijon Academy competition are related, and all but one of the other essays submitted for it are reprinted, in Roger Tissard, Les Concurrents de J. J. Rousseau à l'Académie de Dijon pour le prix de 1754 (Boivin & Cie., Paris, 1936); the previously missing essay has been published by Ch. Porset, "Discours d'un anonyme sur l'inégalité, 1754," Studies on Voltaire and the Eighteenth Century (1979), 182-7-27.


Rousseau's own corrections and additions were first published in the posthumous (1782) edition by Paul Moutou and Paul Du Peyrou of the *Collection complète des oeuvres de Jean Jacques Rousseau* (Geneva). In 1988 the Musée Jean Jacques Rousseau of Montmorency acquired a copy of the *Discours* which had been extensively annotated by Rousseau himself. So many of these corrections and additions were incorporated in the 1782 edition that some scholars plausibly suspect that this is the very copy of the *Discours* which the editors of that edition used. This new find is described in full detail by the Museum's Curator, Robert Thiery, in "Histoire, description et analyse du Discours sur l'Inégalité acquis par le musée," *Etudes Jean-Jacques Rousseau* (1990), 4:231-261; it is also described in Meier's second edition.


While the present translation is based on the *OC* version of the 1755 text, every known later addition or correction has been carefully considered, and most of them have been either incorporated into the translation, or recorded in the critical apparatus. However, we have decided against restoring Rousseau's singular numbering of his Notes. To do so would make for a text inconsistent with the entire modern secondary literature, and hence deprive it of much of its usefulness. The problem of the numbering of the Notes will be discussed in the Editorial Note about Rousseau's Notes (p. 370 below).

The paragraph numbering respects Rousseau's division of the text; in these notes the various sections in the *Second Discourse* are indicated by the following abbreviations:

- Epistle Dedicatory: ED
- Preface: P
- Exordium: E
- Part I: I
- Part II: II
- Rousseau's Notes: N

E.g. p [5] refers to para. 5 of the Preface, and N IX [13] to para. 13 of Rousseau's Note IX.

**Discourse** See the Editorial Note on the title of the *First Discourse*, p. 321.

**Origin and ... Foundations** For a discussion of the title, see Introduction, above, pp. xvf.

Jean Jacques Rousseau, Citizen Unlike the *First Discourse*, this *Discourse* gives both the author's name and his political identity. It was by now a very famous name; and by the time this *Discourse* was published, Rousseau had been restored to full citizenship.

What is natural? The epigraph is given in Latin: *Non in depravatis, sed in quae bene secundum naturam se habent, considerandum est quid sit naturale* (Aristotle, *Politics* 1, 5, 1254a, 36-38). The reference to "Bk. 2" on the title page appears to have been a typographical error, and was corrected in the 1782 edition. The passage is drawn from Aristotle's discussion of natural slavery or, more generally, of natural inequality; it was also cited by Hugo Grotius (1603-1645) in his discussion of the two methods by which to establish natural right: from the nature of man, or *a priori*; and from the view held "by all, or at least the most civilized Nations," or *a posteriori*. Grotius chooses the second method, citing this text of Aristotle among others in support of his choice (Grotius, *The Right of War and Peace*, first [Latin] edition, 1625, vol. 1, 1, §xii; first edition of Barbeyrac's annotated French translation, 1724; all references to this work in the following notes shall be to the English translation [London, 1738], which includes "All the large Notes of Mr. J. Barbeyrac"); Rousseau, citing the same Aristotle text, chooses the first method; as did Hobbes, *De cive* II, 1; see *SC* I 24 [4]-[8], together with the Editorial Notes about the analytic method; *Method for a Book* [6], [10]; *On War* [13]; and V. Gourevitch, "Rousseau's Pure State of Nature," *Interpretation* (1988), 16:23-59, pp. 57-59.

**TO THE REPUBLIC** Rousseau as well as the Genevan authorities were fully aware of how unusual it was to dedicate a book to a city. Rousseau acknowledges as much in the opening sentence of this Epistle Dedicatory, and he wrote a long letter to Perdriaux to justify his action (28 November 1754, *CC* III, 55-60, no. 258). The *Petit Conseil*, Geneva's ruling body, formally accepted the dedication in June 1755 (*CC* III, 132-134, nos. 299, 300, 301). Geneva had been repeatedly torn by civil strife between the party of the Citizens and the ruling Patriciate during the preceding half century. The disturbances of 1737, in particular, left an indelible impression on Rousseau (*Conf.* V, *OC* I, 215f), and one of the aims of this Epistle Dedicatory was to urge the parties to work for a deeper and more lasting reconciliation (to Perdriaux, 28 November 1754, *CC* III, 55-60).
MAGNIFICENT, MOST HONORED, AND SOVEREIGN LORDS The proper form of address to the citizen body sitting in Council (see Letters from the Mountain ii, 7; OC iii, 813f.).

ED [5] one national ... another foreign Chief I.e. the Papacy.

ED [6] freedom is like the solid and hearty foods ... Cp. Poland 6 [6]. the Tarquins' oppression The Tarquins were overthrown, and the first Roman Republic established, in 508 BC.

ED [15] laws lose their vigor The 1782 edition reads “their rigor.”

ED [16] MAGNIFICENT AND MOST HONORED LORDS The Magistrates are not sovereign; Rousseau reserves the title “magistrate” for the officers charged with carrying out the sovereign will: SC iii, 1.

ED [18] the Citizens and even the mere residents The Citoyens or Citizens and the bourgeois or burghers together made up the sovereign Conseil Général or General Council; two hundred of its members were chosen to make up the Grand Conseil or Greater Council; and of these, twenty-five were in turn chosen for life to make up the Petit Conseil or Lesser Council; the habitants, or residents, were resident aliens.

P [1] inscription on the Temple at Delphi “Know Thyself,” and “Every thing within Measure”; Rousseau is manifestly thinking of the first. Samuel Pufendorf (1632–1694), Le Droit de la nature et des gens (Right of Nature and of Nations; first [Latin] edition, 1672; first edition of Barbevra's French translation, 1706) cites the inscription (ii, 4, § v), and a few lines later quotes the lines from Perseus with which Rousseau closes this Preface. In the following notes, all references to Pufendorf's work, translated into French from the original Latin and copiously annotated by Jean Barbevra, are to the second “revised and considerably enlarged” edition, published in Amsterdam in 1712, cited hereafter as Droit; all references to Pufendorf’s own summary of his major work, Les Devoirs de l’homme et du citoyen (1673), will be to the excellent translation by Michael Silverthorne, The Duties of Man and Citizen (Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought, Cambridge, 1991), cited hereafter as Man and Citizen. the statue of Gaulies The fisherman who became a sea god, traditionally depicted in painting and sculpture encrusted with barnacles and covered with seaweed (see Plato, Republic x, 611d).

P [3] Physical causes introduced ... varieties Rousseau is following Buffon (1707–1788), almost half of whose volume De la nature de l’homme (1749; On the Nature of Man) – from which he had quoted in Note ii, at the beginning of the Preface – surveys the “varieties” of man by summarizing a large body of ethnological literature. Varieties are characterized, Buffon holds, by differences in color, form, shape, and temperament or naturel; they are caused by differences in climate, in diet, and in morals or ways of life, that is to say by the “physical causes” Rousseau mentions; and since these varieties result from the steady impact of such general, external causes, varieties may be expected to undergo changes or to disappear with time and changing circumstances (De la nature de l'homme, edited by Michèle Duchet as De l'homme [Maspero, Paris, 1971], pp. 223, 270ff., 319–321; see also Buffon, Oeuvres philosophiques, edited by Jean Piveteau [PUF, Paris, 1954], p. 313, cited hereafter as Buffon, OP).

All early editions read: “introduced in some species the varieties”;

the 1782 edition reads “in some animals the varieties.”

P [4] a state which ... perhaps never did exist Namely the state of men living free of whatever is artificial or conventional, or of what Rousseau also calls the “moral” in contrast to the “physical” aspects of life; see Introduction, p. 600 above. However, the state of nature in the general sense of that expression, the state of men who are not members of one and the same political society, certainly does, and will continue to exist.

P [5] says M. Burlamaqui Rousseau is here quoting from the Principes du droit naturel (1747), i, i, ii, by Jean-Jacques Burlamaqui (1694–1748), Professor of Natural and Civil Law at the Academy of Geneva. The proposition that the principles of natural right must be derived from man’s nature goes back at least as far as Plato’s analogy, in the Republic, between the city and the soul; in one form or another, this proposition remains universally accepted among Rousseau’s contemporaries, e.g. Pufendorf, Droit, ii, iii, § xiv with Barbevra’s note ad loc., and Montesquieu, Spirit of Laws, i, 2.

