'romantic' approach served as a stimulus for new ideas and departures, and then once again dropped out of the sciences. But in our period it cannot be neglected.

If it cannot be neglected as a purely scientific stimulus, it can be even less neglected by the historian of ideas and opinions, for whom even absurd and false ideas are facts and historical forces. We cannot write off a movement which captured or influenced men of the highest intellectual calibre, such as Goethe, Hegel and the young Marx. We can merely seek to understand the deep dissatisfaction with the 'classical' eighteenth-century Anglo-French view of the world, whose titanic achievements in science and in society were undeniable, but whose narrowness and limitations were also increasingly evident in the period of the two revolutions. To be aware of these limits and to seek, often by intuition rather than analysis, the terms in which a more satisfactory picture of the world could be constructed, was not actually to construct it. Nor were the visions of an evolutionary, interconnected, dialectical universe which the natural philosophers expressed, proofs or even adequate formulations. But they reflected real problems—even real problems in the physical sciences—and they anticipated the transformations and extensions of the world of sciences which have produced our modern scientific universe. And in their way they reflected the impact of the dual revolution, which left no aspect of human life unchanged.

CHAPTER 16
CONCLUSION: TOWARDS 1848

Posperism and proletarianism are the suppurating ulcers which have sprung from the organism of the modern states. Can they be healed? The communist doctors propose the complete destruction and annihilation of the existing organism. . . . One thing is certain, if these men gain the power to act, there will be not a political but a social revolution, a war against all property, a complete anarchy. Would this in turn give way to new national states, and on what moral and social foundations? Who shall lift the veil of the future? And what part will be played by Russia? 'I sit on the shore and wait for the wind,' says an old Russian proverb.

Haxthausen, Studien ueber . . . Russland (1847)

I

We began by surveying the state of the world in 1789. Let us conclude by glancing at it some fifty years later, at the end of the most revolutionary half-century in the history recorded up to that date.

It was an age of superlatives. The numerous new compendia of statistics in which this era of counting and calculation sought to record all aspects of the known world* could conclude with justice that virtually every measurable quantity was greater (or smaller) than ever before. The known, mapped and intercommunicating area of the world was larger than ever before, its communications unbelievably speedier. The population of the world was greater than ever before; in several cases greater beyond all expectation or previous probability. Cities of vast size multiplied faster than ever before. Industrial production reached astronomic figures: in the 1840s something like 640 million tons of coal were hacked from the interior of the earth. They were exceeded only by the even more extraordinary figures for international commerce, which had multiplied fourfold since 1780 to reach something like 800 millions of pound sterling's worth, and very much more in the currency of less solid and stable units of currency.

Science had never been more triumphant; knowledge had never

* About fifty major compendia of this type were published between 1790 and 1848, not counting the statistics of governments (censuses, official enquiries, etc.) or the numerous new specialist or economic journals filled with statistical tables.
been more widespread. Over four thousand newspapers informed the citizens of the world and the number of books published annually in Britain, France, Germany and the USA alone ran well into five figures. Human invention was climbing more dazzling peaks every year. The Argand lamp (1782-4) had barely revolutionized artificial lighting—it was the first major advance since the oil-lamp and candle—when the gigantic laboratories known as gasworks, sending their products through endless subterranean pipes, began to illuminate the factories* and soon after the cities of Europe: London from 1807, Dublin from 1818, Paris from 1819, even remote Sydney in 1841. And already the electric arc-light was known. Professor Wheatstone of London was already planning to link England with France by means of a submarine electric telegraph. Forty-eight millions of passengers already used the railways of the United Kingdom in a single year (1843). Men and women could already be hurled along three thousand (1846)—before 1850 along over six thousand—miles of line in Great Britain, along nine thousand in the USA. Regular steamship services already linked Europe and America, Europe and the Indies.