P [6] natural Law See the Introduction to SC tr. the Roman Jurists I.e. Ulpian (d. AD 228), Digests 1, 1, and Justinian (483–565), Institutes 1, 2, § i, as reported for example in Grotius, Right 1, 1, § xi; in Pufendorf, Droit ii, 3, §§ ii et seq., with Barbevra’s notes and his Preface, p. cxiv; in Richard Cumberland, De legibus naturae (London, 1672; translated by Jean Barbevra as Traité philosophique des loix naturelles [Amsterdam, 1744] and cited in Barbevra’s translation hereafter as Loix), v, § 2. The Moderns I.e. Grotius: “Natural Right is the Rule and Dictate of Right Reason, showing the Moral Deformity or Moral Necessity there is in any Act, according to its Suitableness or Unsuitableness to a reasonable and Sociable Nature,” Right 1, 1, § x; note that “and Sociable” is Barbevra’s addition; see also Pufendorf, Droit ii, 3, § xiii; and Cumberland, Loix iv, § 4, among others. This use of “right reason” can be traced to Cicero, De republica iii, 22; it is criticized by Hobbes, De cive ii, 1; and see Editorial Note to i [35] below. So that ... it is impossible to understand the Law of Nature Rousseau
tends to be careful about distinguishing between "law of nature" and "natural law," for the reason which he indicates two paragraphs below. p [9] prior to reason . . . without . . . sociability Cp. Grotius's definition of natural right cited in the preceding note. Sociability or sociality becomes central to Pufendorf's natural right doctrine: see especially Driit ii, 3, § xv and Man and Citizen i, 3, §§ viii et seq. Sometimes "sociability" means no more than fellow-feeling; however tradition also distinguishes different forms or kinds of society - e.g. the family, the household, and political or civil society, to which sometimes is added the whole of mankind. In reading Rousseau or his contemporaries one therefore has to ask oneself in which of its various senses "society," and hence "social" and "sociable," is being used in any given case; and in particular whether it is or is not interchangeable with "political" in the sense in which Aristotle, for example, speaks of man as a "political animal," namely, as inclined to and perfected in and by political society. The article "Social" in Diderot and d'Alembert's Encyclopedia notes that the term is a neologism, any being like ourselves Nos semblables would normally be rendered "our fellows" or "fellow-human beings"; but since the status of fellow-feeling is deliberately problematic, especially in Part i of this Discourse, it seemed more faithful to Rousseau's intention to avoid all allusions to it wherever he himself is clearly at pains to avoid them.

p [12] Learn what the God . . .

Quem deus esse
Jussit, et humana qua parte locat us es in re, Disc.

Perseus (AD 34–62), Satires iii, 71–73

e [2] two sorts of inequality The distinction is drawn by Pufendorf, Man and Citizen i, 7, § ii, and developed by Barbevacin in Pufendorf, Driit iii, 2, § ii, n. 3; see, further, the Introduction, pp. xvf. above.

e [5] The Philosophers . . . state of Nature All the philosophers who have examined the foundations of society, i.e. of political or civil society, have indeed inquired into the condition of men outside of, and especially prior to, political or civil society. But for the most part they did not call that condition "state of nature." The expression was to all intents and purposes introduced by Hobbes: "the state of men without civil society (which state we may properly call the state of nature)" (De cive tr., Preface, p. 34). It may thus refer to (1) men in a prepolitical or precivil - and hence un-civilized or "savage" - state. But, at least formally, it also refers to (2) the state of men we would call civilized, living outside their own or even any civil society, either (i) because they live as strangers who are not subject to a common superior on

earth, or (ii) because they are wise and therefore not in need of a common superior; (3) the state of men in political societies that have "dissolved" or been destroyed: e.g. Locke, Treatises ii, 19, § 211, and this Discourse ii [56]; or, finally, (4) the state of political societies in their relations with one another: e.g. this Discourse ii [34]. Even if "state of nature" is primarily used as Rousseau for the most part uses it, to refer to (1), men in the prepolitical state, the expression is not entirely univocal. For Rousseau distinguishes at least three stages in the state of nature so understood. Some . . . ascribe . . . the Just and the Unjust For instance Burlamaqui speaks of men's "moral instinct," "the natural tendency or inclination that leads us to approve some things as good and praiseworthy; and to condemn others as bad and blameworthy; independently of any reflection. Or if one wishes to denominate this instinct 'moral sense' as does one Scottish scholar - Mr. Hutcheson - then I would say that it is a faculty of our soul which in certain cases immediately discerns moral good and evil by a kind of sensation and taste, independently of reasoning and reflection" (Principes du droit naturel ii, 3, § i); accordingly he also speaks of an innate "sentiment or taste of virtue and of justice which in a sense anticipates reason" (ib. ii, 3, § iv). Others . . . Natural Right to keep what belongs to him For instance, Locke speaks of men being naturally in a state of perfect freedom to "dispose of their possessions . . . as they think fit" (Treatises ii, 2, § 4, cp. § 6). Others . . . the stronger authority over the weaker E.g. Hobbes: "in the natural state of men . . . a sure and irresistible power confers the right of dominion and ruling over those that cannot resist" (De cive i, 14); or Spinoza, "the greater devour the lesser by sovereign natural right (summa naturali jure)" (Tractatus Theologico-Politicus ch. 16). the Writings of Moses Moses is traditionally held to have written down the first five books of the Bible, or Pentateuch. pure state of Nature, unless they relapsed into it About the "paradox" of such a relapse, see Origin of Languages 9 [15], and most fully, V. Gourevitch, "Rousseau's 'Pure' State of Nature," Interpretation (1988), 16:23–59, especially pp. 47–49.

e [6] hypothetical and conditional reasonings . . . comparable to those our Physicists For example, Descartes, explaining how "certain considerations" - i.e. the condemnation of Galileo - kept him from publishing his cosmology, remarks that "in order to shade these things somewhat and to be able to say more freely what I thought regarding them without having to follow or to refute the opinions of the learned, I even resolved to leave the whole of this world to their disputes, and to speak only of what would happen in a new world if somewhere, in imaginary spaces, God now created enough matter to compose it, and
variously and without order shook the various parts of this matter in such a way as to compose as confused a chaos as the poets might feign, and that afterwards he did nothing but to lend nature his ordinary assistance, and let it act according to the laws he had established”. *Discourse on Method* v (Gilson edn.), 41f. See also Buffon’s statement cited in the Editorial Note to this Second Discourse, N ii [2]. God himself... immediately after the creation The last four words were added in 1782. the Lyceum Where Plato’s former student, Aristotle, taught; Xenocrates of Chalcodon (396–314 BC), disciple of Plato, and eventually head of Plato’s Academy.

1 [1] Aristotle thinks... flaws There is no known source for such a claim; however, in his *Reply* to the naturalist Charles-George Le Roy, Rousseau himself adopts a view reminiscent of the view he here attributes to Aristotle. assume him always conformed as I see him Cp.: “But because I did not yet have enough knowledge of them [i.e. of animals and especially of men] to speak about them in the same manner as about the rest [of the universe], namely by proving effects from causes, and by showing from what seeds and in what manner nature must produce them, I contended myself with assuming that God formed the body of a man exactly similar to one of ours in both the external conformation of its limbs and the internal conformation of its organs...”. Descartes, *Discourse on Method* v (Gilson edn.), 45f.

1 [3] imitate their industry *Industrie* also means, as “industry” used to, activity, enterprise, industriousness.

1 [4] Nature... as the Law of Sparta which ordered that defective children be exposed. On nature’s allowing only the fit to survive, see *Languages* 10 [2], and *Emile*, OC iv, 259f., tr. 147. On our societies’ causing children to be killed before birth, and hence indiscriminately, cp. also Second Discourse N ix [5].

1 [5] gather all his machines In the 1782 edition, this became “gather all these machines.”

1 [6] Hobbes contends “All men in the State of nature have a desire, and will to hurt...” (De cive i, 4); “this natural proclivity of men, to hurt each other, which they derive from their Passions, but chiefly from a vain esteeeme of themselves” (ib., i, 12). An illustrious philosopher Montesquieu, according to whom man in the state of nature “would at first feel only his weakness; his timidity would be extreme: and if the point required empirical confirmation, savage men have been found in forests; everything makes them tremble, everything makes them flee” (Spirit of Laws 1, 2). Richard Cumberland held that fear would incline men to peace more than to war: *Loix*, i, § 32, 33. Pufendorf A man abandoned to his own resources and living as Rousseau has so far described original man living would be reduced to “trembling at the least noise, at the first sight of another Animal” (Droit ii, 1, vm); “afraid at the least object, and filled with wonder at the sight of even the sun” (Droit ii, 2, 10).

1 [7] These are undoubtedly The entire paragraph was added in 1782. François Corréal (1648–1708), *Voyages de François Corréal aux Indes Occidentales*; Rousseau cites almost word for word from the new, revised, corrected, enlarged edition in two volumes (Paris, 1722), i, 8. 1 [9] If... [Nature] destined us to be healthy then, I almost dare assert, the state of reflection is a state against Nature Striking as it is, this famous remark is rather guarded: “if,” “almost”; in connection with this remark, also consider Preface to *Narcissus* [32], as well as Buffon’s remark, “This power of reflection has been denied to animals” (Histoire naturelle iv [1753]; see Buffon, *Op*, pp. 332 b 42 and 336 a 21). The wording of the last clause, the man who meditates is a depraved animal, echoes – and the thought challenges – the passage from Aristotle which serves as the epigraph of this Discourse, the opinion of Plato in the Republic iii, 405d–408c; cp. Homer, Iliad xi, 637–642; iv, 215–219. Podalirius and Machaon The sons of the “flawless healer” Asclepius, and themselves good healers (Ida ii, 731f.). And Celsius reports Added in 1782: A. Cornelius Celsius (c. 30 BC–AD 30) remarks that dietetics became a third branch of medicine at the time of Hippocrates, i.e. about 300 BC (De medicina, Pref. 3–5).