No doubt these triumphs had their dark side, though these were not so readily to be summarized in statistical tables. How was one to find quantitative expression for the fact, which few would today deny, that the Industrial Revolution created the ugliest world in which man has ever lived, as the grim and stinking, fog-bound back streets of Manchester already testified? Or, by uprooting men and women in unprecedented numbers and depriving them of the certainties of the ages, probably the unhappiest world? Nevertheless, we can forgive the champions of progress in the 1840s their confidence and their determination 'that commerce may go freely forth, leading civilization with one hand, and peace with the other, to render mankind happier, wiser, better'. 'Sir,' said Lord Palmerston, continuing this lofty statement in the blackest of years, 1842, 'this is the dispensation of Providence.' Nobody could deny that there was poverty of the most shocking kind. Many held that it was even increasing and deepening. And yet, by the all-time criteria which measured the triumphs of industry and science, could even the gloomiest of rational observers maintain that in material terms it was worse than at any time in the past, or even than in unindustrialized countries in the present? He could not. It was sufficiently bitter accusation that the material prosperity of the labouring poor was often no better than in the dark past, and sometimes worse than in periods within living memory. The champions of progress attempted

* Boulton and Watt introduced it in 1796, the cotton-mills of Philips and Lee in Manchester permanently employed a thousand burners from 1805.

CONCLUSION: TOWARDS 1848

to fend it off with the argument that this was due not to the operations of the new bourgeois society, but on the contrary to the obstacles which the old feudalism, monarchy and aristocracy still placed in the way of perfect free enterprise. The new socialists, on the contrary, held that it was due to the very operations of that system. But both agreed that these were growing-pains. The ones held that they would be overcome within the framework of capitalism, the others that they were not likely to be, but both rightly believed that human life faced a prospect of material improvement to equal the advance in man's control over the forces of nature.

When we come to analyse the social and political structure of the world in the 1840s, however, we leave the world of superlatives for that of modest qualified statements. The bulk of the world's inhabitants continued to be peasants as before, though there were a few areas—notably Britain—where agriculture was already the occupation of a small minority, and the urban population already on the verge of exceeding the rural, as it did for the first time in the census of 1851. There were proportionately fewer slaves, for the international slave-trade had been officially abolished in 1815 and actual slavery in the British colonies in 1834, and in the liberated Spanish and French ones in and after the French Revolution. However, while the West Indies were now, with some non-British exceptions, an area of legally free agriculture, numerically slavery continued to expand in its two great remaining strongholds, Brazil and the Southern USA, stimulated by the very progress of industry and commerce which opposed all restraints of goods and persons, and official prohibition made the slave trade more lucrative. The approximate price of a field-hand in the American South was 300 dollars in 1795 but between 1,200 and 1,800 dollars in 1860; the number of slaves in the USA rose from 700,000 in 1790 to 2,500,000 in 1840 and 3,200,000 in 1850. They still came from Africa, but were also increasingly bred for sale within the slave-owning area, e.g. the border states of the USA for sale to the rapidly expanding cotton-belt.

Moreover, already systems of semi-slavery like the export of 'indentured labour' from India to the sugar-islands of the Indian Ocean and the West Indies were developing.

Serfdom or the legal bonding of peasants had been abolished over a large part of Europe, though this had made little difference to the actual situation of the rural poor in such areas of traditional latifundist cultivation as Sicily or Andalusia. However, serfdom persisted in its chief European strongholds, though after great initial expansion its numbers remained steady in Russia at between ten and eleven million
males after 1811, that is to say it declined in relative terms. Nevertheless, serf agriculture (unlike slave agriculture) was clearly on the decline, its economic disadvantages being increasingly evident, and—especially from the 1840s—the rebelliousness of the peasantry being increasingly marked. The greatest serf rising was probably that in Austrian Galicia in 1846, the prelude to general emancipation by the 1848 revolution. But even in Russia there were 148 outbreaks of peasant unrest in 1826-34, 216 in 1835-44, 348 in 1844-54, culminating in the 474 outbreaks of the last years preceding the emancipation of 1861.†

At the other end of the social pyramid, the position of the landed aristocrat also changed less than might have been thought, except in countries of direct peasant revolution like France. No doubt there were now countries—France and the USA for instance—where the richest men were no longer landed proprietors (except so far as they also bought themselves estates as a badge of their entry into the highest class, like the Rothschilds). However, even in Britain in the 1840s the greatest concentrations of wealth were certainly still those of the peerage, and in the Southern USA the cotton-planters even created for themselves a provincial caricature of aristocratic society, inspired by Walter Scott, 'chivalry', ‘romance’ and other concepts which had little bearing in the negro slaves on whom they fattened and the red-necked puritan farmers eating their maize and fat pork. Of course aristocratic firmness concealed a change: noble incomes increasingly depended on the industry, the stocks and shares, the real estate developments of the despised bourgeoisie.