1 [11] The Horse... the Bull... Domesticated... bastardizing Buffon, once again, using the same examples, contrasts domestic and wild or savage (sauvages) animals in the strongest language: “Man changes the natural state of animals by forcing them to obey him, and making them serve his ends; a domestic animal is a slave with which one amuses oneself, which one uses, abuses, adulterates, displaces and denatures, while the wild animal, obeying only Nature, knows no other laws than those of need and of freedom” (Histoire naturelle iv, Buffon, *Op*, p. 351 a 1–9). Rousseau’s very next sentence, As he becomes sociable and a Slave, would seem further to echo Buffon’s text.

1 [12] in cold Countries... appropriate the skins of the Beasts “Unto Adam also and to his wife did the Lord God make coats of skin, and clothed them” (Genesis 3:21). Barbeyrac, after quoting this verse, comments, “that is to say, in the style of the Hebrews, that he taught them how to do so”; in Pufendorf, *Droit* ii, 2, ii, n. 5.

1 [12] there may be a few exceptions... serving the same purpose Note added in 1782. The marsupial described by Corréal and Læt is the opossum. Jan Læt (1593–1649), Dutch geographer, and influential early polygenist; his account of the West Indies appeared in

1 [14] Physical . . . Metaphysical and Moral The "metaphysical side" here refers to the traditional differentiae of man which Rousseau briefly reviews: reason or understanding, and freedom. The "moral side" refers to man as a moral agent, but also, more generally, to needs, passions or feelings, attitudes, beliefs, and conduct in relation to others.

1 [15] or to disturb it. Added in 1782.

1 [16] Some Philosophers In particular Montaigne, in "Of the Inequality That is Between Us," *Essays* I, 42 (Montaigne, OC 250, tr. 189). Although he may, for rhetorical effect, raise questions about whether the difference between a given man and another is greater than that between a given man and a beast, Rousseau rejected the underlying philosophical or scientific premise that there is no clear distinction between man and beast: see the early and important letter to de Conzié, 17 January 1742 (CC I, 134, no. 43) and this Second Discourse, Note x [11].

1 [17] perfectibility. Rousseau coined, or at least gave currency to, the term on this occasion. Inhabitant of the Banks of the Orinoco. The practice is reported by Corrél, *Voyages* I, 260v.; Rousseau refers to it again in *Emile* I, OC iv, 254, tr. 43; Buffon also calls attention to it in *De la nature de l'homme* (Duchet edition, p. 209).

1 [20] the Sands and Rocks of Attica . . . the fertile Banks of the Eurotas Athens and Sparta.

1 [21] the sentiment of its present existence. Rousseau will mention this sentiment twice again in the Second Discourse: II [2] and [57]. The expression was not uncommon, and Buffon had distinguished at length between what he called a sentiment of one's existence, which he allowed that beasts have, and a consciousness of one's existence, which he attributed to man alone ("Discourse on the Nature of Animals," *Histoire naturelle* iv, pp. 328 b 48–333 a 23, cp. 309 b 40v, 322 a 44v). However, as Rousseau's third and final mention of the sentiment of one's own existence in the present Discourse indicates, he comes to endow this sentiment with far greater significance than had his predecessors; it is also central to his argument — his theodicy, really — in the *Letter to Voltaire* [10] and to his last discussion of happiness in the fifth of the *Réveries* (OC I, 1045–1047, tr. 68f). For the contrast between "existing" and "living," see *Emile* (OC iv, 489, tr. 211), and *Réveries* x (OC I, 1099, tr. 141); and cp. the third of the *Letters to Malesherbes* (OC I, 1138).

1 [25] the perplexities regarding the origin of Languages Rousseau knew that insofar as the "perplexities" which he here canvasses arise from an attempt to account for how a being without speech might acquire — discover, devise, or invent — language, they simply cannot be resolved. Such perplexities do not arise in the *Essay on the Origin of Languages* because in that *Essay* he positions himself inside language, so to speak, and attempts to account for the differences between one language or family of languages and another. Etienne Bonnot, Abbé de Condillac (1714–1780), and Rousseau knew each other since 1742, when Rousseau was a tutor in the house of Condillac's brother, M. de Mably. They grew close some years later in Paris; at a much later date, Rousseau entrusted him with a copy of his *Dialogues*. Condillac was a Lockean, but held that Locke had failed to recognize the full extent to which what he calls "signs" (and, in particular, language) are the middle term between sensations and ideas, as well as between one idea and another. Accordingly he devoted half of his first published work, the *Essay on the Origin of Human Knowledge* (1746), to the origin, the growth, and the analysis of language. The *Essay* enjoyed great success. Condillac went on to write extensively on almost all aspects of philosophy. In his speculations about the origin of language, he assumes two children lost or abandoned in a desert place, at first emitting some "natural signs," and gradually associating conventional meanings with these signs; as they grow up and have children of their own, their stock of conventional signs — gestures as well as sounds — gradually grows (*Essay* pt. ii, ch. 1, §§ 1–7; cp. Herodotus, *Histories* ii, 2–6). As Rousseau says, Condillac assumes "some sort of society already established among the inventors of language."


1 [30] general ideas can enter the Mind only with the help of words, and the understanding grasps them only by means of propositions. That is one of the reasons why animals could not form such ideas, nor ever acquire the perfectibility that depends on them. There is no basis for the claim that Rousseau is here saying that perfectibility as such, rather than just a particular perfectibility, depends on language. general ideas "Words become general by being made the signs of general ideas; and ideas become general by separating from them the circumstances of time, and place, and any other ideas, that may determine them to this or that particular existence." John Locke (1632–1704), *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding* (1690; hereafter *Essay*), iii, 3, vi; "the having of general ideas, is that which puts a perfect distinction betwixt man and brutes," ib., ii, 11, x; cp. iii, 11, xvi; and regarding the general idea of a triangle, see iv, 7, ix. Rousseau appears also to have been acquainted with Bishop Berkeley's criticism of these views, possibly through the *Dialogues*,
which were by this time available in a French translation. archetype Locke, Essay, see especially ii, 30, 31; iii, passim; iv, 4, v, vii, viii. Condillac, in contrast to Locke, restricts "archetype" to standards for human action or conduct (Essay pt. 1, ch. 3, §§ 5, 15; pt. 1, ch. 5, § 12; pt. 1, sec. 2, ch. 2, § 26). See also Malebranche, Recherche de la vérité (Search for Truth) 2, 3, 6.

1 [33] we are repeatedly told that nothing would have been as miserable as man Literally: Pufendorf, Droit ii, 1, § viii and vii, 1, § vi; Man and Citizen ii, 5, § ii; Burlamaqui, Droit naturel i, 4, § 4; but also, of course, the most famous such remark, "And the life of man solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short" (Hobbes, Leviathan, ch. xiii); cp. De cive i, 13; also Spinoza, Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, ch. v (near the middle).

1 [35] Hobbes very clearly saw the defect of all modern definitions of Natural right Namely that they define it in terms of man’s being rational and sociable – in the sense of political. his own definition “the Dictate of right reason,” conversant about those things which are either to be done, or omitted for the constant preservation of life, and members as much as in us lyeth”; where, however, “...By Right Reason in the natural state of man, I understand not, as many do, an infallible faculty, but the act of reasoning, that is, the peculiar and true ratiocination of every man concerning those actions of his which may either redound to the damage, or benefit of his neighbours” (De cive ii, 1); and even more bluntly: “...commonly they that call for right reason to decide any controversy, do mean their own. But this is certain, seeing right reason is not existent, the reason of some man, or men, must supply the place thereof...”, Elements of Law, ii, 10, § viii. A wicked man is, he says “Unlesse you give Children all they aske for, they are peevish, and cry, aye and strike their Parents sometimes, and all this they have from nature, yet are they free from guilt, neither may we properly call them wicked; first, because they cannot hurt; next, because wanting the free use of reason they are exempted from all duty; these when they come to riper yeares, having acquired power whereby they may doe hurt, if they shall continue to doe the same things, then truly they both begin to be, and are properly accounted wicked; In so much as a wicked man is almost the same thing with a childe growne strong and sturdy, or a man of a childish disposition; and malice the same with a defect of reason in that age, when nature ought to be better governed through good education and experience. Unlesse therefore we will say that men are naturally evil, because they receive not their education and use from nature, we must needs acknowledge that men may derive desire, feare, anger, and other passions from nature, and yet not impute the evill effects of those unto nature. The foundation therefore which I have laid standing firme, I demonstrate in the first place, that the state of men without civil society (which state we may properly call the state of nature) is nothing else but a mere warre of all against all; and that warre all men have equal right unto all things; Next, that all men as soon as they arrive to understanding of this hateful condition, do desire (even nature it selfe compelling them) to be freed from this misery. But that this cannot be done except by compact, they all quit that right they have to all things” (De cive, Preface to the Reader, pp. 33f; see also i, 10, ii, 12). Rousseau criticizes this passage from the “Preface” again in Emile i, OC iv, 288, tr. 67. so much more Tanto plus in illis profulcis vitiorum ignorato, quam in his cognitio virtutis. Justin (second century AD) is speaking about the Scythians’ ignorance of virtue and the Greeks’ knowledge of it (Histories ii, 2, 15); also quoted by Grotius, Right ii, 2, ii (1), n. 6; and by Pufendorf, Droit ii, 3, vii, n. 5. the author of the Fable of the Bees Bernard de Mandeville (1670–1733); in the context of a discussion of charity he writes: “This virtue is often counterfeited by a passion of ours called pity or compassion, which consists in a fellow-feeling and condolence for the misfortunes and calamities of others: all mankind are more or less affected with it; but the weakest minds generally the most. It is raised in us when the sufferings and misery of other creatures make so forcible an impression upon us, as to make us uneasy ... Should any one of us be lock’d up in a groundroom, where, in a yard joining to it there was a thriving good humour’d child at play, of two or three years old, so near us, that through the grates of the window we could almost touch it with our hand; and if, whilst we took delight in the harmless diversion, and imperfect prattle-prattle of the innocent babe, a nasty over-grown sow should come in upon the child, set it a screaming, and frighten it out of its wits; it is natural to think that this would make us uneasy, and that with crying out, and making all the menacing noise we could, we should endeavour to drive the sow away. But if this should happen to be an half-starved creature, that, mad with hunger, went roaming about in quest of food, and we should behold the ravenous brute, in spite of our cries, and all the threatening gestures we could think of, actually lay hold of the helpless infant, destroy and devour it; to see her widely open her destructive jaws, and the poor lamb beat down with greedy haste; to look on the defenceless posture of tender limbs, first trampled on, then tore asunder; to see the filthy snout digging in the yet living entrails, suck up the soaking blood, and now and then to hear the cracking of the bones, and the cruel animal with savage pleasure, grunt over
the horrid banquet; to hear and see all this, what tortures would it give the soul beyond expression! Let me see the most shining virtue the moralists have to boast of, so manifest either to the person possessed of it, or those who behold his actions; let me see courage, or the love of one’s country, so apparent without any mixture, clear’d and distinct from all other passions. There would be no need of virtue or self-denial to be mov’d to such a scene; and not only a man of humanity, of good morals and commiseration, but likewise an highwayman, an housebreaker, or a murderer, could feel anxieties on such an occasion; how calamitous soever a man’s circumstances might be, he would forget his fortunes for the time, and the most troublesome passion would give way to pity, and not one of the species has a heart so obdurately or engaged, that it would not ake at such a fight, as no language has an epithet to fit it.” “An Essay on Charity and Charity-Schools” (3rd and 4th paragraphs), The Fable of the Bees (1714), edited by F. B. Kaye (Clarendon, Oxford, 1924), vol. i, pp. 254–256.

1 [36] like bloodthirsty Sulla . . . tender-hearted. This was added in 1782. Lucius Cornelius Sulla (139–78 BC), Roman general who became a notoriously cruel tyrant (Plutarch, Life of Sulla xxx, 4). Alexander of Pherae, as told in Montaigne, “Cowardice, Mother of Cruelty” (Essays ii, 27; Montaigne, OC 671, tr. 523f.), drawn from Plutarch (Pelopidas, xxix, 9–11). Rousseau makes the same point with the same examples in the Letter to d’Alembert (OC v, 23; Fuchs edition, p. 32; tr. pp. 24f.), which is quoted in the Editorial Note to Languages 1 [10]a. When nature gave man tears . . .

Mollisima corda
Humano generi dare se Natura fatetur
Quae lacrymas dedit.

Juvenal, Satires xv, 131–133

1 [37] Even if . . . commiseration . . . puts us in the place of him who suffers “Pity is often a sentiment of our own ills in the ills of another,” L. Rocheboucelot, Maxims, no. 264; and “Sweet it is, when on the great sea the winds are buffeting the waters, to gaze from the land on another’s great struggles; not because it is a pleasure or joy that anyone should be distressed, but because it is sweet to perceive from what misfortune you yourself are free”: Lucretius, On the Nature of Things, ii, 1–4 (translated by C. Bailey); cp. Aristotle, Rhetoric ii, 8, 1385b 13–19; Hobbes, De homine (1658), xii, 10, and Leviathan ch. vi; also see Languages 9 [2].

1 [42] the moral from the Physical in . . . love. The distinction is drawn by Buffon, who sets all the agreeable aspects of love on the physical and animal side, all its evils on the moral side (“Discourse on the Nature of Animals,” Histoire naturelle iv, Buffon, OP, pp. 341 a 51–b 44); but the distinction is also suggested by Barbeyrac in Pufendorf, Droit i, 2, § vi, n. 10 and context, as well as in his discussion of Xenophon’s Education of Cyrus v (near the beginning), in Pufendorf, Droit i, 4, § vii, n. 5. Rousseau discusses the present passage from the Discourse in Emile v, OC iv, 796f, tr. pp. 429f.; regarding the “moral” side of love, see also Emile iv, OC iv, 493f, tr. 214; and, especially, the whole of the Nouvelle Héloïse. the sex that should obey According to Genesis 3:16. In a striking early fragment, Rousseau wrote: “Let us begin by considering women deprived of their freedom by the tyranny of men, and men the masters of everything . . . everything in their hands, they seized it by I know not what natural right which I could never quite understand, and which may well have no other foundation than main force” (OC ii, 1254), a taste which he could not have acquired. In 1782 this reads “a distaste which he could not have acquired.”

1 [51] have remained in his primitive condition In 1782, this reads “primitive constitution.”

1 [5] must naturally have engendered In 1782, this reads “must naturally engender.”

1 [9] a Deer . . . a hare an echo of Locke, Treatises ii, § 30.

1 [10] various Savage Nations have now In 1782, this reads “Savage Nations have today.” I cover multitudes In 1782, a new paragraph begins here.


1 [14] speech is imperceptibly established In 1782, this reads “speech was imperceptibly established.” Great floods . . . Revolutions of the Globe Cp. Languages 9 [27], [31], [32], and Fragments politiques, OC iii, 533; Lucretius, On the Nature of Things, v, 386–415; in his Histoire et théorie de la terre (1749), Buffon speaks of the especially frequent early revolutons the earth must have undergone (Buffon, OP, pp. 49–55).

1 [17] Locke “. . . no property . . . no injury” What Locke had said is: “Where there is no property, there is no injustice, is a proposition as certain as any demonstration in Euclid” (Essay iv, 3, § 18); De Coste’s French translation reads “Where there is no property, there can be no injustice”; which Barbeyrac quotes and discusses in his preface to Pufendorf, Droit (p. xx). By substituting “injury” for “injustice,”
Rousseau substitutes the more for the less comprehensive term; "[the brute beasts] cannot distinguish between injury and harme; Thence it happens that as long as it is well with them, they blame not their fellows: But those men are of most trouble to the Republicke, who have most leasure to be idle; for they use not to contend for publique places before they have gotten the victory over hunger, and cold." Hobbes, De cive v, v; see ib. i, x, note; similarly, Pufendorf refers to all voluntary hurt as "injury or wrong" [injure ou tort], Droit i, 7, §§ xiii-xvii, and see ib. ii, 3, § iii, esp. Barbeyrac's note 10; on harm and injury, see also this Discourse i [39].

Pi [18] the genuine youth of the World. Lucretius speaks of the "youth of the world" to describe the first state of the world and of man (On the Nature of Things v, 780, 818, 943, cp. 330); Rousseau borrows the expression, but thinks it correctly describes a later state in the history of man and the world.

Pi [20] For the Poet it is gold and silver, Ovid's fourth age, Rousseau's third stage in the state of nature, introduces gold as well as iron, together with amor scleratus habendi, "evil concupiscence" (Metamorphoses i, 127-150); cp. Locke, Treatises ii, 8, § 111; Rousseau's account of this stage culminates with another Ovidian indictment of gold (Second Discourse ii [29]), both [metallurgy and agriculture] were unknown to the Savages of America. Thus, too, Locke, Essay iv, 12, § 11.

Pi [21] It is very difficult to conjecture how men came to know and to use iron in direct contradiction to Lucretius, On the Nature of Things v, 1281f.

Pi [24] to render to each his own. A traditional formula for justice: Ulpian, Digests 1, 1; Justinian, Institutes 1, 1; it may be traced to Simonides (556-468 BC) in Plato, Republic i, 331; see also Republic iv, 433e-434a. nascent property . . . manual labor. The remark echoes and fully agrees with Locke: "The Labour of his Body and the work of his Hands, we may say, are properly his. Whatsoever then he removes out of the State that Nature hath provided, and left in, he hath mixed his Labour with, and joined to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his Property" (Treatises ii, 5, § 27); on the origin of property; see also Emile ii, OC iv, 330-333, tr. 98f. The Ancients, says Grotius in Right ii, 2, § 2 (5), quoting Servius's (fl. c. AD 400) commentary on Vergil (Aeneid iv, 88). Pufendorf quotes the same text, Droit iv, 4, § xiii. Ceres The Romans' goddess of the fruits of the earth.

Pi [27] instills in all men In 1782, this reads "instill."

Pi [29] Shocked by the novelty . . .

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Attonitus novitate mali, divesque miserque
Effugere opat opes, et quae modo voxaret, odict.
Ovid, Metamorphoses xi, 127f.