The 'middle classes', of course, had increased rapidly, but their numbers even so were not overwhelmingly large. In 1801 there had been about 100,000 tax-payers earning above £150 a year in Britain, at the end of our period there may have been about 340,000; say with large families, a million and a half persons out of a total population of 21 millions (1851).† Naturally the number of those who sought to follow middle class standards and ways of life was very much larger. Not all these were very rich; a good guess‡ is that the number of those earning over £5,000 a year was about 4,000—which includes the aristocracy; a figure not too incompatible with that of the presumable employers of the 7,579 domestic coachmen who adorned the British streets. We may assume that the proportion of the ‘middle classes’ in

* The extension of scolion under Catherine II and Paul (1762-1801) increased it from about 3.8 million males to 10.4 millions in 1811.¶
† Such estimates are arbitrary, but assuming that everyone classifiable in the middle class, kept at least one servant, the 674,000 female ‘general domestic servants’ in 1811 gives something beyond the maximum of ‘middle class’ households, the roughly 50,000 cooks (the numbers of household and housekeepers were about the same) a minimum.
‡ By the eminent statistician William Farr in the Statistical Journal, 1857, p. 102.

other countries was not notably higher than this, and indeed was generally rather lower.

The working class (including the new proletariat of factory, mine, railway, etc.) naturally grew at the fastest rate of all. Nevertheless, except in Britain it could at best be counted in hundreds of thousands rather than millions. Measured against the total population of the world, it was still a numerically negligible, and in any case—except once again for Britain and small nuclei elsewhere—an unorganized one. Yet, as we have seen, its political importance was already immense, and quite disproportionate to its size or achievements.

The political structure of the world was also very considerably transformed by the 1840s; and yet by no means as much as the sanguine (or pessimistic) observer might have anticipated in 1800. Monarchy still remained overwhelmingly the most common mode of governing states, except on the American continent; and even there one of the largest countries (Brazil) was an Empire, and another (Mexico) had at least experimented with imperial titles under General Iturbide (Augustin I) from 1822 to 1833. It is true that several European kingdoms, including France, could now be described as constitutional monarchies, but outside a band of such régimes along the eastern edge of the Atlantic, absolute monarchy prevailed everywhere. It is true that there were by the 1840s several new states, the product of revolution; Belgium, Serbia, Greece and a quivering of Latin American ones. Yet, though Belgium was an industrial power of importance (admittedly to a large extent because it moved in the wake of its greater French neighbour*), the most important of the revolutionary states was the one which had already existed in 1799, the USA. It enjoyed two immense advantages: the absence of any strong neighbours or rival powers which could, or indeed wanted to, prevent its expansion across the huge continent to the Pacific—the French had actually sold it an area as large as the then USA in the ‘Louisiana Purchase’ of 1803—and an extraordinarily rapid rate of economic expansion. The former advantage was also shared by Brazil, which, separating peacefully from Portugal, escaped the fragmentation which a generation of revolutionary war brought to most of Spanish America; but its wealth of resources remained virtually unexploited.