The poet whom Rousseau had cited to introduce this stage (Pi [20] above) is now cited to mark its climax with its description of King Midas's condition upon being granted his wish to have everything he touches turn to gold. The passage is also quoted by Montaigne, "Apology of Raymond Sebond" (Essays ii, 12, Montaigne, OC 556, tr. 424). Pi [33] in a few great Cosmopolitan Souls in the copy of the Discourse which Rousseau gave his English friend and host Richard Daventry, and which is now in The Pierpont Morgan Library, New York, he by hand changed the remainder of this sentence to read: "worthy of crossing the imaginary barriers that separate Peoples, and embracing the whole of mankind in their benevolence on the model of the supreme being that created it." See the Introduction to SC tr.

Pi [35] I know . . . other origins to Political Societies . . . conquests by the more powerful. Possibly Hobbes, De cive viii, 1, or Barbeyrac in Pufendorf, Droit vii, 1, § vii, note 1; or the union of the weak E.g. Glaucoc in Plato, Republic ii, 358e-359a, or d'Alembert, Preliminary Discourse to the Encyclopedia.

Pi [36] begin by purging the throes of the world. Cp. Luke 3:17, as Lycurgus did in Sparta. "The second law that Lycurgus made, and the boldest and hardest he ever took in hand, was the making of a new division of their lands. For he saw so great a disaster, and inequality among the inhabitants, as well of the country, as of the city Lacedaemon, by reason some (and the greatest number of them) were so poor, that they had not a hand full of ground, and other some being least in number were very rich, that had all: he thought with himself to banish out of the city all insolency, envy, covetousness, and deliciousness, and also all riches and poverty, which he took the greatest, and the most continual plagues of a city, or common-weal." Plutarch, Life of Lycurgus viii, 1-3, translated by North; see also SC ii 7 [5], ii 8 [4], and iii 10 [3]*.

Pi [37] protect their goods, their freedoms and their lives. The remark echoes Locke's assertion that men unite "for the mutual preservation of their Lives, Liberties, and Estates" (Treatises ii, 9, § 123, and especially 15, § 171). If we have a Prince, Pliny the Younger (61- c. 113), Panegyric of Trajan iv, 7.

Pi [38] Politicians . . . Philosophers. In the Montmorency copy of the Discourse, Rousseau changed this to read "Our Politicians . . . our Philosophers," which is also how it appears in the 1782 edition; "Politicians" here translates politiques, about which see the Note on the
passage Rousseau quotes closely resembles a passage which Sidney had quoted from this same Traité. “That kings are under the happy inability to do anything against the laws of their country” (Discourses Concerning Government II, 30; edited by Thomas West [Liberty Classics, Indianapolis, 1990], p. 294). Sidney had not given the source of his quote. As Morel long ago pointed out (“Recherches sur les sources du Discours de J. J. Rousseau,” pp. 178ff.), Barbeyrac calls attention to Sidney's quote, identifies its source and, in the last (1734) edition of his translation of Pufendorf’s Droit which he himself revised, reproduces the full context from which Sidney had plucked it: Droit VII, 6, § x, n. 2. Rousseau evidently drew the passage of the Traité which he quotes from this note of Barbeyrac's. (I am indebted to Heinrich Meier for putting me on the track of this important difference between the editions of Barbeyrac's Pufendorf translation.) As a number of previous editors have noted, in context the point of the passage Rousseau quotes is very different from the point Rousseau is making: Rousseau's citation ends with the remark that Princes are subject to the law, whereas the text goes on to say, in the very next sentence, that they are also its authors. I shall ignore . . . of which one is not master. Rousseau added this sentence in the Montmorency copy, and it is included in the 1782 edition. Jean Baptiste Barbeyrac (1674–1744), so frequently mentioned in these notes, the French translator and learned annotator of Grotius, Pufendorf, and Cumberland, was a strong partisan of Locke's political teaching. Rousseau is here quoting his comment in Pufendorf, Droit VII, 8, § vi, n. 2, based on Locke, Treaties II, 4, § 23, and/or II, 15, § 172.

Pufendorf says in his chapter “On the Origin and Foundations of Sovereignty”: “For as one transfers one's goods to another by conventions and contracts, so one can, by a voluntary submission, yield to someone who accepts the renunciation, one's right to dispose of one's freedom and natural forces. Thus a man who commits himself to be my slave, genuinely confers on me the Authority to be his Master; and it is crass ignorance to object to this, as some do, the common -- and, in other respects, true -- maxim, that one cannot relinquish what one does not have” (Droit VII, 3, § 1). And the Jurists who have gravely pronounced. Both Grotius (Right II, 5, § xxii; III, 14, § viii) and Pufendorf (Droit VI, 3, § ix; and Man and Citizen II, 4, § vi) allow that the child of a slave may be born a slave, although they do so with some qualifications.

Without at present entering into The “common opinion” which Rousseau here briefly summarizes is the so-called double-contract doctrine. By the first contract or convention, independent...
individuals agree, each with all the rest, to combine wills and strengths or forces to form a permanent union for the sake of their common security and welfare, and issue an ordnance regarding the form of the government. This much provides "the beginnings and rudiments of a State." By the second contract or convention, this beginning state or people and those it has chosen or accepted to govern it mutually obligate themselves to fulfill their respective responsibilities toward one another. As Pufendorf points out, this second contract is scarcely evident in democracies, where the same persons are at different times or in different respects both sovereign and subject. The primary focus of this doctrine is the second contract, which was seen as a way of placing restrictions on a Hobbesian sovereign (Pufendorf, Droit vii, 2, §§ vii–ix and vii, 6, § x; Man and Citizen ii, 6, §§ vii–ix, adopted by Burlamaqui, Droit politique [1751], vol. 1, 1, 4, § 15, and, with qualifications, by Diderot in his Encyclopedia article "Autorité politique," Political Writings, edited by Robert Wokler and John Mason [Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought, Cambridge, 1992], pp. 6–11). Absolute rulers and their apologists therefore understandably rejected the "common opinion" of a double contract: in 1752 the Encyclopedia came under sharp attack because of the assertion, in the article "Autorité politique," that those who submit to political authority and those upon whom they bestow it explicitly or tacitly enter into a contract. At the same time, absolute rulers and their spokesmen sometimes found it convenient or even necessary to profess the "common opinion" that princes and their subjects are bound by a contract: in 1753, shortly before Rousseau began work on the present Discourse, the editors of the Encyclopedia defended the article "Autorité politique" by citing the Traité des droits de la Reine très-chrestienne sur divers éstats de la monarchie d'Espagne: "That the fundamental law of the state establishes a reciprocal and eternal bond between the prince and his descendants on the one hand, and the subjects and their descendants on the other, by means of a kind of contract (une espèce de contrat) that commits (destine) the sovereign to rule and peoples to obey . . . a solemn commitment they entered into with one another for the sake of mutual assistance" (see Diderot, Political Writings, ed. Wokler and Mason, pp. 11f; cp. Traité, ed. cit. p. 120). Rousseau may, then, refer to double contract as "the common opinion" because even the most absolute of monarchs publicly professed it. Locke had resorted to the same stratagem as that used by Diderot and d'Alembert, by Sidney, and by Rousseau three paragraphs above, when he cited very similar passages from two speeches James I delivered to Parliament in 1603 and 1609: Treatises ii, § 200. In quoting the Traité, Diderot and d'Alembert had no more consulted the original than had Rousseau. J. Lough has shown that they found the passage they quote in a Remonstrance by the Paris Parliament against the Crown of 9 April 1753: "The 'Encyclopédie' and the Remonstrances of the Paris Parliament," The Modern Language Review (1961), 56:393–395; mentioned by Paul Vernière in his edition of Diderot, Œuvres politiques (Garnier Frères, Paris, 1963), p. 7, n. 1. In the immediately following two paragraphs, Rousseau goes on to show that the "common opinion" is untenable because the double contract is unenforceable. He spells out his criticism of it fully and explicitly in SC iii 16, i 7 [3]; iii 1 [6].

II [48] Gerontes . . . Senate . . . Seigneur The root of all three is "elder"; the Spartan Gerontes were the city's supreme legislative council, as the Senate was in Rome. In the present context, Seigneur is best translated "Sir"; see also SC iii 5 [2]: equals to the Gods and Kings of Kings as, respectively, the Roman Emperors and the Kings of Persia were called.

II [49] the progress of inequality As in the state of nature, so in the civil state, Rousseau distinguishes three stages, separated by "revolutions."

II [50] Sparta . . . Lycurgus established morals Plutarch, Life of Lycurgus xiii, 1–4

II [52] even without the Government's intervention Added by Rousseau in the Montmorency copy of the Discourse, and in the posthumous 1782 edition.

II [53] may in future Centuries assume "future" added in the 1782 edition. If you order me

Pectore si fratis gladium juguloque parentis
Condere me jubeas, gravidaeque in viscera partu
Conjugis, invita peragam tamen omnia dextra.

Lucan (30–65), Pharsalia i, 376–378

As quoted and very slightly paraphrased by Sidney, Discourses ii, 19; see context (Morel).

II [55] where honesty offers no hope Cui ex honesto nulla est spee, in Tacitus, Annals v, 3 (Meier); again, as very slightly paraphrased by Sidney in the same chapter of the Discourses, ii, 19.