Still, there had been great changes. Moreover, since about 1830 their momentum was visibly increasing. The revolution of 1830 introduced moderate liberal middle class constitutions—anti-democratic but equally plainly anti-aristocratic—in the chief states of Western Europe. There

* About a third of the Belgian coal and pig iron output was exported, almost entirely to France.
were no doubt compromises, imposed by the fear of a mass revolution which would go beyond moderate middle class aspirations. They left the landed classes over-represented in government, as in Britain, and large sectors of the new—and especially the most dynamic industrial—middle classes unrepresented, as in France. Yet they were compromises which decisively tilted the political balance towards the middle classes. On all matters that counted the British industrialists got their way after 1832; the capacity to abolish the corn-laws was well worth the absence from the more extreme republican and anti-clerical proposals of the Utilitarians. There can be no doubt that in Western Europe middle class Liberalism (though not democratic radicalism) was in the ascendancy. Its chief opponents—Conservatives in Britain, blocs generally rallying round the Catholic Church elsewhere—were on the defensive and knew it.

However, even radical democracy had made major advances. After fifty years of hesitation and hostility, the pressure of the frontiersmen and farmers had finally imposed it on the USA under President Andrew Jackson (1829-37), at roughly the same time as the European revolution regained its momentum. At the very end of our period (1847) a civil war between radicals and Catholics in Switzerland brought it to that country. But few among moderate middle class liberals as yet thought that this system of government, advocated mainly by left-wing revolutionaries, adapted, it seemed, at best for the rude petty producers and traders of mountain or prairie, would one day become the characteristic political framework of capitalism, defended as such against the onslaughts of the very people who were in the 1840s advocating it.

Only in international politics had there been an apparently wholesale and virtually unqualified revolution. The world of the 1840s was completely dominated by the European powers, political and economic, supplemented by the growing USA. The Opium War of 1839-42 had demonstrated that the only surviving non-European great power, the Chinese Empire, was helpless in the face of western military and economic aggression. Nothing, it seemed, could henceforth stand in the way of a few western gunboats or regiments bringing with them trade and bibles. And within this general western domination, Britain was supreme, thanks to her possession of more gunboats, trade and bibles than anyone else. So absolute was this British supremacy that it hardly needed political control to operate. There were no other colonial powers left, except by grace of the British, and consequently no rivals. The French empire was reduced to a few scattered islands and trading posts, though in the process of reviving itself across the Mediterranean in Algeria. The Dutch, restored in Indonesia under the watchful eye of the new British entrepôt of Singapore, no longer competed; the Spaniards retained Cuba, the Philippines and a few vague claims in Africa; the Portuguese colonies were rightly forgotten. British trade dominated the independent Argentina, Brazil and the Southern USA as much as the Spanish colony of Cuba or the British ones in India. British investments had their powerful stake in the Northern USA, and indeed wherever economic development took place. Never in the entire history of the world has a single power exercised a world hegemony like that of the British in the middle of the nineteenth century, for even the greatest empires or hegemonies of the past had been merely regional—the Chinese, the Mohammedan, the Roman. Never since then has any single power succeeded in re-establishing a comparable hegemony, nor indeed is any one likely to in the foreseeable future; for no power has since been able to claim the exclusive status of ‘workshop of the world’.

Nevertheless, the future decline of Britain was already visible. Intelligent observers even in the 1830s and 1840s, like de Tocqueville and Haxthausen, already predicted that the size and potential resources of the USA and Russia would eventually make them into the twin giants of the world; within Europe Germany (as Frederick Engels predicted in 1844) would also soon compete on equal terms. Only France had decisively dropped out of the competition for international hegemony, though this was not yet so evident as to reassure suspicious British and other statesmen.

In brief, the world of the 1840s was out of balance. The forces of economic, technical and social change released in the past half-century were unprecedented, and even to the most superficial observer, irresistible. Their institutional consequences, on the other hand, were as yet modest. It was, for instance, inevitable that sooner or later legal slavery and serfdom (except as relics in remote regions as yet untouched by the new economy) would have to go, as it was inevitable that Britain could not for ever remain the only industrialized country. It was inevitable that landed aristocracies and absolute monarchies must retreat in all countries in which a strong bourgeoisie was developing, whatever the political compromises or formulae found for retaining status, influence and even political power. Moreover, it was inevitable that the injection of political consciousness and permanent political activity among the masses, which was the great legacy of the French Revolution, must sooner or later mean that these masses were allowed to play a formal part in politics. And given the remarkable acceleration of social change since 1830, and the revival of the world revolutionary
movement, it was clearly inevitable that changes—whatever their precise institutional nature—could not be long delayed.*

All this would have been enough to give the men of the 1840s the consciousness of impending change. But not enough to explain, what was widely felt throughout Europe, the consciousness of impending social revolution. It was, significantly enough, not confined to revolutionaries, who expressed it with the greatest elaboration, nor to the ruling classes, whose fear of the masses of poor was never far below the surface in times of social change. The poor themselves felt it. The literate strata of the people expressed it. ‘All well-informed people,’ wrote the American consul from Amsterdam during the hunger of 1847, reporting the sentiments of the German emigrants passing through Holland, ‘express the belief that the present crisis is so deeply interwoven in the events of the present period that it is but the commencement of that great Revolution, which they consider sooner or later is to dissolve the present present constitution of things.’

The reason was that the crisis in what remained of the old society appeared to coincide with a crisis of the new. Looking back on the 1840s it is easy to think that the socialists who predicted the imminent crisis of capitalism were dreamers confusing their hopes with realistic prospects. For in fact what followed was not the breakdown of capitalism, but its most rapid and unchallenged period of expansion and triumph. Yet in the 1830s and 1840s it was far from evident that the new economy could or would overcome its difficulties which merely seemed to increase with its power to produce larger and larger quantities of goods by more and more revolutionary methods. Its very theorists were haunted by the prospect of the ‘stationary state’, that running down of the motive power which drove the economy forward, and which (unlike the theorists of the eighteenth century or those of the subsequent period) they believed to be imminent rather than merely in theoretical reserve. Its very champions were in two minds about its future. In France men who were to be the captains of high finance and heavy industry (the Saint-Simonians) were in the 1830s still undecided as to whether socialism or capitalism was the best way of achieving the triumph of the industrial society. In the USA men like Horace Greeley, who have become immortal as the prophets of individualist expansion (‘Go west, young man’ is his phrase), were in the 1840s adherents of utopian socialism, founding and expounding the merits of Fourier’s ‘Phalanxes’, those kibbutz-like communes which fit so badly into what

* This does not of course mean that all the precise changes then widely predicted were necessarily come about; for instance, the universal triumph of free trade of peace, of sovereign representative assemblies, or the disappearance of monarchs or the Roman Catholic Church.

CONCLUSION: TOWARDS 1848

is now thought to be ‘Americanism’. The very businessmen were desperate. It may in retrospect seem incomprehensible that Quaker businessmen like John Bright and successful cotton-manufacturers of Lancashire, in the midst of their most dynamic period of expansion, should have been prepared to plunge their country into chaos, hunger and riot by a general political lock-out, merely in order to abolish tariffs. Yet in the terrible year of 1841-2 it might well seem to the thoughtful capitalist that industry faced not merely inconvenience and loss, but general strangulation, unless the obstacles to its further expansion were immediately removed.

For the mass of the common people the problem was even simpler. As we have seen their condition in the large cities and manufacturing districts of Western and Central Europe pushed them inevitably towards social revolution. Their hatred of the rich and the great of that bitter world in which they lived, and their dream of a new and better world, gave their desperation eyes and a purpose, even though only some of them, mainly in Britain and France, were conscious of that purpose. Their organization or facility for collective action gave them power. The great awakening of the French Revolution had taught them that common men need not suffer injustices meekly: ‘the nations knew nothing before, and the people thought that kings were gods upon the earth and that they were bound to say that whatever they did was well done. Through this present change it is more difficult to rule the people.’

This was the ‘spectre of communism’ which haunted Europe, the fear of ‘the proletariat’ which affected not merely factory-owners in Lancashire or Northern France but civil servants in rural Germany, priests in Rome and professors everywhere. And with justice. For the revolution which broke out in the first months of 1848 was not a social revolution merely in the sense that it involved and mobilized all social classes. It was in the literal sense the rising of the labouring poor in the cities—especially the capital cities—of Western and Central Europe. Theirs, and theirs almost alone, was the force which toppled the old régimes from Palermo to the borders of Russia. When the dust settled on their ruins, workers—in France actually socialist workers—were seen to be standing on them, demanding not merely bread and employment, but a new state and society.