II [57] Diogenes did not find a man Diogenes the Cynic (fl. 370 BC) went about by day with a lantern, explaining, "I am looking for a man" (Diogenes Laertius, Lives . . . of . . . Philosophers vi, 41), the Stoic's ataraxia i.e. imperturbability, or repose of soul or mind, more originally and typically the aim of the Epicurean and of the Pyrrhonist wise man (Diogenes Laertius, Lives x, 136, ix, 107, cp. 108; Cicero,
Academica II, 42, 130; on Pyrrhonist ataraxia see also Montaigne, "Apology of Raymond Sebond" (Essays II, 12, Montaigne, OC 562, tr. 435f.).

[58] II that a child command Montaigne puts these words in the mouth of his "Cannibals": "They said that in the first place they thought it very strange that so many grown men, bearded, armed, and strong, who were around the king . . . should strive to obey a child, and that one of them was not chosen to command instead. Second (they have a way in their language of speaking of men as halves of one another) they had noticed that there were among us men full and gorged with all sorts of good things, and that their other halves were beggars at their doors, emaciated with hunger and poverty; and they thought it strange that these needy halves could endure such an injustice, and did not take the others by the throat, or set fire to their houses": "Of Cannibals," Essays i, 31, Montaigne, OC, 212f., tr. 159.

ROUSSEAU'S NOTES

In the editions of the Discourse published during Rousseau's lifetime, these Notes were numbered in the following puzzling sequence: (*), (*2), (*3), (*4), 4, 5, (*d), 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, (*b), 11, 12, 13, (*c), 14, 15. The familiar consecutive numbering from i to xix was first introduced in the posthumous 1782 Moulton-Du Peyrou Collection complète des ouvrages de J.-J. Rousseau; Meier, Diskurs/Discours, pp. lixviii, 501; Thierry, "Histoire, Description et Analyse du Discours," p. 260; R. A. Leigh has the consecutive numbering begin in 1764: CC IV, 426, note (a). Meier has called particular attention to the odd original numbering, and he has rightly stressed that it is not likely to have gone unnoticed by Rousseau, who was extremely punctilious about typography, punctuation, and similar details. Yet he chose not to alter this singular sequence although he could easily have done so. Attentive readers should therefore be aware of it. So far no one has offered a plausible explanation of it. The fact that it is odd of course does not prove that it admits of an explanation, let alone of one that must provide the clue to the Discourse's esoteric teaching.

Rousseau had very pointedly called attention to the importance he attaches to these Notes in a Notice immediately following the Preface (p. 129 above).

1 Herodotus relates in Histories III, 83, the restriction placed on this privilege was that Otanes and his descendants not transgress the laws of the realm.

N II [2] de la Nature de l'homme Buffon's Of the Nature of Man (1749), OP, p. 293 a, Duchet edition, p. 39. Georges-Louis Leclerc, who early assumed the name Buffon, began publishing his monumental and influential Natural History in 1749. The first volume dealt with The History and Theory of the Earth. It was immediately censured by the ecclesiastical authorities as "containing principles and maxims not in conformity with those of Religion" (Buffon, OP, pp. 106f.). Buffon thereupon issued a public statement, the first article of which reads: "I declare that (1) I had no intention of contradicting the text of Scripture, and I very firmly believe what is related regarding Creation, both with respect to the order of time and to the factual circumstances; and that I renounce everything in my book that pertains to the formation of the earth, and in general everything that might be contrary to the narration of Moses, as I presented my hypothesis about the formation of the planets only as a pure philosophical suggestion" (OP, p. 108).

Rousseau's Note II quotes the opening paragraph of the third volume of Buffon's Natural History, Of the Nature of Man, a work which in many particulars influenced this Discourse. However, Buffon did not agree with all of Rousseau's arguments and conclusions: the Observations forwarded to Rousseau in Le Roy's name (pp. 229f. above), were presumably Buffon's own; and in subsequent volumes of the Natural History he challenges features of Rousseau's account of the "pure" state of nature (see Editorial Note to Languages 9 [32]*, p. 403 below).

N III [1] the Child found in 1344. The episode is reported by Barbeyrac in Pufendorf, Droit ii, 2, § ii, n. 1, where he also tells of another feral child found in 1661. The Child found in 1694. The episode is, as Rousseau says, reported by Condillac, Essay i, pt. IV, ch. 2, § 23; Rousseau quotes from that report in Note i [7]. The Little Savage of Hanover Known as "Peter"; about whom see James Burnett, Lord Monboddo, Ancient Metaphysics (London, 1784), iii, BK ii, ch. 1; and Joh. Fr. Blumenbach, The Anthropological Treatises, translated by Th. Bendyshe (London, 1863), pp. 319-340. In 1719 two more . . . in the Pyrenees It is not clear to which cases Rousseau is here referring; see, however, regarding them, F. Tinland, L'Homme sauvage (Paris, 1698), pp. 65f.; Tinland also very fully and illuminatingly reviews the known cases of feral children as well as the issues of comparative anatomy which Rousseau raises, especially in the Notes to this Discourse. In connection with Rousseau's argument in this Note, it might be pointed out that Linnaeus had classified man as a quadruped; Rousseau, instead, accepts the traditional view that the upright posture
is natural to man: see, for example, Socrates in Xenophon, *Memorabilia* 1, 4, ix; and in Plato, *Cratylius* 399 b–c; *Timeaus*, 90 a; and Aristotle in *History of Animals* 1, 15, 494a 27–35; *Parts of Animals* 4, 10, 680b 26–35.


N IV [2] *Arabia Petraea* The northwestern section of the Arabian peninsula, and extending beyond it to include Sinai.

N V Dicaearchus (fl. 300 bc), disciple of Aristotle's. St. Jerome (348–420), the Church Father best remembered for his Latin or Vulgate translation of the Bible; the passage from his *Against Jovinianus* II, § 13, which Rousseau here cites, is quoted by Barbevac in his edition of Grotius's *Right* II, 2, § ii, n. 13 (Morel, "Recherches sur les sources du Discours," p. 161); however, Rousseau omits Dicaearchus's equation of the age of Saturn with the golden age. The sentence immediately following the quote, This opinion... was added in the 1782 edition. The reference is to François Corrèal, *Voyage aux Indes Occidentales* 1, 2. The Lucayes are the Bahamas.

N VI [3] "The Hottentots," says Kolben In the digest of his book in the *Histoire des Voyages* (1746–1781), a twenty-volume collection of travelers' reports, begun under the editorship of the Abbé Prévost; P. Kolben's *Description du Cap de Bonne Espérance* (3 vol., Amsterdam, 1741; German original, 1719) is summarized in vol. v; Rousseau is quoting somewhat freely from ch. 3, pp. 155f.


N VI [7] In the year 1746, an Indian The episode is, as Rousseau remarks, reported in Jacques Gautier d'Agoty's (1710–1785) periodical *Observations sur l'histoire naturelle, la physique et la peinture*, published in Paris between 1752 and 1758 (i, 262). The 1782 edition of the *Discourse* has the Indian's proposal addressed to the Government instead of to the Governor.

N VII "The Life-span of Horses," says M. de Buffon In *Histoire Naturelle* (1754), iv, 226f; this volume also contains the important article "Donkey," in which Buffon sets forth his influential definition of "species:" a constant succession of individuals that are similar [semblables] and reproduce" (Buffon, *Op.,* p. 756 a 52–54).

N IX [1] A famous Author Probably Pierre Moreau de Maupertuis (1698–1759), *Essai de philosophie morale* (Berlin, 1749), ch. 2. In this important Note Rousseau traces some of the connections between the *First* and the *Second Discourses*; and raises many of the issues which he discusses at greater length in the *Letter to the Voltaire*, above.

N IX [2] not a single commercial house... dishonest debtor "Dishonesty" added in 1782. London fire In 1666, which was said to have destroyed as much as four-fifths of the city; Mandeville makes much the same point, using the London fire and other instances which Rousseau also adduces in this indictment of society ("A Search into the Nature of Society," in *The Fable of the Bees*, edited by Kaye, vol. 1, p. 359). Montaigne blames "One man's Profit Is Another's Harm," *Essays*, 1, 22, Montaigne, *OC* 105, tr. 76f. Demades Athenian orator, executed in 319 bc.

N IX [4] poisonous utensils Rousseau shared the widely held view that copper pots are noxious; see his the *Letter* he addressed to Raynal, which was published in the *Mercure de France*, July 1755, pp. 5–13 (CC II, 221–227, no. 200).

N IX [6] But are there not This paragraph and the first sentence of the next paragraph were added in the 1782 edition.


N IX [14] What, then? Must Societies be destroyed Rousseau added this concluding paragraph while the book was in page proof (Letter to his publisher Rey, 23 February 1755, *CC* III, 103, no. 279). a precept indifferent in itself In all likelihood refers to the precept or warning not to eat the fruit of the tree of knowledge of good and evil (Genesis 2:17, 3:5, 3:22, 23). Rousseau discusses this precept and the failure to heed it—in other words the Christian Theologians' Fall—in an important note of the *Letter à M. de Beaumont*, Archbishop of Paris, which he wrote in response to that Prelate's condemnation of the *Emile*: "To demur against a useless and arbitrary prohibition is a natural inclination, but which, far from being in itself vicious, conforms to the order of things and to man's good constitution, since he would be unable to attend to his preservation if he had not a very lively love for himself and for the conservation of all his rights and privileges, as he received them from nature. He who could do anything would wish nothing but what would be useful to him; but a feeble Being, whose power is further limited and restrained by law, loses a part of himself, and in his heart he reclaims what he is being deprived of. To impute this to him as a crime is to impute to him as a crime that he is what he is and not some other being; it would be to wish at one and the same time that he be and not be. For this reason, the command infringed by Adam appears to me to have been not so much a true prohibition as a paternal advice; a warning to abstain from a pernicious and deadly
fruit. Surely this idea conforms better to the idea one should have regarding God’s goodness, and even to the text of Genesis, than to the ideas which Divines are pleased to prescribe to us; for with regard to the threat of the twofold death, it has been shown that the expression morte morieris has not the emphatic meaning which they attach to it, and is only an hebraism that is [also] used elsewhere [in Scripture], where such an emphasis would be out of place” (OC iv, 939f., n.). The Vulgate’s morte morieris, King James’s thou shalt surely die (Genesis 2:17 and 3:4), attempts to render faithfully the Hebrew cognate accusative “dying you will die”%; for the same construction, see, for example, Genesis 1:11, Joel 2:22; on these texts, see Robert Sacks, A Commentary on the Book of Genesis (Edwin Mellen Press, Lewiston, 1991). They will love their kind its aimeraent leurs semblables brings to mind, especially in the present context, the biblical precept to love one’s neighbor, Leviticus 19:18 (cp. Mark 12:28–34, Luke 10:25–28, Matthew 22:34–40); but it also recalls the reference at the beginning of this long and difficult sentence to the “men like myself” or “men of my kind,” the hommes semblables à moi.

N x [1] Nations of men of gigantic size Traditionally, the Patagonians, about whom see Note x [11]; about giants, see also Languages 3 [3] and Editorial Note. Pygmies Homer Iliad, iii, 6; Aristotle, History of Animals viii., 12, 597a 6–10; Edward Tyson, Orang-outang, sive Homo Sylvestris, or the anatomie of a Pygmie compared with that of a monkey, an ape, and a man; to which is added a Philosophical Essay concerning the Cynocephali, the satyrs and sphinges of the ancients, wherein it will appear that they are all, either apes or monkeys, and not men as formerly pretended (London, 1690). In spite of his title, Tyson evidently studied a chimpanzee (see Franck Tinland, L’Homme sauvage, pp. 104–110). Laplanders... Greenwichers... Peoples with tails Buffon, De la nature de l’homme, Duchet edition, pp. 223–226, 242–244. Ctesias (fl. c. 400 B.C.) Physician at the court of King Artaxerxes II of Persia, he wrote a work on Persia and another on India, only fragments of which survive.

N x [2] the Kingdom of the Congo The present Zaire. The translator of the Histoire des Voyages Samuel Purchas (1577–1626) in Purchas, His Pilgrimage; or Relations of the World and the Religion Observed in All Ages (London, 1613 and 1625). Orang-outangs are, of course, not found in Africa, but only in Borneo and Sumatra. Andrew Battel An English merchant (c. 1565–1645) whose adventure-filled accounts of Brazil and Angola Purchas recorded. Mayomba Mountain in central Congo or Zaire. Kingdom of Loango North of the mouth of the Congo River. Pongo Gorillas. Enjokos As Purchas remarks at the end of the next paragraph, Battel did not describe these “monsters.”

N x [4] Olfert Dapper Dutch physician and geographer (d. 1690), whose Description de l’Afrique Purchas summarized. If, as it appears, the animal sent to Prince Frederick-Henry of Orange (1584–1647) is the same as that described by Nicholas Tulp, then it was, in all likelihood, a chimpanzee (see Tinland, L’Homme sauvage, pp. 103f.). Jerome Merolla (c.1650 – c.1710), whose account of the Congo, where he spent ten years as a Franciscan missionary, appeared in 1692.

N x [5] These... Anthropomorphic animals... in the third volume Rousseau evidently erred; the descriptions are found in vol. iv of the Histoire des Voyages (Starobinski). Beggos and Mandrills Respectively, the natives’ and the Europeans’ name for what here probably is either a chimpanzees or a gorilla. Monsters... Yet... reproduce in the vocabulary of the time, “monster” still commonly refers to an animal or plant that cannot reproduce; see Rousseau’s Letters on Botany vii, OC iv, 1188; cp. Lucretius, On the Nature of Things v, 845–848. Pongos... fires contrast Languages 9 [29]°. Throughout Rousseau’s discussion in this and subsequent Notes, it must be kept in mind that any twentieth-century reader will have seen and read about more varieties of monkeys and apes than had the most intrepid and learned scholars of Rousseau’s time. However, Rousseau and all his contemporaries knew that “orang-outang” means “man of the woods” in Malay (N x [4]), and hence in Latin homo sylvestris; which is what, for example, Lucretius called the first men (v, 967, 970); thus the name alone tended to prejudice the question at issue, especially for all those who had never so much as seen a single great ape; and the learned and careful Tyson thought he had dissected an orang when he had spent his labors on a chimpanzee.

N x [6] are neither beasts nor gods, but men Added in 1782.

N x [7] What would have been... Child found in 1694 Mentioned in Note iii [11] above. gave no sign... Cradle is a direct quote from Condillac, Essay pt. 1, sec. IV, ch. 2, § 23. Immediately after If, unfortunately for him, Rousseau inserted by hand “or fortunately” in the copy of the Discourse which he presented to Davenport.

N x [9] The Platos, the Thales, and the Pythagoras All three philosophers traveled extensively.

Editorial notes to pages 212–213

“All the South-American languages with which I had any acquaintance are extremely poor; some are energetic and can be elegant, but all lack terms to express abstract and universal ideas; a clear proof of the little progress made by these people. Time, duration, space, being, substance, matter, body; all these and many other words are without equivalent in their languages; not only the names of metaphysical beings, but those of moral beings can be rendered among them only imperfectly and only with the help of elaborate circumlocutions. There is no proper term corresponding to the terms virtue, justice, freedom, gratitude, ingratitude” (pp. 53f.; reprint, pp. 62f.). In the Emile, Rousseau quotes La Condamine’s report (Relation abrégée, pp. 56f.; reprint, pp. 68f.) about a people that could count only up to three, although, as Rousseau adds, they had of course seen the five fingers on their hand (OC iv, 572n., tr. 271n.). Pierre Louis Moreau de Maupertuis (1698–1759) led a scientific expedition to Lapland and reported on that journey in his Relation d’un voyage au fond de la Laponie. Jean Chardin (1643–1713), who journeyed through Persia as far as India between 1671 and 1681, afterwards settled in London, was created baronet by Charles II, and became the British chargé d’affaires and agent of the East India Company in Holland; he published a widely read Travels in Persia and the East Indies (1686). Englebert Kaempfer (1651–1716), German physician who spent some years in the Far East, from whose papers a posthumous History of Japan and Siam was compiled (London 1728; French translation, expanded, Amsterdam, 1729). Charles Pinot Dulong (1704–1772), member of the French Academy, whose commentary on the Port Royal Grammar at least in part inspired the Essay on the Origin of Languages, was to prove one of Rousseau’s steadiest friends; Rousseau dedicated his early opera The Village Soothsayer to him, and he entrusted to him one of the manuscripts of his late, apologetic Dialogues: Rousseau juge de Jean Jacques. Malabar Province of southwestern India, now part of Kerala. Pegu Formerly a kingdom, and now a province north of Rangoon. Ava City, southwest of Mandalay, which for four hundred years was the capital of what is now Myanmar (formerly Burma). Tucumán Province of northern Argentina.

N xi [1]–[2] Locke’s Civil Government Or Second Treatise of Government, ch. 7, “Of Civil or Political Society,” §§ 79, 80. We have translated the text Rousseau published; it departs only slightly from the French version which he consulted: Du gouvernement civil, in a translation attributed to David Mazel, first published in 1691 by Wolfgang, Amsterdam. Mazel’s translation omits Chapter 1 of Locke’s Second Treatise with its summary of the First Treatise and its definition of political power. It begins with the chapter entitled “Of the State of Nature.”

Where Mazel’s translation of Locke reads
to feed on grass
is de facto commonly with child
the wisdom of the great creator

Rousseau writes
to graze the grass
is commonly with child
the wisdom of the creator

All other divergences between Locke’s original and Rousseau’s version are due to the published French translation available to Rousseau; a number of them are noteworthy, and the reader may wish to compare the text published here with Locke’s text.

N xii [5] the Horse . . . the Stag, or all other Quadrupeds In 1782, this reads “Quadruped animals.” Live exclusively off grass In 1782, this reads “off grasses.”


N xiv Plato, showing In the Republic vii, 522d. Palamedes was one of the Greek leaders in the Trojan War; in Languages 5 [11] Rousseau refers to the tradition that credits him with also having added some letters to the alphabet. In connection with the issue raised in Note xiv, see also the passages from La Condamine cited on p. 376 above.

N xv [1] Amour propre and amour de soi-même Rousseau here for the first time, and succinctly, formulates the contrast between the two forms of love of self that is so basic to his entire moral psychology. He develops and illustrates it in all of his subsequent writings, even when he does not explicitly refer to either passion by name. Partly for this reason, it is difficult to single out specific passages for special notice; still, see, among others: Emile iv, OC iv, 494 and context, and 547f., tr. 214f., 252f.; Dialogues, OC i, 66f., 785f., 805–807; Pol. Ec. [30], [36] et seq.; Cosmica, OC iii, 937f.; and this Discourse, ii [52].