While the labouring poor stirred, the increasing weakness and obsolescence of the old régimes of Europe multiplied crises within the world of the rich and influential. In themselves these were not of great moment. Had they occurred at a different time, or in systems which allowed the different sections of the ruling classes to adjust their
THE AGE OF REVOLUTION

rivalries peaceably, they would no more have led to revolution than the perennial squabbles of court factions in eighteenth-century Russia led to the fall of Tsarism. In Britain and Belgium, for instance, there was plenty of conflict between agrarians and industrialists, and different sections of each. But it was clearly understood that the transformations of 1830-32 had decided the issue of power in favour of the industrialists, that nevertheless the political status quo could only be frozen at the risk of revolution, and that this must be avoided at all costs. Consequently the bitter struggle between free-trading British industrialists and the agrarian protectionists over the Corn Laws could be waged and won (1846) in the midst of the Chartist ferment without a moment jeopardizing the unity of all ruling classes against the threat of universal suffrage. In Belgium the victory of the Liberals over the Catholics in the 1847 elections detached the industrialists from the ranks of potential revolutionaries, and a carefully judged electoral reform in 1848, which doubled the electorate, removed the discontent of crucial sections of the lower middle class. There was no 1848 revolution, though in terms of actual suffering Belgium (or rather Flanders) was probably worse off than any other part of Western Europe except Ireland.

But in absolutist Europe the rigidity of the political régimes in 1815, which had been designed to fend off all change of a liberal or national kind, left even the most moderate of oppositionists no choice other than that of the status quo or revolution. They might not be ready to revolt themselves, but, unless there should be an irreversible social revolution, they would gain nothing unless someone did. The régimes of 1815 had to go sooner or later. They knew it themselves. The consciousness that ‘history was against them’ sapped their will to resist, as the fact that it was sapped their ability to do so. In 1848 the first faint puff of revolution—often of revolution abroad—blew them away. But unless there was at least such a puff, they would not go. And conversely the relatively minor frictions within such states—the troubles of rulers with the Prussian and Hungarian diets, the election of a ‘liberal’ Pope in 1846 (i.e. one anxious to bring the Papacy a few inches nearer to the nineteenth century), the resentment of a royal mistress in Bavaria, etc.—turned into major political vibrations.

In theory the France of Louis Philippe should have shared the political flexibility of Britain, Belgium and the Dutch and Scandinavians. In practice it did not. For though it was clear that the ruling class of France—the bankers, financiers and one or two large industrialists—represented only a section of the middle class interest, and

* It was still no more than 80,000 out of 4,000,000.

CONCLUSION: TOWARDS 1848

moreover, one whose economic policy was disliked by the more dynamic industrialist elements as well as by various vested interests, the memory of the Revolution of 1789 stood in the way of reform. For the opposition consisted not merely of the discontented bourgeoisie, but of the politically decisive lower middle class, especially of Paris (which voted against the government in spite of the restricted suffrage in 1846). To widen the franchise might thus let in the potential Jacobins, the Radicals who, but for the official ban, would be Republicans. Louis Philippe’s premier, the historian Guizot (1814-48), thus preferred to leave the broadening of the social base of the régime to economic development, which would automatically increase the number of citizens with the property qualification to enter politics. In fact it did so. The electorate rose from 166,000 in 1831 to 241,000 in 1846. But it did not do so sufficiently. Fear of the Jacobin republic kept the French political structure rigid, and the French political situation increasingly tense. Under British conditions a public political campaign by means of after-dinner speeches, such as the French opposition launched in 1847, would have been perfectly harmless. Under French conditions it was the prelude to revolution.

For, like the other crises in European ruling-class politics, it coincided with a social catastrophe: the great depression which swept across the continent from the middle 1840s. Harvests—and especially the potato crop—failed. Entire populations such as those of Ireland, and to a lesser extent Silesia and Flanders, starved.* Food-prices rose. Industrial depression multiplied unemployment, and the masses of the urban labouring poor were deprived of their modest income at the very moment when their cost of living rocketed. The situation varied from one country to another and within each, and—fortunately for the existing régimes—the most miserable populations, such as the Irish and Flemish, or some of the provincial factory workers were also politically among the most immature: the cotton operatives of the Nord department of France, for instance, took out their desperation on the equally desperate Belgian immigrants who flooded into Northern France, rather than on the government or even the employers. Moreover, in the most industrialized country, the sharpest edge of discontent had already been taken away by the great industrial and railway-building boom of the middle 1840s. 1846-8 were bad years, but not so bad as 1841-2, and what was more, they were merely a sharp dip in what was now visibly an ascending slope of economic prosperity. But, taking Western and Central Europe as a whole, the catastrophe of 1846-8 was

* In the flax-growing districts of Flanders the population dropped by 5 per cent between 1846 and 1848.
universal and the mood of the masses, always pretty close to subsistence level, tense and impassioned.

A European economic cataclysm thus coincided with the visible corrosion of the old régimes. A peasant rising in Galicia in 1846; the election of a “liberal” Pope in the same year; a civil war between radicals and Catholics in Switzerland in late 1847, won by the radicals; one of the perennial Sicilian autonomist insurrections in Palermo in early 1848: they were not merely straws in the wind, they were the first squalls of the gale. Everyone knew it. Rarely has revolution been more universally predicted, though not necessarily for the right countries or the right dates. An entire continent waited, ready by now to pass the news of revolution almost instantly from city to city by means of the electric telegraph. In 1831 Victor Hugo had written that he already heard the dull sound of revolution, still deep down in the earth, pushing out under every kingdom in Europe its subterranean galleries from the central shaft of the mine which is Paris’. In 1847 the sound was loud and close. In 1848 the explosion burst.
## THE STATES OF EUROPE IN 1836

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>TOTAL POPULATION (THOUSANDS)</th>
<th>NUMBER OF CITIES (OVER 50,000)</th>
<th>LAND UNDER TILLAGE IN MORGEN (MILLION)</th>
<th>GRAIN PRODUCTION IN SHEFFEL (MILLION)</th>
<th>BEEF CATTLE (MILLIONS)</th>
<th>IRON (MILLION CWT)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Russia, including Poland and Cracow</td>
<td>49,538</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>276</td>
<td>1125</td>
<td>19</td>
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<td>Austria, including Hungary and Lombardy</td>
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<td>93</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>1.2</td>
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<td>France</td>
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<td>9</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>254</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td>24,273</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>67.5</td>
<td>330</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>13</td>
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<td>German confederation (excluding Austria, Prussia)</td>
<td>14,205</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>37.5</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1.1</td>
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<td>30</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.2</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.2</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>2.8</td>
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<td>20</td>
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<td>116</td>
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<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>2,750</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>9,000</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

### MILLIONS of YARDS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Yards</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.S.A.</td>
<td>242</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>14.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Various</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The WORKSHOP of the WORLD
- British cotton exports to various parts of the world in 1820 and 1840.
NOTES

CHAPTER 1: THE WORLD IN THE 1780S

1 Saint-Just, Oeuvres complètes, II, p. 514.
6 Th. Haebich, Deutsche Latifundien (1947), pp. 27 ff.
9 Sten Carlsson, Ständsamhälle och städsföretag 1700-1865 (1949).
10 Pierre Lebrun et al., La rivoluzione industriale in Belgio, Studi Storici, II, 3-4, 1961, pp. 564-5.
11 Lile Turgot (Oeuvres V, p. 244): 'Ceux qui connaissent la marche du commerce savent aussi que toute entreprise importante, de trafic ou d'industrie, exige le concours de deux espèces d'hommes, d'entrepreneurs... et des ouvriers qui travaillent pour le compte des premiers, moyennant un salaire convenu. Telle est la véritable origine de la distinction entre les entrepreneurs et les maîtres, et les ouvriers ou compagnons, laquelle est fondée sur la nature des choses.'

CHAPTER 2: THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION

1 Arthur Young, Tours in England and Wales, London School of Economics edition, p. 269.