N XVI [4] "All the efforts of the Dutch Missionaries . . ." The story is told by Peter Kolben, and may, as Rousseau indicates, be found in the Histoire des voyages.
N XIX Distributive justice Distributes, as Rousseau indicates, honors and assigns rank in proportion to contributions to the polity: Aristotle’s classic statement of the issues (Nicomachean Ethics v, 2, 1130b 30–33, v, 3, 1131a 23–28; and Politics III, 12, 13) is reported by Pufendorf (Droit i, 7, § xii and Man and Citizen i, 2, § xiv); Pufendorf further discusses distributive justice at length in Droit (1, 7, §§ ix–xiii), and in the course of that discussion (1, 7, § xi, n. 4) he quotes the passage from Isocrates (Aeropaegiticus 21f.), which Rousseau also quotes in this Note. Regarding the role of Roman Censors, cp. SC iv 7. rigorous right, or right strictly and narrowly so called, is right or justice that may appropriately be legislated and enforced, in contrast to what virtue and equity might require: this distinction between distributive justice and rigorous right is introduced by Grotius, Right, Proleg. §§ viii–x and 1, 1, §§ v–viii, followed by Hobbes, De cive iii, 6 and xiv, 6f.; see also Pufendorf, Droit i, 2, § viii; Burlamaqui, Droit naturel i, 11, § xi; and Rousseau’s Letter to d’Alembert (OC v, p. 61; Fuchs edn., p. 89; tr. Bloom p. 66).

The issue briefly raised in this Note, the relation between morals and law, is central to both Discourses, but also to the Essay on the Origin of Languages, and indeed to the whole of Rousseau’s moral and political thought.

LETTER TO PHILOPOLIS (PAGES 223–228)

This letter replies to the main points raised in a quite thoughtful criticism of the Discourse on Inequality published in the October 1755 issue of the Mercure de France over the signature "Philopolis," or "Patriot." Socrates’s accuser Meletus had called himself "philopolis" (Plato, Apology of Socrates, 24b 5). The pseudonym was chosen for the occasion by Charles Bonnet (1720–1793), a well-known naturalist, scion of a patrician Geneva family, and himself for many years a member of his city’s ruling council, the Two Hundred. Bonnet disapproved of Rousseau’s views from the first, and he eventually played an active part in having the Social Contract and the Emile condemned by Geneva. He also urged his fellow scientist Albrecht von Haller, of Berne, to get that city to expel Rousseau after he had taken refuge in its territory. Rousseau later described Bonnet as a man who, “though a materialist, is of a most intolerant orthodoxy wherever I am concerned” (Conf. xi, OC 1, 652).

Rousseau clearly thought of this Letter as an authoritative statement of his views. Although he did not publish it, he did make a clean copy of it, and a letter of Bonnet’s in 1763 indicates that he had learned of the existence and of the tone, if not of the contents, of Rousseau’s reply.


[10] the Leibnizian . . . Philosophy Bonnet had read Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz’s (1646–1716) Theodicy (1710) some years earlier, and in his Mémoires autobiographiques he tells of the lasting impression it had made on him.

[11] According to Leibniz Who argued that this is the best of possible worlds – e.g., Theodicy, Essays on the Goodness of God . . . i §§ 8–10 et passim and to Alexander Pope (1688–1744), whose Essay on Man defends the thesis “Whatever is, is right” (Essay, Epistle i, line 294, Epistle iv, line 394). . . things may be good relative to the whole, though evil in themselves. What contributes to the general good may be a particular evil . . . On this basic issue, see Letter to Voltaire [24] together with its Editorial Note, as well as the Introduction, p. xxvii above.


[14] the monkey . . . the Orang-outang See Second Discourse, Note x, especially the first half of that long note.

[15] very powerful reasons for not choosing that kind of life See especially the Replies to criticisms of the First Discourse, and Second Discourse N IX [14].

[16] to be saints Rousseau had, of course, written sains or "healthy," and not saints or "saintly," and Bonnet had clearly understood him correctly. It is to be hoped that Rousseau would not have let stand this gratuitous remark if he had revised the text for publication; the passage in question occurs in Second Discourse i [9], above.


[19] the Populace, to which M. Rousseau attributes Cp. Second Discourse i [37]. Seide murder his Father Sheik Zopire, while at prayer, but without knowing it was his father he was murdering: Voltaire,
Fanaticism, or Mohammed the Prophet (1741). Thyestes drink his son’s blood in Crébillon’s Atreus and Thyestes (1707). Thyestes caused his brother Atreus to kill his own son; in revenge Atreus killed Thyestes’s son and, at a banquet, offered him a goblet with the son’s blood. [20] I had said so in the Second Discourse I [25].

REPLY TO LE ROY (pages 229–231)

Rousseau jotted down this reply at the bottom of the pages of a note by Charles-Georges Le Roy (1723–1789), Master of the King’s Hunt, the author of several entries in the Encyclopedia, and of the anonymously published Lettres philosophiques sur l’intelligence et la perfectibilité des animaux (1768, expanded 1781; and again in 1802). Le Roy was a childhood friend of Helvétius, and it was he who hatched and largely carried out the scheme of getting De l’esprit past the censors.

Le Roy’s note had been forwarded to Rousseau by Condillac who, in a covering letter, indicated that Buffon agreed with these objections if, indeed, he was not their author (CC IV, 98f., 7 September 1756, no. 434). The objections are aimed at Rousseau’s suggestion that man may not by nature be carnivorous; and, more generally, at his premise that everything in nature is well ordered. “Make sure of your facts, and perhaps you will find that it is not the case that everything is well ordered.” Rousseau speaks to this issue most fully in the Lettre à Voltaire; see also the Editorial Note to Languages 9 [32].

Le Roy’s criticisms and Rousseau’s Replies to them were first published by Vaughan, under the title “Reply to a Naturalist,” Rousseau, vol. 1, app. 1, pp. 512f. R. A. Leigh identified the writer of the criticisms, and he includes a full critical edition of the relevant texts in CC IV, app. A 172, pp. 423–426; as does Meier in Diskurs/Discour, pp. 482–489.


LETTER TO VOLTAIRE (pages 232–246)

Voltaire was moved by the terrible earthquake which struck Lisbon in 1755, and which wreaked such widespread destruction and caused the death of so many thousands of people, to write a long Poème sur le désastre de Lisbonne, au examen de cet axiome: “tou est bien” (Poem on the Lisbon Disaster, or examination of the axiom “All is Good”). It was published together with an earlier poem on natural law in March 1756. Rousseau received a copy of these Poèmes sur le désastre de Lisbonne et sur la loi naturelle in July. He recounts the circumstances surrounding his writing this Letter in response to Voltaire’s poems in Conf. IX (OC I, 429–430), and of its publication in Conf. X (OC I, 539–542). For full details, see R. A. Leigh, “Rousseau’s Letter to Voltaire on Optimism,” Studies on Voltaire and the Eighteenth Century (1964), 30:247–259, summarized in CC IV, 50–59; and in B. Gugnepin’s “Notice bibliographique,” OC IV, 1880–1884. Voltaire acknowledged Rousseau’s Letter in a brief, conciliatory note (12 September 1756, CC IV, 102, no. 437), in which he did not speak to the issues which Rousseau had raised in his Letter. Rousseau believed that Voltaire wrote Candide as his full reply to the Letter (Conf. IX, OC I, 430).

The Letter has most recently been edited by R. A. Leigh in CC IV, 37–84; by Henri Gouhier in OC IV, 1059–1075; by Theodore Besterman in his Oeuvres complètes de Voltaire, vol. I (Correspondance, vol. XVII) (The Voltaire Foundation at the Taylor Institution, Oxford, 1971), pp. 280–297; and by Gilbert Fauconnier in Études Rousseauistes et index J.-J. Rousseau, Série B, vol. V (Slatkine, Geneva, 1979), pp. 152–159. The present translation is based on the OC version of the text; departures from it are flagged in the Editorial Notes; the Notes also reproduce variant readings that might be of interest to attentive readers who are not Rousseau specialists.

[1] I do not know at whose instance these might have come to me, if not yours. Voltaire had indeed asked to have copies sent to Diderot, to d’Alembert, and to Rousseau. Charles Duclos had asked to be the one who would transmit Rousseau’s copy to him: Thieriot to Voltaire, 6 July 1756.

[2] You charge Pope and Leibniz with insulting our evils by maintaining that all is well (or: good). “All is right [or: good]” translates tout est bien, the formula by which contemporary French translators rendered Pope’s “whatever is, is right” (An Essay on Man, Epistle I, line 294, Epistle IV, line 394). However, tout est bien becomes a formula in its own right and with its own meaning in Voltaire’s Poem, and especially in Rousseau’s Letter. For bien (n., adv.), bon (adj.), i.e. “good” and “well,” are central to his understanding of man and of his place in the scheme of things. A further reason for preserving an explicit reference to “good” in translating tout est bien is that both Voltaire and Rousseau are concerned not only with Pope’s dictum, but also with Leibniz’s proposition that this is “the best (optimum) of all possible worlds” (Theodic 1, §§ 8–10 et passim). The same difficulties that surround the attempt to translate bon and bien surround the